BENNIE MAE HARRINGTON, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-020 / 05-1351
Filed April 11, 2007
BENNIE MAE HARRINGTON,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, James M.
Drew, Judge.
Bennie Mae Harrington appeals the district court’s ruling in her
postconviction relief proceeding. AFFIRMED.
Angela Gruber-Gardner of Marks Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget Chambers, Assistant Attorney
General, Paul L. Martin, County Attorney, and Carlyle Dalen, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee State.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
2
MAHAN, J.
Bennie Mae Harrington appeals the district court’s ruling in her
postconviction relief proceeding.
She argues her trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to plead and argue a diminished
capacity defense. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Harrington was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in
prison for the death of eighty-one-year-old Robert Crawford. She appealed her
conviction and sentence. This court affirmed both, but preserved the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel for postconviction relief. State v. Harrington,
No. 03-0824 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2004).
Harrington is of borderline intelligence and has a history of mental health
issues. In 1996 she reported to her doctor, Dr. Mahoney, that she was hearing
voices.
Mahoney diagnosed her with depression, auditory hallucinations,
schizophrenia, and schizoaffective disorder. She was prescribed medication, but
the problem persisted for the next several years. In 1999 she started referring to
the voices as “other personalities.” Following Crawford’s death, Harrington told
officers about an alternate personality, “Sally.” She made no mention of “Sally”
to her doctors previously.
Prior to trial Harrington’s attorney, Susan Flanders, had Harrington
evaluated by Dr. Dan Rogers, a clinical psychologist. Flanders believed there
was a possibility to assert an insanity or diminished capacity defense. Rogers,
however, told her Harrington’s problem had more to do with her competency to
stand trial than her capacity to commit the crime. He observed Harrington had
3
difficulty perceiving, remembering, and reporting events accurately. Dr. Michael
Taylor also met with Harrington. He was reluctant to diagnose her as he had
only spent an hour with her, but did state she suffered from major depressive
disorder. The district court determined Harrington was incompetent to stand trial.
She was committed for treatment at the Iowa Medical and Classification Center
(IMCC). At IMCC Dr. Curtis Fredrickson diagnosed Harrington with adjustment
disorder with mixed emotions and anxiety disorder. He concluded she was not
schizophrenic. He referred Harrington to Leonard J. Welsh, a staff psychologist
at IMCC, for psychological testing and evaluation. He concluded Harrington had
depression and anxiety but did not note any psychotic symptoms during his
evaluation. He concluded she was competent to stand trial.
For Harrington’s second competency hearing, the defense had her
evaluated by Dr. Paul Anderson, a psychiatrist in general practice. Anderson
diagnosed Harrington with bipolar mood disorder, mixed, with psychotic feature.
He agreed that Harrington was not schizophrenic, but indicated the illnesses are
similar and the symptoms can overlap.
competent to stand trial.
competent.
He concluded Harrington was not
The district court, however, determined she was
The court’s opinion was based on improved mental functioning
reported by Fredrickson and Welsh.
Flanders did not file a notice of intent to rely upon the insanity or
diminished responsibility defenses. Instead, she pursued a defense based on
Harrington’s denial she committed the crime. Harrington was convicted.
At the postconviction relief hearing, Flanders testified she chose not to
present a diminished responsibility defense because (1) Rogers told her
4
Harrington’s problem was related to competency, not capacity; (2) none of the
experts who examined Harrington had consistent or strong diagnoses;
(3) Harrington’s actions after Crawford’s death indicated she was capable of
planning and follow-through; (4) videotapes of police interviews with Harrington
indicated she was “smarter” than her intelligence test scores; (5) a diminished
responsibility defense required an implicit admission though Harrington had at all
times denied the crime; and (6) a diminished responsibility defense was both
inconsistent and confusing in conjunction with a defense on the facts. Harrington
did not present any expert testimony supporting her assertion she had
diminished responsibility for her actions.
The district court dismissed
Harrington’s application for postconviction relief. Harrington appeals.
II. Standard of Review
Generally, we review postconviction relief proceedings for errors at law.
Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 131 (Iowa 2001).
However, when the
petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, we review that claim de novo.
Nguyen v. State, 707 N.W.2d 317, 322-23 (Iowa 2005).
III. Merits
In order to show her counsel was ineffective, Harrington must show both
that her attorney failed in an essential duty and that the failure resulted in
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). We may resolve the claim on either prong. Id. at
697, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 699.
In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we are to consider
the totality of the evidence. Id. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2069, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
5
The test we employ for the first element is objective:
whether counsel’s
performance was outside the range of normal competency. State v. Kone, 557
N.W.2d 97, 102 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). We start with a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct was within the “wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694.
Miscalculated trial strategy and mistakes in judgment usually do not rise to the
level of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 564
(Iowa 1995). Further, “counsel has no duty to raise an issue that has no merit.”
State v. Griffin, 691 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 2005). The test for the second
element is whether there is a reasonable probability that, without counsel’s
errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. A reasonable probability is
one that undermines confidence in the outcome. Kone, 557 N.W.2d at 102.
The record shows Flanders carefully considered presenting a diminished
responsibility defense. Flanders was aware of Harrington’s mental health issues
and her intelligence. She had Harrington evaluated by numerous experts and
took their opinions into account in forming her trial strategy. In order to present
that defense, she would have to implicitly admit Harrington’s guilt and show
Harrington could not form the requisite intent for first-degree murder. See State
v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 139, 126 N.W.2d 285, 288 (1964) (describing
diminished responsibility defense).
The evidence supporting a diminished
responsibility defense was at best mixed. At worst, it supported the opposite
conclusion. Additionally, the evidence connecting Harrington to the murder was
6
not strong. The only evidence linking her to Crawford’s death was a smudge of
Crawford’s blood inside her car and her relationship with him.
Essentially, Flanders had three options: first, she could have presented a
diminished responsibility defense; second, she could have presented a defense
solely on the facts; and third, she could have presented both defenses together.
Any of these options would have tested the State’s case. We will not reverse
where counsel has made a reasonable decision concerning trial tactics and
strategy, even when that judgement fails. Fryer v. State, 325 N.W.2d 400, 41315 (1982).
Additionally, Harrington herself denied committing the crime and
acquiesced in presenting a defense on the facts. See Hughes v. State, 479
N.W.2d 616, 618 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). Harrington cannot show Flander’s trial
strategy completely “fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful
adversarial testing.” Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190, 125 S. Ct. 551, 562,
160 L. Ed. 2d 565, 580 (2004) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
659, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 668 (1984)).
We conclude
Flanders did not fail in an essential duty to her client.
Even if we concluded Flanders breached an essential duty, we would
have to conclude that breach did not prejudice her client. As stated above, the
evidence indicating Harrington could not form the requisite intent for first-degree
murder was not strong. She told coworkers the day after Crawford’s death that
she had done something bad. She told police they could not search her home
until she got home from work. She then left work early, washed her home with
bleach and her car with vinegar, then called police to search. Police videotapes
give the impression she was savvier than her intelligence test scores indicate.
7
She presented no additional evidence at her postconviction relief hearing to show
she could not form specific intent.
Therefore, Harrington cannot show the
outcome of her trial would have been different had Flanders presented a
diminished responsibility defense.
The district court’s ruling dismissing
postconviction relief is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Harrington’s
application
for
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
