STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PETER CHRISTIAN, Defendant-Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-518 / 04-0900
Filed August 23, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PETER CHRISTIAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, David M. Remley,
Kristin L. Hibbs, and Larry J. Conmey, Judges.
Peter Christian appeals from his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse.
AFFIRMED.
Clemens Erdahl, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney
General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Anne Lahey and Victoria
Dominguez, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
2
HUITINK, P.J.
Peter Christian appeals from his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse
in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4 (2001). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Peter Christian a/k/a Christian Glass was charged with burglary and
sexual abuse based on allegations he entered Emily D.’s Iowa City apartment
without her consent and engaged in a nonconsensual sex act with her while she
was unconscious. According to Emily’s version of events, she went out drinking
with her roommates, Shannon and Sarah, on the evening of October 25, 2002.
Emily left a party at approximately 2:30 a.m. on October 26 and returned home in
a taxicab. She recalled leaving the door to her apartment unlocked and lying
down on the couch to watch T.V. The next thing she remembered was being
awakened by her roommates who were screaming, “Who was that guy?!”
According to Shannon and Sarah, they returned to their apartment at
approximately 3:30 a.m.
They found the door to the apartment was locked.
When they entered the apartment they saw an unidentified man jump up off of
the couch where he was lying with Emily and pull his pants up. Believing they
had encountered an embarrassing situation, they left the room. After conferring,
Shannon and Sarah concluded something was wrong. They returned to confront
the man lying on the couch with Emily and demanded that he leave their
apartment. The man left after explaining Emily had fallen at some point and he
had helped her return to the apartment. In the course of trying to awaken Emily,
Shannon and Sarah noticed that Emily’s pants were undone and pulled down,
3
prompting them to take Emily to the hospital to determine if she had been
sexually assaulted.
Emily was examined by emergency room physician Dr. Thomas Mitten.
Dr. Mitten collected specimens from Emily’s vagina and clothing.
His
examination did not disclose the presence of any sperm in Emily’s vagina or
cervix. He was also unable to conclusively determine whether Emily’s vagina
had been penetrated.
Iowa City police investigators subsequently sent the sexual assault kit
used in Emily’s examination, her underwear, a blanket, and a comforter to the
Iowa Department of Criminal Investigation (DCI) laboratory for DNA analysis.
The DCI criminalist who examined these items found a seminal stain on the inner
crotch of Emily’s underwear. The DNA sample extracted from this stain matched
an unknown sample of DNA obtained in another unsolved sexual abuse case in
Johnson County that occurred on December 15, 2002.
For reasons not entirely clear from the record, Christian was a suspect in
both cases.
In April 2003 Iowa City Police Officer Jennifer Clarahan was
informed by the Iowa City Rape Victim Advocacy Program (RVAP) that Christian
would be interviewed for a volunteer position with RVAP on April 23, 2003.
Clarahan arranged to sit in on the interview to attempt to obtain a DNA sample
from Christian by furnishing him with a bottle of water that would be subsequently
retained for DNA testing. Clarahan attended the April 23 interview. She brought
four bottles of water to the meeting. During the course of the meeting, Christian
drank from two of the water bottles and ate a piece of cake with a fork furnished
4
to him by RVAP employees. Clarahan seized the first water bottle furnished to
Christian before he was finished with it and substituted another bottle of water
containing approximately the same amount of water in it so that Christian would
not become suspicious of her activities. When the interview was completed,
Christian left without the second water bottle or the fork. Clarahan collected
these items and forwarded them to the DCI lab for analysis. The test results
indicated that the DNA samples obtained from these items matched the DNA
samples obtained from Emily’s underwear, as well as the unknown DNA sample
collected in the companion case.
The test results were incorporated in a
subsequent search warrant application requesting authority to detain Christian for
collection of cheek swabs for additional DNA testing.
These DNA tests
confirmed that the DNA samples already obtained from Christian matched those
found in Emily’s underwear and the samples collected in the companion sexual
abuse case. Christian was charged with two counts of sexual abuse in the third
degree and burglary in the first degree.
Christian filed a motion to suppress all DNA test results, claiming the DNA
samples obtained from the water bottles and fork were products of an illegal
warrantless search. He also claimed the subsequent search warrant authorizing
police to obtain cheek swabs was issued without probable cause, necessitating
suppression of any resulting DNA tests.
The trial court granted Christian’s
motion concerning samples obtained from the first water bottle seized on
April 23, 2003. The court reasoned that Christian had an expectation of privacy
in that water bottle and had not abandoned it because it was seized before he left
5
RVAP. The court declined to suppress the DNA test results based on samples
taken from the second water bottle and fork, citing Christian’s subsequent
abandonment of those items. The court also determined that the search warrant
was supported by the required probable cause even if the challenged DNA
samples were not considered.
