IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF KELLEY LYNN KRAVA AND THOMAS JAMES KRAVA Upon the Petition of KELLEY LYNN KRAVA, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning TOMAS JAMES KRAVA, Respondent-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-538 / 06-0966
Filed September 19, 2007
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF KELLEY LYNN KRAVA
AND THOMAS JAMES KRAVA
Upon the Petition of
KELLEY LYNN KRAVA,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
TOMAS JAMES KRAVA,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Darrell Goodhue,
Judge.
Respondent appeals from district court order modifying a dissolution
decree. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
James R. Cook, of Parrish, Kruidenier, Moss, Dunn, Boles, Gribble &
Cook, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Kerri Keyte of the Marks Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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MAHAN, P.J.
Thomas James Krava appeals from the district court’s findings,
conclusions, and order regarding his application to modify a dissolution decree.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings
Thomas and Kelley Lynn Krava were married in 1983. The couple had
two children during the marriage: Scott, born in 1985, and Zachary, born in
1988. The marriage was dissolved in 1989 by judicial decree. Pursuant to this
decree, Kelley was granted primary physical care of both children, and Thomas
was ordered to pay $350 per month for child support.
In November 2001, at the request of the Child Support Recovery Unit
(CSRU), the court entered an order increasing the monthly child support to $479
per month. This order also indicated his obligation would reduce to $328 per
month when only one child remained eligible for support.
The eldest son, Scott, turned eighteen in April 2003 and graduated from
high school one month later. That same month, the CSRU entered an order
reducing Thomas’s support obligation to $328 per month.
In August 2003 Scott began attending college as a full-time student at
Iowa State University.
Scott financed part of his college expenses through
federal loans, and Kelley financed a significant portion of Scott’s expenses
through separate loans.
On March 22, 2005, the CSRU issued an order increasing Thomas’s child
support obligation. He was ordered to pay $479 per month plus an additional
$95.80 per month towards the “delinquency” created during the past two years
when he had only paid $328 per month, as previously directed by the CSRU.
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Thomas immediately filed an application to modify the dissolution decree.
This application asked the court to void the March 22, 2005 order because “the
order reinstating the child support and creating a deficiency [was] invalid and
unlawful.” The application went on to ask the court to
require [Kelley] to provide all necessary information concerning the
costs and financial aid for the minor child; and to thereafter make a
determination as to the amount to be paid by each parent for the
higher education assistance to the minor child; and for such other,
further relief as the Court deems equitable in the premises.
The CSRU filed another order on May 12, 2005, reducing Thomas’s
monthly child support obligation to $328 per month and requiring that he pay an
additional $65.60 per month “for delinquent support until the total delinquency [of
$3445.77] has been paid.”
The CSRU filed another order on June 7, 2005, reaffirming the $328 per
month child support obligation, reaffirming a total delinquency of $3378.63, and
cancelling the $65.60 payment for delinquent support.
A hearing on Thomas’s motion was delayed for many months due to a
change in counsel and scheduling conflicts.
The case came to trial on
February 16, 2006. On this date, the parties agreed to submit the case to the
court based only on the court file, a statement of stipulated facts, and oral
argument from both parties.
By this time, the youngest child, Zachary, was
scheduled to graduate from high school in May and planned to attend classes at
Des Moines Area Community College as a full-time student later that summer.
The district court entered its “Findings, Conclusions, and Order” on
Thomas’s application to modify on April 24, 2006.
The court found the
dissolution decree was “self-executing” and the $429 payment should have been
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continued until the decree was modified.
Accordingly, the court upheld the
delinquency for the child support that had not been paid for Scott between the
months of May 2003 and June 2005.
The court terminated child support
payments for Scott as of June 2005 and determined that all child support
payments would end as of June 1, 2006, when Zachary graduated from high
school.
The court went on to assign the postsecondary education subsidy
between both parties for the years since the application to modify had been filed.
The court ordered each party to pay $5293.34 for Scott’s postsecondary
education expenses for the 2005-06 school year and $5531.67 for the 2006-07
school year. The court also ordered each party to pay $2943.66 for Zachary’s
postsecondary education expenses for the 2006-07 school year and one-third of
the total cost of postsecondary education for each subsequent year so long as
Zachary made progress towards a degree.
On appeal, Thomas appears to argue that he should not be responsible
for any child support for Scott once Scott graduated from high school. He also
claims the court erred when it determined the amount of postsecondary
education subsidy for each parent.
