STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DAWN KOBEL, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-1000 / 04-0945
Filed February 28, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DAWN KOBEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Humboldt County, Joel E.
Swanson, Judge.
Defendant appeals following conviction and sentence for multiple incidents
of child endangerment. AFFIRMED.
Darren D. Driscoll of Johnson, Erb, Bice, Kramer, Good, Mulholland &
Cochrane, P.L.C., Fort Dodge, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Guddall and Denise Timmins,
Assistant Attorneys General, and Paul Walter, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
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ZIMMER, J.
Dawn Kobel appeals following entry of judgment and sentence for one
count of child endangerment and one count of multiple acts of child
endangerment, in violation of Iowa Code sections 726.6 and 726.6A (1999). She
asserts the record does not contain substantial evidence in support of her
convictions. She also contends both charges should have been dismissed
because they were not brought within the applicable statute of limitations. We
affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Kobel and David Hanse are the biological parents of two daughters, K.M.
and B.M.
At the times relevant to this proceeding, Kobel and Hanse lived
together with the two children.
The family has a history of involvement with the Iowa Department of
Human Services (DHS). Humbolt County DHS workers became involved with
the family in January 2000 after the family moved to Humbolt County. During an
unannounced visit to the family home, DHS workers observed pornographic
magazines “in plain sight for the kids to see.” The workers also received reports
that known sex offenders were being allowed into the home. A caseworker told
Kobel and Hanse they were not to expose the children to pornographic material
and told them to keep known sexual offenders out of the home. Hanse’s family
members also voiced concerns, to Kobel as well as Hanse, that sex offenders
were being allowed in the home.
On April 2, 2001, social workers made an unannounced visit to the home.
They looked through a window and observed that a pornographic movie was
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playing on a television in the front room. As they knocked on the door, the social
workers could hear the television and the voices of K.M. and B.M.
Hanse
belatedly answered the door, wearing only pants. The social workers observed
Hanse was “flushed,” “sweaty,” “nervous,” and “had an erection.”
Hanse
admitted he had been watching an adult movie. K.M., then age four, nervously
informed the social workers her panties were on “funny” because they were
pulled up on one leg. Kobel was not at home.
The social workers took K.M. to a “safe house” designed to provide
protective services to children. B.M., then age two, was left in Hanse’s care. At
the safe house K.M. informed the social workers she had been “making sex with
her dad,” and that the reason it had taken so long to answer the door was
because they all had to put their pants back on. K.M. then reported various
sexual activities that had occurred involving not only Hanse, but other persons
Hanse would invite to the home. K.M. appeared relieved when she was told she
was not returning to the home, but expressed concern that Hanse would “make
sex” with B.M. and that B.M. was too small. Social workers returned to Hanse
and Kobel’s residence and removed B.M. from the home.
The following day, a doctor performed a sexual assault examination on
each child. K.M.’s examination revealed a torn hymen and a hymenal opening
consistent with that of a twelve-year-old. Her injuries were consistent with the
insertion of an adult finger or attempted penile penetration. The injuries were not
considered “acute” because there was no indication they had occurred within the
past twenty-four hours.
B.M.'s examination revealed an enlarged clitoris
consistent with a history of masturbation.
4
K.M. and B.M. were placed in foster care on April 3, 2001. K.M. was later
diagnosed with genital warts and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). B.M.
initially engaged in frequent masturbation and exhibited aberrant sexual behavior
with the foster family’s dogs. 1 Both children were adopted by their foster care
parents after Kobel’s and Hanse’s parental rights were terminated.
By trial information filed August 8, 2003, the State jointly charged Kobel
and Hanse for criminal acts allegedly committed between April 2, 2000, and
April 2, 2001.
Kobel was charged with one count of multiple acts of child
endangerment for acts allegedly committed against K.M. and one count of child
endangerment for an act allegedly committed against B.M. 2
The matter
proceeded to a jury trial in March 2004.
During trial K.M. detailed the various sexual acts inflicted upon her and
B.M. at the hands of Hanse and other adults he invited to the home. Social
workers also testified to statements made by K.M. The evidence, taken in the
light most favorable to the State, reveals the following.
Hanse perpetrated multiple acts of sexual abuse on K.M. He also allowed
K.M.’s grandfather, and at least two other persons named “Scott” and “Rocky,” to
touch K.M. in a sexual manner. In addition, Hanse and Scott caused B.M. to be
touched in a sexual manner. Rocky and Scott, who were friends of Kobel and
1
K.M. disclosed to social workers that Hanse had included a dog in the sexual activity
to which she and B.M. had been exposed.
2
The trial information charged Hanse with one count of sexual abuse in the second
degree and one count of multiple acts of child endangerment for acts allegedly
committed against K.M., and one count of child endangerment for an act allegedly
committed against B.M. Hanse was convicted and sentenced on all three counts. He
appealed and his convictions were upheld by this court. See State v. Hanse, No. 040943 (Iowa Ct. App. June 29, 2005).
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Hanse and in the home frequently, were two of the individuals Kobel and Hanse
had been cautioned to keep out of the home and away from the children.
In detailing the abuse, K.M. used the word “puss” to describe her genital
area. K.M. explained she had learned the word from Kobel one day when Kobel
and Hanse told her “we’re going to make sex,” which Kobel explained as using
your hands to “pull your puss apart.”
K.M. could recall the abuse occurring
“when [she] was four years old.” The abuse occurred “[e]very single day,” and
B.M. was “[a]lways” present. Hanse would abuse K.M. when Kobel left the home
to go to the laundromat. He also abused K.M. when Kobel was in the home.
