IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF SANDRA J. RUNYAN AND SAMUEL R. RUNYAN Upon the Petition of SANDRA J. RUNYAN, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning, SAMUEL R. RUNYAN, Respondent-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-035 / 06-1115
Filed March 28, 2007
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF SANDRA J. RUNYAN AND SAMUEL R. RUNYAN
Upon the Petition of
SANDRA J. RUNYAN,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning,
SAMUEL R. RUNYAN,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Jon C. Fister,
Judge.
Samuel R. Runyan appeals and Sandra J. Runyan cross-appeals
challenging the economic provisions of the decree dissolving their long-term
marriage. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON CROSSAPPEAL.
John J. Wood of Beecher, Field, Walker, Morris, Hoffman & Johnson,
P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Brian G. Sayer of Dunakey & Klatt, P.C., Waterloo, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
Samuel R. Runyan appeals and Sandra J. Runyan cross-appeals
challenging the economic provisions of the decree dissolving their long term
marriage. We affirm as modified on appeal and affirm on cross-appeal.
SCOPE OF REVIEW.
Our review of the economic provisions of a divorce decree is de novo.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We examine the entire record and adjudicate anew the
issues properly presented on appeal. In re Marriage of Steenhoek, 305 N.W.2d
448, 452 (Iowa 1981). We give weight to the fact findings of the trial court,
especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by
them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g); In re Marriage of Grady-Woods, 577 N.W.2d
851, 852 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). We approach this issue from a gender-neutral
position avoiding sexual stereotypes. In re Marriage of Pratt, 489 N.W.2d 56, 58
(Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (citing In re Marriage of Bethke, 484 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1992)).
BACKGROUND.
Samuel, who was fifty-eight years old at the time of trial, and Sandra, who
was fifty-nine, married in 1967. They have three adult children. Sandra was
employed outside the home as an optician from 1985 until 2000. She has had a
number of back surgeries and at the time of trial was working part-time for Kelly
Services, earning ten dollars an hour.
Samuel is a real estate broker, a
contractor, and a developer. He is in good health.
In 2000 and 2001, the parties showed an annual income of just over
$60,000. In 2002, Samuel’s income dramatically increased. The parties showed
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income of $172,325 in 2002, $205,545 in 2003, $266,536 in 2004, and $265,677
in 2005. Nearly all of the family income in those four years can be attributed to
Samuel. Samuel attributes his substantial increase in these years to income
from the sale of lots and homes in developments in which he held an interest.
Samuel testified he does not expect to maintain an income this high in future
years. He owns interests in an addition under development and in two others
that have lots for sale. He believes his income will not remain constant because
of changes in the economy, other new developments in the area, increased
competition, changes in the housing market, and the fact that additional land for
development is not available at a reasonable price in the area.
EQUITY OF PROPERTY DIVISION.
Samuel contends the property division is not equitable primarily because
the district court overvalued property that went to him.
In the case In re Marriage of Dean, 642 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Iowa Ct. App.
2002) (citations omitted), we set forth the court’s considerations when distributing
assets in a dissolution.
Before making an equitable distribution of assets in
dissolution, the court must determine all assets held in the name of
either or both parties as well as the debts owed by either or both.
The assets should then be given their value as of the date of trial.
The assets and liabilities should then be equitably, not necessarily
equally, divided after considering the criteria delineated in Iowa
Code section 598.21(1) (1999). In general, the division of property
is based upon each marriage partner's right to a just and equitable
share of the property accumulated as a result of their joint efforts.
In the June 28, 2006 decree dissolving the parties’ marriage, the district
court entered a decree wherein the court accepted the parties’ values on some
property, valued other property, and then, based on these valuations, determined
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Sandra should have equities of approximately $460,000 in value, and Samuel
should have equities of about $1,263,000 in value. To equalize the property
division the court ordered Samuel to pay Sandra $402,000. The sum was to be
paid at the rate of $50,000 or more a year, plus accrued interest, with the first
payment due on or before December 31, 2006, and successive payments due on
or before December 31 of each year thereafter. The sum was to accrue interest
at seven percent per annum from July 1, 2006, until paid.
