JULIE RANSOM, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. LEONARD FRANCES ZEIEN, Defendant-Appellee.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-401 / 06-1051
Filed June 27, 2007
JULIE RANSOM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
LEONARD FRANCES ZEIEN,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, John S. Mackey,
Judge.
A plaintiff appeals from the jury verdict for the defendant in this negligence
action. AFFIRMED.
Judith O'Donohoe of Elwood, O’Donohoe, Stochl, Braun & Churbuck,
Charles City, for appellant.
Randall Nielsen of Pappajohn, Shriver, Eide & Nielsen, P.C., Mason City,
for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Baker, JJ.
2
BAKER, J.
Julie Ransom appeals from the jury verdict substantially in favor of
Leonard Zeien in this negligence action. Ransom seeks a new trial. We affirm.
I. Background and Facts
On January 3, 2003, an accident occurred involving vehicles driven by
Leonard Zeien and Gary Colsen. Julie Ransom was a passenger in the vehicle
driven by Colsen, who was her husband at the time. Zeien was traveling in the
right eastbound lane of U.S. Highway 18, a four-lane highway. Colsen pulled
onto the eastbound lane. Zeien’s vehicle collided with the left rear of Colsen’s.
After the accident, a state trooper issued Zeien a ticket for failure to have his
vehicle under control, to which he pled guilty. Zeien admitted his cruise control
had been set at approximately sixty-eight miles per hour and that he had told the
trooper he must have dozed off.
Ransom and Colsen filed a lawsuit against Zeien on December 30, 2004.
Colsen’s claim against Zeien was settled. Ransom did not file a claim against
Colsen for her injuries, nor did Zeien seek contribution from Colsen for Ransom’s
claim. A jury trial on Ransom’s claim commenced on May 2, 2006. The trial
court refused Ransom’s motion to direct the verdict and to instruct the jury that
Zeien was negligent as a matter of law. The trial court submitted a verdict form
allowing the allocation of fault between Zeien and Colsen. The jury returned a
verdict finding Gary Colsen eighty-five percent negligent and Zeien fifteen
percent negligent.
The jury found Ranson suffered $5000 in past medical
expenses, $4000 in lost wages, and $800 in past pain and suffering.
A
judgement for fifteen percent of that total, $1470, was entered against Zeien.
3
Ransom filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new
trial, which were denied by the trial court. Ransom appeals. Other facts relevant
to our decision will be considered in our discussion of the legal issues presented.
II. Merits
Ransom contends the record supported a finding, either by directed verdict
or by jury instruction, that Zeien was negligent as a matter of law for failing to
have his vehicle under control. She further contends the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to award a new trial because substantial evidence does not
support the allocation of fault. She also contends the court erred in failing to
enter judgment or grant a new trial on the issue of damages because the verdict
was inadequate.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict for correction
of errors at law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Yates v. Iowa West Racing Ass'n, 721 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Iowa
2006); Seastrom v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 601 N.W.2d 339, 345-46 (Iowa
1999). “If there is substantial evidence to support a claim the motion should be
denied . . . . Even if the facts are undisputed, the case should be submitted to
the jury if reasonable minds could draw different inferences from the evidence.”
Seastrom, 601 N.W.2d at 345 (citation omitted). We also review alleged errors in
jury instructions for correction of errors at law. Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 710
N.W.2d 741, 748 (Iowa 2006). We review the denial of a motion for a new trial
for abuse of discretion. Seastrom, 601 N.W.2d at 345. “If the jury verdict is not
supported by sufficient evidence and fails to effectuate substantial justice, a new
trial may be ordered.” Id. at 345-46.
4
A. Comparative Fault
Ransom argues the record requires a finding that Zeien was negligent as
a matter of law because Zeien’s conduct should have been found to be
negligence per se. While a finding of negligence per se based on Zeien’s failure
to have his vehicle under control may have been appropriate, Ransom can show
no prejudice because the jury found Zeien was negligent. Whether the jury was
instructed regarding negligence per se, or the trial court made a finding of
negligence per se as a matter of law, is immaterial.
There is no basis for
awarding a new trial based on this argument. See Conner v. Menard, Inc., 705
N.W.2d 318, 322 (Iowa 2005) (“[E]rror in giving a challenged instruction will not
result in reversal unless the challenging party has been prejudiced.”).
Ransom also contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for a
new trial because the jury verdict, which allocated less than fifty percent fault to
Zeien, was not sustained by sufficient evidence. “If a jury verdict is not supported
by sufficient evidence and fails to effectuate substantial justice, a new trial may
be ordered.”
Olson v. Sumpter, 728 N.W.2d 844, 850 (Iowa 2007) (citation
omitted). The fact that the court may have reached a different result, however, is
not grounds for setting aside a jury verdict and awarding a new trial. Waddell v.
Peet’s Feeds, Inc., 266 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa 1978).
In this case, the jury’s verdict allocating eighty-five percent fault to Colsen
is supported by sufficient evidence. Colsen testified that he pulled out onto the
highway even though he could see Zeien’s vehicle approaching. Ransom argues
there are two lanes of eastbound travel on the highway, and, “if Zeien wished to
travel faster than the Colsen vehicle, he merely had to pull into the left lane.” A
5
reasonable jury, however, could conclude that Colsen pulled out in front of Zeien
when it was unsafe to do so. See Olson, 728 N.W.2d at 850 (holding a jury
verdict allocating sixty percent fault in vehicle accident to the plaintiff was
supported by sufficient evidence where the plaintiff noticed the defendant’s car
before backing her car onto the street); see also Bredberg v. Pepsico, Inc., 551
N.W.2d 321, 329 (Iowa 1996) (affirming the trial court’s refusal to grant a new
trial where the verdict was “consistent with the intent and purpose of the
comparative fault statute, which allows the fact finder to assign fault (without
explanation) to one or more parties claimed to have contributed to plaintiff’s
injuries”) (citing Iowa Code § 668.3(2)).
