STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. WILLIAM JOSEPH PINEGAR, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-395 / 06-0258
Filed December 12, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM JOSEPH PINEGAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joel D. Novak, Judge.
William Pinegar appeals from his convictions and sentences for homicide
by vehicle, eluding, and operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, First
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Michael T. Hunter, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Baker, JJ.
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HUITINK, P.J.
William Pinegar appeals from his convictions and sentences for homicide
by vehicle, a class “B” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(1),
eluding, a class “D” felony, in violation of section 321.279, and operating a motor
vehicle without the owner’s consent, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of
section 714.7 (2003). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On February 13, 2004, the State filed a three-count trial information
charging Pinegar with homicide by vehicle, a class “C” felony, in violation of
section 707.6A(2), eluding, a class “D” felony, in violation of section 321.279, and
theft in the second degree, a class “D” felony, in violation of sections 714.1 and
714.2(2). The trial information was subsequently amended to charge Pinegar
with homicide by vehicle, a class “B” felony in violation of section 707.6A(1).
Pinegar pleaded not guilty to all offenses charged and timely filed notices of
defenses, including compulsion and necessity.
The record includes evidence of the following: On January 19, 2004, Polk
County Deputy Sheriff Cass Bollman attempted to stop a vehicle driven by
Pinegar for speeding. According to Bollman’s version, he initially activated his
lights and later his siren in an effort to stop Pinegar’s vehicle. Bollman testified
he pursued Pinegar after Pinegar failed to stop and in the course of the pursuit
Pinegar ran stop signs, red lights, and drove at speeds in excess of the posted
speed limits. Pinegar’s vehicle eventually collided with another vehicle, drove
through a fence, struck a tree, and came to rest on its passenger side. Melissa
Sayles, a passenger in Pinegar’s vehicle, was ejected from the vehicle and died
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of resulting head injuries. Police officers found a semi-automatic pistol near her
body. Troy McDaniels, another passenger in Pinegar’s vehicle, was also injured.
Pinegar told investigators he used methamphetamine and marijuana
earlier that day.
A subsequent blood test confirmed the presence of both
substances, as well as amphetamines, in his system.
Pinegar and McDaniels told investigators that Sayles had also used
methamphetamine that day. They also told investigators that Sayles told Pinegar
not to stop because the vehicle was stolen and threatened Pinegar with a pistol if
he refused to comply. Although McDaniels initially told investigators he did not
see the pistol or hear any shots fired, he testified Sayles fired the pistol out of the
window in the course of the pursuit. Bollman testified he did not see or hear any
gunshots from Pinegar’s vehicle during the pursuit.
At the close of the evidence, Pinegar objected to the trial court’s proposed
jury instruction on the eluding count because it failed to include the requisite
willfulness element of that offense. Pinegar also claimed the State failed to prove
Bollman was in uniform, a statutory element of eluding. Pinegar also requested
instructions on both his necessity and compulsion defenses.
The trial court
overruled Pinegar’s objections to the eluding instruction and declined to submit
the necessity defense. The trial court’s ruling states:
[Y]ou established the, basically the prima facie case. You are
entitled to a compulsion defense based on the evidence, because
that’s what I think you were claiming was do or die. The Court does
not believe you are also entitled to the necessity defense. And so
your request for that requested instruction will be overruled and
denied.
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On December 19, 2005, the jury returned a verdict finding Pinegar guilty of
homicide by vehicle, eluding, and operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s
consent. Pinegar was subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to
exceed twenty-five years on the homicide by motor vehicle count, five years on
the eluding count, and two years on the operating a motor vehicle without the
owner’s consent count. The terms of imprisonment for the first two counts were
ordered to be served consecutively, and the term of imprisonment for the last
count was ordered to be served concurrent with the other two counts.
After Pinegar’s trial, trial counsel discovered for the first time that State’s
exhibit 37, a woman’s style wallet that was admitted into evidence, contained two
notes apparently written by Sayles to “Billy.” Testimony at trial revealed Pinegar
and Sayles had an on-again-off-again romantic relationship.
Pinegar’s trial
counsel obtained affidavits from two jurors indicating the jurors had discovered
the notes, discussed them during deliberations, and at least one juror
commented that Sayles would not have held a gun to the head of someone she
loved.
Other matters of fact and record will be referred to as necessary to
resolve the issues on appeal.
On appeal, Pinegar contends:
(1) the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury on his necessity defense; (2) trial counsel was ineffective in a
number of particulars; and (3) the record contains insufficient evidence to support
his eluding conviction.
II. Necessity Defense
We review a trial court’s refusal to give a proffered jury instruction for
errors of law. State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996) (citing Iowa R.
