HEIDI ANN ANFINSON, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-784 / 06-0076
Filed March 28, 2007
HEIDI ANN ANFINSON,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg,
Judge.
Heidi Anfinson appeals the district court’s denial of her application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Alfredo Parrish and Brandon Brown of Parrish, Kruidenier, Moss, Dunn,
Boles, Gribble, and Cook, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich and Cristen Douglass,
Assistant Attorneys General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Joe Weeg,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, J.
Heidi Anfinson appeals the district court’s dismissal of her application for
postconviction relief. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Heidi and Michael Anfinson had a son, Jacob. When Jacob was fifteen
days old, Michael discovered that he was missing. The police were notified.
They obtained a written statement from Heidi Anfinson and interviewed her at the
police station.
Heidi eventually led police to Saylorville Lake, where they
discovered Jacob’s body.
The State charged Heidi Anfinson with first-degree murder and child
endangerment pursuant to Iowa Code sections 707.1, 702.2, 726.6(1) and
726.6(2) (1997). The first trial resulted in a mistrial. At a second trial involving
the same charges, a jury found her guilty of second-degree murder. On appeal,
our court affirmed the judgment and conviction but preserved several claims for
postconviction relief.
State v. Anfinson, No. 00-0511 (Iowa Ct. App. July 3,
2002).
Anfinson filed an application for postconviction relief.
evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed the application.
Following an
This appeal
followed.
II. Analysis
Anfinson contends trial counsel was ineffective in: (A) failing to investigate
or pursue an insanity or diminished responsibility defense prior to the
suppression hearing and at trial; (B) failing to seek suppression of a written
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statement Anfinson provided to police, and portions of her first police interview;
(C) failing to object to certain trial testimony; and (D) improperly advising her on
the factual basis required to satisfy the State’s plea offer. Our review of these
constitutional issues is de novo. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa
2001).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an applicant
must show (1) a failure to perform an essential duty, and (2) resulting prejudice.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674, 695 (1984). A court need not always address both elements. Ledezma,
626 N.W.2d. at 142. “If the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided on that
ground alone without deciding the attorney performed deficiently.” Id.
A. Insanity or Diminished Capacity
Anfinson contends “trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to investigate an insanity or diminished capacity defense that could
have been utilized at a suppression hearing or during trial as an affirmative legal
defense.”
In a detailed ruling, the district court determined that trial counsel
should have investigated Anfinson’s mental state.
The court nevertheless
rejected Anfinson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the ground that she
did not prove she was prejudiced by this breach. The court noted that “no expert
testimony was provided at the postconviction trial in this matter to demonstrate
that Ms. Anfinson suffered from insanity or diminished responsibility at or about
the time of Jacob’s death.” The court also stated that, even if such evidence had
been presented, it was “not clear whether that would have been sufficient for a
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defense of insanity or diminished responsibility.” Finally, the court stated “the
fact that Ms. Anfinson was found guilty of second-degree murder and not firstdegree murder after a first trial resulted in a hung jury indicates that [defense
counsel’s] strategy was not without merit.”
We will only address the prejudice prong of Anfinson’s claim. On this
prong, Anfinson argues that, had evidence of postpartum depression been
introduced as part of the defenses of diminished responsibility and insanity, that
evidence would have “negated the malice aforethought element included in the
murder charges” and would have negated “the specific intent to commit a crime.”
We begin with the defense of diminished responsibility or capacity. Even
if we assume that postpartum depression may be a basis for such a defense, a
proposition for which there is no Iowa authority, 1 it is well-established that
diminished responsibility cannot negate the element of malice aforethought and
is not a defense to general intent crimes. State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 531
(Iowa 2000); State v. Plowman, 386 N.W.2d 546, 547 (Iowa 1986); State v.
McVey, 376 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Iowa 1985); Veverka v. Cash, 318 N.W.2d 447,
449 (Iowa 1982); State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 142, 126 N.W.2d 285, 290
(Iowa 1964). The crime the jury found Anfinson guilty of committing was seconddegree murder. This crime required proof of malice aforethought and did not
1
In State v. Khouri, 503 N.W.2d 393, 394 (Iowa 1993), the Iowa Supreme Court rejected
a defense assertion that the doctrine of diminished capacity should be expanded to
encompass extreme emotional disturbance.
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require proof of specific intent. 2
Under the cited precedent, the defense of
diminished responsibility could not have negated these elements.
Because
Anfinson was not found guilty of first-degree murder, a crime to which the
defense of diminished responsibility might have applied, but was instead found
guilty of second-degree murder, a crime to which the defense of diminished
responsibility did not apply, she suffered no prejudice by counsel’s failure to
investigate this defense.
As for the insanity defense, none of the experts testified that Anfinson met
the standard at the time of Jacob’s death. Iowa Code § 701.4. Therefore, there
is no reasonable probability that, had this defense been raised, it would have
been successful.
B. Suppression of Statements Provided to Police
Anfinson next contends “defense counsel should have investigated” the
defenses of diminished responsibility and insanity prior to the suppression
hearing in order to “demonstrate she did not know what she was doing and that
her statements to the police were not voluntary.” We have addressed most of
this argument above.
We turn to the portion of the argument asserting that
defense counsel should have challenged the police officers’ failure to give her
Miranda warnings before taking a written statement from her and before the first
eleven minutes of questioning at the police station. As the trial court found,
2
The jury was instructed that the State would have to prove the following elements of
second-degree murder:
1. On or about the 20th day of September, 1998, the defendant drowned
Jacob Anfinson.
