CASANDRA LOBBERECHT and DAVID L. LOBBERECHT, Individually and as Next Best Friends of KEIFFER LOBBERECHT, ADAM LOBBERECHT, and OLIVIA LOBBERECHT, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. AKELLA CHENDRASEKHAR, M.D. and THE IOWA CLINIC , P.C., Defendants-Appellees.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-1036 / 06-0672
Filed January 31, 2007
CASANDRA LOBBERECHT and DAVID L.
LOBBERECHT, Individually and as Next Best
Friends of KEIFFER LOBBERECHT, ADAM
LOBBERECHT, and OLIVIA LOBBERECHT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
AKELLA CHENDRASEKHAR, M.D. and THE IOWA
CLINIC , P.C.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joel D. Novak, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment ruling dismissing their petition
for lack of standing. AFFIRMED.
Alfredo Parrish and Tammy Westhoff Gentry of Parrish, Kruidenier, Moss,
Dunn, Boles, Gribble & Cook, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellants.
Robert D. Houghton of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for
appellees.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Baker, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
Plaintiffs Casandra and David Lobberecht, both individually and on behalf
of their children Keiffer, Adam, and Olivia Lobberecht, appeal from the summary
judgment ruling in favor of defendants Akella Chendrasekhar, M.D. and his
employer, the Iowa Clinic, P.C., dismissing their petition for lack of standing. The
court determined the plaintiffs’ claims accrued prior to their filing a bankruptcy
petition, and thus it was the bankruptcy estate that was the real party in interest
rather than the individual plaintiffs. We affirm the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Casandra Lobberecht underwent gastric bypass surgery on December 18,
2002. The procedure was performed by Dr. Chendrasekhar. Sometime after
Lobberecht was able to recommence eating solid food, she began to experience
abdominal pain. The pain worsened, and Lobberecht sought treatment from Dr.
Chendrasekhar. Dr. Chendrasekhar suspected cholecystitis, or inflammation of
the gallbladder. He performed surgery to remove Lobberecht’s gallbladder on
February 22, 2003. However, when Lobberecht once again began to eat solid
food, she again experienced abdominal pain.
Lobberecht continued to experience pain and nausea.
On March 29,
2003, she sought treatment for severe pain at the Mahaska Hospital Emergency
Room. She was transferred to Iowa Methodist Medical Center (IMMC), where
tests revealed a fistula, an opening between the gastric pouch and the remnant
stomach.
According to Lobberecht Dr. Chendrasekhar informed her “that there
was a leak, that they could see material going from the pouch into the remnant
stomach,” but not to “worry about it, it’s not going to hurt anything . . . .”
3
Lobberecht was discharged from the hospital on April 2, 2003.
She
continued to experience pain and nausea. In addition Lobberecht, who has a
nursing background, diagnosed herself as suffering from a hernia.
Dr.
Chendrasekhar confirmed the presence of a hernia, and scheduled Lobberecht
for another surgery to repair the hernia and close the fistulous connection
between the gastric pouch and the remnant stomach.
On April 26, 2003, Lobberecht presented to the Mahaska Hospital with
severe pain and vomiting.
She was again transferred to IMMC.
She was
immediately scheduled for surgery to repair the hernia and close the fistulous
connection. Prior to surgery a resident explained to Lobberecht that during the
initial gastric bypass surgery her “stomach was not divided all the way.” During
surgery, the hernia was repaired but the fistula was not. Following surgery, Dr.
Chendrasekhar informed Lobberecht that “[t]here was a lot of scar tissue . . . and
he had not fixed” the fistulous connection. As of that time Lobberecht understood
“that there was something else that had to be fixed.” Lobberecht was discharged
from the hospital on May 1, 2003. She continued to experience pain, nausea,
and vomiting.
On May 28, 2003, Lobberecht and her husband filed a Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition. The petition did not list any claim against Dr. Chendrasekhar
or the Iowa Clinic. The bankruptcy proceeding resulted in a discharge on August
26, 2003.
