STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DOUGLAS SCOTT FUQUA, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-455 / 05-1440
Filed August 9, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DOUGLAS SCOTT FUQUA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Union County, Paul R. Huscher,
Judge.
Douglas Fuqua appeals his sentences following his convictions for driving
while intoxicated, third offense, and driving while his license was revoked.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Martha Lucey, Assistant
State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney
General, and Timothy R. Kenyon, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Miller, JJ.
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MILLER, J.
Douglas Fuqua appeals his sentences following his convictions for driving
while intoxicated (OWI), third offense, and driving while his license was revoked.
He contends the district court abused its discretion by considering an unproven
offense in determining his sentence and that his attorney was ineffective for
failing to object to the State’s breach of the plea agreement. We reverse the
sentences and remand for resentencing.
The record reveals the following facts. On December 27, 2004, Fuqua
was stopped for speeding. The officer who stopped him believed Fuqua was
intoxicated and arrested him for OWI. Fuqua agreed to a breath test which
showed an alcohol concentration of .129%. On February 2, 2005, the State
charged Fuqua, by trial information, with OWI, third offense in violation of Iowa
Code sections 324J.2, 321J.2(2) and 321.12(4) (2003). On March 23, 2005,
Fuqua was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving. At the time of the
accident his driver’s license had been and remained revoked, apparently a “test
result revocation,” see Iowa Code § 321J.12, related to the then-pending OWI
charge. On May 6, 2005, the State charged Fuqua with driving under revocation
in violation of section 321J.21 (2005).
Fuqua pled guilty to both of these charges on June 3, 2005. The district
court sentenced Fuqua on August 5, 2005 to a term of imprisonment not to
exceed five years on the OWI conviction and one year on the driving while
revoked conviction.
It ordered the sentences to be served concurrently.
Between the time of his guilty pleas on June 3, 2005, and his sentencing in
August 2005, Fuqua was charged with the additional offense of harassment in
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the first degree in an unrelated matter in a different county, the harassment
alleged to have occurred on July 24, 2005. This additional charge was listed in
the pre-sentence investigation report that was relied on by the court in
sentencing. In imposing sentences the district court stated, in relevant part,
This court concludes that this defendant is not an
appropriate candidate for probation; that a structured environment
is necessary to provide not only the treatment that this defendant
needs and to provide some stability for him, but also to protect the
public from further offenses.
It appears that, Mr. Fuqua, you’ve had criminal offenses and
criminal convictions almost every year since 1993. The court is
especially concerned when a defendant who is presently charged
with a criminal offense and is awaiting sentencing on that offense
commits additional offenses. It indicates to the court an inability to
control one’s behavior at a time when it is apparent that one’s
behavior is going to be important in connection with sentencing
matters.
(Emphasis added).
On appeal Fuqua contends the court abused its discretion in sentencing
him by relying on an impermissible factor in imposing the sentences.
More
specifically, he alleges the court impermissibly considered the July 2005
harassment charge as one of the reasons for denying him probation as
evidenced by the emphasized language above.
Our review of sentencing decisions is for correction of errors at law. Iowa
R. App. P. 6.4.
We review for an abuse of discretion or for defects in the
sentencing procedure.
State v. Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755, 756 (Iowa 1995).
Sentencing decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong presumption
in their favor. State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996). A sentence
will not be upset on appeal unless the defendant demonstrates an abuse of trial
court discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure, such as the trial court’s
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consideration of an impermissible factor. State v. Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d 399,
401 (Iowa 2000).
A sentencing court may not rely upon additional, unproven or
unprosecuted charges in determining the appropriate sentence for a defendant.
State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 762 (Iowa 1998). “’We will set aside a sentence
and remand a case to the district court for resentencing if the sentencing court
relied upon charges of an unprosecuted offense that was neither admitted to by
the defendant nor otherwise proved.’” Id. (quoting State v. Black, 324 N.W.2d
313, 315 (Iowa 1982)).
When a defendant claims the sentencing court
improperly considered unproven criminal activity “the issue presented is simply
one of the sufficiency of the record to establish the matters relied on.” State v.
Longo, 608 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Iowa 2000). To overcome the presumption in
favor of a sentencing decision, a defendant must affirmatively show that the
district court relied on improper evidence such as unproven offenses. State v.
Jose, 636 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Iowa 2001); Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 762.
In sentencing Fuqua the district court stated it was “especially concerned
when a defendant who is presently charged with a criminal offense and is
awaiting sentencing on that offense commits additional offenses.”
The only
“additional offense” Fuqua was charged with while “awaiting sentencing”
following his guilty pleas to the OWI and driving while revoked charges was the
July harassment charge. Thus, this is the only “additional offense” to which the
district court could have been referring in sentencing Fuqua. The harassment
charge was still pending at the time of Fuqua’s August 5, 2005 sentencing and
thus was an unproven offense which the court expressly considered in
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determining the sentences. Accordingly, we conclude the court impermissibly
considered an unprosecuted charge that was neither admitted to by Fuqua nor
otherwise sufficiently proven in the record. Therefore, the sentences must be set
aside and the case remanded for resentencing.
At the resentencing the
harassment charge should not be considered by the court in determining
appropriate sentences.
Fuqua also claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the State’s breach of its plea agreement. More specifically, he contends the
State breached the terms of the plea agreement by providing the court with
information beyond the recommendation concerning sentencing it had agreed to
make in the agreement and thereby implied its recommendation should not be
accepted by the court. He claims his defense counsel’s failure to object to this
breach by the State resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. Although there
may be merit to Fuqua’s argument, see State v. Horness, 600 N.W.2d 294, 299
(Iowa 1999), because we are for another reason vacating Fuqua’s sentences and
remanding the case for resentencing we need not address his ineffective
assistance claim at this time.
SENTENCES
RESENTENCING.
VACATED
AND
CASE
REMANDED
FOR
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