IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ANNA BART, Deceased, GALEN BART, Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-681 / 05-1599
Filed October 11, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF ANNA BART, Deceased,
GALEN BART,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Emmet County, Frank B. Nelson,
Judge.
Galen Bart appeals from a district court order denying the temporary
administrator’s petition for authority to sell farmland under the terms of a
mediated settlement. AFFIRMED.
Lance D. Ehmcke, Joel D. Vos, and Jeremy J. Cross of Heidman,
Redmond, Fredregill, Patterson, Plaza, Dykstra & Prahl, L.L.P., Sioux City, for
appellant.
Terri L. Combs and C. Jennifer Peterson of Faegre & Benson L.L.P., Des
Moines, and Paul E. Overson, Oakdale, Minnesota, for appellees Timothy
Haupert and Kelly Stephenson.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
2
HUITINK, P.J.
Galen Bart appeals from a district court order denying the temporary
administrator’s petition for authority to sell farmland under the terms of a
mediated settlement. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Anna Bart died on July 9, 2002, leaving two adult surviving children, Galen
Bart and Mary Lou Bart. The record reveals that probate of the estate has been
contentious, at best. On May 3, 2005, after nearly three years of litigation, a
mediation conference was held in an attempt to settle the estate. Participants in
the mediation included the following: Mary Lou Bart and her attorney, Joseph
Fitzgibbons; Timothy Haupert, Mary Lou’s son, and his Minnesota attorney, Paul
Overson; and Galen Bart, his children, and his attorney, Lance Ehmcke. Joining
mediator David Blair as a “committee of neutrals” were James Ladegaard,
temporary administrator for the estate; Max Pelzer, attorney for the temporary
administrator; and Joseph Heidenreich, attorney for the trustee.
Kelly
Stephenson, Mary Lou’s daughter, was not present, but Haupert and attorney
Overson indicated they were acting for and could bind Stephenson.
After a full day of negotiation, attorney Fitzgibbons drafted a proposed
agreement to present to the Galen Bart group as a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer.
Mary Lou Bart, Fitzgibbons, Pelzer, and Ladegaard signed the agreement and
sent it over to the Galen Bart group for approval and signature. Galen Bart,
Ehmcke, and Galen Bart’s children signed the agreement. Heidenreich signed
the agreement later.
Haupert and Overson left the mediation prior to the
3
preparation of the written agreement and never signed it. Stephenson never
signed the agreement.
The agreement, in pertinent part, requires the liquidation of all estate
assets, including certain farmland.
In June 2005 temporary administrator
Ladegaard filed a petition for authority to sell property, requesting that the court
grant the authority to sell the farmland, pursuant to the mediated agreement.
Galen Bart filed a “concurrence with executor’s petition to sell property under
mediated contract.” Haupert and Stephenson filed an “appearance and objection
to application for authority to sell property,” objecting to the proposed sale of
property and asserting they had not executed the mediated agreement and thus
were not bound thereby.
The district court held a hearing on the petition. The sole issue before the
court was whether all parties were bound by the mediated agreement.
Specifically, the court addressed whether Fitzgibbons had the authority to act on
the part of Haupert and Stephenson and bind them.
The court heard testimony from several parties involved in the mediation.
Max Pelzer, attorney for the temporary administrator, testified that Fitzgibbons
said he had the authority to bind Haupert and Stephenson. Pelzer explained that
Fitzgibbons had previously filed pleadings along with attorney Overson on behalf
of Haupert and Stephenson, and had never indicated he “wasn’t representing
everybody.” 1
1
Overson is a Minnesota attorney not licensed to practice in Iowa. Overson did not file a
motion for admission pro hac vice until after Galen Bart filed his notice of appeal.
4
Temporary administrator Ladegaard testified that negotiations between
the parties were ongoing when Overson and Haupert left. As he understood the
situation, Overson and Haupert would be in contact with Fitzgibbons via cell
phone, and he (Fitzgibbons) represented their interests.
