IN THE MATTER OF THE GU ARDIANSHIP OF M.E.B., Ward, Z.B., Grandmother, Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-074 / 06-0583
Filed May 9, 2007
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.E.B.,
Ward,
Z.B., Grandmother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, William L. Thomas,
Judge.
A grandmother appeals a district court order appointing her daughter as
the legal guardian of the daughter’s adult daughter. AFFIRMED.
Judith Hoover, Cedar Rapids, and Tarek A. Khowassah of Holland and
Anderson, L.L.P., Iowa City, for appellant.
Richard F. Mitvalsky of Gray, Stefani & Mitvalsky, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids,
for appellee.
James C. Holmes of Holmes & Holmes, Cedar Rapids, attorney and
guardian ad litem for proposed ward.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
Z.B. (grandmother) appeals the district court’s order appointing R.B.
(mother) instead of her as the proposed adult ward’s (ward) legal guardian. She
contends the court applied an incorrect legal standard for appointment of a
guardian for an adult ward and erred in not finding that the ward’s best interests
require she be appointed as the ward’s legal guardian. We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
The ward, born in February 1978, is an incapacitated adult female. She
suffers from cerebral palsy, hydrocephaly, microcephaly, scoliosis, spasticity,
mild petit mal epilepsy, constricture of the hands, profound mental retardation,
and is quadriplegic. The mother gave birth to the ward when she was twenty
years old and still lived with her mother, the grandmother. The ward’s father has
never been a part of her life. The mother and ward lived with the grandmother in
the grandmother’s home in Iowa for approximately the first eleven years of the
ward’s life, during which both the mother and grandmother contributed to the
ward’s care. The mother completed her high school education and later began
college studies during this eleven-year period.
In 1989 the grandmother moved to California to live with one of her other
daughters. In 1990 the mother and ward moved to California as well. For the
first few months she and the ward lived with her sister and the grandmother.
They then moved out and lived on their own for a few months. Eventually they
moved in with the mother’s boyfriend, Steve. The grandmother moved back to
Iowa in 2000. From 1991 through 2000 the mother and the ward lived with Steve
3
and raised the ward without any assistance from the grandmother. During this
time the mother enrolled the ward in Redondo Beach High School’s special
education program for disabled students to enhance the ward’s educational
development and secured additional community-based services for the ward,
including in-home support services. In 2000 she also involved the ward with
Vocational Visions, the social service agency which has been involved in her
care since that time. The grandmother seems to concede that during this time
period the mother provided the ward with a stable home and met all of her
educational, medical, and social needs. The mother’s relationship with Steve
ended in 2000.
The mother became involved with Michael, to whom the juvenile court
found she was married at the time of the guardianship hearing, in 2000. The
grandmother and Michael have never got along, and in the past have had
extremely heated arguments on several occasions on numerous subjects. The
mother’s extended family also dislikes Michael and disapproves of his behavior
when around them. In November 2004 Michael pled guilty to domestic abuse of
the mother, with imposition of sentence suspended. The incident giving rise to
the charge apparently occurred in the presence of the ward. In 2001 the ward
suffered a broken leg. There are conflicting versions of how her leg was broken,
however it appears to have occurred when Michael tripped over the family dog
while carrying the ward. The court found the ward has made a good recovery
from this injury, and that “[d]espite the unpleasantness of these observations
about Michael, none of them reflect upon the capacity to care for [the ward],
4
except the suspicion by the extended . . . family that Michael is responsible for
breaking [the ward’s] leg.”
In April 2003, the mother, Michael, and the ward traveled to Iowa to spend
time with the mother’s extended family, including the grandmother. After visiting
with them for some time, the mother and Michael traveled to Oregon to visit
Michael’s extended family. The mother and the grandmother agreed the ward
would stay with the grandmother while the couple traveled to Oregon. While
caring for the ward during this time the grandmother suspected there was
something wrong and took the ward to the emergency room. The doctors found
the ward was in fact suffering from a broken shunt and performed surgery to
correct the problem. Upon learning of the ward’s condition the mother returned
to Iowa to be with her. Following the ward’s discharge from the hospital she and
the mother remained in Iowa for approximately two weeks while she recovered
before returning to California in the summer of 2003.
The grandmother returned to California with Michael, the mother, and the
ward to stay with them. The reasons for her going to California are disputed.