Accordingly, we reject Ransom’s
contention that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her a new trial
based on insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
B. Damages
Ransom contends the trial court erred in failing to enter judgment or grant
a new trial on the issue of damages because the verdict failed to adequately
compensate her. Whether damages are so inadequate to warrant a new trial is
for the trial court to decide. Householder v. Town of Clayton, 221 N.W.2d 488,
493 (Iowa 1974). Whether a particular award of damages is adequate turns on
the facts of each case. Matthess v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 521 N.W.2d
699, 702 (Iowa 1994). We afford the court considerable discretion in ruling on a
motion for new trial based on an inadequate verdict. Fisher v. Davis, 601 N.W.2d
54, 57 (Iowa 1999). If, however, “uncontroverted facts show that the amount of
the verdict bears no reasonable relationship to the loss suffered, the verdict is
6
inadequate” and we will find an abuse of discretion for the trial court’s refusal to
grant a new trial. Witte v. Vogt, 443 N.W.2d 715, 716-17 (Iowa 1989).
[W]e reviewed extensively our cases involving questions of
inadequate awards where the awards were approximately equal to
or less than the special damages. We discovered we have not
adopted an inflexible rule that every verdict awarding only special
damages is inadequate as a matter of law.
Foggia v. Des Moines Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Iowa 1996).
“Another consideration for this court . . . is ‘the fact the trial court, with benefit of
seeing and hearing witnesses, observing the jury and having before it all
incidents of the trial, did not see fit to interfere [with the jury’s verdict].’” Id.
(quoting Olsen v. Drahos, 229 N.W.2d 741, 743 (Iowa 1975)).
Ransom contends $5000 is inadequate to cover her medical expenses,
which she claimed were $9791.10 since the accident and estimated at $936 per
year in the future. She also contends $800 for pain and suffering is inadequate
because, although there is evidence she will continue to have lower back and left
leg pain, the award does not include damages for future pain and suffering.
In McDonnell v. Chally, 529 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994), the
plaintiff claimed $5457 in past medical expenses, $110 per year for future
medical expenses, and $160 per month for future medication costs, yet the jury
awarded her only $1091 for medical expenses and $2000 for past pain and
suffering, which the plaintiff claimed was inadequate.
This court held that,
although the damages were small, “that does not necessarily mean they are
unsupported by the evidence.” Id. Several factors may have influenced the jury.
They may not have believed all of the plaintiff’s medical problems were caused
by the auto accident.
Id.
Further, her testimony may have diminished her
7
credibility and, because she continued to work full-time and reportedly was
having no problems, the jury may just not have believed her injuries were as
serious as contended. Id. In McDonnell, we concluded
the jury may have attempted to award her only that portion which
they believed related to her injuries caused by the accident. In not
awarding her future medical expenses and damages for future pain
and suffering, the jury may have reasonably concluded any need
Julie would have for future medical care was necessitated by
factors other than the accident. Preexisting and post-accident
ailments were proper areas of consideration for the jury, and we
cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
request for a new trial.
Id. at 614-15.
In this case, we similarly conclude the medical expenses and pain and
suffering awards were proper questions for the jury, and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial. There was testimony that,
like the plaintiff in McDonnell, Ransom had preexisting medical issues which may
have influenced the jury into believing not all of her medical problems were
caused by the auto accident. There was also evidence presented that Ransom
had reported she was feeling better, and she had been working full time as a
secretary for a year. Her chiropractor, Dr. Jeanne Staudt, testified that Ranson
should not do physical exercises, that chiropractic care is the only thing that will
ever do her any good, and that “it would be a waste of her time and a waste of
her money” to seek care from a physical therapist or a medical doctor.
Additionally, Ransom testified that prior to the collision, she and Colson had been
on the highway approximately eighteen seconds, he had accelerated “normally
as a person would going onto a four-lane highway,” yet had accelerated to only
thirty-five miles per hour at the time of the collision. We conclude that, like the
8
plaintiff in McDonnell, Ransom’s testimony may have diminished her credibility,
and the jury may not have believed her injuries were as serious as she contends.
Ransom also contends the lost wages award of $4000 is not supported by
the record. Based on her estimated $20,784.77 annual average income from
trucking, she claims she lost $37,997.07 in past wages, and $48,765.50 in future
wages, due to her injuries. 1
The record demonstrates her income in 2003
through 2005 was less than one-half of the $36,475 she and Colsen earned
together in 2000. We find the jury could have reasonably concluded her loss of
income was due to other reasons, e.g. the dissolution of her marriage with
Colsen. See Foggia, 543 N.W.2d at 891.
Ransom asserts the failure-to-mitigate instruction should not have been
given because there was no evidence to support a claim that other employment
was available. Zeine argues that Ransom failed to preserve error because no
objection was made to this instruction. A review of the record indicates Ransom
agreed to this instruction. While this argument may have had merit, because
error was not preserved on this issue, we may not consider it on appeal. See
Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“[I]ssues must ordinarily
be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them.”).
III. Conclusion
We find no error in the trial court’s failure to instruct on negligence per se as
there was no prejudice based on the jury’s finding of fault. Therefore Ransom’s
contention that the record supported a finding that Zeien was negligent as a
1
Following their 1999 marriage, Ransom drove truck with Colsen, who owned the truck,
on an intermittent basis. Colsen and Ransom were divorced in the fall of 2003.
9
matter of law is an insufficient ground for granting a new trial. We reject her
contention that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her a new trial
based on insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Because Ransom
failed to preserve error on the mitigation jury instruction, we will not consider it on
appeal.
We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the
judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
