MINERVA VILLELA, Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, vs. LUND FOOD HOLDINGS, INC., LUND FOOD, INC., TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondents-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY and SECOND INJURY FUND OF IOWA, Respondents-Appellees.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-191 / 06-0367
Filed June 27, 2007
MINERVA VILLELA,
Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
vs.
LUND FOOD HOLDINGS, INC., LUND FOOD, INC.,
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondents-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY and
SECOND INJURY FUND OF IOWA,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winnebago County, James M.
Drew, Judge.
Minerva Villela appeals from the district court’s ruling on judicial review
affirming the workers’ compensation commissioner’s decisions on her claims for
workers’ compensation benefits. AFFIRMED.
Mark S. Soldat, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Julie A. Burger, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee Second Injury Fund of Iowa.
Jeffrey W. Lanz of Huber, Book, Cortese, Happe & Lanz, P.L.C., West
Des Moines, for appellee Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company.
2
John E. Swanson of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, for
appellees Lund Food Holdings, Inc. and Travelers Insurance Company.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Baker, JJ.
3
BAKER, J.
Minerva Villela appeals from the district court’s ruling on judicial review
affirming the workers’ compensation commissioner’s decisions on her claims for
benefits. 1 She asserts the district court erred in affirming the commissioner’s (1)
dismissal of her second injury fund claims, (2) failure to award temporary partial
disability benefits for periods she worked under restricted duty, (3) failure to
award permanent partial disability benefits for various work injuries, (4) finding
she suffered a thirty percent industrial disability, (5) computation of weekly
compensation rates based on her leaving work early without pay, (6) refusal to
award certain transportation expenses, and (7) failure to award additional penalty
payments. Lund Food (Lund) and Travelers cross-appeal the industrial disability
award and the selection of February 22, 2000 as an injury date.
I. Background and Facts
Minerva Villela has been employed with Lund, a food processing facility,
and its predecessor, Byerly’s, since February 1990. She has worked primarily in
the vegetable preparation department.
Her work involves repetition with her
hands and arms and lifting, pushing, and pulling materials. Villela began having
hand and arm pain within a year of employment at Lund.
Prior to the work-related injuries at issue in this appeal, Villela experienced
significant physical problems. She was diagnosed as diabetic in 1977. In 1986,
she suffered a fracture to her left arm, and she fractured her ankle in 1992. She
1
Villela seeks workers’ compensation benefits from Iowa’s second injury fund, and from
Lund Food Holdings, Incorporated, Lund Food, Incorporated, and its insurance carriers,
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, prior to January 1, 2000, and Travelers Insurance
Company, effective 12:01 A.M. on that date.
4
has previously sought treatment for tendinitis and arm, finger, and hand
numbness, swelling and pain. In 1996, she developed an ulcer on her right foot.
Between September 1997 and November 2000, Villela suffered eight
separate injuries, which are the subject of this appeal.
Most relate to the
cumulative injury of her neck, shoulders, arms, fingers, and wrists. Her July 2000
injury occurred when she was struck in the head by a door, causing headaches,
dizziness, and memory loss. She has seen several health care providers and
been diagnosed with various conditions, including bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome and right lateral epicondylitis (tennis elbow). Health care providers
have repeatedly advised her to end her repetitive work. Villela is unable to leave
her job for financial reasons. In January 2000, she was assigned to lighter duty
to accommodate her various hand and arm problems, but she returned to full
duty in March 2002, when Lund refused to continue the accommodation.
In December 2000, Villela filed workers’ compensation claims against
Lund and its insurers and Iowa’s second injury fund.
Because permanency
issues remained on two injuries, the proceedings were bifurcated and resulted in
two decisions by a deputy commissioner, filed on July 29, 2002, and November
26, 2003. Villela appealed. In decisions filed May 30, 2003, and August 16,
2005, the workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed the deputy and (1)
awarded Villela permanent partial disability benefits based on a fifteen-percent
body as a whole impairment caused by carpal tunnel syndrome, (2) found she
sustained a thirty-percent industrial disability caused by her regional pain
condition, with an injury date of February 22, 2000, (3) refused to award
5
permanent partial disability benefits for the other injury dates, (4) denied the
second injury fund claim, (5) refused to award temporary partial disability benefits
for periods she worked under restricted duty, (6) affirmed the use of a weekly
compensation rate that considered voluntary absences from work, (7) refused to
reimburse $9.86 for meal expenses, (8) refused to award additional penalty
payments, and (9) selected February 22, 2000 as an appropriate injury date.
