IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF MICHAEL DEAN LANCE AND STACIE KAY LANCE Upon the Petition of MICHAEL DEAN LANCE, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning STACIE KAY LANCE, Respondent-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-1073 / 06-0638
Filed February 14, 2007
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF MICHAEL DEAN LANCE
AND STACIE KAY LANCE
Upon the Petition of
MICHAEL DEAN LANCE,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
STACIE KAY LANCE,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Henry County, Cynthia H.
Danielson, Judge.
Respondent appeals from provisions of a dissolution decree. AFFIRMED
IN PART AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Robert J. Engler, Burlington, for appellant.
Timothy B. Liechty, New London, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Mahan, JJ.
2
MAHAN, J.
Stacie Lance appeals from the child support, alimony, and property
division provisions of the district court’s decree dissolving her marriage to
Michael Lance. We affirm in part and remand with directions.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Michael and Stacie Lance were married in November 1994. Michael was
thirty-five years old at the date of trial and Stacie was thirty-one. Three children
were born to the marriage:
Madelaine, born in April 1995; Mikayle, born in
September 1997; and Izaak, born in September 2002.
Michael has no post-high school education or training.
purchased a sanitation business from his grandfather.
In 1990 he
Michael’s grandfather
operated the business as a hobby, but Michael turned “Lance Refuse” into a
career.
Michael works six days a week to run Lance Refuse.
Outside the
invoicing process, Lance Refuse is a one-man operation.
Stacie earned a two-year degree as an L.P.N. prior to the marriage. She
worked as a medical assistant at Family Medicine for three years. She then
worked at Hometown Medical Center for approximately one year. When Mikayle
was born in 1997, Stacie quit her full-time position and primarily stayed home to
care for the children and the home. While at home she did some secretarial work
and billing for Lance Refuse. She also held various part-time jobs. She worked
in the medical field as recently as 2004. She recently went back to school to
receive training to become a massage therapist. At the time of trial she was only
a few months shy of completing her training.
3
The parties have been effectively separated since November 2004.
Michael filed this action in December 2004. He continued to pay all family living
expenses until Stacie moved out of the family home in September 2005.
Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to an award of joint legal custody and
joint physical care of the children. Under the shared physical care arrangement,
each parent would have equal time with the children. The parties also stipulated
to the division of most of their assets and liabilities. 1
The parties were unable to agree on their respective incomes for purposes
of calculating child support and whether Stacie should receive rehabilitative
alimony. The parties were also unable to agree on the division of a home equity
debt with State Farm. This loan was initially obtained for the purpose of making
improvements to the family home. However, proceeds from the loan were also
used to pay business expenses, purchase a boat, and pay off credit cards.
The district court ordered Stacie responsible for $54,649 of the home
equity debt and Michael responsible for the remaining $10,500. The justification
for the division was that it left both parties with a nearly equal division of assets
and liabilities. 2
The district court also calculated Michael’s self-employment
income and imputed Stacie’s earning capacity.
Based on the child support
guidelines, the court determined Stacie owed Michael approximately fifty-one
dollars per month for child support. Due to the similarity in incomes and earning
1
The family home and business assets constituted the bulk of the marital assets. Stacie
wanted the home, and Michael wanted the various assets used in his refuse business.
2
In total, Stacie was awarded $188,230 in gross assets, and Michael was awarded
$122,172.50 in gross assets. Stacie was ordered responsible for $155,252.71 in
liabilities and Michael responsible for $88,600.
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capacity and the alternating dependency deduction for Madelaine, Michael
suggested the court waive the child support obligation. The court agreed and
ordered that neither party pay child support to the other.
Stacie appeals, arguing the court erred in the following matters:
(1) improperly calculating Michael’s self-employment income for purposes of
determining child support, (2) improperly calculating her earning capacity for
purposes of determining child support, (3) inequitably dividing the State Farm
equity line of credit, (4) not awarding her rehabilitative alimony, and (5) not
awarding her attorney fees at trial. Stacie also contends she should be awarded
appellate attorney fees.
II. Standard of Review
Our scope of review in this equitable action is de novo. Iowa R. App. 6.4.
Because the district court has a firsthand opportunity to hear the evidence and
view the witnesses, we give weight to its findings of fact, especially when
considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them. In re
Marriage of Will, 489 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Iowa 1992). We accord the trial court
considerable latitude in resolving economic provisions of a dissolution decree
and will disturb a ruling only when there has been a failure to do equity. In re
Marriage of Smith, 573 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Iowa 1998).
III. Child Support
A. Michael’s Self-Employment Income
Stacie contends the district court erred in calculating Michael’s selfemployment income for purposes of determining his child support obligation.
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Stacie claims the court utilized deductions for accelerated depreciation and
deductions for expenses not related to the production of income.
A court must determine the parent’s monthly income from the most
reliable evidence presented. In re Marriage of Powell, 474 N.W.2d 531, 534
(Iowa 1991). The Iowa Supreme Court has stated, “some consideration must be
given to business expenses reasonably necessary to maintain the business or
occupation.”
