STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANTONIO VINCENT GRAY, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-397 / 06-0578
Filed July 12, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO VINCENT GRAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark J. Smith,
Judge.
Antonio Vincent Gray appeals from his convictions of possession of more
than ten grams of cocaine base with intent to deliver, a drug tax stamp violation,
and possession of marijuana. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau,
Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth S. Reynoldson, Assistant
Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Robert E. Weinberg,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
2
ZIMMER, J.
Antonio Vincent Gray appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by
the district court after a jury returned verdicts finding him guilty of possession of
more than ten grams of cocaine base with intent to deliver in violation of Iowa
Code section 124.401(1)(b), a drug tax stamp violation under section 453B.12,
and possession of marijuana in violation of section 124.401(5) (2005). Gray
contends there was insufficient evidence to prove he was guilty of possession of
more than ten grams of cocaine base with intent to deliver. We affirm.
I.
Background Facts & Proceedings
Davenport Police Officers Shawn Roth and Geoffrey Peiffer were
patrolling the downtown area of Davenport at approximately 8:00 p.m. on
March 2, 2005, when they observed a vehicle with two occupants. Because the
passenger in the vehicle was not wearing a seat belt, Officer Roth initiated a
traffic stop. Officer Roth approached the driver’s side of the vehicle while Officer
Peiffer approached the passenger’s side. Antonio Gray opened the driver’s-side
door, and Officer Roth immediately smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana
emanating from the vehicle. The officer removed Gray from the vehicle and
patted him down, discovering $3800 in cash and a $50 money order in his front
pockets. The officer then placed Gray in the back of the patrol car.
While standing outside of Gray’s vehicle, Officer Peiffer observed a plastic
bag of marijuana on the floorboard of the front driver’s side of the vehicle. The
officers discovered another plastic bag of marijuana and a crack pipe under the
back seat of the patrol car after they had removed Gray from their vehicle for
booking.
3
Gray provided the officers with conflicting stories in response to their
questions regarding the source of the money. First, Gray told the officers the
money came from an employer; however, he was unable to recall his employer’s
name. Gray then altered his story and told the officers the money came from his
grandmother.
contraband.
The officers received information that Gray might be carrying
At the jail, Gray was strip searched, and officers discovered a
plastic bag containing sixteen grams of crack cocaine between his buttocks.
Gray responded to the discovery of the drugs by offering to “work with” law
enforcement officers. He told an officer that he could make individual purchases
of at least an ounce of crack cocaine from his suppliers.
The State filed a trial information charging Gray with possession of more
than ten grams of cocaine base with intent to deliver as a habitual offender
(count I) 1 , a drug tax stamp violation (count II), and possession of marijuana
(count III). On January 19, 2006, a jury returned guilty verdicts on all three
counts. The court sentenced Gray to a term of imprisonment of thirty years on
count I, fifteen years on count II, and six months on count III. The sentences
were ordered to run concurrently, and fines of $5000, $1000, and $250 plus
surcharges were also assessed. Gray now appeals.
II.
Scope & Standards of Review
We review Gray’s claim that the record contains insufficient evidence to
support his convictions for the correction of errors at law, and we will uphold the
jury’s verdict if substantial evidence supports it. State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d
1
Gray stipulated to prior felony convictions of robbery, unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, and obstructing justice.
4
23, 27 (Iowa 2005). Substantial evidence is defined as evidence that “could
convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Iowa 1980). We consider all
the evidence in the record, not just the evidence supporting guilt. State v. Carter,
696 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Iowa 2005). We also consider legitimate inferences and
presumptions that may reasonably be deduced from the evidence in the record,
and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.
Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally probative.
Id.
Iowa R. App. P.
6.14(6)(p).
III.
Discussion
Gray argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
possessed the crack cocaine with the intent to deliver.
He maintains that
because there were no scales, packaging materials, drug notes, weapons, or
other items normally associated with drug dealers in his vehicle, he was a drug
user rather than a drug dealer. Gray contends the discovery of the crack pipe in
the patrol car supports his contention that he intended to use the drugs
discovered on his person. Gray also notes there was no trial testimony that he
delivered crack to anyone, and while he was cooperating with the police, he
provided the names of several drug suppliers, but no drug buyers.
In order to prove Gray possessed crack cocaine with the intent to deliver
as defined in jury instruction eleven, the State had to establish:
1.
2.
On or about the 2nd day of March, 2005, the defendant
knowingly possessed crack cocaine.
The defendant knew that the substance he possessed was
crack cocaine.
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3.
The defendant possessed the substance with the intent to
deliver a controlled substance.
Gray concedes he had possession of the crack cocaine, but he challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the intent to deliver element of the charge.
Evidence of intent is rarely capable of direct proof. State v. Delay, 320 N.W.2d
831, 835 (Iowa 1982). Proof of intent usually arises from circumstantial evidence
and inferences that are drawn from that evidence. State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d
686, 692 (Iowa 1996). The quantity and packaging of a controlled substance
may indicate an intent to deliver. State v. See, 532 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1995).
Davenport Police Sergeant Kevin Smull, who had worked for the
department for eleven years and had extensive training and experience with drug
trafficking, testified crack cocaine is generally sold in twenty-dollar or fifty-dollar
rocks. According to Smull, the twenty-dollar rocks generally weigh between onetenth and two tenths of a gram, and the fifty-dollar rocks generally weigh between
three-tenths and one-half of a gram.
Sergeant Smull testified users usually
possess only one or two twenty-dollar or fifty-dollar rocks. The sergeant also
said it is rare for a user to purchase even one or two grams of crack cocaine.
Sergeant Smull explained that experienced dealers do not need a scale to sell
crack cocaine because they are able to pinch off fairly accurate amounts with
their fingers. Based on his training and experience, the sergeant concluded that
possession of crack cocaine weighing sixteen grams together with $3850 in
increments of twenty $100 bills, thirteen $50 bills, fifty-six $20 bills, one $10 bill,
two $5 bills, and ten $1 bills indicated an intent to distribute rather than an intent
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to hold the drugs for personal use. 2 As we have already mentioned, Gray gave
conflicting stories to explain the source of the money found in his pocket.
Davenport Police Corporal Michael Parker testified that Gray’s offers to
assist law enforcement with undercover drug purchases by purchasing one
ounce of crack cocaine at a time indicated Gray was a drug dealer. Corporal
Parker explained the amounts Gray offered to buy were much larger than a user
would generally purchase, and they were indicative of a drug dealer.
Upon our review of all the evidence presented at trial, we conclude the
jury could have rationally concluded Gray possessed crack cocaine with the
intent to deliver. The officers’ expert testimony regarding the significance of the
amount of cocaine found on Gray, the amount and denominations of the money
found on the defendant, Gray’s inconsistent explanations for the source of the
money, and Gray’s obvious familiarity with crack dealers support the jury’s
verdict.
We conclude there was substantial evidence to support Gray’s
convictions.
IV.
Conclusion
Because we find sufficient evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that
Gray possessed crack cocaine with the intent to deliver, we affirm his
convictions.
AFFIRMED.
2
See State v. Grant, 722 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Iowa 2006) (holding testimony by law
enforcement officers who are experienced in drug trafficking may be offered as evidence
for the purpose of aiding the trier of fact to determine intent).
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