STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LONDON ERAN GAAR, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-066 / 06-0423
Filed February 28, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
LONDON ERAN GAAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carol Egly, District
Associate Judge.
London Gaar appeals from a district court order that denied his motion to
suppress. AFFIRMED.
Patricia Reynolds, Acting Appellate Defender, and Dennis D. Hendrickson
and David Arthur Adams, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Linda Zanders and Romonda
Belcher Ford, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Baker, JJ.
2
ZIMMER, P.J.
London Gaar appeals from his conviction of operating while intoxicated.
He contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because
there were not reasonable grounds to invoke implied consent. We affirm.
During the early morning hours of June 30, 2005, Gaar drove his van off a
roadway in Des Moines and struck a tree.
Officer Amanda Cowman was
dispatched to the scene of the one-vehicle accident.
passenger smelled strongly of alcohol.
under the influence of alcohol.
Both Gaar and his
Officer Cowman believed Gaar was
Gaar was transported to a local hospital for
treatment of his injuries.
Officer Colin Boone met Officer Cowman at the hospital.
Cowman
informed Boone about the circumstances of the accident. Boone went to the
emergency room to see Gaar. He smelled a moderate odor of alcohol as he
entered the room. Based on the information he received from Officer Cowman
and his own observations, Boone believed Gaar was under the influence of
alcohol. Officer Boone invoked implied consent. Gaar refused to provide a body
specimen for chemical analysis.
The State charged Gaar with operating while intoxicated in violation of
Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2005). 1 Gaar filed a motion to suppress. Among
other things, his motion alleged the officers did not have reasonable grounds to
1
Section 321J.2 provides, in relevant part:
1. A person commits the offense of operating while intoxicated if the
person operates a motor vehicle in this state in any of the following
conditions:
a. While under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or other drug or a
combination of such substances.
3
invoke implied consent. The district court denied the motion. Gaar waived a jury
and was found guilty of operating while intoxicated following a bench trial. This
appeal followed.
In his brief on appeal, Gaar reasserts his claim that the district court
should have sustained his motion to suppress because reasonable grounds to
invoke implied consent did not exist in this case.
Iowa Code section 321J.6, our implied consent statute, authorizes an
officer to request a sample of a person’s blood, breath, or urine for testing if the
officer has reasonable grounds to believe the driver was operating while
intoxicated.
The reasonable grounds test is met when the facts and
circumstances known to the officer at the time implied consent was invoked
would have warranted a prudent person’s belief that an offense has been
committed. State v. Owens, 418 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1988).
Applying these standards, it is apparent that reasonable grounds existed
for invoking implied consent in this case. Gaar lost control of his vehicle on a city
street and crashed into a tree. There is no indication in the record that any factor
other than his impairment played a role in his accident. Officer Cowman noticed
a strong odor of alcohol on Gaar, and Officer Boone noticed a moderate odor of
alcohol on Gaar at the hospital. 2 Both officers believed the defendant was under
the influence of alcohol. These facts are sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief
2
Gaar argues Officer Cowman’s failure to include her observations about the odor of
alcohol in her written report undermines her credibility. The district court addressed this
issue and found Cowman’s testimony describing a strong order of alcohol to be “very
credible.” We find no reason to second-guess the trial court’s assessments of witness
credibility.
4
that Gaar was operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Gaar’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
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