PHYLLIS REELFS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-334 / 06-1750
Filed June 27, 2007
PHYLLIS REELFS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Patrick R. Grady,
Judge.
Phyllis Reelfs appeals from a district court ruling that upheld the decision
of the Employment Appeal Board denying her claim for unemployment
compensation benefits. AFFIRMED.
J. Richard Johnson of White & Johnson, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for
appellant.
Richard Autry, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
2
HUITINK, P.J.
Phyllis Reelfs appeals from the district court ruling that upheld the decision
of the Employment Appeal Board (Board) denying her claim for unemployment
compensation benefits. We affirm the district court.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Reelfs began working at the University of Iowa in 1985. In September
2004, while working as a secretary, she started to use sick leave and vacation
time to cover work missed for various mental health issues. Her last full day of
work was September 24, 2004. Reelfs filed a request for leave under the Family
and Medical Leave Act.
Over the next four months, Reelfs supplied her
employer with numerous notes excusing her from work. Each note excused her
from work for a specific period of time. As a note neared expiration, she would
arrange to have a new note sent to her employer. On January 19, 2005, the
employer requested documentation in order to finalize the approval of the
designation of FMLA leave. Reelfs did not respond to this request.
The last medical note received by her employer excused her absence
through February 9, 2005. Reelfs did not appear for work on February 10 or
contact her employer. On Friday, February 11, her employer drafted a letter
stating the following:
This notice is to advise you of our withdrawal of FMLA
designation of your current leave due to your failure to provide the
requested documentation as stated in my memo to you on January
19th. Your FMLA protected leave therefore ended December 31,
2004.
In order for your continued absence to remain authorized,
we require a medical certificate or other appropriate verification,
pursuant to Article IX, §10(B)(1) of the collective bargaining
agreement between the State of Iowa and AFSCME Council 61.
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Please provide verification by the close of business on Friday,
February 18, 2005. Failure to provide verification or a release to
return to work by that date may result in our regarding your
continued absence as job abandonment, and would constitute
grounds for terminating your employment.
Please call me . . . if you have any questions.
This letter was sent to Reelfs via certified mail on Monday, February 14. When
Reelfs did not respond by the close of business on Friday, February 18, the
University terminated her employment on Monday, February 21, for job
abandonment.
Reelfs filed the present claim for unemployment compensation benefits.
An Iowa Workforce Development representative issued a decision denying
benefits. The decision stated: “Our records indicate you voluntarily quit work on
2/09/05, by failing to report to work for three days in a row and not notifying your
employer of the reason. Your quitting was not caused by your employer.” Reelfs
appealed, and hearings were held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on
May 11 and May 23, 2005.
At the hearings Reelfs presented a letter from her doctor stating that he
had faxed her employer notes excusing her from work on two occasions:
January 17 (excusing her from work for thirty days) and February 17 (excusing
her from work for two weeks). Her employer denied receiving either fax.
A representative for the employer testified that the United States Postal
Service website confirmed the above-quoted letter was delivered to Reelf’s
address at 8:56 a.m. on February 15. Reelfs testified that she was unable to
check her mail during this time frame because her depression would not allow
her to function or perform daily activities. Despite her inability to function, Reelfs
4
admitted she left her home on either February 17 or 18 for a medical
appointment and left her home to visit her union representative on February 19.
Reelfs testified that she learned of the termination on February 23, when a coworker called to ask why she had left. Reelfs then immediately checked her mail
and discovered the letter.
The ALJ issued a decision affirming the representative’s decision. The
ALJ
concluded
Reelfs
voluntarily
left
her
job
because
she
stopped
communicating with her employer and failed to return to work. In doing so, the
ALJ made the following pertinent findings of fact:
(1) the employer did not
receive a response to its January 19 request for FMLA documentation; (2) Reelfs
received the certified letter on February 15 and did not respond because she did
not read the letter until February 23; (3) Reelfs did not follow up on whether any
excuses or documentation were received by her employer.
Reelfs appealed her decision to the Board. The Board adopted the ALJ’s
decision as its own and affirmed. However, one member of the Board dissented
because Reelfs’s “mental health problems complicated her communication with
the employer.” Reelfs filed a petition in district court for judicial review. The
district court affirmed the Board’s decision, noting there was substantial evidence
to support the Board’s decision.