5
App. P. 4; State v. Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Iowa 1992)). A defendant is
entitled to a jury instruction on a defense if he or she has made a timely request,
the request is supported by the evidence, and the request sets forth a correct
statement of the law. State v. Johnson, 534 N.W.2d 118, 124 (Iowa Ct. App.
1995) (citing United States v. Brake, 596 F.2d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1979)).
The necessity defense has long been recognized in Iowa. See State v.
Ward, 170 Iowa 185, 191, 152 N.W. 501, 503 (1915) (holding the defendant was
entitled to pursue this defense for killing a deer that destroyed his crop).
Historically, this defense was only available in cases involving physical forces;
however, the Iowa Supreme Court has held it is also available in cases involving
human forces. State v. Walton, 311 N.W.2d 113, 114-15 (Iowa 1981) (citing
State v. Reese, 272 N.W.2d 863, 866 (Iowa 1978); W. LaFave & A. Scott,
Handbook on Criminal Law § 50, at 381 (1972) [hereinafter LaFave & Scott]; R.
Perkins, Criminal Law 956 (2d ed. 1969)).
“The rationale of the necessity defense lies in [the] defendant being
required to choose the lesser of two evils and thus avoiding a greater harm by
bringing about a lesser harm.” Id. at 115. According to one commentator, “‘the
law ought to promote the achievement of higher values at the expense of lesser
values, and sometimes the greater good for society will be accomplished by
violating the literal language of the criminal law.’” State v. Bonjour, 694 N.W.2d
511, 512 (Iowa 2005) (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §
10.1 (2d ed. 2003)).
The necessity defense only applies in emergency situations “where the
threatened harm is immediate and the threatened disaster imminent.” Walton,
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311 N.W.2d at 115. In addition, if a defendant “is not personally at fault for
creating the situation calling for the necessity,” we must consider the following
factors: “(1) the harm avoided, (2) the harm done, (3) the defendant’s intention to
avoid the greater harm, (4) the relative value of the harm avoided and the harm
done, and (5) optional courses of action and the imminence of disaster.” Id.
(citing LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 50, at 385-88). However,
“[i]f all of the requirements of the defense are not addressed in the defendant’s
evidence, [the] trial court is not obligated to submit the issue to the jury.” Id.
(citing United States v. Campbell, 609 F.2d 922, 924-25 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980)); see also State v. Harrison, 473 N.W.2d 242, 243
(Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (holding the evidence the defendant presented did not
generate a fact question on necessity).
Based on our review of the record, we conclude the trial court correctly
declined Pinegar’s proffered jury instruction on necessity.
Pinegar was
personally at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the claimed necessity
because he was speeding and driving under the influence of marijuana and
methamphetamine.
Moreover, a necessity defense assumes a reasoned
decision or choice. Walton, 311 N.W.2d at 115; see also United States v. Baily,
444 U.S. 394, 410 100 S. Ct. 624, 634, 62 L. Ed. 2d 575, 590 (1980). The trial
court’s observation that “what . . . you [are] claiming was do or die” captured the
essential element distinguishing the necessity defense from the compulsion
defense submitted to the jury. We accordingly affirm on this issue.
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III. Eluding/Substantial Evidence
We review challenges to sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors
at law. State v. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Iowa 1997) (citing State v. Randle,
555 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 1996)). A jury’s verdict is binding on appeal if it is
supported by substantial evidence. State v. LeGear, 346 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Iowa
1984) (citing State v. Schrier, 300 N.W.2d 305, 306 (Iowa 1981)). Substantial
evidence is “such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Gay, 526 N.W.2d 294,
295 (Iowa 1995) (citing State v. Taft, 506 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Iowa 1993)).
Evidence, however, that only raises “‘suspicion, speculation, or conjecture’” does
not constitute substantial evidence. Randle, 555 N.W.2d at 671 (quoting State v.
Barnes, 204 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa 1972)).
When reviewing challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the State, including legitimate inferences
and presumptions that fairly and reasonably may be deduced from the evidence
in the record.” State v. Hoeck, 547 N.W.2d 852, 859 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (citing
State v. Bass, 349 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Iowa 1984); State v. Hall, 371 N.W.2d 187,
188 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985)). “Although direct and circumstantial evidence are
equally probative, the inferences to be drawn from the proof in a criminal case
must ‘raise a fair inference of guilt as to each essential element of the crime.’”
State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Casady,
491 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Iowa 1992)).
Finally, we must consider all of the
evidence, not just that which supports the jury’s verdict. State v. Conroy, 604
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N.W.2d 636, 638 (Iowa 2000) (citing State v. Kostman, 585 N.W.2d 209, 211
(Iowa 1998)).
