JASON KLINGEMAN, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-638 / 06-1681
Filed October 12, 2007
JASON KLINGEMAN,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, Stephen C.
Clarke, Judge.
Jason Klingeman appeals from the district court’s order denying his
application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas Tauber, Assistant Attorney
General, and Allan W. Vanderhart, County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
2
ZIMMER, J.
Jason Klingeman appeals following the denial of his application for
postconviction relief. He raises two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
We affirm the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
At a plea agreement hearing on April 22, 2003, Klingeman entered an
Alford guilty plea 1 to charges of first-degree burglary 2 and third-degree sexual
abuse. 3 The plea agreement stated that the State would recommend sentences
of twenty-five years and ten years, to be served concurrently with one another
and with a probation revocation from his prior conviction of second-degree
burglary in Winneshiek County, which had a ten-year sentence. Therefore, by
accepting the plea agreement, Klingeman would be sentenced to twenty-five
years in prison.
The court received Klingeman’s permission to use the minutes of
testimony to establish a factual basis, and also heard the prosecutor’s recitation
of the facts the State was prepared to prove. According to these sources, on
March 18, 2003, Klingeman opened his neighbor’s window and entered her
apartment while she was asleep, got into bed with her, kissed her, and fondled
her vagina. When the woman realized Klingeman was not her boyfriend she fled
1
An Alford plea allows a defendant to voluntarily and intelligently plead guilty even if he
is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime. North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32-38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164-68, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 168-72
(1970).
2
In violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.3 (2003); class B forcible felony.
3
In violation of sections 709.1(1) and 709.4(1); class C forcible felony.
3
the apartment and called the police. Klingeman was arrested in his apartment
later that day.
At the plea hearing, Klingeman said he understood the agreement and
had no questions. The court explained the maximum possible sentences for the
two charges, but did not add that prison would be mandatory. Klingeman pled
guilty pursuant to the agreement, and also admitted violating the terms of his
Winneshiek County probation. Klingeman waived his rights and asked to be
sentenced immediately.
The district court imposed sentences of twenty-five
years and ten years, to be served concurrently with one another and with all
other sentences. The court stated its intention to enter an order revoking the
Winneshiek County probation and imposing a sentence in that case that would
be concurrent with the sentences in this case.
Klingeman did not file a direct appeal.
However, Klingeman filed an
application for postconviction relief on January 19, 2006. At the postconviction
hearing, Klingeman claimed he did not know the charges were forcible felonies.
He testified that his trial counsel did not tell him he was pleading guilty to forcible
felonies, and that she told him he would probably serve two or three years and
then be paroled. Klingeman’s trial counsel, Julia Stoner, testified that she told
Klingeman that he was charged with a forcible felony, that prison would be
mandatory, and that probation would not be an option. Klingeman admitted that
he knew he would go to prison as a result of the plea agreement, considered as
a whole.
The postconviction court denied Klingeman’s application, finding that his
“testimony with respect to the actions of his trial counsel [is] not credible.” The
4
court found that Klingeman knew he would go to prison as a result of his plea
and knew his sentence would be twenty-five years. The court also found that
Klingeman chose to take advantage of the plea agreement and to accept a sure
twenty-five-year sentence, rather than risk a possible forty-five-year sentence.
Klingeman appeals.
He contends his trial counsel was ineffective for
waiving and failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment based on the court’s
failure to inform Klingeman of the mandatory minimum sentence of incarceration
for the two forcible felony charges. He also contends his postconviction counsel
was ineffective for failing to claim trial counsel ineffective for allowing a guilty plea
to go forward on that basis.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
Ordinarily, we review postconviction relief proceedings for errors of law.
Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1999).
However, because
Klingeman raises a constitutional issue, alleging the denial of his right to effective
assistance of counsel, we conduct a de novo review. Id.
III. Discussion.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Klingeman must prove
(1) his
attorney's
performance
fell
below
“an
objective
standard
of
reasonableness” and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed.
2d 674, 693 (1984). To establish breach of duty, Klingeman must overcome the
presumption that counsel was competent and prove that counsel’s performance
was not within the range of normal competency. State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850,
853 (Iowa 1994). Klingeman may establish prejudice by showing a reasonable
5
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have
differed. State v. Atwood, 602 N.W.2d 775, 784 (Iowa 1999). We may dispose
of Klingeman’s ineffective assistance claims if he fails to prove either prong.
State v. Query, 594 N.W.2d 438, 445 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).
Klingeman contends his postconviction counsel was ineffective for waiving
and failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment based on the court’s failure to
inform him of the mandatory minimum sentence of incarceration for the two
forcible felony charges. However, none of the sentences in Klingeman’s plea
agreement involved a mandatory minimum sentence. Klingeman’s burglary and
sexual abuse charges were both forcible felonies, which carry mandatory
imprisonment sentences. Thus, we interpret Klingeman’s actual claim to be that
he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel’s failure to
challenge the plea proceedings on the basis that the court did not tell Klingeman
that sentences of imprisonment would be mandatory. We find this claim to be
without merit, however, because Klingeman is unable to establish prejudice.
In order to establish prejudice resulted from his counsel’s ineffective
assistance in connection with his guilty plea, Klingeman must show a reasonable
probability that, but for his counsel’s alleged error, he would not have pled guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-59,
106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 210 (1985); State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d
128, 137-38 (Iowa 2006). At his postconviction hearing, Klingeman admitted that
he knew we would go to prison as a result of the plea agreement. We agree with
the postconviction court that Klingeman chose to take advantage of the plea
6
agreement in order to accept a twenty-five-year sentence, rather than going to
trial and risking receiving a forty-five-year term of incarceration.
Klingeman testified that if he chose not to accept the plea agreement and
went to trial he would risk “that they would stack the sentences, run them
consecutive or possibly charge me with a more serious crime.”
Although
Klingeman also testified his trial attorney told him that he would likely serve two
to three years in prison and then be paroled, we agree with the postconviction
court that those statements lack credibility.
The plea-taking court informed
Klingeman of the maximum penalties for each charge and Klingeman stated that
he understood the plea agreement, had no questions, and plead guilty pursuant
to the agreement. Although nothing in the record indicates the court stated these
charges carried mandatory imprisonment sentences, Klingeman’s trial counsel
informed Klingeman that he was charged with a forcible felony, prison would be
mandatory, and probation would not be an option. Klingeman admitted during
his postconviction hearing that he knew he was going to prison if he accepted the
plea bargain, he knew the number of years he faced in prison for each charge,
and he knew by accepting the plea bargain he would avoid serving a possible
forty-five-year sentence.
Because Klingeman cannot show he would have
declined the plea bargain and would have risked going to trial had he known his
imprisonment sentences were mandatory, we find that he has not established
prejudice. 4
4
We note that Klingeman, in the alternative, argued that we should remand his case to
the postconviction court to allow him the opportunity to present evidence on the issue of
prejudice. However, we find the record is sufficient to establish prejudice would not have
7
Klingeman also claims his postconviction counsel was ineffective for
failing to claim trial counsel ineffective for allowing a guilty plea to go forward.
Because we find that no prejudice resulted from Klingeman’s underlying claim
involving his trial counsel, we conclude Klingeman was not denied effective
assistance of counsel by postconviction counsel’s failure to raise a meritless
claim. State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 555 (Iowa 2006).
IV. Conclusion.
We find Klingeman’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel without
merit and affirm the decision of the postconviction court.
AFFIRMED.
resulted because Klingeman chose to accept the plea bargain knowing he would be
imprisoned, rather than going to trial and risk receiving a longer sentence.
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