IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JANN RACHEL STANLEY AND GENE D. STANLEY Upon the Petition of JANN RACHEL STANLEY, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning GENE D. STANLEY, Respondent-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-437 / 06-1952
Filed October 12, 2007
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JANN RACHEL STANLEY
AND GENE D. STANLEY
Upon the Petition of
JANN RACHEL STANLEY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
GENE D. STANLEY,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hamilton County, Michael J. Moon,
Judge.
Gene Stanley appeals the economic provisions of his decree of dissolution
of marriage. AFFIRMED.
Matthew Boles of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble, Cook, Parrish,
Gentry & Fisher, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
R. Thomas Price of R. Thomas Price Law Office, Fort Dodge, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Baker, JJ.
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BAKER, J.
Gene Stanley appeals the property distribution and alimony provisions of
his decree of dissolution of marriage. We affirm.
I. Background and Facts
Jann and Gene Stanley were united in marriage on June 19, 1993. No
children were born to the marriage. 1 The marriage was dissolved by decree on
November 1, 2006.
Jann and Gene both worked throughout the marriage. At the time of trial
Jann was employed as a secretary at North Central Turf in Webster City, Iowa.
Gene was initially employed as a truck driver and later began farming with Jann’s
parents, Grant and Maxine Anderson. He farmed their property until the summer
of 2006, when he was prevented from continuing to farm that property due to the
district court’s issuance of a no-contact order. 2 Gene was also employed as a
bus driver by Webster City Community Schools, but at the time of trial he no
longer worked for the school district. Gene testified that he had not secured
other employment because he was “waiting to farm [his] ground.”
In addition to her employment income, Jann derives income from farm
property. In 1978, Jann purchased 138 acres of property in Stanhope with her
father’s help. The property is currently valued at $486,150. Her parents have
gifted to Jann approximately forty-seven percent of the shares of Anderson Seed
Company, which owns a 240-acre farm known as the “Airport” farm.
1
2
Both Jann and Gene have adult children from prior marriages.
Pursuant to the order, Gene and Jann were prohibited from having any contact with
each other, Jann was allowed exclusive possession of their home, and Gene was
ordered to give the Hamilton County Sheriff possession of two guns.
3
Jann’s parents owned a 300-acre farm, known as the “Highview” farm,
and approximately fifty-three percent of Anderson Seed. Her father, Grant, died
in 1998. Upon his death, his one-half of the interest in these farms passed to
Maxine in a life estate. Upon Maxine’s death, Jann will inherit a life estate in the
one-half of these interests which passed from Grant to Maxine, which will then
pass to Jann’s children upon her death. The other half of the Highview farm and
interest in Anderson Seed is owned by Maxine.
When Jann and Gene first began cohabitating in 1988, they lived in a
house in Webster City. Gene assisted with the payment of utilities and taxes and
made significant improvements to the home. In September 1995, Grant and
Maxine executed a warranty deed, conveying the house to Jann and Gene for
$24,000. In 2002, Gene and Jann spent approximately $525,000 3 to build a
home on the Highview farm. 4 To finance construction, they sold the house in
Webster City; Gene withdrew approximately $150,000 from his individual
retirement account (IRA); they took out a mortgage, using Jann’s Stanhope
property as collateral; and they obtained a $65,000 loan from Maxine.
The district court awarded Jann total assets of $701,103, and total
liabilities of $338,789. The court awarded Gene total assets of $113,104, and
total liabilities of $26,795. The court ordered Jann to pay Gene an additional
property settlement of $120,000 in twelve equal annual installments without
3
4
The parties stipulated the approximate value of the home is $375,000.
Maxine signed a quitclaim deed, apparently attempting to convey a piece of her
Highview property to Jann and Gene. The quitclaim deed was never recorded.
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interest. The result is a disparity of approximately $36,000. The district court
awarded alimony to neither party. Gene appeals.
II. Merits
Gene contends the district court erred in its property distribution
determination and in failing to award alimony. We conduct a de novo review of
divorce proceedings. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; In re Marriage of Smith, 573 N.W.2d
924, 926 (Iowa 1998). We accord the district court considerable latitude and will
disturb the court’s alimony and property distribution determinations only when
there has been a failure to do equity. In re Marriage of Schriner, 695 N.W.2d
493, 496 (Iowa 2005); In re Marriage of Anliker, 694 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Iowa
2005).
This deference to the trial court’s determination is decidedly in the
public interest.
When appellate courts unduly refine these
important, but often conjectural, judgment calls, they thereby foster
appeals in hosts of cases, at staggering expense to the parties
wholly disproportionate to any benefit they might hope to realize.
In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa 1996).
A. Property Distribution
Gene contends the district court erred in its property distribution
determination because it (1) failed to consider Jann’s Stanhope property, (2)
failed to place any value on the land upon which their home was built, (3)
awarded the home to Jann, and (4) failed to consider Jann’s additional present
and future interests in the farm properties and Maxine’s other assets.