2. Jacob Anfinson died as a result of drowning.
3. The defendant acted with malice aforethought.
The jury was also instructed that “Murder in the Second Degree does not require a
specific intent to kill another person.”
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Anfinson was not in custody during the times those statements were elicited.
Therefore, Miranda was not triggered. State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553,
557 (Iowa 1997) (“Miranda warnings are not required unless there is both
custody and interrogation.”). However, even if she was in custody, she has not
pointed to anything in the written statement or in the first eleven minutes of the
interview that, if suppressed, may reasonably have resulted in a different
outcome. She simply asserts that, because the written statement was read to
the jury, her “credibility and truthfulness” were prejudiced.
We conclude this
assertion is too general to address. See Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15
(Iowa 1994). Accordingly, we reject this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
C. Trial Testimony Regarding Anfinson’s “Mental State”
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine requesting the exclusion of
any testimony concerning the defenses of insanity, intoxication and diminished
responsibility.
The district court granted the motion, stating “None of the
witnesses in the trial should make any reference to the Defendant’s mental
state.”
At trial, several police officers testified to Anfinson’s lack of emotion. Trial
counsel did not object to this testimony.
Anfinson contends his inaction
amounted to ineffective assistance.
At the postconviction relief trial, trial counsel explained that he did not
object to the cited testimony because the district court’s ruling on the motion in
limine only addressed legal defenses and not demeanor evidence. The district
court accepted this explanation, stating:
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The order granting the motion in limine directed that witnesses in
the trial should make no reference to the defendant’s mental state.
It did not preclude observations concerning her demeanor. The
evidence that was elicited by the various police officers was
admissible as to the Applicant’s demeanor. It does not appear to
this Court to have violated the Court’s order upon the motion in
limine.
We agree with this reasoning. See Black’s Law Dictionary 463 (8th ed. 1999)
(defining “demeanor” as “[o]utward appearance or behavior, such as facial
expressions, tone of voice, gestures and the hesitation or readiness to answer
questions.”).
See also Schrier v. State, 347 N.W.2d 657, 665 (Iowa 1984)
(finding demeanor evidence “relevant and material” to the jury’s understanding of
the events and “a legitimate basis for inferring consciousness of guilt”). As the
police officers’ testimony about Anfinson’s demeanor did not violate the district
court’s ruling on the motion in limine, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to
object to it.
D. Factual Basis For State’s Plea Offer
The State offered Anfinson the opportunity to plead guilty to child
endangerment. Anfinson rejected this offer. In an on-the-record discussion of
the plea offer, Anfinson stated she was unwilling to plead guilty to the crime
because it called for her to admit to three separate acts of child endangerment.
Additionally, she testified she was unwilling to admit that she knew the baby was
alive when she took him to the lake.
On direct appeal, Anfinson’s counsel asserted that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to inquire about an Alford plea. 3 We rejected this ineffective-
3
An Alford plea is a variation of a guilty plea in which the defendant does not admit
participation in the acts constituting the crime but consents to the imposition of a
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assistance-of-counsel claim, noting that Alford pleas, like other pleas, required a
factual basis and there was no showing of “three separate acts of child
endangerment.”
Following the postconviction relief hearing, Anfinson asked to amend the
petition to conform to the proof with respect to the guilty plea discussion by trial
counsel. The district court allowed the amendment but rejected the claim. The
court stated:
Ms. Anfinson further claims that [defense counsel] failed to properly
instruct her about all the plea offers made by the State of Iowa.
Specifically, when [defense counsel] explained to her the offer
made by the State to plead to three acts of child endangerment of
which one of the acts required a serious injury to the child, he
misrepresented the necessary factual basis. However, the record
is clear that no factual basis could have been made because Ms.
Anfinson was consistent in her belief that any “serious injury” was
an accident and that Jacob was not alive when placed in Saylorville
Lake. (Transcript of postconviction proceedings, pages 286-87,
321-23). The Court finds that the [Applicant’s] position regarding
plea offers and any alleged ineffectiveness by [defense counsel]
are without merit. Ms. Anfinson has consistently maintained up to
the time of and including the postconviction trial that any injury
including the death of Jacob was an accident. Further, there was
no factual basis upon which such a plea could have been made
based upon Ms. Anfinson’s consistent and stated position
concerning the events leading up to and including the death of
Jacob. No essential duty was neglected by [defense counsel] in
this regard and this issue is without merit.
On appeal from this ruling, Anfinson contends “trial counsel failed to fully apprise
[her] of the child endangerment plea offer because he was under the false
impression that she would have to admit that she placed her child in Saylorville
Lake while he was still alive.” She suggests that she could have pled guilty to
child endangerment based on three acts other than her placement of the baby in
sentence. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167, 27 L. Ed. 2d
162, 171 (1970); State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 n.1 (Iowa 2001).
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the lake. She states, for example, that trial counsel could have advised her to
plead guilty based on her earlier placement of the baby in the bathtub and based
on other acts that might have occurred before the day of young Jacob’s death.
Postconviction counsel does not elaborate on what those prior incidents might
have been.
We conclude this ineffective assistance of counsel claim is too
speculative to decide on the merits. See Dunbar, 515 N.W.2d at 15.
II. Disposition
We affirm the dismissal of Anfinson’s postconviction relief application.
AFFIRMED.
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