In re Marriage of Gaer, 476 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Iowa 1991)
(emphasis added).
When defining “net monthly income,” the child support guidelines do not
provide for a deduction for depreciation. See Iowa Ct. R. 9.5. However, our
case law allows a deduction for all or part of straight-line depreciation, given a
finding the guidelines would otherwise be unjust or inappropriate. Gaer, 476
N.W.2d at 326, 329. The decision of whether to allow depreciation is to be
“determined from all the circumstances including the amount of depreciation
claimed and the property depreciated.” Id. at 328.
The district court adopted the $29,234 net income figure from Schedule C
of their 2004 tax return as the most credible evidence of Michael’s annual
income. The court did not include its rationale for the wholesale adoption of all
business expenses listed on Schedule C. Upon our de novo review we find
several business expenses were improperly deducted when computing Michael’s
self-employment income.
As noted above, our supreme court allows a deduction for straight-line
depreciation. Id. However, in this case multiple assets were depreciated using
an accelerated depreciation method.
The depreciation expenses included a
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$5694 accelerated depreciation deduction for a Ford F-250 vehicle that was used
only once or twice per week for business purposes.
Also included was an
accelerated depreciation deduction for dumpsters purchased in previous years
and a $6771 section 179 deduction 3 for dumpsters purchased in the current year.
These depreciation deductions and related section 179 deduction significantly
reduced Michael’s net annual income.
A review of the business expenses listed on Schedule C also suggests
some personal expenses were included as business expense deductions.
Schedule C lists a $1916 deduction for utilities expense. The 2004 tax return
does not identify this expense as one incurred from the business use of a home,
but Michael testified that this expense was for the utilities in the home.
Schedule C also identifies $3256 in phone expense, but testimony suggests the
family’s home phone was used for the refuse business.
There is no
documentation allocating these expenses between personal and business use.
Similarly, testimony indicates Michael used his vehicles for personal and
business use, yet the licensing fees and insurance fees for these vehicles were
included as business expenses. Also, as noted above, Michael depreciated the
full cost of his Ford F-250 vehicle even though it was used only once or twice per
week for business purposes.
The 2004 tax return standing alone does not
constitute credible evidence that the entire amount of each of these expenses
are reasonably necessary to maintain or operate the refuse business.
3
A section 179 expense deduction allows a party to elect to deduct the entire cost of
certain business assets from current income rather than depreciating the assets over the
length of their useful life. 26 U.S.C.A. § 179 (2006).
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The deductions for accelerated depreciation and expenses were not
reasonably necessary to maintain the business and artificially reduced Michael’s
net income for purposes of calculating child support. We believe adjustments are
therefore necessary to provide for the needs of the children and to do justice
between the parties. Under the circumstances of this case, Michael should be
allowed a deduction for depreciation; however it should be determined by using
the straight-line method of depreciation rather than an accelerated method or
same-year section 179 expense deduction. See In re Marriage of McKamey, 522
N.W.2d 95, 99 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that a noncustodial parent
electing to expense certain depreciable assets should have that amount of
expenses allocated over a reasonable depreciation period). Also, the district
court should deduct from gross income only the portion of the aforementioned
expenses which pertain to business use, rather than personal use. With this
guidance in mind, we remand for a redetermination of Michael’s self-employment
income. The court may wish to set this matter for the taking of further evidence.
B. Stacie’s Imputed Income
Stacie contends the court should have imputed her income for child
support purposes to be $18,000, rather than $25,000.
Stacie has a degree as an L.P.N. and was previously licensed in that field.
With minimal effort she could reactivate her license. Stacie stipulates that a fulltime L.P.N. earns $12.45 per hour for a total income of $25,480 at the Henry
County Health Center. The age of the children would not prevent Stacie from
pursuing such full-time employment.
8
Stacie is also very close to completing her training to become a massage
therapist. As a massage therapist, Stacie estimates she would charge forty-five
dollars per hour and work approximately thirty hours per week.
That would
equate to a gross income of more than $70,000 per year. Even with deductions
for costs related to running her own business, it is not unreasonable to conclude
she could earn an annual income of $25,000 as a massage therapist.
Upon our de novo review of the evidence, we find $25,000 is a reasonable
and equitable annual earning capacity.
IV. Property Division
Stacie disputes the court’s decision to make her responsible for the
majority of the State Farm home equity debt. The district court made Stacie
responsible for $54,569 of the liability and Michael responsible for the remaining
$10,500. The justification for the division was that it left both parties with a nearly
equal division of assets and liabilities.
Stacie contends the court should have ordered both parties to pay the
percentage of the debt which was expended towards the assets they were
awarded in the decree. In essence, she contends that most of the money was
spent on the refuse business, rather than the home, and therefore Michael
should be awarded the lion’s share of this debt.