Villela petitioned for judicial review.
The district court affirmed the
commissioner’s decision. Villela appeals. Lund and Travelers cross-appeal.
II. Standard of Review
We review decisions of administrative agencies for correction of errors at
law. Kostelac v. Feldman’s, Inc., 497 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Iowa 1993). Agency
decisions carry the weight of a jury verdict.
Id.
We are bound by the
commissioner’s findings of fact if supported in the record as a whole and will
reverse the agency findings only if we determine that substantial evidence does
not support them. Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006); see
also Terwilliger v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 529 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa 1995)
(declining to apply scrutinizing analysis to agency decisions).
The definitive
question is not whether the evidence supports a different finding, but whether the
evidence supports the findings that were actually made. Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at
218.
“We are not bound, however, by an agency’s erroneous conclusions of
law.” Kostelac, 497 N.W.2d at 856. We allocate some degree of discretion in
6
our review of the application of the law to the facts, but not the breadth of
discretion given to the findings of fact. Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218-19.
III. Merits
Villela argues the district court erred in affirming the commissioner’s
decisions on seven issues. Lund and Travelers contend the court erred on two.
A. Second Injury Fund
Villela asserts the district court erred in affirming the commissioner’s
dismissal of her second injury fund claims. The fund’s primary purpose is to
encourage employers to hire persons with disabilities by reducing the risk of
increased workers’ compensation costs that might otherwise be associated with
hiring a person who has previously suffered a “permanent disability.” Anderson
v. Second Injury Fund, 262 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 1978). The fund may be
liable for a portion of an industrial disability caused by two successive injuries
when (1) the employee has either lost or lost the use of a hand,
arm, foot, leg, or eyes; (2) the employee sustained the loss, or loss
of use of another such member or organ through a work related
injury; and (3) there is some permanent disability from the injuries.
Haynes v. Second Injury Fund, 547 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); see
also Iowa Code § 85.64 (1999). The prior loss of use need not be work related,
and it does not have to be a total loss of use. Second Injury Fund v. Shank, 516
N.W.2d 808, 812-13 (Iowa 1994). While an impairment rating or expert medical
evidence are generally used to establish the permanency of an injury, they are
not always required. Haynes, 547 N.W.2d at 13-14.
Villela fractured her ankle in a nonwork-related accident in 1992. She had
a subsequent work-related injury in 1996, when she bumped her leg against a
7
pallet and was treated for the resulting ulcer and infections. In affirming the
commissioner’s decision, the district court found that, although she had obviously
injured her foot, there had been no permanent impairment or loss of use. We
agree. While the record indicates Minerva has experienced scarring, decreased
sensation, swelling, and pain in her left ankle, the evidence does not show Villela
had any significant loss of use of her ankle or any restrictions on the use of her
leg. These injuries are not the type of “permanent disability” injury for which the
second injury fund was intended.
See Anderson, 262 N.W.2d at 791 (“The
source of this pre-existing disability . . . must be permanent and must tend to act
as a hindrance to the individual’s ability to obtain or retain effective
employment.”). We find no error in the denial of her second injury fund claim.
B. Temporary Partial Benefits
Villella contends the district court erred in affirming the commissioner’s
failure to award temporary partial benefits under Iowa Code section 85.33 without
applying the statutory formula for calculating such benefits. Villela has been
restricted in her duties on an intermittent basis. The commissioner found there
was no showing that Villela’s hours of work or rate of pay were reduced due to
her work restrictions and determined the deputy correctly denied benefits. The
district court held that, even though it was “possible that the commissioner and
deputy used a ‘shortcut’ to analyze this issue, . . . any error that might have been
committed in applying the statute was harmless.”
