STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HEROLD DANIEL SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-326 / 05-1560
Filed August 9, 2006
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HEROLD DANIEL SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, K.D. Briner
and Jon Fister, Judges.
Defendant-appellant, Herold Daniel Smith, appeals the sentence imposed
for his conviction for third-offense domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury
as a habitual offender. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Greta Truman, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen Douglass, Assistant Attorney
General, and Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Miller, JJ.
2
SACKETT, C.J.
Defendant-appellant, Herold Daniel Smith, was convicted of third-offense
domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury as a habitual offender. He appeals
the sentence for the crime. Defendant argues that the sentence of a term of
imprisonment not to exceed fifteen years for his crime is cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of his constitutional rights. We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
Defendant was convicted, following a bench trial, of third-offense domestic
abuse assault causing bodily injury as a habitual offender, a class D felony, in
violation Iowa Code sections 708.2A(4), 902.8 and 902.9(3) (2003). Defendant
repeatedly punched his girlfriend, with whom he lived, in the face while she was
driving.
The victim fled on foot, but defendant caught her and continued to
assault her.
The police were called to the scene.
The victim informed the
officers of the assault. The officers requested a warrant for defendant’s arrest.
The victim went to the hospital where doctors reported she had sustained “a
possible broken nose, possible broken right hand, bruises to both eyes, and a
bruise to her upper right forehead.”
Defendant had twice previously been convicted of domestic abuse
assault. Therefore, defendant was charged with third offense domestic abuse
causing bodily injury as a habitual offender. Defendant moved to dismiss the
habitual offender enhancement as cruel and unusual punishment. The motion
was denied. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment
not to exceed fifteen years. Defendant appeals, arguing the sentence imposed
violated the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment found in the Eighth
3
Amendment to the United States and article I, section 17 of the Iowa
Constitution.
II.
SCOPE OF REVIEW.
We review constitutional issues de novo. State v. Kukowski, 704 N.W.2d
687, 690 (Iowa 2005).
III.
ANALYSIS.
Punishment for a crime may be deemed cruel and unusual where it inflicts
torture, is otherwise barbaric, or is so excessively severe it is disproportionate to
the offense charged.
State v. Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d 664, 669 (Iowa 2000)
(citing State v. Lara, 580 N.W.2d 783, 784-85 (Iowa 1998)).
Generally, a
sentence that falls within statutorily prescribed parameters does not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment, as we afford the legislature substantial deference
in establishing criminal penalties. Id. Nonetheless, it is the role of the courts to
determine
whether
the
term
of
imprisonment
imposed
is
“grossly
disproportionate” to the crime charged. Id. If it is not, no further analysis is
necessary.
Id.
Defendant argues that his sentence of up to fifteen years
incarceration is grossly disproportionate to the convicted crime–domestic abuse
assault causing bodily injury.
We begin our analysis with applying an objective test “measuring the
harshness of the penalty against the gravity of the offense.” State v. Seering,
701 N.W.2d 655, 670 (Iowa 2005). We believe the threshold comparison in the
present case reveals that the fifteen-year sentence is in appropriate proportion
with the crime and, thus, is not cruel and unusual punishment.
4
First, we note that defendant committed an egregiously violent offense
against another person. Defendant repeatedly punched his victim in the face.
When the victim sought to escape the assault, defendant chased her down and
continued to assault her.
The victim sustained substantial injuries from the
assault.
Defendant argues that certain offenses, that he deems more heinous than
the one he committed, are punished by lesser sentences. See State v. Newell,
710 N.W.2d 6, 30 (Iowa 2006). The threshold comparison we are to make is
“whether the term of imprisonment imposed is grossly disproportionate to the
crime charged.” Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d at 669. Defendant acknowledges the
crime with which he was charged and convicted was violation of Iowa Code
section 708.2A(4). Third-offense domestic abuse assault is the crime embodied
in that statutory provision.
The severity of the punishment for third-offense domestic abuse assault
causing bodily injury and whether that offense should be more harshly punished
than a first offense for sexual abuse is the type of decision within the discretion of
the legislature. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3009,
77 L. Ed. 2d 637, 649 (1983); Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 670; Cronkhite, 613
N.W.2d at 669; Lara, 580 N.W.2d at 785. The legislature has spoken on the
issue and its decision to allow third-offense domestic abuse assault causing
bodily injury to be punished by up to fifteen years incarceration is not unfairly
harsh or disproportionate to the crime.
AFFIRMED.
Miller, J., concurs specially.
5
MILLER, J. (concurs specially)
I concur in the result.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
