IN THE INTEREST OF H.P., Minor Child, C.G.P., Father, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-011 / 06-2012
Filed January 31, 2007
IN THE INTEREST OF H.P.,
Minor Child,
C.G.P., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Susan Flaherty,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
C.G.P. appeals from the order terminating his parental rights. AFFIRMED.
John Broz, Cedar Rapids, for appellant father.
Sara Smith, Cedar Rapids, for mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, Harold Denton, County Attorney, and Troy Powell, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee State.
Janice Binder, Mount Vernon, for minor child.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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HUITINK, P.J.
C.G.P. appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights
concerning his child, H.P.
He argues the State failed to prove the statutory
grounds for termination and that termination is not in the best interest of H.P. We
review his claims de novo.
In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
C.G.P.’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to Iowa Code section
232.116(1)(h) (2005) (child is three or younger, child CINA, removed from home
for six of last twelve months, and child cannot be returned home). There is no
dispute concerning the sufficiency of the State’s proof concerning the first three
elements of section 232.116(1)(h).
H.P. is three years of age or younger,
adjudicated a child in need of assistance and removed from C.G.P.’s care for at
least thirteen months. C.G.P. claims the State failed to prove H.P. could not be
returned to his custody and terminating his parental rights is not in H.P.’s best
interest. We disagree.
The requirement of section 232.116(1)(h)(4) “is met when the child cannot
be returned to the parental home because the definitional grounds of a child in
need of assistance, Iowa Code section 232.2(6), exist.”
N.W.2d 723, 725 (Iowa 1988).
In re A.M.S., 419
If any one of the grounds listed in section
232.2(6) can be proven by clear and convincing evidence, there is sufficient
basis for termination. In re M.W., 458 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 1990). The threat
of probable harm will justify the termination of parental rights, and the perceived
harm need not be one that supported the child’s initial removal from the home. In
re M.M., 483 N.W.2d 812, 815 (Iowa 1992). A parent cannot use incarceration as
a justification for the lack of his relationship with his or her child. In re M.M.S.,
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502 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Iowa 1993). “While recognizing the law requires a ‘full measure
of patience with troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting
skills,’ Iowa has built this patience into the statutory scheme of Iowa Code
chapter 232.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 494 (quoting In re D.A., Jr., 506 N.W.2d
478, 479 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)). “Children simply cannot wait for responsible
parenting.” In re L.L., 459 N.W.3d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990). “Parenting cannot be
turned off and on like spigot.” Id. “It must be constant, responsible, and reliable.”
Id. “Children should not endlessly await the maturity of their parents.” In re
T.D.C., 336 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Iowa 1983).
The court can, however, deny the State’s requested termination of
parental rights if circumstances indicate that termination is not in the child’s best
interests. In re A.L., 492 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). Termination is
not in the child’s best interest if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the
termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of
the parent-child relationship.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c) (2005). The factors
under section 232.116(3) have been interpreted by the courts as being
permissive, not mandatory. In re C.L.H., 500 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Iowa 1993). The
appellate court has deferred to the trial court in such matters because the trial
court is closer to the parties and is able to observe the family dynamic. In re
D.E.D., 476 N.W.2d 737, 738 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
The juvenile court’s order terminating C.G.P.’s parental rights includes the
following findings of fact:
The evidence presented during this trial establishes that
substance abuse, domestic violence, untreated mental health
issues and criminal activity have rendered [H.P.’s mother, S.S.] and
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[C.G.P.] unavailable and unsuitable to provide ongoing care for
[H.P.]; that [H.P.] has been in the care and custody of others for
over one year; and that attempts had been made to assist the
parents to remedy these issues and resume care of [H.P.], but that
those efforts had not been successful. [S.S.] acknowledges her
shortcomings and has consented to this termination action. While
[C.G.P.] testified to this Court that he believes he should be given
an opportunity to parent [H.P.], his behavior since achieving parole
causes this Court to conclude that to do so would continue to place
[H.P.] [at risk] of abuse and neglect. [C.G.P.] believes that, with
some transition time, he could assume full time care of [H.P.].
While the Court could continue [H.P.] in temporary care and allow
[C.G.P.] additional time to demonstrate that he will refrain from drug
use and criminal activity and that he will provide a safe, stable
home for [H.P.], the Court does not believe that such a decision
would alter the outcome, nor would it be in [H.P.’s] best interest.
Based on our de novo review of the record, we find clear and convincing
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s findings of fact, and we adopt them as
our own. We especially note C.G.P.’s substantial violent criminal history and
resulting incarceration.
C.G.P.’s criminal and substance abuse history is
accurately described in the following excerpt from an Iowa Department of Human
Services report included in the termination record:
[H.P.’s] father, [C.G.P.], has a very long criminal history and
was incarcerated at the Anamosa State Penitentiary at the time this
case began in June, 2005 until his release in June, 2006. This was
[C.G.P.’s] third prison sentence at Anamosa. . . . He has a
significant history of criminal behavior, domestic violence and
substance abuse (including methamphetamine, marijuana and
cocaine). He had been physically abusive to [H.P.’s mother]
causing her bodily injury on occasion. The abuse occurred both
before and after she gave birth to [H.P.] He went to prison this
most recent time after he set fire to a home vacated by [H.P. and
her mother]. [C.G.P. and H.P.] have not had a visit with each other
for over 1 1/2 years now, and they are not bonded with each other.
We additionally note C.G.P.’s testimony indicating he has violated conditions of
his release from incarceration concerning alcohol abuse and curfew restrictions.
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Lastly, we conclude termination of C.G.P.’s parental rights is in H.P.’s best
interests. “[A] child’s safety and the need for a permanent home are now the
primary concerns when determining a child’s best interests.” In re J.E., 723
N.W.2d 793, 801-02 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially). Both the facts
of this case as well as the consensus opinions of H.P.’s therapist, social workers,
and guardian ad litem indicate H.P.’s needs for permanency are immediate and
compelling. Contrary to C.G.P.’s claims, it is not in H.P.’s best interests to grant
him additional time to demonstrate his ability to care for H.P.
The juvenile court’s decision terminating C.G.P.’s parental rights with
respect to H.P. is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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