VALUATION.
Samuel contends the district court overvalued certain property transferred
to him: The Meadows, Fieldstone Second Addition, and Fieldstone Third
Addition. The two Fieldstone Additions together with Fieldstone First Addition,
which has been totally sold, are owned by what appears to be an S Corporation,
Lamas, Inc., which was formed seven or eight years prior to trial. Samuel owns
one-half of the shares of stock in Lamas, Inc., and the other shares are owned by
his partner.
The extremely successful earlier sales of Fieldstone First and
Second contributed to the spike in Samuel’s income. A year prior to trial, Samuel
valued his interest in Lamas, Inc. at $99,000 on a financial statement when he
sought credit from his bank.
Although our review is de novo, we will defer to the trial court when
valuations are accompanied with supporting credibility findings or corroborating
evidence. In re Marriage of Vieth, 591 N.W.2d 639, 640 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).
Where we find the value placed on a particular item of property by the district
court to be well within the reasonable range of credible evidence, we will not
disturb such valuation on appeal. In re Marriage of Bare, 203 N.W.2d 551, 554
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(Iowa 1973); In re Marriage of Driscoll, 563 N.W.2d 640, 643 (Iowa Ct. App.
1997).
A.
Valuation of the Meadows.
There are five developed lots in this
division and a home not yet completed. The district court took the listing price for
the lots and house, discounted it by ten percent, and subtracted the debt on the
property. Samuel’s interest was determined to be about $10,000. Samuel does
not appear to challenge this value. We find it within the reasonable range of
credible evidence and affirm. Bare, 203 N.W.2d at 554.
B. Valuation of Second Fieldstone Addition. There are five developed lots
in this division that have been on the market for a considerable amount of time.
The asking price for a lot is between $50,000 and $52,000. The district court
determined the asking price for the five lots to be $255,000. The court found
there had been no recent offers or sales and determined the asking price should
be discounted by at least ten percent to account for the delay and risk in getting
the lots sold. The court set the present value of the remaining lots at $229,000.
Samuel challenges this valuation, contending two lots did not sell because they
were corner lots and required setbacks which would require a home of unique
design to utilize the lots. He testified the other lots may need to be reduced to
$50,000 per lot to be sold. We find this valuation to be within the reasonable
range of credible evidence and affirm.
C. Valuation of Fieldstone Third Addition. Fieldstone Third Addition is
currently being developed. There are forty-four lots in the addition and the plan
calls for a total asking price of $3,445,500. At the time of trial, the development
did not have sewer, water, streets, telephone, and cable; grading was not
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finished; and seeding and landscaping needed to be done. There was testimony
that additional improvements might be necessary to make the lots sellable at the
proposed listing price.
The district court found it might take five years for all the lots to be sold,
and discounted the listing price by ten percent.
It appeared the court then
subtracted $1,137,825 for what it determined would be borrowed to complete the
project, and $239,580, the debt yet owing on the purchase of the land. The court
then valued the Addition at $1,723,545, putting the value of Samuel’s one-half
interest at $938,000.
Samuel contends this development was overvalued.
He contends it
should be valued at $517,000. Samuel notes that for borrowing purposes he
valued Lamas, Inc. a year earlier at $99,000. He argues that the district court
discounting undeveloped lots, which may not be sold for five years, by the same
percentage as the court discounted developed lots ready for sale, is not
equitable.
He points out it will require his continued effort to ready the
development for sale, and that the money borrowed for development and owed
on the purchase will draw interest until there are sufficient sale proceeds to pay
them off. He also notes there may be commissions due when the lots are sold. 1
He contends the district court did not consider these factors.
We recognize there is no guarantee when the lots will sell, whether they
will bring the asking price, or more or less than the asking price.
We also
recognize that interest will continue to accrue on debt, and that finishing and
selling the development will require Samuel’s future services. Should the lots sell
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Samuel testified if he or his partner sold the lots there would not be commissions, but if
sold by others there would be.
