JOSEPH P. KRAMER, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. R.L. CRAFT ROOFING COMPANY, ACADEMY ROOFING COMPANY and CNA INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondents-Appellees.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-053 / 05-2117
Filed July 25, 2007
JOSEPH P. KRAMER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
R.L. CRAFT ROOFING COMPANY,
ACADEMY ROOFING COMPANY and
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Shelby County, James S.
Heckerman, Judge.
Joseph Kramer appeals a workers’ compensation decision. AFFIRMED.
Richard B. Maher, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellant.
Joseph Happe, West Des Moines, for appellee R.L. Craft Roofing and
CNA Insurance.
Michael C. McEnroe and Carolyn A. Rafferty, Waterloo, for appellees
Academy Roofing and CNA Insurance.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, J.
Joseph Kramer appeals a workers’ compensation decision finding no
causal relationship between his claimed disabilities and two on-the-job motor
vehicle accidents.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Kramer worked for R.L. Craft Roofing Company as a supervisor. In 1999,
he was driving on business when another vehicle struck his. A short time later,
the right side of his neck swelled. The following day, Kramer saw his family
physician, Dr. Bendixen. Dr. Bendixen diagnosed Kramer with neck strain and
muscle contraction headaches.
The following year, Kramer began working for a new employer, Academy
Roofing. In 2001, Kramer was making a delivery for Academy when he drove
over a manhole cover and hit a retaining wall. At a hearing, he testified he hurt
his left eye, right shoulder, lower back, left leg, and neck. He also testified that
one of the medications administered after the accident caused him to experience
sensitivity to sunlight.
Kramer filed petitions for workers’ compensation benefits.
The deputy
workers’ compensation commissioner denied the claims after finding no causal
relationship between his claimed disabilities and the accidents. The workers’
compensation commissioner affirmed, as did the district court on judicial review.
II. Standard of Review
On appeal, Kramer cites several judicial review standards. We believe the
appeal is controlled by one: whether the agency decision is
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[b]ased upon a determination of fact clearly vested by a provision of
law in the discretion of the agency that is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record
is viewed as a whole.
Iowa Code §17A.19(10)(f) (2005).
III. Analysis
Kramer first takes issue with the deputy workers’ compensation
commissioner’s extensive credibility findings. Those findings were recognized
and affirmed by the commissioner. Some were based on Kramer’s demeanor at
the arbitration hearing, others were based on Kramer’s testimony and his reports
to medical providers, and still others were based on perceived inconsistencies
between a medical provider’s opinion testimony and his medical records.
The pertinent judicial review standard requires us to judge the adequacy
of the evidence supporting a particular fact finding in light of “any determinations
of veracity by the presiding officer who personally observed the demeanor of the
witnesses.” Id. § 17A.19(10)(f)(3); Cf. Wal-Mart v. Caselman, 657 N.W.2d 493,
500 (Iowa 2003) (finding substantial evidence supporting deputy’s credibility
finding).
Therefore, we will review the deputy’s credibility determinations in
connection with the fact findings on causation.
A. 1999 Accident
The deputy detailed Kramer’s lengthy history of poor health conditions
prior to the 1999 accident. The deputy found Kramer “had intermittent flare-ups
of these conditions and periods when they were quiescent.” She further found
that Kramer showed the same pattern of flare-ups and quiescence after the 1999
accident. Based on this pattern, the deputy determined that the pain Kramer
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experienced following the 1999 accident was not an aggravation of preexisting
conditions. See Ziegler v. United States Gypsum Co., 252 Iowa 613, 620, 106
N.W.2d 591, 595 (1960) (holding that a claimant may recover for aggravation of a
preexisting injury where the aggravation occurs in the course of employment and
a causal connection is established). In making this determination, the deputy
discounted the contrary opinion of Dr. Bendixen, noting that the opinion did not
“square with” his medical records.
These findings are supported by substantial evidence. With respect to
Kramer’s conditions following the 1999 accident, Dr. Bendixen’s records
indicated they were “quiescent for several months,” but recurred after he held his
two-year-old granddaughter for most of the day and after he planted some trees.