On January 9, 2004, Lobberecht again presented to the Mahaska Hospital
Emergency Room in acute pain. She was seen by Dr. Tim Breon, who identified
the fistula as well as an anastomotic stricture. He attempted to correct that latter
4
with
a
balloon
dilation.
Lobberecht
subsequently
underwent
six
esophagogastroduodenoscopy procedures. Dr. Breon performed a revision of
Lobberecht’s gastric bypass on August 31, 2004, in which he closed the fistulous
connection between the gastric pouch and remnant stomach.
In December 2004 the Lobberechts, individually and on behalf of their
children, filed a petition against Dr. Chendrasekhar and the Iowa Clinic, alleging
claims for medical malpractice and loss of consortium. Specifically, the plaintiffs
alleged that Dr. Chendrasekhar negligently performed Lobberecht’s gastric
bypass surgery, negligently assessed and treated Lobberecht’s post-operative
complications, and performed unnecessary gallbladder removal surgery.
Dr. Chendrasekhar and the Iowa Clinic moved for summary judgment on
the grounds the plaintiffs (1) were judicially estopped from filing the claims
because they failed to list them in the bankruptcy petition, and (2) lacked
standing to bring the claims because the bankruptcy estate was the real party in
interest. The plaintiffs filed a resistance and the matter proceeded to hearing. In
a February 1, 2006 order the court rejected the judicial estoppel argument but
agreed the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue the medical malpractice and loss
of consortium claims. The court concluded that, under the undisputed facts, the
causes of action had accrued prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and
accordingly belonged to the bankruptcy estate.
It therefore granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition.
The plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
1.904(2), which was resisted by the defendants. In an April 6 ruling, the court
enlarged, amended, and clarified certain portions of its summary judgment ruling,
5
but declined to alter its conclusion that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue the
claims in their petition and the case should accordingly be dismissed. 1
The plaintiffs appeal. They contend the district court erred in concluding
that their causes of action accrued prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
Summary judgment rulings are reviewed for the correction of errors at law.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; General Car & Truck Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Lane &
Waterman, 557 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 1996).
Where no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, summary judgment is appropriate. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3); City of West
Branch v. Miller, 546 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1996). All facts are viewed in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.
Bearshield v. John Morrell & Co., 570 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1997). However, a
party resisting a properly supported summary judgment motion must “set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered.” Iowa
R. Civ. P. 1.981(5).
III. Discussion.
The plaintiffs do not dispute that, if the causes of action asserted in their
petition accrued prior to the May 28, 2003 filing of their Chapter 7 bankruptcy
1
The plaintiffs assert their appeal is solely from the February 1 summary judgment
ruling because at the conclusion of the rule 1.904(2) ruling the district court stated the
plaintiffs’ motion was “DENIED.” However, it is clear from the body of the rule 1.904(2)
ruling that the district court intended to enlarge, amend, and clarify certain portions of its
summary judgment ruling without altering its ultimate determination. To ignore the clear
intent of the district court is to elevate form over substance, and this we will not do.
Accordingly, we will consider issues relevant to the February 1 summary judgment
ruling, as modified by the April 6 rule 1.904(2) ruling.
6
petition, their interest in the claims passed to the trustee of the bankruptcy estate
and their petition was properly dismissed for lack of standing. See Collins v.
Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 421 N.W.2d 136, 138-39 (Iowa 1988) (noting the
bankruptcy estate “includes causes of action belonging to the debtor at the time
the case is commenced’” (citation omitted)); see also U.S. ex rel. Gebert v.
Transport Admin. Servs., 260 F.3d 909, 913 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he property of
the bankruptcy estate includes all causes of action that the debtor could have
brought at the time of the bankruptcy petition.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly,
the sole question before us in this appeal is whether the claims asserted by the
plaintiffs did, as the district court concluded, accrue prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.
