DAVID ALAN LONDRIE, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-970 / 06-0737
Filed April 11, 2007
DAVID ALAN LONDRIE,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, John G. Linn,
Judge.
Londrie appeals from the district court order dismissing his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Esther J. Dean, Muscatine, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, Michael Short, County Attorney, and Bruce C. McDonald, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, J.
A jury found David Allen Londrie guilty of (1) possession with intent to
manufacture methamphetamine, (2) possession with intent to deliver more than
five grams of methamphetamine, (3) possession of a precursor with intent to
manufacture, and (4) a tax stamp violation.
On direct appeal, our court reversed the judgment for possession with
intent to manufacture but affirmed in all other respects. State v. Londrie, No. 020543 (Iowa Ct. App. May 29, 2003).
Londrie filed an application for postconviction relief. That application was
later amended to raise fourteen ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court rejected all fourteen claims
and dismissed the postconviction relief application.
Londrie appeals.
As all fourteen claims raise issues of constitutional
magnitude, our review is de novo. Giles v. State, 511 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Iowa
1994). Londrie was obligated to show that counsel breached an essential duty
and prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695 (1984).
I. Analysis
Claim 1: “Failure to properly prepare and investigate regarding Motion to
Suppress.”
Prior to trial, Londrie filed motions to suppress evidence seized in
searches of his vehicle, the home in which he lived, and an El Camino pickup
truck parked near the home that was being searched. The district court denied
the suppression motions and our court affirmed.
In his postconviction relief
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application, Londrie reasserted a challenge to the suppression ruling. The district
court concluded he was impermissibly “attempting to relitigate” the issue. The
court nevertheless considered and rejected the claim on the merits. We find no
reason to disagree with the court’s detailed findings and conclusions on this
claim.
Claim 2: “Failure to properly prepare and investigate regarding Trial to
Jury.”
Londrie contends trial counsel should have had Wayne Saunders, Paul
Londrie, Teri Thrush, and Angel Welch testify as defense witnesses.
A.
Saunders.
Londrie asserts that Saunders’s testimony was important
because he could have stated that a key witness for the State, Stephanie Jones,
“made methamphetamine.” However, this evidence was already in the record.
Jones testified she went on “runs” with Londrie to purchase cold pills that were
used in the preparation of methamphetamine. She also testified that Londrie
made her participate in a methamphetamine “cook” so that she would be as
guilty as he was. In light of this testimony, we conclude trial counsel’s decision
not to call Saunders was a reasonable strategic decision.
Accordingly, this
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails.
B. Paul Londrie. Londrie contends that another Londrie, Paul, “could have
testified that Jones tried to sell him drugs.” He also maintains Paul could have
testified that he saw a black bag containing methamphetamine in Jones’s
possession. Again, this evidence was already in the record. Jones stated she
pled guilty to aiding and abetting the delivery of methamphetamine. As for the
black bag, it was found under her car seat. Although Jones testified the bag
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belonged to Londrie, the fact that it was briefly in her constructive possession
renders Paul’s testimony cumulative.
C.
Thrush.
Londrie contends Thrush could have testified that “Jones was
jealous of [him].”
assisted him.
Londrie does not specify how this testimony would have
If he is contending that the testimony would have diminished
Jones’s credibility, defense counsel performed this task in his vigorous crossexamination of Jones.
D. Welch. Londrie contends Welch would have testified that “she was with [him]
the night before he was arrested and therefore he could not have been making
methamphetamine as Jones had accused him.” He also contends Welch knew
Jones was “cooking” methamphetamine.
Counsel’s failure to elicit the first piece of testimony was not prejudicial, as
the charge of possession with intent to manufacture was dismissed. The second
piece of testimony would have been cumulative.
Additionally, there was
evidence that Welch was a methamphetamine user, rendering her testimony
subject to impeachment. We conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective in
declining to call the listed witnesses.
Claim 3: “Failure to object to testimony.”
Londrie contends trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to
evidence of his “character, prior bad acts, his relationship with his girlfriends, and
his relationship with his family.” The postconviction court thoroughly addressed
this issue, citing several pieces of testimony to which trial counsel arguably
should have objected. The court concluded that, even if objections to these
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pieces of testimony had been made and had been sustained, there is no
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.
We agree with this conclusion.
The State presented overwhelming
evidence to support the elements of the crimes on which judgment was ultimately
entered. We find it unnecessary to detail this evidence, much of which was
summarized in our earlier opinion. See State v. Londrie, No. 02-0543 (Iowa Ct.
App. May 29, 2003). As Londrie was unable to establish Strickland prejudice,
this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails.
Claim 4: “Failure to impeach witnesses.”
