IN THE INTEREST OF J.T., Minor Child, S.L.B., Mother, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-452 / 07-0901
Filed July 12, 2007
IN THE INTEREST OF J.T.,
Minor Child,
S.L.B., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, John G. Mullen,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to a son.
AFFIRMED.
Jennifer Olsen, Davenport, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Gerda C. Lane,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Stephen Newport of Newport & Newport, P.L.C., Davenport for intervenor.
Robert Phelps, Bettendorf, for appellee father.
Martha Whitmer, Davenport, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Baker, JJ.
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BAKER, J.
Setara is the mother of Jeremiah, who was born in March 2004. The
family came to the attention of the juvenile court system after hand marks were
found on Jeremiah’s body.
Setara admitted having lost her patience and
slapping him. She was later convicted of an aggravated misdemeanor based on
this incident, and Jeremiah was adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance
under Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(b) and (c)(2) (2005).
On July 27, 2005,
Jeremiah was removed from his mother’s custody and placed in foster care with
his maternal grandmother, with whom he has resided ever since.
On January 24, 2007, the State filed a petition seeking to terminate
Setara’s parental rights to Jeremiah. Following a hearing on the petition, the
court granted the State’s request and terminated Setara’s rights under sections
232.116(1)(b), (d), (e), (h), and (l). Setara appeals from this order, contending
the court erred in concluding termination of her parental rights was in Jeremiah’s
best interests.
We review termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824
(Iowa 1991). While the district court terminated the parental rights on more than
one statutory ground, we will affirm if at least one ground has been proved by
clear and convincing evidence. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1995). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re C.B.,
611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
Iowa Code section 232.116(3) provides that the court need not terminate
the parent-child relationship if a relative has legal custody of the child or if there
is “clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the
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child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.”
On
appeal, Setara relies on these provisions and asserts that because her mother
has custody of Jeremiah and because there was an undeniable mother-child
bond, the court should have declined to terminate their relationship.
Like the juvenile court, we must first acknowledge that at the time of the
termination, and since his removal in July of 2005, Jeremiah has been in the care
of his maternal grandmother.
Likewise, we must also recognize that many
positive attributes of Setara were presented at trial. The juvenile court found her
“pleasant appearing” and noted that she “presents herself well.” She apparently
possesses decent parenting skills, achieved some goals, presented her case
plan, and stabilized her housing and employment situations to a small degree.
Finally, all agree that there is a fairly substantial bond between mother and child.
In fact, family counselor Jennifer Lyons testified that even though she would
recommend termination, she still believed it would be in Jeremiah’s best interests
to maintain some level of contact with Setara.
However, the ultimate question for the juvenile court, and for this court on
appeal, is whether Jeremiah’s best interests would be served by severing his
mother’s legal relationship with him. Upon careful consideration, we conclude
they would be. The positive attributes set forth at the start of the juvenile court’s
opinion do not present a full picture of Setara’s commitment to reunifying with her
child.
Setara has failed to take seriously the steps necessary for reunification. It
is clear that Jeremiah does not take a position of primary importance in Setara’s
life. Instead, she has chosen to pursue a relationship with her paramour, Dionte,
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at the expense of parenting her son. Dionte had a previous confirmed child
abuse report for a physical injury to a previous paramour’s child. While Setara
was convicted of the abuse that led to Jeremiah’s adjudication, there is some
indication in the record that Dionte was actually the one who committed the
abuse and that Setara took the blame to protect him. Thus, service providers
were immediately concerned with Setara’s relationship with him, and Setara
initially denied a continuing relationship. However, they secretly pursued such a
relationship. Their association has led to a history of emotional and physical
abuse, violence, and drug use. Twice during this case a service provider found
marijuana in Setara’s home. Seemingly unconcerned, she claimed the drugs
belonged to the boyfriend. Moreover, Dionte has ignored requests from DHS to
participate in services that would alleviate concerns about him and foster a
reunification between mother and child. In particular, he refused to participate in
domestic violence counseling and substance abuse treatment. It is believed he
continues to abuse drugs. The juvenile court found, and we agree, that the
adjudicatory harm has not been resolved and a high risk of adjudicatory harm
remains. Further, there is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be
returned to the custody of Setara.
Setara has failed to take advantage of the many opportunities she has
been offered to have significant contact with her son. Jennifer Lyons testified
that since the permanency hearing in November of 2006, Setara had not
maintained “significant and meaningful contact with Jeremiah.”
In the two
months prior to that hearing, Setara attended seven scheduled visits, while in the
five months after the hearing, she only attended six such visits. While she did
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have additional “informal” visits through her mother, those visits were small in
number as well when considered with the fact she basically had an “open door
policy” and could have visited at any time. Again, this reflects a pattern of failing
to put forth the effort indicative of a parent who understands and is concerned
with the possibility of losing her parental rights.
Jeremiah’s grandmother, under whose care he has thrived, plans to adopt
him. This goal is reflected in DHS’s permanency plan. In fact, this home is the
only home Jeremiah has ever known. His grandmother has taken seriously her
role as his caretaker, and there is no reason to believe this would not continue. It
is likely that in the event she would adopt him, Setara would maintain some level
of contact with Jeremiah following the termination.
As the juvenile court found, Setara’s attitude toward permanency and
reunification can best be described as “indifferent.” Faced with the consequence
of termination, she chose to pursue a clandestine relationship with a troublesome
character and failed to take advantage of the opportunities afforded to spend
precious time with her child. Perhaps this can be attributed to Setara’s youth and
immaturity; however, when Jeremiah’s best interests are at stake, those
justifications cannot control.
He should not be forced to endlessly await the
maturity of his natural parent. See In re T.D.C., 336 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Iowa
1983); see also In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J.,
concurring) (“A child's safety and the need for a permanent home are now the
primary concerns when determining a child's best interests.”). While the law
requires a “full measure of patience with troubled parents who attempt to remedy
a lack of parenting skills,” this patience has been built into the statutory scheme
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of chapter 232. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000). Setara has been
extended considerable patience, and has not yet made the simple sacrifices
demanded of a parent. We therefore affirm the termination of her parental rights
to Jeremiah.
AFFIRMED.
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