JOEL A. HARPER and KATHY L. HARPER, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, vs. PELLA CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-404 / 06-1198
Filed July 12, 2007
JOEL A. HARPER and KATHY L. HARPER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees,
vs.
PELLA CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, John D. Lloyd and
Gary Kimes, Judges.
Plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendant on plaintiffs’ liability claims.
Defendant appeals from the
district court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment based on the statute of
limitations. AFFIRMED.
Robert A. Wright Jr. of Wright & Wright, Des Moines, for appellants.
Ross W. Johnson and Carolyn A. Gunkel of Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., Des
Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Miller, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
This is a premises liability case. Plaintiff, Joel Harper, sued defendant for
injuries he sustained in a fall that occurred while he was delivering a Pella
employee’s household goods to a house in Kentucky owned by defendant. At
the time of his fall, plaintiff was carrying empty packing boxes down hardwood
stairs in his stocking feet. A later amendment added a claim by Kathy Harper for
loss of consortium.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging Kentucky’s oneyear statute of limitations applied. The district court (Judge Kimes) overruled the
motion, finding Iowa’s two-year statute of limitations applied. Defendant filed a
subsequent motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ liability claims.
The
district court (Judge Lloyd) sustained the motion and dismissed the case, finding
there was no evidence of a defect on the premises and Joel Harper was aware of
any defect.
The court also denied plaintiff’s motion to amend or enlarge its
ruling. We affirm on plaintiffs’ appeal. Defendant’s cross appeal is moot.
Scope of Review. Review of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment
is for correction of errors at law. Otterberg v. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 696
N.W.2d 24, 27 (Iowa 2005). If the record shows no genuine dispute of a material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary
judgment is appropriate.
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3).
“When the facts are
undisputed and the only dispute concerns the legal consequences flowing from
those facts, the must determine whether the district court correctly applied the
law.” Perkins v. Dallas Center-Grimes Cmty. Sch. Dist., ___ N.W.2d ___, ___
(Iowa 2007).
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Appeal. In order to recover on a premises liability claim, a plaintiff must
prove the following propositions:
1. The defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known of a condition on the premises and that it
involved an unreasonable risk of injury to a person in the plaintiff’s
position.
2. The defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known:
a. the plaintiff would not discover the condition, or
b. the plaintiff would not realize the condition presented an
unreasonable risk of injury, or
c. the plaintiff would not protect [himself] [herself] from the
condition.
3. The defendant was negligent in (set forth the particulars of the
claim of negligence in failing to protect the plaintiff).
4. The negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damage.
5. The nature and extent of damage.
Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 900.1 (2003). Concerning element two, however, “a
defendant is not liable for injuries or damages caused by a condition that is
known or obvious to a person in the plaintiff’s position unless the defendant
should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” Id. 900.6.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the evidence
shows the hardwood stairs “looked like glass” or appeared “unusually shiny.”
The finish on the stairs was appropriate for that use and was not slick. Another
person walked on the stairs in his stocking feet without falling. One witness said
he does not walk on hardwood surfaces in his stocking feet. As Joel Harper was
descending the stairs in his stocking feet, he fell and slid down eight stairs.
The district court concluded being slick might be a defective condition, but
looking slick is not. See Osborn v. Klaber Bros., 227 Iowa 105, 109, 287 N.W.
252, 254-55 (1939) (finding evidence a floor looked slick insufficient to warrant
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submitting negligence to the jury). The court also concluded plaintiff’s fall does
not prove a defect on the stairs. See Chevraux v. Nahas, 260 Iowa 817, 824,
150 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Iowa 1967) (“[T]he mere fact plaintiff fell and was injured is
not in itself sufficient to establish, nor does it create a presumption, defendants
were negligent.”). Plaintiffs contend the defect was not the condition of the stairs
or the fact Joel fell, but rather “that [defendant] knew Joel would be working in his
stocking feet while carrying items outside to his truck.” We, like the district court,
find no genuine issue as to a material fact concerning the alleged condition that
involved an unreasonable risk of injury. The district court correctly applied the
law in concluding plaintiffs had not proved the first essential proposition.
The court also determined the evidence shows the condition of the stairs
and the possibility of slipping on them while in stocking feet was known and
obvious to Joel. The evidence shows Joel noticed the stairs were shiny and he
knew he needed to be careful and was trying to be extra careful when
descending the stairs. It also shows he did not hold the railing when descending
the stairs. Although a possessor of land has a duty to warn an invitee of a
dangerous condition, that duty to warn is discharged if the invitee has knowledge
of the risk. See Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 900.6. There is no genuine issue of
material fact on this proposition. The district court correctly applied the law.
Cross-Appeal. Defendant claims the district court erred in its conflict-oflaws analysis in denying its motion for summary judgment on statute-oflimitations grounds.
Because we have affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in defendant’s favor on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, the
issue raised on cross-appeal is moot.
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Conclusion. The evidence fails to show a dangerous condition. It is
clear plaintiff had knowledge of the circumstances and appreciated any risk.
Because the evidence fails to demonstrate essential elements to prove premises
liability, the district court was correct in granting defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on the
merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. The claim raised on cross-appeal is moot.
AFFIRMED.
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