Temporary partial disability benefits are payable because of a reduction in
an employee’s earning ability when suffering from an injury. If an employee is
8
temporarily, partially disabled and the employer offers work within the employee’s
restrictions, the employee must accept the work and may then be compensated
with temporary partial benefits. Iowa Code § 85.33(3). If the employee refuses
the suitable work, “the employee will not be compensated with temporary partial .
. . benefits during the period of the refusal.” Id. Iowa Code section 85.33(2)
provides for benefits for a “temporary partial reduction in earning ability as a
result of the employee’s temporary partial disability.” Because the reduction in
earning ability must be “as a result of” the injury, not other absences, an
employee need not be paid the benefit if absences were due to other reasons.
The record supports the determination that Villela did not lose income due
to temporary partial disability. Any reduction in her earnings while she was on
restricted duty was attributable to factors (e.g. voluntarily leaving early) other
than her disability. Because there was no loss of earnings due to disability, the
application of the statutory formula for calculating such benefits does not even
come into play. We affirm the district court’s decision on this issue.
C. Permanent Partial Benefits
Villela contends the district court erred in affirming the commissioner’s
failure to award permanent disability compensation for five cumulative injuries. 2
The court affirmed the holding that Villela suffered injuries to various parts of her
upper extremities and that the injuries were work related. The court found the
agency’s denial of permanent partial benefits was supported by “ample evidence
2
Injuries dated September 26, 1997 (right elbow); June 3, 1998 (right shoulder, elbows,
wrists); December 24, 1998 (wrists); August 5, 1999 and September 27, 1999 (fingers).
9
in the record” that Villela had no permanent impairment to her elbows, fingers,
shoulder, and neck. We find no error in the district court’s holding.
D. Industrial Disability
Villela contends the thirty percent industrial disability award for the
February 22, 2000, 3 injury is too low because the “small award was not logical or
supported by substantial evidence.”
Lund and Travelers contend the thirty
percent industrial disability is “contrary to the overwhelming evidence and the
applicable law.” 4
Industrial disability measures an injured worker’s lost earning
capacity. Factors to be considered include the employee’s
functional disability, age, education, qualifications, experience, and
the ability of the employee to engage in similar employment. The
focus is not solely on what the worker can or cannot do; industrial
disability rests on the ability of the worker to be gainfully employed.
Myers v. F.C.A. Servs., Inc., 592 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 1999) (citing Quaker
Oats Co. v. Ciha, 552 N.W.2d 143, 157 (Iowa 1996)). “If the evidence relating to
these criteria is substantial when the record is viewed as a whole, the
Commissioner’s decision must be sustained.”
Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v.
Tasler, 483 N.W.2d 824, 831 (Iowa 1992).
The district court found the deputy engaged in a detailed analysis, which
was adopted by the commissioner, and that the deputy considered the
appropriate facts and correctly applied the law to determine the industrial
disability award. We agree with the court’s conclusion that “there is no basis for
3
February 22, 2000, is the date designated by the deputy as the most appropriate
manifestation date for Villela’s neck, shoulder, and upper back chronic pain syndrome.
4
We echo the district court’s questioning of “how the parties, presumably acting in good
faith, can have such differing views of the same evidence,” and we agree “[t]he truth
probably lies somewhere in the middle.”
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changing the commissioner’s decision on this issue.” See Myers, 592 N.W.2d at
357 (“The industrial commissioner is not required to fix disability with precise
accuracy.”); Second Injury Fund v. Bergeson, 526 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Iowa 1995)
(noting this court prefers to defer to the commissioner’s expertise on this issue).
Villela argues “the commissioner’s award is the result of a misapplication
of the law,” because it considered the continuation of her accommodated work
and failed to explain “how the evidence warranted as low as a 30% industrial
disability determination.” She contends there is no evidence or rationale in the
record that there was work available for her in the competitive job market.
In measuring a claimant’s loss of earning capacity, . . . an
employer’s accommodation . . . may only be considered if such
accommodation would be available in the general labor market.
Otherwise, the loss of earning capacity must be based on the
injured worker’s present ability to earn in the competitive job market
without regard to any accommodation furnished by that person’s
present employer.