Specifically, he contends the reasonable
costs for necessary postsecondary education expenses do not include
medical/dental expenses, personal expenses, and transportation expenses. He
also claims Scott’s personal contribution to his own postsecondary education
expenses includes all the funds available through his financial aid package. This
financial aid package included a federal loan in Scott’s name and a large
separate loan in Kelley’s name. By Thomas’s calculation, the sum total of these
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two loans exceeded Scott’s postsecondary expenses, therefore there is nothing
left for Thomas to pay.
Kelley has not resisted the relief sought by Thomas either by brief or
argument.
II. Standard of Review
"A proceeding to modify or implement a marriage dissolution decree
subsequent to its entry is triable in equity and reviewed de novo on appeal." In re
Marriage of Mullen-Funderburk, 696 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Iowa 2005).
III. Merits
The original dissolution decree set forth that Thomas was to pay Kelley
$350 per month for “child support” until such time as the “last minor child of the
parties shall have attained the age of eighteen (18) years, marries, becomes
emancipated, whichever should have occurred first, or as may be continued by
further provision herein.” When the decree was issued in 1989, the Iowa Code
defined “support” in the following manner:
“Support” or “support payments” means an amount which
the court may require either of the parties to pay under a temporary
order or a final judgment or decree, and may include alimony, child
support, maintenance, and any other term used to describe these
obligations. The obligations may include support for a child who is
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two years who is
regularly attending an accredited school in pursuance of a course
of study leading to a high school diploma or its equivalent, or
regularly attending a course of vocational-technical training either
as a part of a regular school program or under special
arrangements adapted to the individual person’s needs; or is, in
good faith, a full-time student in a college . . . and the next regular
term has not yet begun; or a child of any age who is dependent on
the parties to the dissolution proceedings because of physical or
mental disability.
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Iowa Code § 598.1(2) (1989). This definition permitted the court to impose a
continuing child support obligation on Thomas so long as the children pursued
postsecondary education as full-time students. See In re Marriage of Pals, 714
N.W.2d 644, 647 (Iowa 2006); In re Marriage of Phares, 500 N.W.2d 76, 79
(Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (“The trial court can, in its discretion, award support of a
child through college under the proper circumstances.”).
The Krava decree
incorporated this definition and included the following optional provision to
provide support for the children while they pursued postsecondary education:
that the obligation to provide child support . . . as outlined above,
shall continue beyond the age of eighteen (18) years if any of the
children have not completed high school, and shall continue
beyond the age of eighteen (18) years if any of the children have
not completed high school, and shall continue for the benefit of any
child who is between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-two (22)
and is regularly attending an approved school in furtherance of a
course of study leading to a high school diploma . . . or is, in good
faith, a full-time student in a college . . . or has been accepted for
admission to a college . . . and the next regular term has not yet
begun[.]
A later provision also stated that the “Court shall retain jurisdiction over these
parties for purposes of ascertaining their respective obligations for support and
college expenses when and if their children pursue a further educational
program, beyond high school.”
The viability of the provision providing child support throughout college
changed in 1997 when the Iowa Legislature amended section 598.1 and
removed the postsecondary-support clause from the definition of support and
enacted a separate statute to provide for a postsecondary education subsidy by
both parents. Pals, 714 N.W.2d at 647 (citing 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 175, §§ 185,
190).
Thereafter, in 2002 the legislature enacted section 598.21(5A)(e) to
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specifically authorize courts to retroactively apply the postsecondary-education
statute to modify prior decrees that imposed a support obligation for college
expenses. See id. at 648 (citing 2002 Iowa Acts ch. 1018, § 17).
Pursuant to these amendments, Thomas could have made an application
to modify the dissolution decree in May of 2003 when Scott graduated from high
school. The court would have then determined whether there was good cause to
establish a postsecondary-education subsidy for Scott and, if it had found good
cause, would have gone on to determine the amount of that subsidy. See id. at
649-50. Regardless of whether there was good cause to establish the subsidy,
the court would have terminated the prior support obligation as it related to Scott
because he was eighteen and had graduated from high school. See id. at 649
(“We recognize that the application of the postsecondary-education subsidy
statute necessarily results in a termination of the prior support obligation.”).
