MELISSA SCIACCA, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES and/or IOWA DEPARTMENT OF INSPECTIONS AND APPEALS, Respondent-Appellees.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-329 / 06-1276
Filed July 12, 2007
MELISSA SCIACCA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES and/or
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF INSPECTIONS AND APPEALS,
Respondent-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, James D. Scott,
Judge.
Petitioner appeals from a district court judicial review ruling affirming the
finding that she committed dependent adult abuse. AFFIRMED.
H. Allan Sturgeon of Al Sturgeon Law Firm, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, John R. Lundquist, Assistant Attorney
General, and Ann Marie Brick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Miller, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
Melissa Sciacca appeals from a district court judicial review ruling
affirming the finding of the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals (DIA)
that she committed dependent adult abuse. We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
On October 20, 2004, Sciacca was working as a registered nurse at
Sunrise Retirement Community, a nursing facility, in Sioux City, Iowa. She was
assigned to the Sunlight Unit of the facility. The Sunlight Unit is dedicated to the
care of residents suffering from dementia. H.B., a ninety-one-year-old female, is
a resident of the Sunlight Unit. On the afternoon of October 20, 2004, Teanne
Watson, a certified nursing assistant, requested Sciacca’s aid in persuading H.B.
to go to the restroom. H.B. had rejected Watson’s earlier attempts to take her to
the restroom. Watson and Sciacca put their arms under H.B.’s arms to assist her
in standing.
H.B. resisted and punched Sciacca in her stomach.
Sciacca
responded by grabbing H.B.’s wrists in an attempt to restrain her arms. Bruises
were discovered on H.B.’s wrists approximately five hours after the incident.
Carol Starch, an activity assistant at the facility, witnessed the incident and
reported it to the unit’s manager. The facility subsequently forwarded a report of
suspected dependent adult abuse to DIA. After conducting an investigation, the
Health Facilities Division of DIA issued a comprehensive abuse memo on
January 28, 2005, which found Sciacca committed dependent adult abuse.
Sciacca appealed the finding.
Following an evidentiary hearing, an
administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a proposed decision on September 30,
2005, reversing the finding of dependent adult abuse. DIA sought further agency
3
review of the proposed decision. On December 15, 2005, the deputy director of
DIA entered a final order reversing the ALJ’s proposed decision and affirming the
initial finding of dependent adult abuse. Sciacca sought judicial review of the
agency’s decision. On July 11, 2006, the district court entered a ruling affirming
the agency’s finding that Sciacca committed dependent adult abuse.
Sciacca appeals. She contends the district court erred in affirming the
agency’s finding that she committed dependent adult abuse by assaulting H.B.
II.
SCOPE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 17A of the 2005 Iowa
Code, governs judicial review of administrative agency decisions.
Mosher v.
Dep’t of Inspections & Appeals, 671 N.W.2d 501, 508 (Iowa 2003). The district
court acts in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law on the part of the
agency. Grundmeyer v. Weyerhauser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 2002). In
reviewing the district court’s decision, we must determine whether our
conclusions
are
the
same
as
those
reached
by
the
district
court.
Locate.Plus.Com, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 650 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa
2002). The agency decision itself is reviewed under the standards set forth in
section 17A.19(10). Mosher, 671 N.W.2d at 508.
Pursuant to section 17A.19(10), we may only grant relief from the
agency’s action if the party challenging the agency action establishes “it is
erroneous under one of the grounds enumerated in the statute and a party’s
substantial rights have been prejudiced.” Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213,
4
218 (Iowa 2006). Sciacca claims the agency’s decision is erroneous under Iowa
Code section 17A.19(10) (f), (i), (k), 1 (m) and (n). 2
Factual findings regarding whether dependent adult abuse has occurred in
a health care facility are within the discretion of DIA. Mosher, 671 N.W.2d at
510. We are accordingly bound by DIA’s findings of fact if they are supported by
substantial evidence in the record when the record is viewed as a whole. Iowa
Code § 17A.19(10)(f); Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 465 (Iowa
2004). On the other hand, the agency’s application of the law to the facts can be
affected by other grounds of error such as irrational reasoning or irrational,
illogical or wholly unjustifiable application of law to facts.
Iowa Code §
17A.19(10)(i), (m); Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218. We allocate some degree of
discretion in our review of the agency’s application of the law to the facts, but not
the breadth of discretion given to the findings of fact. Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 219.
III.
MERITS.
Dependent adult abuse occurs when “willful or negligent acts or omissions
of a caretaker” cause “assault of a dependent adult.”
Iowa Code §
235B.2(5)(a)(1)(a) (2003). The definition of “adult abuse” in the administrative
rules implementing Iowa Code chapter 235B mirrors the statutory definition. See
Iowa Admin. Code r. 441-176.1(235B) (2003). The parties stipulated H.B. was a
1
This ground was not presented to or decided by the district court. “Issues must
ordinarily be presented to and passed upon by the trial court before they may be raised
and adjudicated on appeal.” Benavides v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 352,
356 (Iowa 1995). We accordingly find error was not preserved as to section
17A.19(10)(f). Furthermore, Sciacca does not argue or cite any authority in support of
this ground. We therefore consider this ground waived. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)(c).