Christian also filed an application for a bill of particulars concerning
count III of the trial information. Christian alleged that the trial information and
attached minutes of testimony failed to “apprise the Defendant of the necessary
legal elements that constitute burglary in the first degree . . . .” The trial court
denied Christian’s application for a bill of particulars, citing adequacy of the trial
information as supplemented by the State’s response to the motion providing
further information concerning the factual basis of the burglary count. Christian’s
other pretrial motions included two motions in limine, as well as one or more
motions concerning discovery issues. The substance and resolution of those
motions, as well as additional pertinent facts regarding them, will be later
addressed as necessary to resolve any related issues raised on appeal.
At trial, Emily testified that she remembered everything that occurred on
October 26 “up until the time she fell asleep on the couch.” She denied consent
to sexual contact with anyone and that she even knew anyone was having sexual
contact with her.
Christian’s self-described theory of his defense at trial was:
1.
2.
The putative victim was walking home, Defendant and his
friend assisted her and she invited them in her apartment.
They engaged in small talk and some romantic activity of a
consensual nature occurred between her and the Defendant.
6
3.
4.
5.
6.
He ejaculated prematurely.
When her roommates came home he asked them to wake
her up so she could explain that he was invited in the
apartment.
He did not flee; but, rather, was rudely escorted out without
having the opportunity to speak with the putative victim.
The putative victim had functioned in a “black out” [alcohol
induced amnesia] that allowed her to remain lucid and
apparently capable of consent, but left her confused about
how she got home and most details of what happened after
she got there.
He expressly denied sexual intercourse with Emily.
Other evidence and
testimony at trial implicated by evidentiary rulings and constitutional issues raised
on appeal will be addressed to the extent needed to resolve those issues.
Christian’s motions for directed verdict were overruled. The jury convicted
Christian of sexual abuse in the third degree and acquitted him on the burglary
count. The court entered a judgment of conviction and sentence in accordance
with the verdict.
On appeal Christian argues the following in the brief submitted by his
attorney:
I.
II.
III.
The court erred by not suppressing the DNA evidence
secretly acquired by the state and committed further error by
simultaneously finding that the subsequent search warrant
affidavit contained probable cause to search if the DNA
evidence was removed.
Errors of the district court allowed conviction without
sufficient proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Prosecutorial misconduct coupled with errors of the court
and counsel deprived defendant of his theory of defense and
thereby deprived him of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights.
In Christian’s pro se brief, he argues the following:
I.
The trial court’s failure to suppress illegally obtained DNA
evidence was reversible error.
7
II.
III.
Christian’s right to due process was violated.
Officer Lippold’s testimony was speculative, conclusory and
prejudicial, in violation of State v. Graves.
II. Motion to Suppress.
A motion to suppress implicates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution. State v. Wiese, 525 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Iowa
1994) overruled on other grounds by State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa
2000). We review constitutional issues de novo and independently evaluate the
totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Howard, 509
N.W.2d 764, 767 (Iowa 1993). “We give deference to the district court’s fact
findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, but we are
not bound by those findings.” State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001).
In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we consider both the evidence presented at
the suppression hearing and the evidence introduced at trial. State v. Breuer,
577 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1998).
To establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment, Christian must show
that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item seized. Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 472, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373, 379 (1998).
“When individuals voluntarily abandon property, they forfeit any expectation of
privacy in it that they might have had.” United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169,
1171 (10th Cir. 1983.
Warrantless seizure of abandoned property does not
violate the Fourth Amendment. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.
Ct. 683, 698, 4 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1960). In other words, “[v]oluntary abandonment
of property in the constitutional sense occurs when an individual no longer has a
8
reasonable expectation of privacy.”
(Iowa 1990).
State v. Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d 619, 625
To determine whether a person has voluntarily abandoned
property, we consider whether the person intended to abandon the property. Id.
Intent to abandon the property “may be inferred from words, acts, and other
objective facts.” Id.
Christian arrived at the meeting with the RVAP staff member and the
undercover officer carrying some paperwork and a magazine. As noted earlier,
during the meeting he drank from two bottles of water, one of which was covertly
taken by Clarahan and the other he left when the meeting concluded. Christian
also ate a piece of cake that was served at the meeting. When he left the
meeting, he left the fork which he had used to eat the cake, but he took with him
the paperwork and magazine which he had brought to the meeting. By leaving
both the water bottle and the fork and taking the magazine and the paperwork,
Christian demonstrated he was not interested in keeping either the water bottle
or the fork. He abandoned the second water bottle and the fork and therefore,
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the either the bottle or the fork. In
the absence of any definitive authority to the contrary, we are unable to say
Christian had a subjective or objective expectation of privacy in the DNA shed on
the items seized. In any event, we believe the same abandonment analysis
applies equally to the items seized or the shed DNA samples obtained from
them.