K.M. recalled there were times Kobel would use the computer and watch Hanse
abuse K.M. According to K.M., Kobel and Hanse argued about the abuse Hanse
was perpetrating on K.M. and Kobel asked Hanse to stop the abuse on at least
five occasions.
Kobel moved to dismiss the charges, citing to section 802.3’s requirement
that the trial information be filed within three years of the alleged commission of
the crimes. She also moved for a judgment of acquittal, asserting the evidence
was not sufficient to support a finding of guilt on either charge. The court denied
both motions, and the matter was submitted to the jury, which returned a guilty
verdict on each count. Kobel filed a motion for a new trial and a motion in arrest
of judgment, which were both overruled.
Kobel was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed fifty years for the multiple acts
of child endangerment conviction and an indeterminate term of incarceration not
to exceed two years on the child endangerment conviction, to be served
concurrently.
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Kobel appeals.
She renews her contentions that there is insufficient
evidence to support either conviction and both charges should have been
dismissed pursuant to section 802.3.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
Our review is for the correction of errors at law.
State v. Booth, 670
N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 2003) (statutory interpretation); State v. Turner, 630
N.W.2d 601, 610 (Iowa 2001) (substantial evidence). The jury’s verdicts will be
upheld if supported by substantial evidence.
Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 610.
Evidence is substantial when it is sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact,
beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt.
Id.
In assessing the
sufficiency of the evidence, we view the totality of the record in the light most
favorable to the State, drawing any and all legitimate inferences that can be
reasonably deduced from the evidence. State v. Williams, 574 N.W.2d 293, 296
(Iowa 1998).
III. Discussion.
Kobel asserts the charges in this matter should have been dismissed
pursuant to section 802.3, which provides, in relevant part, that “an indictment or
information for a felony or aggravated or serious misdemeanor shall be found
within three years after its commission.”
She points out that K.M. testified
generally to acts committed and events occurring when she was four years old,
but did not provide any specific dates on which the acts and events were alleged
to have occurred. She asserts that because K.M. was born in June 1996 her
testimony necessarily encompassed part of June, July, and the beginning of
August 2000, all of which occurred more than three years prior to the August 8,
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2003 filing of the trial information. Essentially, Kobel asserts the charges must
be dismissed because the State has not established the necessary acts occurred
within the limitations period, and thus she could have been convicted based on
acts that occurred outside of the limitations period.
The State asserts, and the district court found, that child endangerment is
a continuing offense and thus the limitations period did not begin to run until
commission of the last act, in this case April 2, 2001, the date the social workers
removed K.M. and B.M. from the home. See Iowa Code § 802.7 (“When an
offense is based on a series of acts committed at different times, the period of
limitation . . . shall commence upon the commission of the last of such acts.”).
We need not determine whether the district court was correct in its conclusion,
because we conclude the record contains substantial evidence that the charged
offenses occurred within the statutory period.
Pursuant to the controlling statutes in this case, Kobel was guilty of
multiple acts of child endangerment if, by three or more acts during the relevant
period, she knowingly acted in a manner that created a substantial risk to K.M.’s
physical, mental, or emotional health or safety and one or more of the acts
resulted in a serious injury to K.M. Kobel was guilty of child endangerment if,
during the relevant period, she knowingly acted in a manner that created a
substantial risk to B.M.’s physical, mental, or emotional health or safety. See
Iowa Code §§ 726.6, .6A. 3 The requirement of three separate acts under the
multiple acts alternative of child endangerment “should be established with
3
The other elements as charged in this case—that during the relevant period Kobel
was a parent, guardian, or person having custody of K.M. and B.M., who were under the
age of fourteen years—are not in dispute. Id.
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enough precision to enable a jury to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of a
time and place where each of the three acts occurred.” State v. Hickman, 576
N.W.2d 364, 368 (Iowa 1998). “However, this rule does not mean that evidence
of the precise time and place of each incident or act is required, but merely
means the three or more acts must be separated by time and place so that each
incident is separate and distinct.” State v. Yeo, 659 N.W.2d 544, 550 (Iowa
2003).
The record substantially supports a finding that Kobel knew Hanse was
abusing K.M. K.M. asserted during her testimony and through statements made
to social workers that Kobel would watch Hanse abusing her and even helped
explain to K.M. the child’s expected role during the abuse. K.M.’s testimony also
substantially demonstrates that Hanse’s abuse of K.M. occurred often and
repeatedly during the statutory period and that B.M. was present for most if not
all of the abuse. Despite this fact, Kobel continued to leave both children in the
care of Hanse, a man who not only abused K.M. but allowed sexual offenders
into the home. 4 These facts are sufficient to demonstrate Kobel knowingly acted
in a manner that created a substantial risk to K.M.’s and B.M.’s physical, mental,
or emotional health or safety, and that she did so within the statutory period.
In regard to the multiple acts charge involving K.M., it is reasonable to
infer from the record that Kobel left the children alone in Hanse’s care on at least
three separate occasions within the statutory period.
The record also
substantially supports the conclusion that these acts led to K.M. suffering serious
4
Contrary to Kobel’s assertion, her requests that Hanse stop the abuse do not
somehow vitiate her decision to leave the children alone in the care of a sexual
perpetrator.
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injury, as there can be little doubt K.M.’s physical injuries and PTSD were the
result of Hanse’s abuse.
We accordingly conclude Kobel’s convictions are
supported by substantial evidence.
AFFIRMED.
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