HAMILTON COUNTY, IOWA, A Political Subdivision, Plaintiff-Appell ee/Cross-Appellant, vs. WEBSTER COUNTY, IOWA, A Political Subdivision, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Intervenor-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-181 / 05-1827
Filed June 27, 2007
HAMILTON COUNTY, IOWA, A Political Subdivision,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
WEBSTER COUNTY, IOWA, A Political Subdivision,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Intervenor-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hamilton County, Timothy J. Finn,
Judge.
Webster County appeals, and Hamilton County cross-appeals, from the
ruling on a dispute over which party should bear the costs of a person’s care in
the Woodward State Resource Center. REVERSED.
Timothy N. Schott, Webster County Attorney, Fort Dodge, for appellant.
Patrick B. Chambers, Hamilton County Attorney, Webster City, for
appellee.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary Pippin, Assistant Attorney
General, for intervenor-State.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., Vogel and Baker, JJ., and Nelson, S.J.
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2007).
2
VOGEL, J.
Webster County appeals and Hamilton County cross-appeals from the
ruling on a dispute over which party should bear the costs of an individual’s care
in the Woodward State Resource Center. We reverse.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. C.W., who has been described
as “profoundly mentally retarded,” was born in 1945 in Wyoming. Her parents,
Loveda and Robert, were not married at the time of her birth. 1 In the early 1950s
the family moved to Hamilton County, Iowa. On June 17, 1951, Loveda and
Robert voluntarily placed C.W. into a state facility then known as Woodward
State Hospital, now known as Woodward State Resource Center (Woodward).
The application for admission to Woodward, which acknowledged her residence
as being in Hamilton County, was approved by the Hamilton County Board of
Supervisors, attested to by the Hamilton County Auditor, and signed by the
Hamilton County Attorney.
In 1954, while C.W. still remained in the Woodward facility, Loveda and
Robert moved to Fort Dodge, in Webster County. They remained in Webster
County until 1985, when they moved to Eldridge in Scott County. On April 16,
1966, C.W. turned twenty-one years of age. 2
resided in Webster County.
At that time, C.W.’s parents
Having reached the age of majority, C.W. was
discharged from Woodward. From 1966 until October of 1984, C.W. resided in
various Iowa facilities located in Des Moines, Webster City, Gowrie, Fort Dodge,
1
After the initiation of this suit, a birth certificate was discovered listing another individual
as C.W.’s birth father.
2
Iowa Code § 591.1 (1966) provided the age of majority was twenty-one years.
3
Humboldt and Emmetsburg. On October 1, 1984, C.W. was readmitted to the
Woodward facility and continued to reside there until the time of trial in this
matter. The Chairman of the Hamilton County Board of Supervisors, having
made the determination that Hamilton County was C.W.’s legal settlement,
signed the 1984 readmission application.
Throughout both of C.W.’s stays at the Woodward facility, Hamilton
County continued to pay the cost of her care. However, beginning in September
of 2003, Hamilton County stopped paying the bills. It thereafter gave notice to
Webster County, contending that Webster County had been obligated for most of
her past care, and that it owed Hamilton County $573,387.85 for monies it had
improperly expended. Webster County denied the claim and asserted various
affirmative defenses including statute of limitations, laches, and lack of
jurisdiction. On February 24, 2004, Hamilton County brought suit in the district
court to determine C.W.’s “legal settlement,” and thus which county was
obligated to pay for her care at the Woodward facility. The State of Iowa, through
the Department of Human Services, subsequently intervened and argued that
C.W.’s legal settlement was established in 1951 in Hamilton County and had not
changed.
Following a trial, the district court held that in 1956 C.W.’s legal settlement
changed to Webster County as a result of her parents’ move to that county. It
therefore ruled that Webster County should have been liable for the costs of
C.W.’s care at Woodward since 1956. However, it further ruled that it would be
inequitable to require Webster County to pay for past costs since it had no notice
of its obligation until 2003. It therefore held the doctrine of laches precluded
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Hamilton County from recovering any of its payments that were made before
August of 2003, at which time it put Webster County on notice of its potential
liability.
Accordingly, it entered judgment in favor of Hamilton County for
$52,091.28, with interest from June 1, 2005.
Webster County appeals and
Hamilton County cross-appeals from this judgment. The State has filed a joinder
in Webster County’s brief.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Webster County first asserts that the trial court was without jurisdiction to
hear the case, and that it should now be dismissed.
In particular, Webster
County argues that legislative changes that occurred in 2004 served to divest the
district court of jurisdiction, instead requiring an administrative action with the
Department of Inspections and Appeals.