Attorney Overson testified an “agreement in principle” was discussed prior
to his and Haupert’s departure from the mediation, and attorney Fitzgibbons was
to call with any changes. On cross-examination, Overson testified he did not
give Fitzgibbons authority to bind Haupert and Stephenson to the mediated
agreement. Specifically, he testified his clients never agreed to a provision in the
agreement providing that Galen Bart “shall be paid the sum of $50,000 as part of
the estate expenses to satisfy the contract regarding the bins.” 2
Attorney Fitzgibbons testified there was no deal between the parties when
Overson and Haupert left the mediation. In particular, he testified the grain bins
had not been discussed prior to Overson’s and Haupert’s departure. Fitzgibbons
agreed to be in contact with them by cell phone. He had no recollection of a
conversation in which he said he could bind Haupert or Stephenson, and no
recollection of being asked if he had the authority to bind them. He explained he
would not have included signature lines for Haupert, Stephenson, and Overson in
the agreement if he had been given the authority to bind them.
The district court concluded the mediated agreement was not binding on
all parties, and therefore the court could not approve it. Accordingly, the court
2
Galen owned grain bins located on the farmland he rented from his mother. The lease
agreement provided that upon termination of the lease he had the right to sell his grain
bins to the estate for $50,000. In an interim report filed in May 2004, and approved by
the court, the temporary administrator indicated the grain bin agreement was
enforceable.
5
denied the petition for authority to sell property. Galen appeals, arguing attorney
Fitzgibbons had either actual or apparent authority to bind Haupert and
Stephenson to the mediated agreement.
II. Scope of Review
The parties dispute the scope of review. Galen contends our review is de
novo because with the exception of certain actions not applicable here, probate
matters are generally tried in equity. See Iowa Code § 633.33 (2005); Iowa R.
App. P. 6.4. Haupert and Stephenson contend our review is for errors at law
because the sole issue on appeal relates to the enforceability of an alleged
settlement agreement, citing Strong v. Rothamel, 523 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1994) (reviewing the district court’s ruling on a motion to enforce settlement
for errors at law).
To determine the appropriate scope of review, we look to the nature of the
trial proceedings. Crawley v. Price, 692 N.W.2d 44, 48 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004).
The petition for authority to sell property asked the court to enter an order
approving the mediated contract as a binding obligation on all parties. Haupert’s
and Stephenson’s objection to the application for authority to sell property
requested that the court refuse to grant the request for authority to sell the
property.
Thus, the parties’ pleadings impliedly asked the court to use its
equitable powers.
Although the district court ruled on evidentiary objections,
normally the indication of a proceeding at law, the objections were minor and did
not have a significant effect on the proceedings. See Passehl Estate v. Passehl,
712 N.W.2d 408, 414 n.6 (Iowa 2006). Moreover, the parties do not argue that
6
evidence was improperly excluded; therefore, the court’s ruling on objections
does not prevent a de novo review. See id.
We conclude the matter was tried in equity; therefore, our review is de
novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; see also Linn County v. Kindred, 373 N.W.2d 147,
149 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (reviewing de novo a “case tried in equity to enforce a
settlement agreement”). We give weight to the district court’s findings of fact,
especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by
them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g).
III. Discussion
A. Applicable Law.
“A basic element of agency law is that whatever an agent does within the
scope of the agent’s actual authority binds the agent’s principal.” Hendricks v.
Great Plains Supply Co., 609 N.W.2d 486, 493 (Iowa 2000).
Actual authority to act is created when a principal
intentionally confers authority on the agent either by writing or
through other conduct which, reasonably interpreted, allows the
agent to believe that he has the power to act. Actual authority
includes both express and implied authority. Express authority is
derived from specific instructions by the principal in setting out
duties, while implied authority is actual authority circumstantially
proved.
Id. (quoting Dillon v. City of Davenport, 366 N.W.2d 918, 924 (Iowa 1985)
(citations omitted)).
Apparent authority
is authority which, although not actually granted, has been
knowingly permitted by the principal or which the principal holds the
agent out as possessing. Apparent authority must be determined
by what the principal does, rather than by any acts of the agent.