A reasonable fact finder could surmise that these records were inconsistent with
Dr. Bendixen’s subsequent finding of a causal relationship between Kramer’s
neck pain and headaches and the 1999 accident. Additionally, a reasonable fact
finder could discern an inconsistency between records showing “several years of
some recurring” muscle spasms and osteoarthritis and Dr. Bendixen’s
subsequent opinion that preexisting conditions had “resolved.”
We
recognize
that
Dr.
Bendixen
addressed
these
apparent
inconsistencies in his deposition testimony. However, it was for the deputy as
trier of fact “to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the
evidence, together with the other disclosed facts and circumstances, and then to
accept or reject the opinion.” Dunlavey v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d
845, 853 (Iowa 1995).
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We also recognize that at least one other physician, Dr. Spencer, causally
related Kramer’s neck pain to the 1999 accident. However, one of Dr. Spencer’s
medical notes states, Kramer “denies ever experiencing any pain prior to” the
1999 accident.
This statement is inconsistent with Dr. Bendixen’s medical
records and supports the deputy’s finding that Kramer did not disclose his full
medical history to some of the medical providers, including Dr. Spencer.
Because the opinion was based on “an incomplete history,” the opinion was “not
necessarily binding upon the commissioner.” Id. Additionally, a reasonable fact
finder could have discounted Dr. Spencer’s causation opinion based on his
admittedly “small window of interaction” with Kramer and his consequent
reluctance to opine on how much of Kramer’s pain preceded the accident or was
a result of the accident.
B. 2001 Accident
As noted, Kramer testified to several impairments following the 2001
accident. The deputy cited one, Kramer’s eye problem. She acknowledged that
this problem might be related to the accident but found that the condition was not
“independently producing any disability.” The deputy appeared to discount the
opinions of medical providers who opined about Kramer’s remaining postaccident complaints, stating those opinions did not account for Kramer’s prior
history of musculoskeletal problems.
These findings are supported by substantial evidence. With respect to the
eye impairment, Dr. Clavenna diagnosed an “accommodative spasm,” but
advised Kramer this generally resolved spontaneously. He also diagnosed a
detachment of the “posterior vitreous” and prescribed eye drops and a return visit
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in six weeks. There is scant, if any, evidence that this condition created ongoing
problems for Kramer.
As for Kramer’s complaint of right shoulder pain, Kramer advised one
physician, Dr. Hutton, that “he has never had right shoulder problems prior to the
manhole accident.”
A reasonable fact finder could have discerned from Dr.
Bendixen’s medical records that he experienced pain in the right shoulder in
1994. While the fact finder could have found the pain experienced in 2001 was a
compensable aggravation of a preexisting condition, there was substantial
evidence supporting a contrary finding.
Specifically, another physician, Dr.
Pollack, found that Kramer “had normal range of motion, negative impingement
signs and normal rotator cuff function” in his right shoulder immediately following
the accident.
The same is true of Kramer’s complaints of low back pain. Dr. Bendixen’s
records indicate Kramer was having problems with his left sacroiliac area as
early as 1993 and he had recurring back problems in 1995 and 1996. Again,
Kramer could have experienced a compensable aggravation of his pre-existing
back condition following the 2001 accident.
However, there was substantial
evidence supporting a contrary finding.
With respect to Kramer’s complaint of left leg pain, he testified he
experienced “a burning” on the inside of that leg. He stated his “calf muscle back
in there” ached and his toes burned. However, immediately following the 2001
accident, Kramer reported problems with his right leg rather than his left. There
was substantial evidence supporting a finding that Kramer’s left leg pain was not
caused by the 2001 accident.
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Kramer also complained of neck pain following the 2001 accident.
A
reasonable fact finder could have discounted this complaint based on Kramer’s
failure to give medical providers a complete history. For example, shortly after
the accident, a physical therapist stated Kramer’s prognosis for rehabilitation was
good, as he had “no significant past medical history of problems with his neck.”
This leaves us with Kramer’s complaint of photosensitivity.
On this
question, there was medical evidence categorically rejecting suggestions that
Kramer’s sensitivity was related to a medication prescribed in connection with the
2001 accident.
IV. Disposition
The record contains substantial evidence to support the deputy’s findings
on causation. Those findings were adopted in full by the commissioner. We
accordingly affirm the agency’s final decision.
We find additional issues raised by Kramer to be unpreserved or
unnecessary to decide.
AFFIRMED.
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