2
The “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion” standard of review set forth in
Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(n) does not apply to a final decision in a contested case.
Keystone Nursing Care Center v. Craddock, 705 N.W.2d 299, 304, n.2 (Iowa 2005).
5
dependent adult and Sciacca was her caretaker. Thus, the question before us is
whether the district court erred in affirming the DIA’s determination that Sciacca
assaulted H.B.
Iowa Code section 235B.2 does not define “assault.” However, the rules
promulgated pursuant to chapter 235B provide, “‘Assault’ means ‘assault’ as
defined in Iowa Code section 708.1.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 441-176.1(235B).
Section 708.1 states in pertinent part:
A person commits an assault when, without justification, the person
does any of the following:
1. Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or
which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting
or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute
the act.
2. Any act which is intended to place another in fear of
immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting,
or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act.
Sciacca argues there is not substantial evidence supporting the agency’s
conclusion that an assault occurred. Substantial evidence “means the quantity
and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached
and reasonable person . . . .”
Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1).
An agency’s
decision does not lack substantial evidential support merely because inconsistent
conclusions may be drawn from the same evidence. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621
N.W.2d 410, 418 (Iowa 2001). The ultimate question is not whether the evidence
supports a different finding but whether the evidence supports the findings
actually made. City of Hampton v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 554 N.W.2d 532,
536 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Gaskey v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 537 N.W.2d 695, 698
(Iowa 1995)). Courts should broadly and liberally apply the agency’s findings to
6
uphold rather than defeat the agency’s decision. IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604
N.W.2d 621, 632 (Iowa 2000).
The record before the agency, when viewed as a whole, contains
substantial evidence from which the finder of fact could reasonably determine
Sciacca assaulted H.B. There was evidence Sciacca grabbed H.B.’s wrists three
or more times in an “overly rough” manner and engaged in a three to five second
“arm struggle” with her, which “scared” H.B. and caused her to sustain bruising
on her wrists. The ALJ discounted testimony provided by Starch, a witness to
the incident, while the deputy director chose to give her testimony greater weight.
We give deference to credibility determinations made by the agency. Clark v.
Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 644 N.W.2d 310, 315 (Iowa 2002). Because our
review is not de novo, we must not reassess the weight to be accorded to various
items of evidence. Hy-Vee, Inc. v. Employment Appeal Bd., 710 N.W.2d 1, 3
(Iowa 2005) (quoting Burns v. Bd. of Nursing, 495 N.W.2d 698, 699 (Iowa 1993)).
We therefore conclude substantial evidence supports the agency’s findings and
decision on this issue.
Sciacca argues the agency’s application of the law to the facts was
“irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable” and “the product of reasoning that is
so illogical as to render it wholly irrational.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(i), (m). 3
She asserts “[h]er actions do not fit the definition of assault of ‘intending to cause
3
Although it is not at all clear that these issues were preserved by being presented to
and passed upon by the district court, we have nevertheless chosen to briefly address
them.
7
pain or injury . . . .’” 4 While this may be true, the agency relied on the alternative
definition of assault as “[a]ny act which is . . . intended to result in physical
contact which will be insulting or offensive to another” in concluding Sciacca
committed dependent adult abuse. Iowa Code § 708.1(1). The district court
affirmed the agency’s decision that Sciacca’s actions “fit this definition of
assault,” stating, “[T]he Final Order provides a reasonable analysis to find that
assault . . . occurred . . . .” Under our standard of review, we must likewise
conclude the agency’s reasoning and application of the law to the facts was not
irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the agency’s findings that
Sciacca committed dependent adult abuse by assaulting H.B.
We further
conclude the agency’s determination that Sciacca’s actions constituted assault
was not “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable,” nor was it the “product of
reasoning that is so illogical as to render it wholly irrational.”
Iowa Code §
17A.19(10)(i), (m).
We have carefully considered all of the issues.
Those we have not
addressed were not preserved, were waived, or lack merit. Because we reach
the same conclusions the district court reached, we affirm its decision.
AFFIRMED.
4
Sciacca also asserts the district court erred in affirming the finding of dependent adult
abuse because “DIA’s reversal was based on the Department’s contrived assertion that
the ALJ utilized a ‘justification’ defense for the assault in making a finding of no found[ed]
abuse, which, in fact, he did not.” The mention of this issue, without elaboration or
supportive authority, is insufficient to raise the issue for our consideration. Iowa R. App.
P. 6.14(1)(c); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 691 (Iowa
1994). Furthermore, we note the ALJ did find “it is not possible to prove” Sciacca “acted
without justification” in concluding she did not assault H.B.
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