Ellingson v. Fleetguard, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 440, 445 (Iowa 1999) (citations
omitted).
The deputy found Villela “demonstrated a loss of the opportunity to return
to past jobs,” and, although she offered no evidence to show loss of future job
opportunities, “there probably are some.” “Given the fact that she continues to
happily work at Lund, despite her pain without loss of income,” the deputy found
Villela entitled to a thirty percent award. In affirming the deputy’s decision, the
commissioner stated she “has permanent physical impairment and permanent
activity restrictions that affect her access to jobs. In view of [her] lack of skills for
other types of work and limited education, her prospects for work with other
11
employers is bleak.”
We find the agency appropriately considered, and
sufficiently explained, Villela’s present ability to work in the job market.
Lund and Travelers contend the evidence fails to support any award
because there has been “no lost income, no lost earning capacity, and no
impairment to Villela’s ability to earn wages.”
While an actual reduction in
earning capacity may be important in establishing an industrial disability, it is not
essential to a determination that an employee has suffered a loss of earning
capacity.
Oscar Mayer, 483 N.W.2d at 831.
Villela’s continued full-time
employment does not preclude an industrial disability award. Further, the record
contains sufficient evidence to support the agency’s determination that her
injuries have caused a permanent impairment to her ability to earn wages.
We conclude the district court correctly applied the law in affirming the
agency. It is clear the agency considered appropriate factors, including Villela’s
inability to engage in similar employment. “[T]he Commissioner is entitled to
draw reasonable inferences based upon the evidence presented.” Id. It was
reasonable to conclude, viewing the record as a whole, that Villela sustained a
thirty percent loss of earning capacity.
E. Compensation Rates
Villela next argues the district court erred in affirming the commissioner’s
computation of the compensation rates. She contends that, rather than the hours
she customarily worked, her weekly rate computation should have been based
on “what hours she could have worked because she was ‘entitled’ to them.”
12
An injured employee’s computation rate is based on his or her weekly
earnings at the time of the injury. Iowa Code § 85.36.
Weekly earnings means gross salary, wages, or earnings of an
employee to which such employee would have been entitled had
the employee worked the customary hours for the full pay period in
which the employee was injured, as regularly required by the
employee’s employer.
Id. (emphasis added).
“[T]he focus of the statute is on the ‘customary hours’ the employee is
‘regularly required’ to work.” Griffin Pipe Prods. Co. v. Guarino, 663 N.W.2d 862,
866 (Iowa 2003). Weeks that contain absences due to causes such as illness
and vacation are routinely excluded from the calculation because they are not
representative of a customary week. Id.; see, e.g., Weishaar v. Snap-On Tools
Corp., 582 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa 1998) (excluding several weeks in which
employee worked less than forty hours was not error because the customary
week was forty hours); Thilges v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 528 N.W.2d 614,
619 (Iowa 1995) (holding, although employee “worked less than forty hours
during seven of the thirteen weeks immediately prior to the injury date, . . . [t]he
customary hours for the full pay period for her job were . . . a forty-hour week”).
The issue then is whether Villela’s hours of work in the weeks used to
calculate her weekly rate are typical of the hours customarily worked. If a fortyhour week was customary for Villela, then forty hours must be used as the basis
of her weekly rate computation. The agency properly calculated Villella’s rate
based on actual hours because those hours reflected the customary hours she
typically worked. Villela worked forty or more hours in only thirteen of the thirty-
13
seven weeks from January to September 1997. Villela testified that it was typical
for her to take time off on an afternoon when Lund was not busy. There is
substantial evidence to conclude that a forty-hour week was not customary.
Villela also asks this court to direct the commissioner on remand to
address the computation of the weekly rate for the September 27, 1999 injury.
This issue has not been addressed by the deputy, commissioner, or district court.
“When a district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the party
who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve
error for appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (citations
omitted); see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(2); Cripps v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 613
N.W.2d 210, 212 (Iowa 2000) (applying rule 1.904(2) in a judicial review
proceeding). Villela did not request a ruling from the district court on this issue.