Subject matter jurisdiction may of
course be raised at any time. Pierce v. Pierce, 287 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Iowa
1980).
Prior to July 1, 2004, Iowa Code section 222.70 (2003) governed disputes
concerning legal settlement and determinations as to the responsible county for
the payment of the care of its residents. In sum, that section provided for two
methods in which to settle such a dispute. The first provided for a district court
action in which the contesting counties and the Attorney General, on behalf of the
State, were to be parties to the action. Iowa Code § 222.70(1). The second
allowed for an alternative dispute mechanism process between the contesting
counties. Iowa Code § 222.70(2).
In 2004, the legislature substantially modified the mechanisms by which
legal settlement dispute resolution takes place. Iowa Code section 222.70 was
5
amended to read, in pertinent part, that such disputes “shall be resolved as
provided in section 225C.8.” Further, the 2004 legislation provided the following
as to its applicability:
1. The timeframes specified in section 225C.8, as enacted by this
division of this Act, are applicable to legal settlement disputes
involving billings for services provided on or after July 1, 2004.
2. For legal settlement disputes involving billings for services
provided prior to July 1, 2004, unless the county disputed the billing
prior to July 1, 2004, the person’s legal settlement shall be deemed
to be in the county that was billed for services provided to the
person. However, if a county disputed the billing for a service
provided prior to July 1, 2004, and the matter cannot be resolved
with the department of human services or with the other county, in
lieu of the forty-five-day period specified in section 225C.8,
subsection 2, a party may move for the matter to be resolved in the
manner provided in section 225C.8, at any time prior to January 1,
2005. If a party has not made such a motion, effective January 1,
2005, the matter shall be closed and the person's legal settlement
shall be in the county that was billed for services provided to the
person.
Iowa Code section 225C.8(2) now provides, in short, that legal settlement
disputes shall be resolved by filing a motion to the Department of Inspections and
Appeals for a contested case hearing under chapter 17A before an administrative
law judge. It is undisputed that this administrative process was not invoked in
this case.
The amendment to sections 222.70 and the addition of section 225C.8
were passed on April 14, 2004. See 2004 Iowa Acts ch. 1090, § 43. Iowa Code
section 3.7 (2003) states that, unless otherwise provided, all acts of the general
assembly shall take effect on the first day of July following their passage.
Accordingly, these amendments became effective on July 1, 2004. This suit was
filed on February 24, more than four months prior to the effective date. Because
the new provisions were not in effect at the time this action was filed, we
6
conclude Iowa Code section 222.70 (2003) applies. Thus, the new legislation did
not serve to divest the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Legal Settlement.
Legal settlement is similar to the concept of domicile. Audubon County v.
Vogessor, 228 Iowa 281, 286, 291 N.W. 135, 136 (1940). It requires more than
mere physical presence in the county. Id. The individual must intend to remain
in the county of legal settlement indefinitely. State ex rel. Palmer v. Hancock
County, 443 N.W.2d 690, 691 (Iowa 1989); Audubon County, 228 Iowa at 285,
291 N.W. at 136. The concept of legal settlement is meant to allow assessment
of expenses and responsibility to the county in which the individual lived and
which received the benefits of the individual’s residence prior to the need for
public assistance. State ex rel. Palmer v. Dubuque County, 473 N.W.2d 190,
192 (Iowa 1991).
Webster County argues “the trial court erred in applying the current legal
settlement law instead of the legal settlement law in 1951.” Upon our de novo
review, see Iowa R. App. P. 6.4, we agree with Webster County to the extent that
we must give effect to the relevant Code provisions that were extant at the time
of the significant events through the course of this over half-century time line.
As noted, C.W. was first admitted to the Woodward facility in 1951. At the
time of her admission, her parents resided in Hamilton County. The 1950 Code
provided that the “necessary and legal costs and expenses attending the . . .
care . . . of an insane person committed to a state hospital shall be paid . . . [b]y
the county in which the person has legal settlement.” Iowa Code § 230.1(1)
(1950). In addition, the Code provided that the “residence of any person . . . who
7
is an inmate of any state institution shall be that existing at the time of the
admission thereto.” Id. Thus, the significant point of reference is the date of
admission to the facility.
In 1951, pursuant to section 252.16(5), “legitimate” children “[took] the
settlement of their father, if there be one, if not, then that of the mother.”
