IN THE INTEREST OF A.K., Minor Child, K.W., Mother, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-601 / 06-1023
Filed August 23, 2006
IN THE INTEREST OF A.K., Minor Child,
K.W., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karla J. Fultz,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court order terminating her parental
rights to her son. AFFIRMED.
Victoria Meade, West Des Moines, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Annette Taylor,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Heather Dickinson, West Des Moines, for father.
Jessica Miskimins, Youth Law Center, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
Khalidah is the mother, and Ezra the father, of Anthoneih, born in January
of 2005. He was removed from his parents’ care in April of 2005 after his mother
threw his car seat, with Anthoneih in it, during a disturbance at a shopping mall.
He was placed with his paternal grandmother, Laura, where he remained during
the pendency of this case. Following a termination hearing in April of 2006, the
court terminated both parents’ rights in an order filed on June 12, 2006. The
mother appeals.
We review termination proceedings de novo. Although we are not bound
by them, we give weight to the trial court's findings of fact, especially when
considering credibility of witnesses. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000)
(citations omitted).
Khalidah first contends termination was not in Anthoneih’s interest
because he is placed with a relative. Iowa Code section 232.116(3) provides that
the court need not terminate a parent’s rights if a relative has legal custody of the
child.
Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a) (2005).
The provisions of 232.116(3) are
permissive, not mandatory. In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Iowa 1997). It is
within the sound discretion of the juvenile court, based on the unique
circumstances before it and the best interests of the child, whether to apply
section 232.116(3). The court found:
Anthoneih is too young for the court to enter a 232.104(2)(d)
order establishing a guardianship. Although he is placed with his
paternal grandmother, he should have a permanent home through
adoption. He regards her as his primary parent. She will adopt him
if parental rights are terminated. Neither of his parents will be
available within a reasonable period of time to care for him.
....
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Anthoneih is in a preadoptive home with his grandmother,
Laura [ ], where he has been since he was removed twelve months
ago. It is in the best interest of Anthoneih [ ] that termination of
parental rights . . . occur.
Guardianships are subject to re-litigation, and would not afford Anthoneih the
stability and permanency he deserves. Temporary or even long-term foster care
is not in a child’s best interests, especially when, as in this case, the child is
adoptable and an adoptive home awaits him. See In re T.T., 541 N.W.2d 552,
557 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
We conclude the juvenile court properly found
termination was in Anthoneih’s best interest and exercised its discretion in
considering the application of section 232.116(3) to the circumstances before it.
Khalidah also contends the State did not make reasonable efforts to
reunify her with Anthoneih. The State asserts error was not preserved on this
issue. Khalidah asserts she requested services “during court proceedings” and
the court “subsequently” ruled on the issue in the termination order. From our
review of the record, we find a request for additional visitation that was denied.
Khalidah has not identified any other or different services she requested or that
might have assisted in reunification efforts. See In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91
(Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (“The [State] has an obligation to make reasonable efforts
toward reunification, but a parent has an equal obligation to demand other,
different, or additional services prior to a permanency or termination hearing.”).
The record reveals the State offered Khalidah these services:
mental
health assessment, psychosocial evaluation, individual therapy, random drug
screens, parenting support groups and classes, substance abuse evaluations
and treatment, substance abuse education, anger management therapy, skill
development and supervised visitation, bus tokens, gas cards, and child-proofing
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items for her home. Khalidah did not take advantage of most of the services
offered. The core of the reasonable efforts mandate is that the child welfare
agency must make reasonable efforts to prevent placement or to reunify families
in each case. In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). While
efforts made by the State to reunify a family may not be successful, this does not
mean that the efforts were unreasonable.
Id.
We find the State made
reasonable efforts to reunify Khalidah and Anthoneih.
The juvenile court carefully considered Anthoneih’s circumstances, age,
placement, need for stability, bonding with his grandmother, the likelihood of
reunification with his parents, and other factors in determining termination was
preferable to a guardianship or long-term foster care. We affirm its exercise of
discretion.
We find the reunification efforts made by the State, though
unsuccessful, were reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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