As this issue has not been preserved, we decline to address it.
F. Transportation Expenses
Villela asserts the district court erred in affirming the agency’s failure to
award $9.68 in food expenses she incurred en route to a doctor’s visit. The
deputy initially ruled there was no evidence in the record to award the expense.
When the receipts were brought to his attention, the deputy again refused,
stating “just dumping a receipt in the record and arguing it is connected does not
establish a causal connection.” We agree with the district court “there is no basis
for reversing the agency’s determination” on this trivial issue.
14
G. Penalty
Villela next contends she should have been awarded a penalty for
nonpayment of permanent partial disability compensation.
She asserts that,
even though Fireman’s was advised of her injuries, it failed to take affirmative
action to learn whether the injury to her carpal tunnels caused permanent
functional disability or to pay any permanent partial disability for the injury. She
also contends a penalty should be imposed against Travelers for its failure to pay
partial permanent disability benefits for her February 22, 2000 injury because
Travelers produced no evidence of a reasonable excuse for the delay. 5
[A]n employee is entitled to penalty benefits if there has been a
delay in payment unless the employer proves a reasonable cause
or excuse. A reasonable cause or excuse exists if either (1) the
delay was necessary for the insurer to investigate the claim or (2)
the employer had a reasonable basis to contest the employee’s
entitlement to benefits. A “reasonable basis” for denial of the claim
exists if the claim is “fairly debatable.”
Christensen, 554 N.W.2d at 260.
On April 24, 2000, and on January 30, 2002, Dr. Ciota indicated Villela
had a zero percent impairment rating. On December 4, 2000, Dr. McMains gave
5
In her reply brief, Villela argues,
[t]he issue is not whether these defendants could identify evidence in the
record which theoretically might have constituted a reasonable excuse for
not paying . . . . Rather, the issue was whether the defendants offered
evidence by which to carry their burden of proof that a reasonable excuse
was in fact the reason that compensation was not paid when due.
Villela cites no legal authority to support an argument that the “reasonable excuse” must
“in fact” be the reason compensation was not paid. Therefore, we need not consider this
argument. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 6.14(1)(c). Further, in considering whether a reasonable
excuse exists, “[t]he focus is on whether timely payment of the benefits due was made
and if not, whether there was a reasonable excuse for the failure to make timely
payment.” Christensen v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 554 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Iowa 1996).
15
Villela a zero percent impairment rating. It was not until February 13, 2002,
following an independent evaluation by Dr. Ban, that a permanent impairment
rating was provided.
Because “at least two doctors ha[d] opined that these
injuries resulted in no permanent impairment,” the deputy found the claim was
“fairly debatable” and denied the claim for penalty benefits. The record supports
the district court’s conclusion that Villela “did not have a ratable disability as late
as January 30, 2002,” making her claims “fairly debatable.”
The more troublesome delay is that which occurred between February 13,
2002, the date of Dr. Ban’s impairment rating, and June 19, 2002, during which
Fireman’s failed to pay any permanent partial disability. Fireman’s contends that,
because “three[6] physicians had provided 0% impairment ratings,” it had a basis
to not pay the claim. We disagree with Fireman’s contention that Villela’s claim
for a penalty is “totally without merit.” Further, Fireman’s cites no authority to
support it was reasonable, in the face of a current impairment rating, to rely for
an additional four months on the previous opinions. We will, however, reverse an
agency’s findings only if we determine that substantial evidence does not support
them. Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218. The previous zero percent impairment ratings
provide sufficient “substantial evidence” to support the district court’s affirmation
on this issue. See Murillo v. Blackhawk Foundry, 571 N.W.2d 16, 17 (Iowa 1997)
(“The mere fact that we could draw inconsistent conclusions from the same
evidence does not mean the commissioner’s conclusions were unsupported by
substantial evidence.”); see also Craddock, 705 N.W.2d at 307-08 (finding
permanent partial disability was “fairly debatable” where employer believed
16
employee had not sustained an industrial disability based on physician’s written
release); Christensen, 554 N.W.2d at 261 (holding a two-month delay was
reasonable in light of prior medical records indicating employee would recover).
