IN THE INTEREST OF G.F. and D.F., Minor Children, N.M., Mother, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-221 / 07-0293
Filed April 25, 2007
IN THE INTEREST OF G.F. and D.F.,
Minor Children,
N.M., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Gerald W. Magee,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights
to two children. AFFIRMED.
Thea Porisch of Schroeder Law Office, Charles City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, Jesse Marzen, County Attorney, and Marilyn Dettmer, Special
Prosecutor, for appellee-State.
Rodney Mulcahy, Charles City, for appellee-intervenor.
Richard Stochl, New Hampton, for father.
Cynthia Schuknecht of Noah, Smith & Schuknecht, P.L.C., Charles City,
guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Mahan, JJ.
2
SACKETT, C.J.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights
to two children. She contends she should have been given more time to pursue
reunification, the State did not prove the statutory grounds for termination, and the
court erred in admitting hearsay evidence. We affirm.
Noel is the mother and Casey is the father 1 of Gabriel, born in 2003, and
Damien, born in 2004. The children were removed from their parents’ care in July of
2005. In August, they were found to be in need of assistance under Iowa Code
section 232.2(6)(n) (2005) (parent’s mental capacity (or condition, or drug or alcohol
abuse) results in child not receiving adequate care) at an uncontested hearing. The
dispositional order in November continued the children’s foster placement based in
part on the children’s aggression and Noel’s diagnosis of anxiety disorder, panic
disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, psychoactive substance abuse, and
personality disorder.
At a contested permanency hearing in June of 2006, Noel requested an
additional six months to pursue reunification. The court found the many corrections
and changes she would have to make were a “tall order” and “the children should
not be held in limbo to await success or failure.” The court encouraged Noel to use
the time remaining before the termination hearing to make the corrections and
changes necessary for reunification. The court found the permanency goal to be
adoption, but allowed concurrent efforts at reunification, continued the children in
foster care, directed the State to initiate home studies of appropriate relatives for
possible adoption, and ordered that a petition to terminate parental rights be filed.
1
The father consented to termination of his parental rights has did not appeal.
3
Noel appealed. The supreme court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory. In re
G.F., No. 06-1072 (Iowa Aug. 23, 2006).
The State petitioned to terminate parental rights in July of 2006, but it was not
heard until January of 2007. The court found the children could not be returned to
Noel’s care “at the present time or within the foreseeable future.” It noted Noel had
not demonstrated improved parenting skills during the six months since the
permanency hearing. The court further found,
while Noel has made some efforts, has had regular visits with her
children and is bonded to them, she sees no barriers to reunification
and no deficiency in parenting skills and has not yet assumed the
affirmative assumption of parental duties. Despite multiple and longterm services, she remains self-centered and still is only “doing what
others ask,” and does not recognize the changes she needs to make.
She has not completed the responsibilities in the case plan or those
outlined in family team meeting. Her efforts have not been sufficient,
or genuinely made to complete responsibilities nor have been
reasonable, in light of the circumstances, to resume the care of these
children despite multiple services and the opportunity to do so. She
plays with them, hugs them and can be appropriate on visits, but
those are not sufficient genuine efforts to change or to establish and
maintain a place of importance in their lives.
The court terminated Noel’s parental rights to Gabriel and Damien under Iowa Code
sections 232.116(1)(e) and (h).
Our review is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; In re D.G., 704 N.W.2d 454, 456
(Iowa Ct. App. 2005). The State must prove the statutory grounds for termination by
clear and convincing evidence. In re L.E.H., 696 N.W.2d 617, 618 (Iowa Ct. App.
2005). If the juvenile court terminates a parent’s rights on more than one statutory
ground, we will affirm if at least one ground has been proved by clear and
convincing evidence. In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
Noel first contends the juvenile court erred in its permanency order in not
giving her an additional six months to work toward reunification. See Iowa Code
4
§ 232.104(2)(b) (permitting entry of a permanency order continuing placement for
six months if the court determines the need for removal will no longer exist at that
time). We find no merit in this claim. Although the court expressly denied her
request for a six-month continuation of the children’s placement to allow her time to
work toward reunification because “the children should not be held in limbo to await
success or failure,” it also made it clear to her she should use the time she had
wisely, noting “nothing precludes Noel from working hard to make those changes, to
show the ability to parent these children and to accomplish reunification.” As a
practical matter, Noel had nearly six months between the date of the permanency
order and the termination hearing in which to make the changes required by the
case plan and show her ability to parent her children. If the court had granted her
request for six months, she would have had only a couple of weeks more time than
she actually had. She cannot reasonably claim, given her lack of progress during
the nearly six months she had, that two more weeks would have made a difference.
At the time of the permanency hearing, the court was correct in not making a
determination “that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no
longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Id. (Emphasis added.)
We affirm on this issue.
Noel also contends the statutory grounds for termination are not supported by
clear and convincing evidence. The court terminated her parental rights under
sections 232.116(1)(e) and (h). Proof of the first three elements of section (h) is
clearly established in the record. The fourth element requires “clear and convincing
evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as
provided in section 232.102 at the present time.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4).
5
Noel argues the juvenile court failed to specify “which portion of § 232.102 prevents
the children from being returned.” We find no requirement that the court specify
which portion of section 232.102 prevents the children from being returned. Section
232.102(5)(a) provides for a child’s removal if the child (1) cannot be protected from
physical abuse or (2) the child cannot be protected from some harm that would
justify the child’s adjudication as a child in need of assistance. The threat of
probable harm will justify termination of parental rights, and the perceived harm
need not be the one that supported the child’s removal from the home. See In re
M.M., 482 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa 1992). Clear and convincing evidence in the
record supports the court’s determination the children could not be returned to
Noel’s care at the time of the termination hearing. They would be at risk of harm
that would justify their adjudication as children in need of assistance under section
232.2(6).
We affirm the termination of Noel’s parental rights under section
232.116(1)(h).
Noel contends the court erred in admitting police testimony and reports and
hospital records relating to an incident in December of 2006 in which Noel called
police and was admitted to a hospital.
In our de novo review we have not
considered any of the challenged testimony or exhibits. Consequently, we need not
address Noel’s evidentiary claims.
AFFIRMED.
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