MICHAEL BLACKWELL, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-134 / 06-0401
Filed March 28, 2007
MICHAEL BLACKWELL,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G. Blane II,
Judge.
A postconviction relief applicant appeals from the dismissal of his
application. AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey Mains of Mains Law Office P.L.C., Des Moines, and Susan
Stockdale, Colo, for appellant.
Michael Blackwell, Newton, pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Steve Foritano, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Mahan, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
Applicant-appellant, Michael Blackwell, appeals from the district court
order dismissing his second application for postconviction relief. He contends
the court erred in summarily dismissing his application because (1) the State did
not plead the statute of limitations in its answer and (2) the State was not entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. We affirm.
Background Proceedings
Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in August of 1991. This
court affirmed. State v. Blackwell, No. 91-1501 (Iowa Ct. App. May 4, 1993). He
filed his first application for postconviction relief in September of 1994. It was
denied in August of 1996.
On appeal, counsel noted the existence of a
psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Shin, arguing it was favorable to appellant and could
have changed the result of his trial. This court affirmed. Blackwell v. State, No.
96-2086 (Iowa Ct. App. April 24, 1998). Following unsuccessful habeas corpus
proceedings in federal court related to claims counsel was ineffective for not
developing or using the report by Dr. Shin, appellant filed his second application
for postconviction relief on December 17, 2004, alleging various claims of
ineffective assistance relating to the report by Dr. Shin.
The State filed an
answer in February of 2005, denying all the allegations in the application. The
State filed a motion to dismiss in October of 2006, alleging the application for
postconviction relief was untimely and raised grounds that have been, or could
have been, raised in prior proceedings.
The district court determined the application was appropriate for dismissal
because it was not filed within three years of the time the applicant was alerted to
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the existence of the report by Dr. Shin, which was during the appeal from the first
postconviction proceeding in 1997. The court also determined the time period for
filing the second postconviction application was not tolled during the time
appellant was pursuing the habeas action in federal court.
Scope of Review
We review postconviction proceedings for correction of errors at law.
Bugley v. State, 596 N.W.2d 893, 895 (Iowa 1999). Review of a district court’s
determination a postconviction application is time-barred is “to correct errors of
law.” Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Dible v.
State, 557 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Iowa 1996)). “Thus, we will affirm if the trial court's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and the law was correctly
applied.” Id. at 520 (citing Benton v. State, 199 N.W.2d 56, 57 (Iowa 1972)).
Merits
Applications for postconviction relief must “be filed within three years from
the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the
date the writ of procedendo is issued.” Iowa Code § 822.3 (2003). A statute-oflimitations defense is an affirmative defense generally raised by a responsive
pleading. Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 708 (Iowa 1989). The State did not
raise the issue of the timeliness of appellant’s application in its answer, but in a
subsequent motion to dismiss. We have recognized the statute of limitations
may be raised in a motion to dismiss “when the narrow scope of the proceedings
confirms the claim for relief was barred when the action was commenced.”
Cornell v. State, 529 N.W.2d 606, 609-10 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). The application
was filed in 2004. Following the direct appeal, procedendo issued on July 7,
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1993. On its face, the application was filed eleven years after procedendo issued
and untimely when commenced.
The statute provides an exception to the three-year limitation for “a ground
of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period.”
Iowa Code § 822.3. To take advantage of the exception, an applicant “must
show the alleged ground of fact could not have been raised earlier, the applicant
must also show a nexus between the asserted ground of fact and the challenged
conviction.” Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 520. Examples of exceptions to the time
bar are newly-discovered evidence or a ground the applicant was at least not
alerted to in some way. Hogan v. State, 454 N.W.2d 360, 361 (Iowa 1990).
Appellant argues the report by Dr. Shin is evidence that falls within the exception.
The district court determined appellant failed to show the claim could not have
been raised earlier. We conclude the district court’s determination is supported
by substantial evidence and that the court correctly applied the law.
See
Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 520.
We have considered all claims and arguments raised on appeal. We find
any issues not specifically addressed in this decision are either controlled by our
resolution of the issues expressly addressed, need not be reached, or are
without merit.
AFFIRMED.
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