We also reject Christian’s claims that the DNA test results should be
suppressed because he was tricked into furnishing an incriminating DNA sample
9
to the police. In another context, our supreme court has held that incriminating
statements obtained by deception need not be suppressed as long as the
deception was not coercive or so fundamentally unfair as to deny due process.
State v. Cooper, 217 N.W.2d 589, 597 (Iowa 1974); see also United States v.
Flynn, 309 F.3d 736, 739 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding ruse created to cause
defendant to abandon item was not illegal); People v. LaGuerre, 815 N.Y.S.2d
211, 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (holding no due process violation when DNA
sample taken from chewing gum defendant discarded in course of police
contrived Pepsi taste test).
Based on the foregoing facts, we do not find
Clarahan’s conduct so coercive or fundamentally unfair as to deny Christian’s
right to due process of law. We therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling denying
Christian’s motion to suppress the DNA test results seized without a warrant.
Because we have affirmed on this issue, we need not address the merits of
Christian’s challenge to the search warrant.
III. Bill of Particulars.
Christian claims that the trial court erred in denying his request for a bill of
particulars. He claims the State did not allege a sex act as required by the
charges of both burglary and sex abuse in the third degree. The State maintains
that Christian did not adequately preserve this issue because his request for a bill
of particulars only related to the charge of burglary in the first degree and
Christian was found not guilty of burglary in the first degree.
“A defendant does not have an absolute right to a bill of particulars; trial
courts have discretion to determine the adequacy of an indictment in light of
10
minutes attached.” State v. Doss, 355 N.W.2d 874, 880 (Iowa 1984). “We will
not disturb a trial court’s denial of a motion for bill of particulars in absence of an
abuse of discretion.” Id. “A bill of particulars is a request for a more specific
statement of the details of the offense charged.” State v. Watkins, 659 N.W.2d
526, 533 (Iowa 2003). “Its purpose is to provide additional information that the
indictment and minutes of testimony do not give.” Id. “A bill of particulars should
be allowed when the charge and minutes do not sufficiently inform the defendant
of the criminal acts of which she is accused.” Id.
Here, the request for a bill of particulars filed by Christian only referenced
the burglary charge and only requested more specific evidence on that charge.
Christian was found not guilty on the burglary charge. He did not argue before
the trial court that he was entitled to a bill of particulars on the charge of sexual
abuse in the third degree. It is unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule
correctly on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider. DeVoss v.
State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Iowa 2002). Moreover, “it is unfair to allow a party to
choose to remain silent in the trial court in the face of error, taking a chance on a
favorable outcome, and subsequently assert on appeal if the outcome in the trial
court is unfavorable.” Id. (quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 690, at 36061 (1995)). Accordingly, his argument that he was entitled to a bill of particulars
regarding the charge of sex abuse in the third degree was not preserved.
11
IV. Directed Verdict.
At the close of the evidence, Christian’s attorney made the following
argument in support of his motion for directed verdict:
There has been no proof or evidence elicited by any of the
witnesses we heard today that would support a finding of any one
of those listed defined meanings of the word “sex act” or “sexual
activity” as required for the purpose of Sex Abuse in the Third
Degree or Burglary First premised upon that charge.
The prosecution argued:
So I think there’s certainly circumstantial evidence from
which the jury could find that a sex act occurred, that there was
intimate contact under the definition of a sex act; that there,
obviously, was contact with her genital area, because his semen
was essentially found on an area where her genitalia was as far as
the inner crotch of her panties.
The court ruled:
The court is required to by the standard in this case and,
actually, in all criminal cases, all civil cases and that standard is to
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, which in this case is the State. The Defendant’s Motion for
Directed Verdict of Acquittal is overruled on both charges.
Christian seizes on the trial court’s reference to civil cases, claiming the trial court
applied the wrong legal standard in the resolution of Christian’s motion. He also
argues that the State’s case failed as a matter of law because there was no proof
of the requisite sex act element of the crime of sexual abuse. We disagree.
We review rulings on motions for directed verdicts for errors of law. Iowa
R. App. P. 6.4.
The trial court correctly noted that the evidence must be
considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. State v. Bass, 349
N.W.2d 498, 500 (Iowa 1984). We fail to see how the trial court’s reference to
the viewed-in-the-light-most-favorable-to-the-nonmoving-party standard common
12
to both civil and criminal cases resulted in application of a lesser standard of
proof than required here.