However, Thomas did not need to file an application to modify the decree
when Scott graduated from high school because the CSRU’s May 2003 order
had already reduced his child support obligation to $328 per month, the amount
required to support the one remaining minor child. It would be inequitable to find
that Thomas cannot now challenge his child support obligation simply because
he did not make a timely challenge in May of 2003. It would also be inequitable
to absolve Thomas from any obligation for Scott’s first two years of
postsecondary education simply because the CSRU improvidently entered the
May 2003 order. Consequently, we reverse the district court’s order modifying
the decree and now consider Thomas’s application to modify the dissolution
decree as though it had been filed in a timely manner, in May 2003.
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Under Iowa Code section 598.21(5A) (2005), we first determine whether
there is good cause to establish a postsecondary education subsidy for Scott
beginning with his entry into postsecondary education in August of 2003. When
making this decision, we consider Scott’s age, his ability to pursue
postsecondary education, his financial resources, and whether he is selfsustaining. Iowa Code § 598.21(5A)(a). We also consider the financial condition
of both parents. Id. Regrettably, the stipulated record in this case contains no
information about Scott’s financial situation in 2003.
There is no information
about his income, his assets, or his overall ability to be a self-sustaining member
of society. We therefore remand to the district court to have a hearing on these
factual issues. 1 If the district court finds there is not good cause to establish a
college subsidy, the prior decree must nevertheless be modified to eliminate the
existing child support obligation under the decree. Pals, 714 N.W.2d at 649.
However, if the court finds good cause for a subsidy, then the terms of the
subsidy modify and replace the existing child-support provision of the decree. Id.
at 649-50. The court would determine the amount of the subsidy by utilizing the
statutory scheme set forth in Iowa Code sections 598.21(5A)(a)(1)-(3).
Under this scheme, the court would first determine the reasonable costs
for necessary postsecondary expenses. Iowa Code § 598.21(5A)(a)(1). These
costs may exceed tuition, books, supplies, and a room and board plan. In re
Marriage of Vannausdle, 668 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2003).
Under some
circumstances, these costs include transportation expenses and personal
1
Similarly, the court shall also determine whether there was good cause to establish a
subsidy for Zachary beginning with his entry into postsecondary education in August
2006.
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expenses. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goodman, 690 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Iowa
2004) (“[U]nder the facts of this case, the postsecondary education subsidy
should include [the child’s] monthly cash allowance [for social, cultural, and
educational experiences outside the classroom].”); In re Marriage of Dolter, 644
N.W.2d 370, 374 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (“With regard to transportation and
personal expenses we find no evidence in the present case to show these costs
are necessary to [the child’s] education.”). We also find these reasonable costs
may include, under some circumstances, medical/dental expenses. In any case,
the court would have to articulate why expenses beyond tuition, books, supplies,
and room and board are reasonable under the facts of the case.
The court’s next step would be to consider the amount the child may be
reasonably expected to pay towards postsecondary education. Iowa Code §
598.21(5A)(a)(2). This determination will require the court to consider the child’s
financial resources, the child’s ability to earn income while attending school, and
available financial aid, which includes scholarships, grants, and student loans.
Id. This determination does not include student loans taken out by a parent for
the benefit of the child.
The child’s expected contribution would then be deducted from the cost of
postsecondary education calculated above. Id. § 598.21(5A)(a)(3). The court
would then allocate this remaining balance between the parents, with the
limitation that the amount paid by one individual parent shall not exceed thirtythree-and-one-third percent of the total cost of postsecondary education, as
calculated above. Id.
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IV. Conclusion
We reverse the district court’s order modifying the original decree. We
also reverse the orders entered by the CSRU on May 8, 2003; March 22, 2005;
May 12, 2005; and June 7, 2005. On remand, the district court shall conduct a
hearing to determine whether there was good cause to impose a postsecondary
education subsidy for both children, beginning when Scott first began attending
college in August 2003. If the district court finds no good cause to establish a
college subsidy, the prior decree must be modified to eliminate Thomas’s child
support obligation for Scott after May 2003. However, if the court finds good
cause for a subsidy, then the court shall determine the terms of the subsidy for
Scott’s postsecondary education expenses, beginning in August 2003, and
Zachary’s postsecondary education expenses, beginning in the fall of 2006.
These subsidies would necessarily modify and replace the existing child-support
provision in the decree. Finally, the court shall also include in its analysis any
amount incorrectly collected by the CSRU after May 2003 to cure the alleged
deficiency in child support payments. Costs on appeal are taxed one-half to
petitioner and one-half to respondent.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Miller, J., concurs; Vaitheswaran, J., concurs specially.
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VAITHESWARAN, J. (concurring specially)
The majority has reached an equitable result in a procedurally and
substantively convoluted case. I concur in the result.
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