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slowly and for less than the suggested price, this valuation will be unfair to
Samuel because the property division is not modifiable. See In re Marriage of
Wiedemann, 402 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Iowa 1987) (noting the nature of the assets
should be considered, especially where there is a high risk of decrease in value).
We agree with Samuel that it is difficult to reconcile the district court’s
application of a ten percent discount to developed lots available for immediate
sale and undeveloped lots. It does not appear in discounting the undeveloped
lots by ten percent the district court gave adequate consideration to interest that
will continue to occur on the development debt, sales commissions that will be
owed on lots sold by other than Samuel and his partner, and the income tax
consequence on sale of the lots which will be sold. Tax consequences can be
considered in a property division.
See Iowa Code § 598.2(1) (2005); In re
Marriage of Hook, 364 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 1985). Particularly where, as
here, a sale of the property is pending as distinguished from In re Marriage of
Friedman, 466 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Iowa 1991), where the court rejected reduction
of value of assets by tax consequence of sale where there was no evidence a
sale was pending or contemplated.
We find, upon considering all factors, that valuing the lots at $517,000 is
more reasonable.
The reduction in value calls for a modification of the property settlement.
Also in modifying the property settlement we consider that the district court
ordered Samuel to immediately pay interest on Sandra’s property settlement
despite its finding liquidation of the lots will take five years.
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We decrease the amount Samuel is ordered to pay Sandra to $200,000 at the
rate of $25,000 a year with accrued interest at seven percent per annum until
paid.
ALIMONY.
Samuel contends the alimony award is too high. Sandra contends she
should have more alimony. Sandra was awarded spousal support of $2000 a
month. In addition, Samuel was ordered to provide health insurance for Sandra
and pay her co-payments and deductibles but not in excess of $5000 a year.
“[A]ny form of alimony is discretionary with the court.” In re Marriage of
Ask, 551 N.W.2d 643, 645 (Iowa 1996) (citing In re Marriage of Wessels, 542
N.W.2d 486, 490 (Iowa 1995)). Before awarding alimony, the district court is
required to consider the factors listed in Iowa Code section 598.21(3). These
factors include (1) the length of the marriage, (2) the age and the physical and
emotional health of the parties, (3) the property distribution made in the
dissolution decree, (4) the educational levels of the parties, (5) the earning
capacity of the party seeking maintenance, (6) the ability of the party seeking
maintenance to become self-supporting at the standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage, (7) the tax consequences to each party, (8) any mutual agreements
by the parties concerning financial or service contributions, (9) the provisions of
any antenuptial agreement, and (10) any other factors the court determines
relevant on a case-by-case basis. Id.; In re Marriage of Crotty, 584 N.W.2d 714,
719 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). Whether spousal support is justified is dependent
upon the facts of each case. In re Marriage of Fleener, 247 N.W.2d 219, 220
(Iowa 1976). “An alimony award is justified when the distribution of the assets of
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the marriage does not equalize the inequities and economic disadvantages
suffered in marriage by the party seeking the alimony, who also has a need for
support.” In re Marriage of Sychra, 552 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996)
(citing In re Marriage of Weiss, 496 N.W.2d 785, 787-88 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering alimony of $2000 a
month and we affirm on this issue.
ATTORNEY FEES.
The district court ordered Samuel to pay $10,000 towards Sandra’s
attorney fees. We review for an abuse of discretion.
In re Marriage of Wood,
567 N.W.2d 680, 684 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). The district court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering Samuel to pay $10,000 towards Sandra’s attorney fees.
Sandra requests appellate attorney fees. “An award of appellate attorney
fees is not a matter of right, but rests within the court’s discretion.”
Id.
In
determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, “we consider the needs of
the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether
the party making the request was obligated to defend the decision of the trial
court on appeal.” Id.
We deny Sandra’s request for appellate attorney fees.
She is receiving substantial assets and has the ability to pay her fees and among
other things she was not successful on her cross-appeal.
Costs on appeal are taxed equally to the parties.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON CROSSAPPEAL.
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