In reaching its decision, the district court was guided by case law
addressing accrual of causes of actions in the context of Chapter 7 bankruptcies.
In such a context, our supreme court has held that a cause of action does not
accrue until there is an “actual loss to the interest of another,” or until “the
wrongful act produces injury to the claimant.” Collins, 421 N.W.2d at 139-40.
Applying this standard, the district court determined that, under the undisputed
facts, Lobberecht’s injuries occurred, and thus the plaintiffs’ causes of actions
accrued, prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The court did not believe
the medical malpractice statute of limitations should be applied in this case,
concluding that “the accrual of a cause of action for purposes of ownership in a
bankruptcy proceeding is distinctly different from the accrual period with regard to
the statute of limitations and the frequently used discovery rule.”
7
Nevertheless, at the urging of the parties, the court analyzed the matter
under the medical malpractice statute of limitations, which allows a plaintiff to
bring a claim “within two years after the date on which the claimant knew, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, . . . of, the injury . . .
for which damages are sought . . . .” Iowa Code § 614.1(9)(a) (2003). Injury, as
used in this section, refers to the physical harm suffered by the plaintiff and not
the wrongful act that produces the physical harm.
Schlote v. Dawson, 676
N.W.2d 187, 193 (Iowa 2004), disavowed on other grounds by Christy v. Miulli,
692 N.W.2d 694, 701 n.1 (Iowa 2005). Thus, the statute begins to run
when a person gains knowledge sufficient to put the person on
inquiry. On that date, the person is charged with knowledge of facts
that would have been disclosed by a reasonably diligent
investigation. Moreover, once a person is aware that a problem
exists, the person has a duty to investigate even though the person
may not have knowledge of the nature of the problem that caused
the injury.
Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Iowa 1995).
Applying these
standards, the district court concluded the plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of
Lobberecht’s injuries prior to the bankruptcy filing, and thus their causes of action
accrued prior to this time.
We decline the plaintiffs’ invitation to decide whether section 614.1(9)(a) is
applicable in this matter (and to consider the related questions of inquiry notice
and the continuous treatment doctrine), because we agree with the district court
that, pursuant to Collins, their claims accrued prior to the bankruptcy filing.
Under the undisputed facts in the summary judgment record, the allegedly
negligent gastric bypass surgery, relevant post-operative care, and gallbladder
removal surgery all occurred prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. So too
8
did the allegedly injurious consequences of those acts, including the fistulous
connection between the gastric pouch and the remnant stomach.
In light of
these undisputed facts, the only reasonable conclusion to be reached is that the
alleged wrongful acts did produce the alleged injuries to Lobberecht prior to the
bankruptcy filing. See Collins, 421 N.W.2d at 139-40. 2
The plaintiffs’ claims accrued prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
They accordingly passed to the bankruptcy estate, which became the real party
in interest. The district court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims.
AFFIRMED.
2
The plaintiffs assert that they should be allowed the benefit of the common-law
personal injury discovery rule adopted in Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 463,
150 N.W.2d 94, 100 (1967), because Collins, 421 N.W.2d at 139, cites to Chrischilles for
the proposition that a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has been
damaged. Chrischilles provided that a malpractice statute of limitation did not begin to
run until “‘the date of discovery, or the date when, by the exercise of reasonable care,
plaintiff should have discovered the wrongful act . . . .’” Chrischilles, 260 Iowa at 462,
150 N.W.2d at 100. We are not convinced the Collins court, in citing to Chrischilles for a
limited proposition, also intended to implicitly adopt the common-law discovery rule.
However, even if that were the case, the common-law rule has been statutorily
abrogated in the context of medical malpractice. See Langner, 533 N.W.2d at 511.
Moreover, we note that, contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertion, nothing in Collins requires a
plaintiff to have actual knowledge of an injury for a cause of action to accrue. See
Collins, 421 N.W.2d at 139.
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