The partners in a marriage are entitled to a just and equitable share of the
property accumulated through their joint efforts. In re Marriage of Dean, 642
N.W.2d 321, 325 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002). Iowa courts do not require an equal
division or percentage distribution. In re Marriage of Campbell, 623 N.W.2d 585,
586 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001). The determining factor is what is fair and equitable in
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each particular circumstance. In re Marriage of Miller, 552 N.W.2d 460, 463
(Iowa Ct. App. 1996). The distribution should be made in consideration of the
criteria set forth in Iowa Code section 598.21(5) (2005). Id. We accord the trial
court considerable latitude in resolving economic provisions of a dissolution
decree and will disturb a ruling only when there has been a failure to do equity.
In re Marriage of Smith, 573 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Iowa 1998).
As noted above, the current property division left both parties with a nearly
equal division of assets and liabilities. Stacie was ordered to pay the larger
portion of the State Farm debt because she desired to retain the single largest
asset of the marriage, the family home. Her equity in the home far exceeds her
liability to State Farm. “[T]he allocation of marital debts inheres in the property
division.” In re Marriage of Johnson, 299 N.W.2d 466, 467 (Iowa 1980). “Even
though a debt may have been incurred by a party for family expenses, it is not
inequitable to order that party to be responsible for the entire amount of the debt
as long as the overall property distribution is equitable.” In re Marriage of Sullins,
715 N.W.2d 242, 251 (Iowa 2006). Because the overall property distribution is
equitable, it is not inequitable that Stacie be charged with repaying the State
Farm Liability.
Stacie also argues the liability should be offset because the client list and
good will associated with the refuse business are income producing assets for
Michael. 4 This argument is without merit and not supported by the record.
4
Stacie states that we should not include a value for the good will when dividing the
assets and liabilities.
10
Stacie did not present an expert or any type of appraisal indicating the
value, or potential future income stream associated with the good will and client
list of Lance Refuse. On the contrary, Mike Prottsman, owner of Mike Prottsman
Sanitation, Inc., testified that Lance Refuse has little or no value without
Michael’s labor. When asked whether he would ever consider purchasing Lance
Refuse, Prossman stated “without [Mike] in the driver’s seat, there is no other
business. There is no Lance Refuse. So it wouldn’t really do me any good [to
buy Lance Refuse].” The record also indicates that only one client has a contract
with Lance Refuse. At any time, a client can hire someone else to handle their
sanitation needs.
Lance Refuse is the vehicle by which Michael earns a living. It is not an
income producing asset. We find no reason to alter the current distribution.
V. Alimony
Stacie challenges the district court’s decision to deny her request for
rehabilitative alimony.
Rehabilitative alimony supports an economically
dependent spouse through a limited period of education or retraining following
divorce, “thereby creating incentive and opportunity for that spouse to become
self-supporting.” In re Marriage of Anliker, 694 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Iowa 2005).
While we review the district court’s award of alimony de novo, “we give that court
considerable latitude in making this determination based on criteria in section
598.21(3).” Id. We will disturb the court’s alimony determination “only when
there has been a failure to do equity.” Id.
Alimony is not an absolute right; an award of alimony depends on the
circumstances of the particular case. Id. The district court may award alimony
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after considering the factors in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1). These factors
include: (1) the length of the marriage, (2) the age and physical and emotional
health of the parties, (3) the property distribution, (4) the educational level of the
parties at the time of the marriage and at the time the dissolution action is
commenced, (5) the earning capacity of the party seeking alimony, and (6) the
feasibility of the party seeking alimony becoming self-supporting at a standard of
living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage. Iowa Code §
598.21A(1)(a)-(f).
Because we remand so that the court can recalculate Michael’s selfemployment income, it is no longer clear whether Stacie will become selfsupporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during
the marriage. On remand, the district court shall address whether alimony is now
appropriate in light of Michael’s recalculated income.
VI. Attorney Fees
A. Trial Attorney Fees
Stacie argues the district court abused its discretion in failing to award her
trial attorney fees. Attorney fees are not a matter of right but are within the
court’s discretion.
1997).
In re Marriage of Romanelli, 570 N.W.2d 761, 765 (Iowa
We review the district court’s award of attorney fees for abuse of
discretion. Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 255. The award should be reasonable and fair
and based on the parties’ respective abilities to pay.
In re Marriage of
Scheppele, 524 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). We conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to award Kathy trial attorney
fees.
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B. Appellate Attorney Fees
Appellate attorney fees are not a matter of right, but rather rest in the
court’s discretion. In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005).
We consider the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other
party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal. Id. Based on the merit of the
appeal, we award Stacie $500 in appellate attorney fees. Costs on appeal are
taxed one-half to each party.
VII. Conclusion
We have considered all other arguments raised on appeal, and except as
discussed above, we find them without merit or unnecessary to the disposition of
this case. We remand to the district court to determine Michael's income in
accordance with this opinion, to exercise its discretion in applying the income to
the child support guidelines, and to address whether the recalculated income
necessitates an alimony award. We affirm the other provisions of the district
court’s decree. We do not retain jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
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