Iowa is an “equitable distribution” state for purposes of dividing property in
a marriage dissolution.
Schriner, 695 N.W.2d at 496.
“A justified property
division is one that is equitable under the circumstances.” In re Marriage of
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Earsa, 480 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). Factors the court may consider
in dividing the property include the length of the marriage; the property brought to
the marriage by each party; the contribution of each party to the marriage; the
age and health of the parties; the earning capacity of each party, including
education,
training,
skills,
and
work
experience;
and
other
economic
circumstances of each party, including pension benefits. Iowa Code § 598.21(5)
(Supp. 2005). Although “it is generally recognized that equality is often most
equitable,” an equitable distribution does not necessarily mean an equal division
of marital property. In re Marriage of Rhinehart, 704 N.W.2d 677, 683 (Iowa
2005).
“The determining factor is what is fair and equitable in each
circumstance.” In re Marriage of Hass, 538 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Iowa Ct. App.
1995).
We “look to the economic provisions of the decree as a whole in
assessing the equity of the property division.”
In re Marriage of Dean, 642
N.W.2d 321, 325 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002).
i. Premarital Property
Gene contends the district court erred in failing to include the Stanhope
property in its division of assets and in failing to consider Jann’s continuing
income from her ownership of the property.
A premarital asset is not
automatically set aside. In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa
2006). “Instead, ‘property brought to the marriage by each party’ is merely one
factor among many to be considered.” In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d
97, 102 (Iowa 2007) (quoting Iowa Code § 598.21(1) (2005)). Considering the
property division as a whole, we find Jann’s continued ownership of a property,
which she purchased with her father’s assistance many years prior to the
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marriage and with which Gene had no involvement, does not require us to disturb
the district court’s decree. See In re Marriage of Johnson, 499 N.W.2d 326,
328 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (“Property brought into a marriage by one party need
not necessarily be divided.”); In re Marriage of Wallace, 315 N.W.2d 827,
831 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981) (“[I]t cannot be said that the partner who has benefited
from the other’s inheritance or other property necessarily has a claim to half of all
that property.”).
ii. Homestead Land
Gene contends the 2.2 acres upon which their home was built, which he
claims is valued at $94,000, should have been included in the divisible estate.
While he admits the quitclaim deed conveying the land was never recorded, he
argues the land was held by Jann and Gene and should therefore have been
included. Jann’s response to this issue is limited to
The parties’ home as is obvious from the record, cost much
more to build than its value. This is now a cost that both parties
must bear. It sits on land owned by the Grant Anderson Trust and
Maxine Anderson and has no access other than over Maxine
Anderson’s land.
I don’t believe the record reflects a discussion as to the
value of the land the house sits on.
Notwithstanding the failure of both parties to cite any authority to support
their argument on this issue, we have reviewed the record and find there has
been no failure to do equity. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)(c) (“Failure in the brief
to . . . cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”);
Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(2) (“The brief of appellee shall conform to the requirements
of rule 6.14(1).”); Lausen v. Bd. of Supervisors, 204 Iowa 30, 32, 214 N.W. 682,
7
684 (1927) (describing appellant’s failure to cite authorities to support his
contentions as “wholly inexcusable”).
iii. Residence
Gene next contends the district court erred in awarding Jann the Highview
home because “the homestead amounts to so much more than simply a ‘house’
to Gene.” He quotes Wallace, 315 N.W.2d at 832, to support his contention that
Iowa adjudicatory law recognizes that “[a]ny item that is reasonably
likely to possess far greater sentimental value to one party than to
the other . . . should remain, as far as is reasonably possible, in the
possession of the party to whom the sentimental value is the
greatest.”
The portion of the Wallace quote omitted in Gene’s brief to this court
specifically refers to items “such as jewelry, heirlooms, the fruits of hobbies (such
as stamp or coin collections), and the products of artistic efforts by one of the
parties.” Wallace, 315 N.W.2d at 832. We therefore find his reliance on Wallace
to support his argument is misplaced.
The Highview home sits on real property that has been in Jann’s family.
In Wallace, we stated such real property “ought, as far as possible, to be
permitted to remain in the possession” of the party whose family owned it and
should be subject to “a reasonable division of the couple’s property and to
provide for the proper maintenance of the other party . . . only as a last resort.”
Id. (emphasis added).
Additionally, Jann’s testimony that she “could live without the house” does
not definitively demonstrate she places less sentimental value on the home than
Gene. The facts suggest the opposite: the home is built on property owned by
Maxine, the only access to the home is via Maxine’s driveway, it is built in close
8
proximity to Maxine’s own home, the $65,825 Maxine loaned the parties to build
the home has not been repaid, and Jann’s Stanhope property serves as the
collateral for the $192,668 mortgage on the home.