The State correctly notes that in deciding a motion for directed verdict, the
court is simply deciding whether the State’s evidence has generated a jury
question. Doss, 355 N.W.2d at 877. Although the evidence must be such that,
when considered as a whole, “a reasonable person could find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt,” all “legitimate inferences arising reasonably and fairly from
the evidence may be indulged in to support the verdict.” Id. An inference is a
reasonable deduction from proven facts, a permissible finding based on the
existence of other facts. State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Iowa 1972). An
inference leaves the trier of fact free to infer the elemental fact from the basic
facts. State v. Shoemaker, 338 N.W.2d 874, 879 (Iowa 1983). Due process
standards are met if there is a rational connection between the basic facts that
the prosecution proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the latter is more
likely to flow from the former. State v. Post, 286 N.W.2d 195, 203 (Iowa 1979).
Christian was charged with sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of
Iowa Code sections 709.1, 709.4(1), and 709.4(4). Section 709.1 defines sexual
abuse, in pertinent part, as any sex act done between persons if the act is done
while otherwise in a state of unconsciousness. Section 709.4(1) defines sexual
abuse in the third degree as occurring if the person performs a sex act by force
or against the will of the other person. Section 709.4(4) also defines sexual
abuse in the third degree as occurring if the sex act is “performed while the other
13
person is mentally incapacitated, physically incapacitated, or physically helpless.”
Sex act is defined as follows:
any sexual contact between two or more persons by penetration of
the penis into the vagina or anus; contact between the mouth and
genitalia or by contact between the genitalia of one person and the
genitalia or anus of another person; contact between the finger or
hand of one person and the genitalia or anus of another person…
Iowa Code § 702.17.
The record includes abundant evidence from which a reasonable juror
could infer the foregoing elemental facts. Christian was seen lying on top of
Emily with his pants down. Emily’s pants were also pulled down.
Christian
ejaculated but did not know where it went. The inner crotch of Emily’s underwear
contained a semen stain matching Christian’s DNA. Dr. Mitten testified he could
not confirm the fact or absence of penetration.
Even without the additional
evidence that semen drained from Emily’s vagina, we find the record sufficient to
support the trial court’s ruling on Christian’s motion for a directed verdict. We
affirm on this issue.
V. State’s Theory of the Crime at Trial.
Christian claims the State’s sex act theory advanced at trial was different
than that described in the trial information and minutes of testimony. He argues
the resulting surprise and prejudice violated his right to due process under both
the Iowa and United States Constitutions. Because Christian failed to raise this
issue in the trial court, we decline to consider it on appeal. DeVoss, 648 N.W.2d
at 60.
14
VI. Prosecutorial Misconduct.
To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must
establish that misconduct occurred, and that he was so prejudiced by the
misconduct that he was deprived of a fair trial. See State v. Bowers, 656 N.W.2d
349, 355 (Iowa 2002); State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 30-31 (Iowa 1999). Thus
it is the prejudice resulting from misconduct, not the misconduct itself, that
entitles a defendant to a new trial. Greene, 592 N.W.2d at 31. In determining
whether prosecutorial misconduct warrants a new trial, the court should consider
such misconduct within the context of the entire trial, including the court’s
instructions. Id. at 32. Whether the misconduct was isolated or pervasive and
the
strength
of
the
evidence
against
the
defendant
are
appropriate
considerations for the trial court. State v. Belken, 633 N.W.2d 786, 802 (Iowa
2001); Greene, 592 N.W.2d at 32.
Christian argues the prosecution’s questions concerning his familiarity with
police reports and discovery depositions amounted to an impermissible comment
on the exercise of his right to remain silent. Even if we assume he has preserved
error on this issue, there is nothing in the prosecution’s questions that can be
fairly interpreted as a comment on his right to remain silent. The purpose of that
inquiry was to discredit Christian’s claim that Emily was awake and engaged in
small talk with him during their encounter on October 26.
Christian also claims he was denied a fair trial by the State’s failure to
disclose testimony by Officer Clarahan concerning the identity and work schedule
of a taxicab driver. Christian has not preserved error on this issue by making a
15
timely objection or otherwise challenging the admissibility of Clarahan’s
testimony at trial. DeVoss, 648 N.W.2d at 60.
Christian raises five additional claims implicating his due process right to a
fair trial or specific instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Our review of the
record fails to disclose any timely objections or motions raising those claims in
the trial court. Christian has therefore failed to preserve error on any of the five
remaining claims of prosecutorial misconduct.
To the extent Christian’s
remaining claims implicate his right to effective assistance of counsel, they are
preserved for postconviction relief proceedings.
Lastly, we have carefully reviewed and considered the issues raised by
Christian in his pro se brief. It is sufficient to note that the resolution of those
issues is either controlled by the foregoing, or they have no merit.
Christian’s conviction of sexual abuse in the third degree is affirmed in its
entirety.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
