STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CHARLES KENNETH POLING, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-140 / 06-0684
Filed May 9, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHARLES KENNETH POLING,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Richard R.
Gleason (motion to suppress), and Randal J. Nigg (trial and sentencing), District
Associate Judges.
Charles K. Poling appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated,
second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2005). He claims the
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.
Charles Hallberg of Hallberg, Jacobsen, Johnson & Viner, Cedar Rapids,
for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, Ralph Potter, County Attorney, and Michael J. Whalen,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Baker, JJ.
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MILLER, J.
Charles K. Poling appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated
(OWI), second offense. He claims the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress, arguing the stop of his vehicle was illegal. We affirm.
The record reveals the following facts. On January 1, 2005, at about 5:30
in the afternoon, Lieutenant Mark Dalsing of the Dubuque Police Department
stopped Poling for driving the wrong way on a one-way street. Dalsing checked
the status of Poling’s driver’s license and verified he had a valid license. After a
brief conversation, Lieutenant Dalsing allowed Poling to proceed on his way.
When Poling left the parking lot Dalsing observed Poling again go the wrong way
on the one-way street.
Accordingly, Dalsing directed his back-up officers,
McTague and Ryan, to again stop Poling. Poling only drove about a half block
out of the parking lot before Officers McTague and Ryan stopped him a second
time. After the second stop Officer Ryan formed the opinion that Poling was
under the influence of alcohol. Poling failed the field sobriety tests and was
arrested for operating while intoxicated.
A breath test at the police station
revealed an alcohol concentration of .242.
The State charged Poling, by trial information, with OWI, second offense,
in violation of Iowa Code sections 321J.2(1) and 321J.2(2) (2005). Poling filed a
motion to suppress, contending the second stop of his vehicle was without
reasonable suspicion, was thus illegal, and all evidence obtained as a result of
the stop should therefore be suppressed. The district court held a hearing on the
motion and denied the motion. The court determined that although there was
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some variation in the officers’ exact testimony concerning where they saw Poling
and how he was stopped, “Lieutenant Dalsing testified clearly that [Poling], after
receiving a warning concerning his failure to drive in the proper direction on a
one-way street, repeated his conduct when he left the site of the first stop.”
Thus, the district court concluded the State met its burden to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that reasonable cause existed for the stop.
Poling was later convicted, following a non-jury trial on stipulated
evidence, of OWI second offense. He was sentenced to a two-year prison term
with all but fourteen days suspended, a fine and surcharge, and costs.
Poling appeals his conviction, claiming the court erred in denying his
motion to suppress. He argues the stop violated his rights under both the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution. 1 More specifically, he contends that based on Officers Ryan’s and
McTague’s inconsistent statements the record is not clear if they actually saw
him commit a traffic violation and thus the court erred in concluding the officers
had reasonable cause to stop him.
Because Poling’s motion to suppress was based on alleged constitutional
violations, our review of the district court’s ruling on his motion is de novo. State
v. Carter, 696 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Iowa 2005); State v. McConnelee, 690 N.W.2d 27,
30 (Iowa 2004). We independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances
1
The language of the state and federal constitutions protecting citizens against
unreasonable search and seizure is substantially identical and we have consistently
interpreted the scope and purpose of article I, section 8, of the Iowa Constitution to track
with federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41,
44 (Iowa 1998); State v. Showalter, 427 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Iowa 1988). Accordingly, we
analyze the validity of the stop here similarly under both the federal and state
constitutions.
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shown by the record. State v. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Iowa 2004). We
give deference to the district court's fact findings because of that court's ability to
assess the credibility of the witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings.
State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537, 541 (Iowa 2003).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a
person's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 2
Evidence
obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in a prosecution, no matter
how relevant or probative the evidence may be. State v. Manna, 534 N.W.2d
642, 643-44 (Iowa 1995).
To stop an individual for investigatory purposes the Fourth Amendment
requires that a police officer have reasonable cause to believe that a crime has
occurred or is occurring. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968); State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). An
automobile stop is subject to these Fourth Amendment protections and will be
upheld only when it is reasonable. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810,
116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95 (1996).
When a person challenges a stop on the basis that reasonable
suspicion did not exist, the State must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the stopping officer had specific and articulable
facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, [reasonably warrant a belief that] criminal activity may have
occurred. Mere suspicion, curiosity, or hunch of criminal activity is
not enough.
Whether reasonable suspicion exists for an
investigatory stop must be determined in light of the totality of the
circumstances confronting the officer, including all information
available to the officer at the time the officer makes the decision to
2
The rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment apply to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1694, 6 L.
Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961).
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stop the vehicle. The legality of the stop does not depend on the
actual motivations of the officer involved in the stop.
State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004) (internal citations omitted).
The weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses are primarily to be
determined by the fact-finder, here the trial court. State v. Ruiz, 496 N.W.2d 789,
792 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); State v. King, 344 N.W.2d 562, 563 (Iowa Ct. App.
1983). Although our review is de novo, the district court’s findings on credibility
of witnesses are entitled to considerable deference by this court.
State v.
Liggins, 524 N.W.2d 181, 186 (Iowa 1994); State v. Evans, 495 N.W.2d 760, 762
(Iowa 1993). Here the trial court found Officer Dalsing’s testimony to be more
credible than Poling’s regarding whether Poling went the wrong way again after
the first stop. In addition, a defendant’s “direct interest in the outcome of the
hearing” can weigh against the credibility of the defendant’s testimony.
See
Missman v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 653 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 2002) (citation
omitted).
Accordingly, we give deference to the district court’s credibility
determinations and find Dalsing did in fact observe Poling again go the wrong
way on the one-way street after the initial stop.
Where there is at least some communication between officers, the shared
or collective knowledge doctrine is applied and thus the knowledge of one police
officer is presumed to be shared by all. See State v. Satern, 516 N.W.2d 839,
841 (Iowa 1994); State v. Owens, 418 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1988); State v.
Thornton, 300 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Iowa 1981). Under this doctrine, the facts known
to Officer Dalsing were imputed to Officers Ryan and McTague.
Dalsing’s
observation of Poling driving the wrong way on the one-way street a second time
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gave him reasonable cause to stop Poling a second time, but he instead radioed
this information to Ryan and McTague and asked them to perform the stop.
Thus, whether Ryan and McTague themselves observed Poling committing a
traffic violation is not of consequence.
Because the facts known to Dalsing
provided him with reasonable cause to stop Poling, Officers Ryan and McTague
also had reasonable cause to lawfully stop him. See United States v. Hensley,
469 U.S. 221, 230-33, 105 S. Ct. 675, 681-82, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 613-15 (1985)
(holding stop made by officer who lacked reasonable suspicion is lawful if it is
made on the basis of a request by another officer, provided the information
known to the other officer establishes reasonable suspicion).
Based on our de novo review, and for the reasons set forth above, we
conclude Officers Ryan and McTague had reasonable cause to stop Poling
based on Officer Dalsing notifying them of his observation of Poling driving the
wrong way on a one-way street.
Poling’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
The district court was correct in denying
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