EDWARD TEJEDA, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-428 / 06-1255
Filed July 25, 2007
EDWARD TEJEDA,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Gregory A. Hulse,
Judge.
Edward Tejeda appeals from the denial of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Christopher A. Kragnes, Sr., of Kragnes & Associates, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Mike Hunter, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Baker, JJ.
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BAKER, J.
Edward Tejeda, who was convicted of willful injury, appeals from the
denial of his subsequent application for postconviction relief. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
We find the facts, as found by the postconviction court, are supported by
substantial evidence in the record, and set them forth here in full:
In December 2002, the applicant, Edward Tejeda, was tried
for willful injury for striking another individual with a baseball bat,
but the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision and a
mistrial was declared. In the period leading up to his second trial,
Tejeda alleges that a complete breakdown in communication
occurred between his attorney and himself. According to the
applicant, prior to trial, the Polk County Attorney extended a plea
offer and Tejeda’s attorney strongly recommended that he accept.
When he refused to do so, Tejeda contends, his attorney stormed
from the room in protest. Consequently, the applicant wrote a letter
to Judge Novak relating this episode and expressing his opinion
that he could not win at trial with his current attorney and
furthermore was scared to share possible new evidence with him.
In response to this letter, Judge Ovrom ordered counsel to submit
responses to the letter, but no filing was made by either attorney.
On February 13, 2003, Tejeda again requested that the court
appoint substitute counsel in a letter addressed to Judge Novak.
The letter again alleged a breakdown in communication. No
response was issued by the court or either attorney and the matter
proceeded to trial. The applicant was subsequently convicted.
Attorney Moss testified in the post-conviction relief hearing
that he had no recollection either of being asked to withdraw or
feeling the need to withdraw. Furthermore, he never believed that
such a breakdown occurred and indeed characterized his
communication with his client as “open.” Tejeda, on the other
hand, testified that the communication had deteriorated to such an
extent that he withheld new evidence from his attorney.
Following the trial on this matter, Tejeda was found guilty of willful injury,
in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4 (2001). On direct appeal, the supreme
court affirmed the conviction, but held that the district court had failed in its duty
to inquire into a potential breakdown in communication between Tejeda and his
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counsel. State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 2004) (Tejeda I). It preserved
that issue for postconviction relief proceedings. The postconviction court later
rejected Tejeda’s claims, finding “little, if any, evidence to lend credence to
Tejeda’s assertions that there was a complete breakdown in communication.”
Tejeda appeals from this ruling.
Scope of Review.
Iowa appellate courts typically review postconviction relief proceedings on
error. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). However, where
the applicant asserts claims of a constitutional nature, our review is de novo. Id.
In order to show his counsel rendered ineffective assistance, Tejeda must show
(1) his counsel breached an essential duty and (2) that breach resulted in
prejudice to his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984).
Ineffective Assistance.
In Tejeda I, the supreme court held that because prior to trial Tejeda had
made a “colorable complaint” indicating a breakdown of his relationship with his
attorney, the court should have inquired into whether there was a “complete
breakdown in communication between the attorney and the defendant” sufficient
to implicate constitutional concerns.
Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d at 751-52.
It thus
preserved this claim for a postconviction application. Appropriately responding to
this direction, the postconviction court determined its only issue to be “whether a
breakdown in communication occurred so as to infringe on Tejeda’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel”.
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On appeal, Tejeda maintains the record evinces a complete breakdown of
communication in attorney-client communications. He further alleges the court
erred in finding attorney Moss to be more credible than him. Upon our de novo
review of the record, we find the court’s credibility findings are fully supported by
substantial evidence. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g). The postconviction court had a
firsthand opportunity to hear the evidence and view the witnesses. See In re
Marriage of Will, 489 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Iowa 1992).
Tejeda had the burden to show a complete breakdown of communication
in attorney-client communications. As the court noted in Tejeda I :
The types of communication breakdowns that constitute
“total breakdowns” defy easy definition . . . . As a general
matter . . . to prove a total breakdown in communication, a
defendant must put forth evidence of a severe and pervasive
conflict with his attorney or evidence that he had such
minimal contact with the attorney that meaningful
communication was not possible.
Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d at 751.
For his part, attorney Moss recalled a good working relationship with
Tejeda, and described it as one that entailed open communication and
cooperation during trial. Moss recalled a variety of strategic topics he discussed
with Tejeda during trial. The only area Moss could recall any dispute on was
whether Tejeda should plead guilty during his second trial. 1
He related that
because the State would be able to strengthen its case based upon what it
learned during the first trial, he felt a guilty verdict was more likely in the second
trial. Tejeda rejected this advice. The trial court found, and we agree, that the
1
Tejeda’s first trial resulted in a hung jury.
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evidence did not show a complete breakdown of communication in attorney-client
communications.
Although the court in Tejeda I appears to have remanded solely for a
determination as to the nature of the relationship, Tejeda still had the burden to
show the second prong of Strickland. See State v. Jefferson, 574 N.W.2d 268,
278 (Iowa 1997) (“A defendant must ordinarily show prejudice, unless he has
been denied counsel or counsel has a conflict of interest.”). See also Mickens v.
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1242-43, 152 L. Ed. 2d 291, 304
(2002) (requiring a showing of probable effect upon the outcome of trial). During
the postconviction proceedings and now on appeal Tejeda stresses that his
relationship with Moss had so deteriorated that he began withholding information
from Moss. However, during his postconviction testimony Tejeda could not recall
any of the specific information that he allegedly withheld from Moss. He could
only explain that because he had then been in prison for four years, he had
“adapted to the routine in prison” and could not focus on what happened prior to
then. Without some indication as to what information was withheld or that the
result would have been different, it is not possible to conclude that Tejeda has
satisfied the second essential element of Strickland, i.e. prejudice.
Conclusion.
In Tejeda I, the supreme court ordered a remand to further develop the
record as to the health of the attorney-client relationship at the time of trial, and to
determine whether a complete breakdown in communication had occurred.
Finding that such a breakdown had not occurred, the postconviction court denied
Tejeda’s request for relief. Because our de novo review of the record persuades
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us that there was no complete breakdown in communication, we affirm the
decision of the postconviction court.
AFFIRMED.
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