Both the jury instruction on eluding submitted in this case and section
321.279(3) require the peace officer be in uniform. See Iowa Code § 321.279(3)
(“The driver of a motor vehicle commits a class “D” felony if the driver willfully
fails to bring the motor vehicle to a stop or otherwise eludes or attempts to elude
a marked official law enforcement vehicle that is driven by a uniformed peace
officer. . . .”).
There is no dispute concerning the absence of any direct evidence
indicating Bollman was in uniform at the time he attempted to stop Pinegar’s
vehicle. The State, nevertheless, argued, “Well, Judge, my understanding is the
officer testified that he was on duty that day. He showed up in court in uniform. I
think the jury can infer that when he is on duty he is in uniform.”
It is the State’s burden to prove the essential elements of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Gray, 216 N.W.2d 306, 307 (Iowa
1974).
In appropriate circumstances, the State’s burden can be met by
inference. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d at 741 (citing Casady, 491 N.W.2d at 787). To
“infer” means to “‘derive by reasoning (or) implication or conclude from facts or
premises.’”
Henderson v. Scurr, 313 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa 1981) (quoting
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1158 (1961)).
A permissive
inference allows but does not require the trier of fact to infer an elemental fact
from a basic fact. Id. (citing County Ct. of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S.
140, 157, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2224, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777, 792 (1979)). The elemental
fact to be established must be reasonably and generally inferred from the facts
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shown. Carter v. MacMillan Oil Co., 355 N.W.2d 52, 56-57 (Iowa 1984) (citing
Stenberg v. Buckley, 245 Iowa 622, 627-29, 61 N.W.2d 452 455-56 (1953);
Gilmer v. Neuenswander, 238 Iowa 502, 506, 28 N.W.2d 43, 45 (1947)). Here
the State was required to prove Bollman was in uniform at the time he attempted
to stop Pinegar. See Iowa Code § 321.279(3). Because the record contains no
direct evidence of that fact, the jury was required to make that determination by
inference based on other facts in the record. Contrary to the State’s claim, none
of the facts cited by the State support the requisite inference in the exercise of
ordinary deductive reasoning. In other words, the fact that the officer was on
duty or wore his uniform to court is insufficient to support the jury’s implicit finding
that he was in uniform at the time he attempted to stop Pinegar. See, e.g., State
v. Hudson, 932 P.2d 714, 717-18 (Wash. App. 1997); State v. Fussell, 925 P.2d
642, 644-45 (Wash. App. 1996) (stating evidence officer in marked car and on
duty insufficient for jury to infer beyond reasonable doubt that officer was in
uniform). Moreover, we are not inclined to diminish the State’s burden of proof
by permitting the suggested inference, especially in view of the relative ease with
which the uniform element of eluding can be established. Because the evidence
was not sufficient to establish all of the essential elements of eluding, we reverse
Pinegar’s conviction on that count and remand for entry of a judgment of
acquittal.
See State v. Boggs, ____ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2007) (stating
conviction reversed for insufficient evidence is the equivalent of an adjudication
of not guilty) (citing Iowa Code § 816.3(3) (2001); United States v. DeFrancesco,
449 U.S. 117, 131, 101 S. Ct. 426, 434, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328, 341 (1980); State v.
Swartz, 541 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)).
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IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims, arising from a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, de novo. State v. Westeen, 591
N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 1999) (citing U.S. Const. amend VI; State v. Brooks, 555
N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1996)).
In general, we preserve ineffective assistance of counsel claims for
postconviction relief proceedings “where preserving the claim[s] allow[ ] the
defendant to make a complete record of the claim, allow[ ] trial counsel an
opportunity to explain his or her actions, and allow[ ] the trial court to rule on the
claim.” State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 136 (Iowa 2006) (citing State v.
Bass, 385 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1986)). If, however, the record is adequate to
determine that the defendant is not able to establish either prong of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim as a matter of law, we will affirm the defendant’s
conviction without preserving the ineffective assistance of counsel claims for
postconviction relief proceedings. State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 134 (Iowa
2004) (citing State v. Reynolds, 670 N.W.2d 405, 411 (Iowa 2003); State v.
Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Iowa 2003)). Because the record is inadequate
and trial counsel should be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions, we
preserve Pinegar’s remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims for
postconviction relief proceedings.
V. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Pinegar’s homicide by vehicle
conviction, reverse his eluding conviction, and preserve his ineffective assistance
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of counsel claims for postconviction relief proceedings. We also remand to the
trial court for further proceedings in conformity with our opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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