Pursuant to section 252.16(6), “illegitimate” children, such as C.W., “[took] the
legal settlement of their mother.” Accordingly, under either of these provisions, at
the time of her admission to Woodward, C.W.’s legal settlement was the same as
that of her parents, namely, Hamilton County. Unless some other Code provision
served to change that initial settlement determination, that determination would
remain, as legal settlement “shall be that existing at the time of the admission
thereto.” Iowa Code § 230.1(1). This conclusion is also mandated by Iowa Code
section 252.17 (1950), which states that a “legal settlement once acquired shall
so remain until such a person had removed from the state . . . or has acquired a
legal settlement in some other country or state.” (Emphasis added.)
C.W.’s parents moved to Webster County in 1954. The question becomes
whether C.W.’s legal settlement likewise changed along with her parents’,
despite the fact C.W. had never resided in Webster County. The Code at that
time did not contain any provision for determining whether and how a minor
child’s legal settlement may ever change. As such, it could be considered that
settlement was fixed indeterminately at the time of admission, at least for a
minor. Not until 1974 was Iowa Code section 252.16(3) amended to provide that
a minor residing in an institution “assumes the settlement of his or her parents”
and that settlement of the “minor child changes with the settlement of the parent.”
8
Iowa Code § 252.16(3) (1975). But, it further provided that the child shall “retain
the settlement that his parent has on the child’s eighteenth birthday until he is
discharged from the institution . . . .” Id.
However, by the time this provision had been added to the Code in 1974,
C.W. had already reached the age of majority, in 1966. Thus, as she was no
longer a minor, the amendment to section 232.16(3) did not serve to shift her
county of legal settlement to that of her parents, Webster County. There is no
indication this provision was intended to apply retroactively, that is, to effectuate
a change of legal settlement either in 1956, when C.W.’s parents’ legal
settlement changed to Webster County, or in 1966, when C.W. turned twentyone and was discharged from the Woodward facility.
See Iowa Code § 4.5
(2005) (“A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly
made retroactive.”); Matter of D.N. 522 N.W.2d 824, 828 (Iowa 1994) (declining
to apply a statute retroactively in a legal settlement dispute); Dubuque County,
473 N.W.2d at 192 (same). Accordingly, we believe the district court was in error
when it determined that “C.W.’s legal settlement changed in 1956 to Webster
County as a result of her mother’s and her mother’s husband’s move to . . .
Webster County in 1954.” 3 The error occurred in applying a then non-existent
Code provision.
We now consider whether other changes over the years serve to shift
C.W.’s legal settlement. The next relevant event to occur in this time line was in
1966, when C.W. reached the age of majority and was discharged from the
3
Iowa Code section 252.16(1) (1950) provided that new legal settlement is acquired by
continuously residing in a county for two years.
9
Woodward facility. The question becomes whether this occurrence affected the
legal settlement question. At that time, as an adult, C.W.’s legal settlement was
no longer tied to that of her parents. Again, the 1966 Iowa Code provided that
the legal settlement “shall be that existing at the time of admission thereto.” Iowa
Code § 230.1(2) (1966).
This principal, taken in conjunction with the rule
expressed in section 252.17 providing that a legal settlement “once acquired
shall so remain,” warrants a determination that C.W.’s legal settlement continued
in Hamilton County.
Finally, C.W. was readmitted to the Woodward facility in 1984, after having
spent the intervening years in various homes and placements. By this time,
while the legislature had specifically provided that settlement of a minor child
shall change with the settlement of the parent, see Iowa Code § 252.16(3)
(1983), C.W. was no long a minor, so this provision did not apply. Moreover,
because C.W. had been a resident of various institutions supported by public
funds, she did not acquire a new legal settlement in any of the counties in which
those intervening facilities were located. See Iowa Code § 252.16(3) (providing
that a person who is “an inmate of or is supported by an institution” supported by
public funds, shall not acquire a settlement in that county unless before
becoming supported by the institution, the person already had legal settlement in
that county); Dubuque County, 473 N.W.2d at 192.
Finally, the Code also
specified that once a resident reaches eighteen years of age, his or her legal
settlement shall remain as it was on that day, until he or she is discharged, at
which time his or her own legal settlement is acquired. Id. Of course, because
10
C.W. has never been discharged since this date, no new legal settlement was
acquired.
Conclusion.
At the time of C.W.’s admission to Woodward, her county of legal
settlement was considered to be Hamilton County by virtue of the residence of
her parents. Nothing in the intervening time frame has effected a change of her
county of legal settlement. Consequently, the district court erred in concluding
that her legal settlement has been Webster County since 1956 and we reverse
its ruling to that effect. By virtue of this ruling, we need not address Hamilton
County’s contentions in its cross-appeal that the court erred in applying the
doctrine of laches to prohibit recoupment of those expenses paid out prior to
August 2003 and in failing to impose interest at the rate specified in Iowa Code
section 222.68.
REVERSED.
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