7
Id. (citations omitted). For apparent authority to exist, “the principal must have
acted in such a manner as to lead persons dealing with the agent to believe the
agent has authority.” Waukon Auto Supply v. Farmers & Merchs. Sav. Bank, 440
N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa 1989) (citation omitted). This determination is a fact
question. Id. “[T]he burden of showing that an agent acted within the scope of
the agent’s actual or apparent authority is on the party claiming that such
authority existed.” Id.
B. Actual Authority.
In the case before us, neither Overson nor Haupert 3 conferred authority
on Fitzgibbons by writing.
Therefore, the question is whether Overson or
Haupert, through their conduct and statements, led Fitzgibbons to reasonably
believe he had the authority to bind Haupert and Stephenson to the mediated
agreement. See Gabelmann v. NFO, Inc., 571 N.W.2d 476, 481 (Iowa 1997).
On our de novo review of the evidence before the district court, we conclude they
did not.
Galen argues Overson’s admission that Fitzgibbons had limited authority
to present a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer to the Galen Bart group proves
actual authority. Overson, however, testified unequivocally on cross-examination
that he had not given Fitzgibbons authority to bind Haupert and Stephenson to
the mediated agreement. 4
Fitzgibbons’s testimony confirmed Overson’s
testimony. Moreover, the details of the settlement had not been worked out
3
Based on the testimony that Overson and Haupert had the authority to bind
Stephenson, any references to Overson and Haupert impliedly include Stephenson.
4
Neither Haupert nor Stephenson appeared or testified at the hearing on the petition for
authority to sell property.
8
between the parties when Overson and Haupert left the mediation.
mediated agreement was drafted only after their departure.
The
Fitzgibbons
explained that at the end of the day on May 3, 2005, he “knew that they [Haupert,
Stephenson, and Overson] would have to sign the agreement.”
He further
testified that “because this had been such a difficult estate, . . . quite frankly I
knew we didn’t have a settlement until the court approved the same.”
We conclude Fitzgibbons did not have actual authority to bind Haupert
and Stephenson to the mediated agreement.
C. Apparent Authority.
Galen argues that “[w]here, as here, a party leaves a mediation
designating an attorney as a representative to offer a final deal, that party has
given the attorney apparent authority and should be bound by the settlement that
is reached.”
He contends the acts of Overson and Haupert created any
confusion over the scope of Fitzgibbons’s authority, and therefore the risks of the
outcome must be allocated to them.
In order to establish Fitzgibbons’s apparent authority, Galen must show
that Overson and Haupert acted in a manner that led the others in attendance at
the mediation to believe Fitzgibbons had the authority to act on behalf of Overson
and Haupert. We focus our attention on the actions of Overson and Haupert;
therefore, any representations made by Fitzgibbons are immaterial to the issue of
apparent authority. Waukon Auto Supply, 440 N.W.2d at 847.
Our review of the record leads to the conclusion that Overson’s and
Haupert’s actions allegedly conferring authority upon Fitzgibbons were
ambiguous, at best, and unconfirmed by those in attendance at the mediation.
9
Overson and Haupert left the mediation without instructions to the mediator or
the others acting as the “committee of neutrals.” Overson and Haupert were in
contact with Fitzgibbons via cell phone, but the full extent of those conversations
is unclear from the record. Fitzgibbons had previously filed pleadings along with
attorney Overson on behalf of Haupert and Stephenson, thereby undoubtedly
creating some confusion among the parties. However, Overson had appeared
on behalf of Haupert and Stephenson at a hearing on several pending motions in
June 2004, at which the parties participating in the mediation were present.
Moreover, the signature page of the mediated agreement, with signature lines for
Overson, Haupert, and Stephenson, should have given the parties some
indication that Fitzgibbons had no authority to bind those three to the agreement.
IV. Conclusion
Galen has failed to prove that attorney Fitzgibbons had either actual or
apparent authority to bind Haupert and Stephenson to the mediated agreement.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the temporary administrator’s
petition for authority to sell property. Any other issues raised by the parties on
appeal are either adequately addressed herein, waived, or without merit.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