II. Analysis
The sole argument raised on appeal is “Whether substantial evidence
supports the Agency’s decision that Phyllis Reelfs’s actions constituted
misconduct.”
Specifically, Reelfs argues there was no “reasonable basis” to
disregard her evidence that the medical excuses were faxed to the employer
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within the appropriate time frame.
She contends the ALJ decision is not
supported by substantial evidence because a letter from her doctor indicates he
faxed appropriate documentation excusing her from work. She also argues there
was not substantial evidence to support the finding that she received the abovequoted letter on February 15 because the employer did not produce a returnreceipt substantiating this assertion.
Our review of an agency finding is at law and not de novo. Terwilliger v.
Snap-On Tools Corp., 529 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa 1995). Because our review is
not de novo, we must not reassess the weight to be accorded various items of
evidence.
2005).
Hy-Vee, Inc. v. Employment Appeal Bd., 710 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa
“Weight of evidence remains within the agency’s exclusive domain.”
Burns v. Board of Nursing, 495 N.W.2d 698, 699 (Iowa 1993). “We will reverse
an agency’s findings only if, after reviewing the record as a whole, we determine
that substantial evidence does not support them.” Terwilliger, 529 N.W.2d at
271.
Faxed Documentation. At the hearing, Reelfs presented a letter from her
doctor indicating he had faxed notes to her employer on January 17 and
February 17. However, she did not present any computerized confirmation letter
or other documentation to substantiate her claim that the employer received the
faxes. The employer presented evidence that it did not receive either fax. The
employer also pointed out that Reelfs did not make any effort to confirm the faxes
were received. After reviewing this conflicting testimony, the Board concluded
the employer did not receive either fax.
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The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the same
evidence does not mean the agency’s findings were not supported by substantial
evidence. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 418 (Iowa 2001). Substantial
evidence is what a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to reach a given
conclusion. Titan Tire Corp. v. Employment Appeal Bd., 641 N.W.2d 752, 755
(Iowa 2002). The question is not whether there was substantial evidence to
warrant a decision that the agency did not make, but rather whether there was
substantial evidence to warrant the decision it did make. Terwilliger, 529 N.W.2d
at 271. Judged by this standard, we conclude there was adequate evidence from
which a reasonable mind could find that the employer did not receive either fax.
This constitutes substantial evidence for the Board’s conclusion that the
employer did not receive timely authorization for Reelf’s absence.
Certified Letter. A representative for the employer testified that the letter
was sent by certified mail and received by Reelfs on February 15.
Reelfs
contends this does not constitute substantial evidence because there is no
written document corroborating the date of delivery.
We disagree.
The
employer’s witness provided a detailed description of how the receipt was
verified. Reelfs testified that the letter was present when she checked her mail
on February 23. We find this constitutes substantial evidence from which a fact
finder could conclude the letter was mailed and received by Reelfs on February
15. Cf. Montgomery Ward, Inc. v. Davis, 398 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Iowa 1987)
(“Proof that a document was properly mailed raises a presumption that it was
received.”).
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Job Abandonment. Under Iowa Code section 96.5(1), an individual is
disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits if he or she
voluntary quits without good cause attributable to the employer.
In general, a voluntary quit means discontinuing the employment
because the employee no longer desires to remain in the
relationship of an employee with the employer from whom the
employee has separated. The employer has the burden of proving
that the claimant is disqualified for benefits pursuant to Iowa Code
section 96.5 . . . . The following reasons for a voluntary quit shall
be presumed to be without good cause attributable to the employer:
. . . . The claimant was absent for three days without giving notice
to employer in violation of company rule.
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25(96) (2005).
Chapter 681 of the Iowa
Administrative Code sets forth personnel administration rules for employees of
the Iowa Board of Regents. Iowa Admin. Code r. 681-3.2(8A). One such rule
specifies: “Employees who are absent from duty for three consecutive work days
without proper notification and authorization thereof shall be deemed to have
resigned their positions.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 681-3.104(5). Evidence at the
hearing indicated Reelfs was absent for more than three consecutive work days
without proper notification and authorization.
This is presumed to be a quit
without good cause. We find no error in the Board’s decision to deny Reelfs
unemployment benefits. The district court’s ruling is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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