The grandmother claims she went with them upon her insistence in order to deter
further abuse and neglect of the ward, while the mother testified she invited the
grandmother to return with them to have some fun and do some shopping.
Regardless of the reason, the grandmother’s return to California with the family
was initially intended to last only a few weeks. However, she ended up staying
for approximately one year. Due to the grandmother’s extended stay and her
extremely contentious relationship with Michael, tensions in the household rose.
5
The domestic abuse incidents described at the hearing occurred largely during
this time.
In the summer of 2004 the grandmother returned to Iowa to attend another
granddaughter’s wedding.
The mother could not attend but allowed the
grandmother to take the ward with her to Iowa for the wedding. Although no set
schedule for the visit to Iowa was established, the mother and grandmother both
agreed it was to be relatively brief and mainly for the purpose of attending the
wedding. However, the grandmother never voluntarily returned the ward to her
mother.
In February 2005 the mother and Michael drove to Iowa to visit and take
the ward back to California with them. When Michael and the mother informed
the grandmother and the rest of her extended family that they intended to take
the ward back with them an altercation ensued. The family in Iowa asserted the
ward was in poor condition when she arrived in Iowa and they were merely
looking out for her best interests. Nevertheless, none of the family members
reported any suspicion of abuse or neglect to authorities in Iowa. The family told
the mother she was not welcome, accused her of wanting the ward only for the
ward’s social security benefits, and insisted she and Michael get out of the
house.
The mother stayed in Iowa for approximately five days and then returned
to California without the ward but with the assurance from the grandmother that
she would immediately fly with the ward back to California. However, instead of
returning the ward to her mother, the grandmother filed the present petition to
6
have herself appointed as the ward’s guardian.
She also secured an order
appointing her as the ward’s temporary guardian. A hearing was held on the
grandmother’s petition for guardianship on January 31, 2006.
The ward was a client of Vocational Visions, a social services agency for
disabled people in California, from 2000 up to the time the grandmother took her
to Iowa in 2004. A registered nurse from the staff of Vocational Visions testified
via telephone at the hearing. She testified the ward was at the facility every day
for approximately six hours and that she was personally familiar with both the
mother and the ward. She stated the ward was always well groomed and clean
when she arrived at the facility and the mother was involved in the ward’s care
and programming. The nurse further testified the ward was doing well in her
programming, her health was good, and the mother was very knowledgeable and
good at caring for the ward. She was also aware of a report that was made in
California alleging abuse of the ward but stated the report was investigated and
found to be unsubstantiated.
Finally, she noted that if the ward returned to
California she could return to the program at Vocational Visions right away.
Evidence was also admitted at trial regarding the grandmother’s mental
and physical health. The court found the grandmother was sixty-eight years of
age at the time of the hearing and has a long history of mental illness, including
auditory hallucinations.
She was still currently carrying a diagnosis of
schizophrenia, although her current psychiatrist was not completely confidant
that was the correct diagnosis. She had been on several different medications in
the past for her mental illness but was not taking any at the time of the hearing.
7
The court further found that in addition to her mental illness, the grandmother
also had several physical conditions which could affect her ability to care for the
ward.
The record shows that some of her current health concerns include
diabetes, heart arrhythmia, and high cholesterol.
Historically she has also
suffered from anxiety, nervousness, and hypertension.
The district court concluded a guardianship was needed but that the
grandmother failed to establish the mother was unfit or that the grandmother
would be a better caretaker for the ward. Thus, the court appointed the mother
as the ward’s permanent guardian.
In reaching its conclusion the court
concluded that the mother was to be preferred as a guardian, citing Iowa Code
section 633.559 (2005) in support of that conclusion.
The guardian ad litem and attorney for the ward filed a “Motion to Amend
Findings, Conclusions and Order” arguing: the parental preference in section
633.559 is applicable only to minor children and the court should not have
applied it; the court should have applied a best interests legal standard instead of
placing the burden on the grandmother to establish that the mother was unfit and
that she was a better caretaker; and if the court had correctly applied that
standard, it would have found the grandmother the more appropriate guardian.
The grandmother filed a separate motion concurring with the guardian ad litem’s
motion. The district court denied the motions, concluding there was no reason to
amend the prior order.
The grandmother appeals the district court’s ruling appointing the mother
as the ward’s legal guardian. She claims the court erred in applying the parental
8
preference under section 633.559, arguing it should not be applied when
appointing a guardian for an adult ward. She also claims the court erred in not
finding the ward’s best interests required she be appointed as her legal guardian.