Villela next contends the fifty-percent penalties that were awarded were
incorrectly calculated. 6 Villela did not request a ruling from the trial court on this
issue pursuant to rule 1.904(2).
As the issue regarding these insignificant
amounts has not been preserved for our review, we will not address it.
H. Injury Date
Lund and Travelers contend the district court erred in affirming the
commissioner’s selection of February 22, 2000, as the injury date. They assert
they “went to hearing and litigated based on an alleged injury date of November
30, 2000,” and were therefore deprived of “notice and the opportunity to defend”
because there was no notice of a February 22, 2000 injury date until after the
hearing. Therefore, they assert, because no injury was found to have occurred
on November 30, 2000, the injury date alleged by Villela, the thirty percent
industrial disability award for the February 22, 2000 injury should be reversed.
Because it is an inherently fact-based determination, the agency is entitled
to a substantial amount of latitude in making a determination regarding the date
of injury. Oscar Mayer, 483 N.W.2d at 829. It may “consider a multitude of
factors such as absence from work because of inability to perform, the point at
which medical care is received, or others, none of which is necessarily
dispositive.”
6
Id. at 830.
Determining whether an employer was sufficiently
Villela contends the $116.47 penalty should have been $142.64, and the $851.51
penalty should have been $886.84.
17
informed of the alleged basis for the employee’s claim is also a matter within the
agency’s discretion. Univ. of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics v. Waters, 674 N.W.2d 92,
96 (Iowa 2004).
Accordingly, our review of this issue is for an abuse of
discretion. Id.
[W]ith respect to agency adjudications, due process requires that a
party “be informed somehow of the issue involved in order to
prevent surprise at the hearing and allow an opportunity to prepare
. . . . The test is fundamental fairness, not whether the notice
meets technical rules of common law pleading.”
Oscar Mayer, 483 N.W.2d at 828 (quoting Wedergren v. Bd. of Dirs., 307 N.W.2d
12, 16 (Iowa 1981)). To establish a due process violation, a showing of prejudice
is required. Oscar Mayer, 483 N.W.2d at 828.
We agree Lund had adequate notice of Villela’s cumulative injury. Her
petition states the injury occurred “cumulatively and progressively” and affected
“both upper extremities, including shoulders, neck, and upper back.” While the
petition states an injury date of approximately November 30, 2000, it also notes
disability dates throughout 1999. Because Villela’s petition was filed within two
years of the determined injury date, there is no statute of limitations issue, and
therefore no prejudice to Lund.
Additionally, because Lund had detailed
knowledge of Villela’s injury and treatment records, there was no unfair surprise.
In affirming the February 22, 2000 injury date, the district court did not exercise
its discretion on untenable grounds, nor was its exercise of discretion clearly
erroneous. See IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 630 (Iowa 2000) (noting
an abuse of discretion occurs when the district court has exercised its discretion
on clearly untenable or unreasonable grounds). We affirm on this issue.
18
IV. Conclusion
Because Villela’s 1992 ankle fracture did not result in a permanent
impairment or loss of use, we affirm the district court’s denial of her second injury
fund claim. Because the record supports the determination that she did not lose
income due to temporary partial disability, we affirm the court’s refusal to award
temporary partial benefits. We affirm the court’s refusal to award permanent
partial disability for the injuries to Villela’s elbows, fingers, shoulder, and neck.
We also affirm the thirty-percent industrial ability award because the agency
considered appropriate facts, including Villela’s inability to engage in similar
employment, and correctly applied the law. As there was substantial evidence to
support the conclusion that a forty-hour week was not customary, we affirm the
calculation of her weekly rate based on actual hours worked. There is no basis
for reversing the agency’s determination on the $9.68 food expense. We affirm
the court’s denial of her claim for additional penalty benefits because there is
sufficient substantial evidence to find her claims for permanent partial disability
were “fairly debatable.” Finally, because Lunds was not unfairly deprived of its
due process rights, the court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the February
22, 2000 injury date. We have carefully considered all issues raised on appeal
and find they have no merit or are effectively resolved by the foregoing. The
judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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