STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOANN MINNIE KAMBER, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-981 / 05-1868
Filed January 18, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOANN MINNIE KAMBER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis Reis (plea) and
John D. Lloyd (sentencing), Judges.
Defendant appeals from the district court determination she was ineligible for
a deferred judgment under Iowa Code section 907.3(1)(c) (2005) because she had
two prior deferred sentences. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch and Dennis D.
Hendrickson, Assistant State Appellate Defenders, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and John Judisch, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
Defendant, Joann Minnie Kamber appeals, contending the district court erred
in determining she was ineligible for a deferred judgment under Iowa Code section
907.3(1)(c) (2005) because she had two prior deferred sentences. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings
Defendant stole over $2500 in merchandise from two Des Moines businesses
and was charged with one court of second-degree theft, in violation of Iowa Code
sections 714.1 and 714.2(2), and one court of third-degree theft, in violation of
sections 714.1 and 714.2(3) (2005). The second count was enhanced because
defendant had been convicted of fifth-degree theft in 1998 and 2000.
Defendant made a plea agreement with the State and agreed to enter guilty
pleas to second-degree theft, in violation of sections 714.1 and 714.2(2), in
exchange for the State dismissing the other count.
At the time the plea was entered the State informed the court its intention was
to recommend a suspended sentence.
The defendant requested a deferred
judgment. The court accepted the defendant’s plea. Before sentencing the court
considered the sentencing recommendations of the State and the defendant. The
State again resisted the defendant’s request for a deferred judgment noting she had
received two prior deferred sentences.
The district court determined defendant was not eligible for a deferred
judgment because prior to the commission of the offense at issue she had been
granted “deferred judgments or similar relief two or more times.”
The court
determined that under Iowa Code section 907.3(1)(c), this made her ineligible for a
deferred judgment.
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The court sentenced the defendant to an indeterminate term of incarceration
not to exceed five years, suspended the period of incarceration, and put defendant
on supervised probation for two years, as well as imposing a fine and costs.
Defendant contends the district court erred in concluding she was not eligible
for a deferred judgment because it was prohibited by Iowa Code section 907.3(1)(c).
The State concedes that error was preserved on this issue and contends the district
court properly interpreted the relevant code section and we should affirm.
Standard of Review.
“Statutory construction is properly invoked when a statute contains such
ambiguities or obscurities that reasonable minds may disagree or be uncertain of its
meaning.” State v. Blood, 360 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Iowa 1985) (citing Janson v.
Fulton, 162 N.W.2d 438, 443 (Iowa 1968)). “‘The fundamental rule of statutory
construction is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention or purpose of
the legislature as expressed in the statute.’” Id. (quoting Hedges v. Conder, 166
N.W.2d 844, 852 (Iowa 1969)).
We review the interpretation of a statute by the district court for correction of
errors at law. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 620 N.W.2d 271, 272-73 (Iowa 2000). The
court is not bound by the district court’s interpretation. Id.
Analysis.
Iowa Code section 901.5(1) provides that in pronouncing judgment and
sentence the court may, if authorized by section 907.3, defer the judgment and
sentence for an indefinite period in accordance with chapter 907.
Iowa Code section 907.3 provides in relevant part:
Pursuant to section 901.5, the trial court may, upon a plea of
guilty . . . exercise any of the options contained in this section. . . .
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1.
With the consent of the defendant, the court may defer
judgment . . . .
However, this subsection shall not apply if any of the following
is true:
....
(c)
Prior to the commission of the offense the defendant had
been granted a deferred judgment or similar relief, two or more times
anywhere in the United States.
(Emphasis supplied).
Does a deferred sentence provide “similar relief” to that granted in a deferred
judgment within the meaning of the statute so as to preclude defendant from
receiving a deferred judgment?
Both terms are defined in Iowa Code section 907.1, which provides:
As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
1.
“Deferred judgment” means a sentencing option whereby both
the adjudication of guilt and the imposition of sentence are deferred by
the court. The court retains the power to pronounce judgment and
impose a sentence subject to the defendant’s compliance with
conditions set by the court as a requirement of the deferred judgment.
2.
“Deferred sentence” means a sentencing option whereby the
court enters an adjudication of guilt but does not impose a sentence.
The court retains the power to sentence the defendant to any
sentence it originally could have imposed subject to the defendant’s
compliance with conditions set by the court as a requirement of the
deferred sentence.
The primary distinction between a deferred sentence and a deferred
judgment is that with a deferred sentence the court pronounces judgment but defers
imposition of a sentence, while with a deferred judgment the court defers judgment
of both the finding of guilt and the imposition of sentence. In addition, on the
defendant’s discharge from a deferred judgment the criminal record is expunged.
See Iowa Code § 907.9(4).
The legislature did not define the term “similar relief.” Consequently, our task
is to provide an interpretation. State v. Simmons, 500 N.W.2d 58, 59 (Iowa 1993).
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Certain principles guide us in this task. Id. Words of a statute are given their plain
or ordinary meaning, absent legislative definition or particular and appropriate
meaning in the law. American Asbestos Training Ctr., Ltd. v. Eastern Iowa Cmty.
Col., 463 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Iowa 1990). Consulting a dictionary is an acceptable
method of ascertaining the meaning of words in a statute. See State v. Williams,
315 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Iowa 1982).
The word “similar” is defined as “having characteristics in common: very
much alike” or “alike in substance or essentials.” Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 2120 (2002).
Looking at the statutory definitions of deferred sentence and deferred
judgment we find them, though not the same, to be similar. In both cases a
sentence is not imposed, but the trial court retains the power to impose a sentence it
could have originally imposed.
When construing a statute, we look at the object sought to be accomplished
and the evils and mischief sought to be remedied to arrive at an interpretation that
will accomplish the intended purpose rather than one which will defeat it. State v.
Moore, 569 N.W.2d 130,132 (Iowa 1997); Thompson v. State, 524 N.W.2d 160, 162
(Iowa 1994). Looking at section 907.3 in its entirety, it appears that generally the
legislature intended that deferred judgments would not be available to those who
have engaged in prior criminal conduct. In saying this, we note that the subsection
“shall not apply if any of the following is true:”
The defendant previously has been convicted of a felony.
....
Prior to the commission of the offense the defendant had been
granted a deferred judgment or similar relief in a felony prosecution.
....
6
The offense is a violation of section 321J.2 and the person has
been convicted of a violation of that section or the person’s driver’s
license has been revoked.
....
If the defendant has previously been convicted of a violation of
section 321J.2 subsection 1.
If the defendant has previously received a deferred judgment or
sentence for violation of section 321J.2, subsection 1.
Iowa Code §§ 907.3(b), (d), and (g).
Furthermore, when deferred sentences and deferred judgments are allowed
by statutes they have been treated similarly in several ways. Neither a deferred
judgment nor a deferred sentence may be used to enhance punishment when a
later offense is charged, as long as the sentence is not in violation of section 321J.2.
State v. Simons, 500 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Iowa 1993). We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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