II.
SCOPE OF REVIEW.
The parties agree that appointment of a legal guardian for the ward is
necessary, and the issue is whether the ward’s mother or grandmother should be
appointed. They also agree, although for somewhat different reasons, that our
scope of review is de novo, and we will so review the issue of which party should
be appointed as the ward’s guardian. With de novo review we give weight to the
fact-findings of the district court, especially with regard to witness credibility
determinations, but we are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. 6.15(6)(g). Our
review of a district court’s construction, interpretation, and/or application of a
statute is, however, for errors at law. Horizon Homes of Davenport v. Nunn, 686
N.W.2d 221, 224 (Iowa 2004) (interpretation); In re Detention of Swanson, 668
N.W.2d 570, 575 (Iowa 2003) (construction); State v. McCoy, 618 N.W.2d 324,
325 (Iowa 2000) (interpretation and application); State v. Moore, 569 N.W.2d
130, 131 (Iowa 1997) (application). We thus review the district court’s partial
reliance on Iowa Code section 633.559 for correction of error.
III.
MERITS.
Iowa Code section 633.559 provides:
The parents of a minor, or either of them, if qualified and
suitable, shall be preferred over all others for appointment as
guardian. Preference shall then be given to any person, if qualified
and suitable, nominated as guardian for a minor child by a will
executed by the parent having custody of a minor child, and any
qualified and suitable person requested by a minor fourteen years
9
of age or older, or by standby petition executed by a person having
physical and legal custody of a minor. Subject to these preferences,
the court shall appoint as guardian a qualified and suitable person
who is willing to serve in that capacity.
(Emphasis added.)
The district court clearly relied in part on this statute in
determining the mother, rather than the grandmother, should be the guardian of
the ward. The grandmother contends this constituted application of an incorrect
legal standard in determining the appropriate guardian for an adult ward, and
thus the court’s ruling must be reversed.
The controlling rule of statutory construction is: “When a statute is plain
and its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search for meaning beyond its
express terms.” State v. Knowles, 602 N.W.2d 800, 801 (Iowa 1999) (quoting
State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998)). Our supreme court has
frequently stated that we do not resort to the rules of construction when the terms
of the statute are unambiguous.
Teamsters Local Union No. 421 v. City of
Dubuque, 706 N.W.2d 709, 714 n.2 (2005). In determining what the legislature
intended in adopting a statute, the court is constrained to follow the express
terms of the statute. State v. Byers, 456 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1990). “We do
not search for meaning beyond the express terms of a statute when a statute is
plain and its meaning is clear.” Cubit v. Mahaska County, 677 N.W.2d 777, 78182 (Iowa 2004) (quoting In re Name Change of Reindl, 671 N.W.2d 466, 469
(Iowa 2003)). We do not speculate as to the probable legislative intent apart
from the words used in the statute, State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa
1996), and we resort to rules of statutory construction only when a statute is
ambiguous. State v. Gilmour, 522 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Iowa 1994).
10
Section 633.559 is clear that in deciding who should be appointed as
guardian for a minor child the parents of the minor are favored over all others, so
long as they are “qualified and suitable.”
However, the statute mentions no
parental preference for an adult ward. The parties have not cited and we have
not found any other provision in the code providing for a parental preference, or
any other preference, for appointment as guardian for an adult ward.
We conclude the text of section 633.559 is plain and its meaning
unambiguously clear, and thus we need not, nor can we, search for meaning
beyond its express terms. The legislature’s intent that the parental preference be
applied only to minors is clear from the language of the statute. If the legislature
intended a parental preference to be applied in selecting a guardian for an adult
ward it easily could have expressly provided for such a preference. It has chosen
not to do so. Accordingly, we conclude the district court erred in applying the
parental preference set forth in section 633.559 in determining the appropriate
guardian for the adult ward in this case. See, e.g., In re Queiro, 864 A.2d 437,
444-45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (finding trial court used incorrect legal
standard in applying statute strictly applicable to guardianship of minors in
determining guardianship for an incapacitated adult).
There is no express statutory preference for the appointment of a guardian
for an adult ward. Nor does there appear to be any guidance in our prior case
law concerning which of two or more statutorily qualified and suitable persons,
such as we have in the case at hand, should be appointed as guardian of a
profoundly handicapped adult.
