IN THE INTEREST OF B.K.L., Minor Child , A.K.L., Mother, Petitioner-Appellant .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-243 / 06-1713
Filed May 9, 2007
IN THE INTEREST OF B.K.L.,
Minor Child,
A.K.L., Mother,
Petitioner-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Victor G. Lathrop,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals from the order refusing her request to terminate the
parental rights of the father to their daughter. REVERSED AND REMANDED
WITH DIRECTIONS.
Michael Smith of Craig & Smith, L.L.P., Eldora, for appellant mother.
Kenneth Wiese, Huxley, pro se.
Robert Goodwin, Ames, guardian ad litem for the minor child.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Baker, JJ.
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BAKER, J.
A mother appeals from the order refusing her request to terminate the
parental rights of the father to their daughter. We reverse and remand with
directions.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
A.L. is the mother, and K.W., the father, of B.L., who was born in June of
2003.
On August 11, 2006, the mother filed a private petition seeking to
terminate the father’s parental rights based on the father’s abandonment and
desertion of the child. Attached to the petition was a document signed by the
father entitled “Consent to Termination of Parental Rights and Waiver of Notice.”
In that document, the father “consent[ed] to the entry of a decree terminating the
parental-child relationship between himself and [B.L.] without further notice to
him.”
On September 13, a short hearing was held at which A.L. and K.W., with
whom she was living at the time, testified. K.W. did not attend or testify at the
hearing.
The mother testified as to K.W.’s complete lack of interest in their
daughter. She testified that the father does not support B.L. financially and that
he only visits his daughter when “summoned.” In addition, she related her goal in
seeking termination was to protect B.L. in the event of something happening to
her that would render her unable to care for B.L. Next, A.L.’s father testified. He
addressed his ability and willingness to support A.L. and B.L. financially. He also
testified to his willingness to serve as a “stand-by guardian” for B.L.
In addition, the court received a written report from the child’s guardian ad
litem, in which the guardian ad litem advocated that the court terminate the
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father’s parental rights. In particular, the guardian ad litem related the father “has
no interest in having any contact or involvement with [B.L.].” He further noted
that K.W. comes from a dysfunctional family and the mother’s concern is that,
should she become incapacitated, the father would obtain custody and pass
along B.L.’s care to his alcoholic and abusive parents. Finally, the guardian ad
litem noted the mother’s supportive family and their ability to care for B.L. in the
event of the mother’s incapacitation.
On September 29, 2006, the court entered an order denying the mother’s
request to terminate the father’s parental rights. The court first acknowledged
the father’s apparent abandonment of B.L. and his consent to terminate. As
such, it recognized the statutory grounds for termination were satisfied.
However, after addressing B.L.’s best interests, it refused to terminate the
father’s parental rights.
The court stated “[K.W.] should not be allowed to
terminate his parental rights just to avoid the possibility of being required to pay
support in the future if [A.L.] ever requests the Court establish an amount of child
support.” The mother appeals from this ruling.
Scope of Review.
We review private termination proceedings de novo. In re R.K.B., 572
N.W.2d 600, 601 (Iowa 1998). Our primary interest in termination proceedings is
the best interests of the child. Id. at 602. Even when the statutory grounds for
termination are met, the decision to terminate parental rights must reflect the
child's best interests. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994). When we
consider the child's best interests, we look to his or her long-range as well as
immediate best interests. In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997).
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Termination.
First, upon our de novo review of the record, we find there is absolutely no
indication that K.W. was motivated primarily by economic concerns to terminate
his potential obligation to pay child support. The court apparently divined this
motivation from the circumstances of the case. 1 It is true that in some cases
Iowa’s courts have held a desire to avoid financial obligations insufficient to
justify a termination of parental rights. See In re D.W.K., 365 N.W.2d 32 (Iowa
1985); In re J.L.W., 496 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); In re K.J.K., 396
N.W.2d 370 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986).
However, we find those cases
distinguishable.
In J.L.W., 496 N.W.2d at 283, the mother objected to the father’s attempt
to voluntarily terminate his parental rights. Here the mother affirmatively seeks
the father’s termination. In K.J.K., 396 N.W.2d at 372, the mother was receiving
public assistance while the father made substantial yearly earnings. Here, in
contrast, the mother will soon become a nurse and is not receiving any public
funds. Finally, in D.W.K., 365 N.W.2d at 33, evidence was presented that the
father’s “primary motive in terminating this relationship is to . . . free himself from
the support obligations previously ordered.” As noted above, here there is simply
no way to determine from the record that the father’s consent to terminate was in
any way motivated by his desire to shirk his financial obligations.
1
The court stated that “[t]ermination of [K.W.’s] parental rights would deprive [B.L.] of the
child support she deserves from her father.” We would note, however, that K.W. is not,
and has not been, supporting his daughter in any fashion since her birth.
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The court here also noted that “[A.L.’s] reasoning for terminating [K.W.’s]
parental rights is too speculative to be a basis for termination.” We disagree.
Beyond her stated desire to protect her daughter from any future involvement
with the father’s parents, A.L. presented unrebutted evidence that K.W. had
totally abandoned their daughter and that, despite being employed, he has never
provided support for her. These two grounds, abandonment and lack of support,
are two statutorily prescribed reasons to terminate. See Iowa Code §§ 600A.8(3)
(abandonment) and 600A.8(4) (failure to support financially). As such, they are
far from “speculative.” Indeed they are concrete examples of K.W.’s history as a
parent and his likelihood of ever playing a meaningful role in B.L.’s life, either
emotionally or financially. Furthermore, lack of objection to a petition to terminate
is also a ground for granting a petition. See Iowa Code § 600A.8(5).
Finally, if best interests are to be considered the polestar, we find
guidance directly in chapter 600A (Termination of Parental Rights) wherein it
states that the “best interests of a child requires that each biological parent
affirmatively assume the duties by the role of being a parent.”
B.L.’s best
interests are served by severing the rights of a biological parent who has shown
no interest in her life whatsoever, who has provided no support for her, and who
has no future intentions of becoming involved with her. See, e.g. In re M.S., 519
N.W.2d 398 401 (Iowa1994).
We therefore reverse the order declining the
request to terminate the father’s parental rights in this case. We remand with
directions for the juvenile court to enter an order terminating the father’s parental
rights.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
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