Londrie contends “trial counsel offered no evidence which would have
impeached Stephanie Jones and his brother Keith Londrie.”
He specifically
contends counsel should have impeached Jones with love letters she wrote to
him and should have impeached his brother with evidence of his mental illness.
In fact, this evidence was in the record.
First, contrary to Londrie’s
assertion, defense counsel asked Jones about the love letters she wrote to
Londrie while in jail and established that these letters were inconsistent with her
testimony that Londrie threatened her. Second, Keith Londrie testified he had
schizoaffective disorder. Defense counsel elicited an admission from Keith that
this disorder caused lapses in memory. Because trial counsel cross-examined
these State witnesses as Londrie wished, we discern no breach of an essential
duty. Therefore, the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must fail.
Claim 5: “Failure to file Motions in limine.”
Londrie contends there were “no efforts to exclude the deposition
testimony of Stephanie Jones, Keith Londrie Jr. and Elizabeth Londrie regarding
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their alleged fear of Londrie, the alleged threats he made to Jones and Elizabeth
Londrie and the alleged assaults on Keith Londrie.” We cannot discern how
exclusion of these witnesses’ deposition testimony would have aided the
defense. The prosecution elicited similar testimony at trial and defense counsel
effectively used these witnesses’ earlier deposition testimony to highlight
inconsistencies in their trial testimony.
For this reason we conclude this
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails.
Claim 6: “Failure to pursue plea negotiations.”
Londrie contends “trial counsel failed to pursue plea negotiations and
properly advise him of the benefits of a plea agreement.” The postconviction
court found that “Londrie's trial testimony on this issue is not credible.” We give
weight to this finding. See Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).
In addition, Londrie's trial attorney testified that he “asked Dave if he would want
to see about getting a plea worked out, and he said he would not take a plea.”
Based on this testimony and the postconviction court’s credibility finding, we
reject this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
Claim 7: “Trial counsel’s failure to make a timely Motion for Mistrial.”
This ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must fail because counsel in
fact moved for a mistrial. Indeed, the trial court’s denial of the motion was raised
as an issue on direct appeal and our court found no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s ruling. See State v. Londrie, No. 02-0543 (Iowa Ct. App. May 29,
2003).
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Claim 8: “Trial Counsel failed to move for a new trial.”
Londrie contends “trial counsel did not move for a new trial based on the
fact that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.” First, we note
that, although trial counsel did not explicitly raise this ground in his motion for
new trial, the trial court addressed the demeanor of several witnesses and the
inconsistencies in their testimony. Second, there is no reasonable probability
that, had counsel explicitly raised the issue, the outcome would have been
different.
For these reasons, we reject this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim.
Claim 9: “Trial Counsel failed to request Jury Instruction 200.34.”
Londrie contends trial counsel should have requested a jury instruction on
other wrongful acts.
We have already concluded that, even if trial counsel
arguably should have objected to the testimony of prior bad acts, there is no
reasonable probability that the outcome would have changed if these objections
had been sustained.
That conclusion applies equally to this ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim.
Claim 10: “Trial Counsel failed to request a mistrial based on testimony
and evidence not appearing in the Minutes of Evidence.”
The district court thoroughly addressed this claim.
We agree with the
court’s reasoning and disposition.
Claim 11: “Trial Counsel failed to specify grounds for Motion to Dismiss at
the close of evidence.”
On this claim, the record reveals that trial counsel moved for a judgment of
acquittal on all counts and had a lengthy discussion with the trial court on several
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key elements. Londrie does not specify what additional elements trial counsel
should have challenged. Based on this lack of specificity and the fact that trial
counsel challenged the State’s evidence, we reject this ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim.
See Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994) (“The
applicant must state the specific ways in which counsel’s performance was
inadequate and identify how competent representation probably would have
changed the outcome.”).
Claim 12: “Trial Counsel failed to request a merger of counts I and II.”
Appellate counsel concedes that “[t]he Court of Appeals handled this issue
when it vacated Londrie’s conviction on Count I with no assistance from trial
counsel.” This concession disposes of the claim.
Claim 13: “Trial Counsel failed to investigate a potential problem with Jeff
Herr.”
The postconviction court fully addressed this claim both factually and
legally. We agree with the court’s reasoning on this issue.
Claim 14:
“The Appellant (sic) Attorney did not raise all the issues on
applicant’s behalf in the presentation of this appeal.”
Londrie asserts that appellate counsel “did not raise the issue of the Trial
Court’s denial of the Motion to Suppress.” In fact, this issue was raised and
considered on direct appeal. See State v. Londrie, No. 02-0543 (Iowa Ct. App.
May 29, 2003).
II. Disposition
We affirm the dismissal of Londrie’s application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
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