Gene’s claimed strong
feelings toward his “dream house” are insufficient to compel us to disturb the
district court’s decree as to the Highview home.
iv. Future Interests
Finally, we consider Gene’s contention that the district court erred in failing
to appropriately consider Jann’s additional present and future interests in the
Highview and Airport farm properties and Maxine’s other assets in dividing the
estate. He does not contend these assets should be considered as part of the
divisible estate. 5 Rather he contends “the district court should have considered
the assets in determining the equitable distribution of the parties’ property.” He
argues that, pursuant to section 598.21(1)(i), the court should consider other
economic circumstances, including pension benefits and future interests.
Because “Jann will enjoy a far more secure retirement due to her future interests”
while “Gene spent virtually his entire retirement savings towards the construction
of the homestead,” he requests this court more equitably divide the property.
5
We agree that these inherited assets should not be considered part of the divisible
estate. Marital property is to be distributed equitably, “except inherited property or gifts
received or expected by one party.” Iowa Code § 598.21(1). Property received by one
party by inheritance or gift is not automatically subject to the factors contained in section
598.21(1). In re Marriage of Liebich, 547 N.W.2d 844, 850 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
In determining whether inherited property is divisible as marital property,
the controlling factors are the intent of the donor and the circumstances
surrounding the inheritance or gift. Placing inherited property into joint
ownership does not, in and of itself, destroy the separate character of the
property.
Id. (citations omitted).
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A spouse’s nonmarital assets that are available for future support may be
considered in determining whether there has been an equitable division of
property. Rhinehart, 704 N.W.2d at 683-84. “[I]t is appropriate to adjust the
division of marital property ‘on the basis that one party, far more than the other,
can reasonably expect to enjoy a secure retirement.’” Id. at 684 (quoting Boyer,
538 N.W.2d at 296).
We find, however, no reason to disturb the district court’s decree as to the
property division.
There is little doubt that Jann’s retirement income will be
significantly increased by her present and future interests in the farm properties.
We believe, however, that the property distribution is within the district court’s
“considerable latitude” in this matter. Schriner, 695 N.W.2d at 496. While Jann’s
retirement income will be supplemented by this property, she has been ordered
to pay $120,000 in additional property settlement. Gene may choose to use
these funds to replenish the retirement account he depleted to build the Highview
home.
B. Alimony
Gene also contends alimony should be awarded because (1) Jann has
refused to allow him to continue his source of employment, farming; (2) while
“Jann possesses extensive retirement assets at her disposal,” Gene expended
virtually all of his retirement savings on the Highview home “with the assurance
he could continue the farming operation”; (3) Jann possesses a bachelor’s
degree compared to Gene’s high school diploma, and over the past several
years his non-farming income has been lower than Jann’s income; and (4) the
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property distribution resulted in Jann receiving “a substantially greater amount of
marital assets than Gene.”
Alimony is not an absolute right, and an award thereof depends upon the
facts of each case. Anliker, 694 N.W.2d at 540; In re Marriage of Fleener, 247
N.W.2d 219, 220 (Iowa 1976). “Precedent is of little value, and each case must
be decided on its own peculiar circumstances.” Fleener, 247 N.W.2d at 220. “An
alimony award is justified when the distribution of the assets of the marriage does
not equalize the inequities and economic disadvantages suffered in marriage by
the party seeking the alimony who also has a need for support.” In re Marriage
of Sychra, 552 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
“Although alimony on one hand and allocation of property rights on the
other are distinguishable and have different purposes in marriage dissolution
proceedings, they are still closely related in the matter of determining the amount
to be allowed.” In re Marriage of Cooper, 225 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Iowa 1975)
(citations omitted). “We consider the property division and alimony together in
evaluating their individual sufficiency; they are neither made nor subject to
evaluation in isolation from one another.” Earsa, 480 N.W.2d at 85.
We have reviewed the record before us and agree with the district court’s
conclusion that Gene is not entitled to alimony. Notwithstanding Gene’s failure to
secure other employment, he has experience driving truck and farming, and
could probably find other employment. Additionally, the court awarded Gene net
assets totalling $86,309, and Jann will pay him $10,000 per year over the next
twelve years. “[T]he question boils down to whether the property division and
alimony taken together are equitable.”
Cooper, 225 N.W.2d at 919.
11
Notwithstanding Jann’s failure to cite a single authority to support her argument
that the district court “quite appropriately did not award alimony,” we find nothing
in the record to justify disturbing the district court’s decree. See Iowa R. App. P.
6.14(1)(c) and (2); cf. Lausen, 204 Iowa at 32, 214 N.W. at 684.
III. Conclusion
We have considered all issues raised on appeal.
We find the district
court’s division of property to be fair and equitable and affirm the property
distribution as set forth by the district court. We also affirm the district court’s
denial of alimony. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Gene. Each party shall
pay their own appellate attorney fees.
AFFIRMED.
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