LAURA J. STENSRUD and DON V. HELGESON, as Co-Executors of the Estate of VERNO N J. HELGESON, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. JANICE HELGESON, Defendant-Appellee.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-534 / 05-1078
Filed August 9, 2006
LAURA J. STENSRUD and DON V.
HELGESON, as Co-Executors of the
Estate of VERNON J. HELGESON,
Deceased,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
JANICE HELGESON,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winnebago County, Bryan H.
McKinley, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal a district court ruling dismissing their petition for
declaratory judgment. AFFIRMED.
David J. Dutton and Chad A. Swanson of Dutton, Braun, Staack &
Hellman, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellants
Michael G. Byrne of Winston & Byrne, P.C., for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
2
HUITINK, P.J.
Laura Stensrud and Don Helgeson, plaintiffs and co-executors of the
Estate of Vernon J. Helgeson, are two of Vernon’s five surviving children. The
defendant, Janice Helgeson, is Vernon’s widow. Vernon and Janice married in
1997, approximately one year after the death of Vernon’s first wife. Vernon died
testate on September 1, 2002. Laura and Don, as co-executors of his estate,
filed a petition for declaratory judgment, seeking the return of property from
Janice. They claimed Janice received the property as a result of undue influence
and in violation of a premarital agreement between Janice and Vernon.
The matter was tried before the district court in equity over eleven days.
The court heard the testimony of between thirty and forty witnesses and received
nearly 100 exhibits, including financial records and medical records. In a lengthy
opinion, the district court summarized the situation during the last few years of
Vernon’s life as follows:
[I]t is readily apparent that Vernon’s predisposition from the
beginning of his second marriage to his death was to spend money
at levels far beyond financial patterns that had been established
between he and his first wife.
Vernon’s two marriages were in contrast. In Vernon’s first
marriage, Barbara and he raised a wonderful family. He built a
successful lumberyard business, bought and sold real estate, and
Barbara helped suppress his drinking.
After the death of Barbara, he became depressed, drank
heavily, and suffered from loneliness. His needs had changed from
the time of his first marriage and when Janice met Vernon at this
point in his life, he was retired as a successful businessman, drank
heavily, and questioned his self-worth. This record establishes that
Vernon married for the second time for companionship, and Janice,
who was coming from a first marriage where her husband died of
Lou Gehrig’s disease, was seeking security.
It is within this marital setting where loneliness and security
were the dominant traits and the financial pattern of spending to
3
satisfy vices (gambling and alcohol), along with travel and an
elevated standard of living evolved.
The district court also noted Vernon’s “tendency to tell people what they wanted
to hear,” which resulted in his saying “different things to different people, both
before and during his marriage to Janice.”
The court concluded (1) the
premarital agreement entered into by Janice and Vernon was valid and
enforceable, (2) Janice and Vernon did not abandon the premarital agreement,
which permitted either party to transfer or convey property to the other party, and
(3) the plaintiffs failed to prove a confidential relationship between Janice and
Vernon. The court accordingly dismissed the petition for declaratory judgment.
The plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2).
The court made additional fact findings, but reaffirmed its previous ruling.
The plaintiffs appeal, arguing there is clear, satisfactory, and convincing
evidence that a confidential relationship existed between Janice and Vernon, and
that Janice exercised undue influence over Vernon. The plaintiffs further argue
Janice violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in her
performance of the premarital agreement. 1 Our review of this equitable action is
de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.
On appeal, as they did at trial, the parties present two vastly different
versions of events during the last few years of Vernon’s life. Not surprisingly, the
plaintiffs point to testimony and other evidence that would suggest that due at
least in part to Vernon’s alcoholism, depression, and other physical and mental
1
The plaintiffs do not appeal from the district court’s conclusion that the premarital
agreement was valid and enforceable and not abandoned by the parties during the
course of the marriage.
4
conditions, Janice was the controlling and dominating party who made all the
financial and social decisions for the couple. The defendant, in contrast, points
to evidence that would suggest Janice “never mastered Vernon’s financial
confidence” and that the primary transactions challenged by plaintiffs occurred
prior to any deterioration of Vernon’s health or general competency. Thus, in
addressing the issue of undue influence, the district court was faced with the
difficult task of sorting through the conflicting testimony and other evidence to
determine whether a confidential relationship existed between Janice and
Vernon. See Mendenhall v. Judy, 671 N.W.2d 452, 454 (Iowa 2003) (explaining
that a transfer to a grantee standing in a confidential or fiduciary relationship to
the grantor is presumptively fraudulent and therefore presumptively the product
of undue influence).
After carefully reviewing the evidence and giving the appropriate weight to
the fact findings and credibility determinations of the district court, see Iowa R.
App. P. 6.14(6)(g), we must agree with the district court that a confidential
relationship did not exist and that the plaintiffs failed to prove undue influence by
clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. See Mendenhall, 671 N.W.2d at
454. As the district court noted, Vernon’s spending habits changed during his
second marriage. The court also found, however, this pattern of liberal spending
was primarily due to Vernon’s personal sense of moral obligation and
commitment to take care of Janice, rather than any particular influence exerted
by Janice.
We agree with the district court’s assessment of the evidence.
Moreover, while Vernon’s health was clearly in decline during the last years of his
life, we agree with the district court that Vernon was able to manage, control, and
5
maintain his personal financial interests during the majority of his marriage to
Janice.
The plaintiffs also contend the premarital agreement, as a contract
between the parties, contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and that Janice violated the covenant in her performance of the contract. We
treat premarital contracts in the same manner as ordinary contracts.
In re
Marriage of Gonzalez, 561 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). A contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith in its performance and
enforcement.
Engstrom v. State, 461 N.W.2d 309, 314 (Iowa 1990).
For
reasons similar to those outlined above, we conclude the plaintiffs failed to prove
that Janice violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in her
performance of the premarital agreement.
Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s ruling dismissing the plaintiffs’ petition for declaratory judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