Thus, the question of what standard or test
11
should be applied in making such a determination is an issue of first impression
in Iowa.
Some of the other jurisdictions that have looked at the issue of appointing
a guardian for an adult ward have adopted a standard whereby the court simply
looks to which guardian’s appointment would serve the best interest of the ward.
See Guardianship of Brown, 546 P.2d 298, 303 (Cal. 1976) (finding in a case
determining guardian for an adult that where the statutory provisions “contain no
explicit order of preference or legal standard to be applied by a court in the
selection of a guardian . . . the paramount consideration guiding the trial court is
the best interest of the incompetent.”); In re Estate of Robertson, 494 N.E.2d
562, 570 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (finding that in selecting a guardian for an
incompetent adult the “best interest and welfare of the incompetent person is of
paramount concern in selecting a guardian.”); Queiro, 864 N.W.2d at 309-11
(adopting “the best interest and welfare of the mental incompetent” as standard
for appointment of guardian for adult).
We agree with these jurisdictions and conclude that when two or more
statutorily qualified and suitable persons are seeking guardianship of an adult
ward the appropriate legal standard is the best interest and welfare of the ward.
The court must determine which proposed guardian’s appointment would better
serve the best interests and well-being of the ward. Furthermore, we believe that
closeness of consanguinity or affinity should be considered in making such a
decision, but only as a part of the best interest analysis. See, e.g., Peter G.
Guthrie, Annotation, Priority and Preference in Appointment of Conservator or
12
Guardian for an Incompetent, 65 A.L.R. 3d 991, § 4, at 998-1003, § 6(a), at
1009-12 (1975).
Although we have determined the trial court erred in taking the parental
preference in section 633.559 into account because it is not applicable to the
case at hand, we nevertheless give weight to its findings of fact, especially with
regard to witness credibility. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g).
Independent of any discussion of or reliance on section 633.559, the trial
court’s findings of fact included a detailed examination of both the mother’s and
grandmother’s respective strengths, weaknesses, and histories in caring for the
ward. The court also made findings with regard to the grandmother’s mental
and physical disabilities, the domestic abuse of the mother by Michael, and the
nature and quality of the care and services the mother provided the ward in
California from 1991 through 2004.
In addition, the court considered the
grandmother’s actions in taking the ward to Iowa with her for what was to be a
short visit, and then not returning her despite the mother’s wishes and her own
promises to do so. These are precisely the kind of matters that need to be taken
into consideration in making a best interest determination in cases such as this.
Based on the evidence set forth in detail above, we conclude the best
interest and welfare of the ward will be served by the appointment of her mother
as her guardian. The evidence before us demonstrates that the mother did an
excellent job of caring for the ward for over ten years in California. Her care
included, but was not limited to, providing the ward with the medical, educational,
and social services and support she needed. The testimony of one of the nurses
13
who has helped care for the ward at Vocational Visions is very revealing on these
matters. On the other hand, the grandmother suffers from physical and mental
disabilities which could have a negative impact on her ability to care for the ward,
if not now almost certainly in the not-too-distant future. In addition, her behavior
following her return with the ward to Iowa in July 2004, including denying the
mother access to her daughter and the use of ruse and deception concerning her
true intentions with regard to the ward, at best show very poor judgment on her
part.
The ward has a stable home in California with her mother and Michael
where all of her medical, educational, and social needs are being more than
adequately met.
She also has several capable medical and social service
providers there with whom she appears to be familiar and comfortable. The fact
there was some domestic violence between the mother and Michael is of course
somewhat troubling to us. However, it appears any such incidents were largely
confined to the time when the grandmother was living with the mother and
Michael, and they resulted in part from tension caused by her extended stay and
the grandmother’s and Michael’s extreme dislike for each other. In addition, the
evidence concerning these incidents was before the district court and it clearly
did not find the incidents to be of such recency or nature as to indicate the
mother could not or would not provide appropriate care for the ward or that the
grandmother would be a better guardian.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
14
We conclude the district court erred in applying the parental preference
found in section 633.559. The statute is unambiguously and expressly limited to
cases involving minors and should not have been applied here in determining
which proposed guardian’s appointment would be most conducive to the best
interest and welfare of an adult ward. Based on our de novo review of all of the
evidence before us, and for the reasons set forth above, we conclude the best
interest and welfare of the ward will be served by the appointment of the ward’s
mother as her legal guardian. We therefore affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.