IN THE INTEREST OF A.C., Minor Child, A.C., Minor Child, Appellant,
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 6-041 / 05-1787
No. 6-117 / 06-0083
Filed July 12, 2006
IN THE INTEREST OF A.C.,
Minor Child,
A.C., Minor Child,
Appellant,
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, John G. Mullen,
District Associate Judge.
The guardian ad litem appeals from the district court order placing the
child with her paternal great-grandparents. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Jennifer Olsen of Olsen Law Office, Davenport, guardian ad litem for
appellant minor child.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney
General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Gerda Lane, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee State.
Cheryl Newport of Newport & Newport, P.L.C., Davenport, for intervenorfoster parents.
Neill Kroeger, Davenport, for appellee mother.
Jean Capdevila, Davenport, for appellee father.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Mahan, JJ.
2
MAHAN, J.
The guardian ad litem appeals the district court’s order modifying the
dispositional order and placing the minor child with her paternal greatgrandparents in Illinois. We reverse the order of the district court and remand for
further proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A.C., born in April 2004, is the daughter of Casey and Maurice. She was
removed from Casey’s care in February 2005 due to the presence of
methamphetamine in her system, Casey’s substance abuse, and the presence of
a sex offender in the home. Maurice has been incarcerated in Illinois at all times
during this proceeding.
Maurice’s grandparents, Sereatha and Roger, came
forward at the time of A.C.’s adjudication as a child in need of assistance (CINA)
to request placement with them in Illinois. A.C. was instead placed in foster care
in Iowa to avoid hindering reunification efforts with Casey. She was adjudicated
CINA in March 2005. While Casey initially cooperated well with reunification
services, her efforts began to wane in June 2005. Casey stopped attending
substance abuse treatment, gave drug screens positive for controlled
substances, stopped working, and failed to maintain her residence. The Iowa
Department of Human Services (DHS) requested Casey check into inpatient
treatment in July 2005 due to her relapse. Instead, Casey fled to Sereatha and
Roger’s home in Illinois.
During the pendency of the CINA case, there were concerns from the
DHS and other parties about Sereatha and Roger as a possible placement for
A.C. The concern was due to their ages, their past abilities to parent, the current
3
residence of Maurice’s sister, Teri, in Sereatha and Roger’s home, and Sereatha
and Roger’s indications that they will allow Casey and Maurice to see A.C. and
foster a relationship with her in their care. A home study on Sereatha and Roger
was conducted through Lutheran Social Services of Illinois. The report, dated
May 2, 2005, approves Sereatha and Roger for placement but fails to address
the concerns listed above. The modification hearing was held on October 11,
2005, where Sereatha and three service providers testified. The juvenile court
ordered modification of the dispositional order on October 20 and ordered
placement with Sereatha and Roger no later than December 1, 2005.
The
guardian ad litem now appeals. The supreme court has issued a stay of the
transfer of custody pending outcome of this appeal.
II. Scope of Review.
We conduct a de novo review of CINA proceedings.
In re H.G., 601
N.W.2d 84, 85 (Iowa 1999). We give weight to the fact findings of the juvenile
court, especially when considering the credibility of the witnesses, but we are not
bound by these findings. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g). Our overriding concern in
such cases is always the best interests of the children. In re K.N., 625 N.W.2d
731, 733 (Iowa 2001).
We also recognize that Chapter 232 favors relative
placements over non-relative placements. See In re N.M., 528 N.W.2d 94, 97
(Iowa 1995).
III. Change in Placement.
The guardian ad litem argues on appeal that the juvenile court erred when
it determined that Sereatha and Roger’s home was an appropriate placement for
A.C.
Specifically, the guardian ad litem contends the juvenile court erred in
4
(1) determining the placement was appropriate; (2) determining the placement
was in the child’s best interests; and (3) exposing the child to future risk of
unsupervised contact with her parents. We agree.
The county attorney, DHS, and the guardian ad litem were all in
agreement in opposing the child’s placement with Sereatha and Roger for
several reasons. 1 First, it is clear the home study on which the district court
relied was vastly incomplete. It failed to address how Sereatha and Roger would
protect A.C. from her parents’ substance abuse, how they would provide
boundaries between A.C. and her parents, or how they would handle contact
from A.C.’s father.
Second, Sereatha and Roger have made poor parenting decisions in the
past.
Two of their grandchildren, whom they raised, have substance abuse
problems and significant criminal histories. They also allowed a minor and a sex
offender to live together and have intimate relations in their home.
Third, Sereatha and Roger have indicated to service providers that they
will foster a relationship between A.C. and her father once he is released from
prison, even though he is both a convicted sex offender and drug abuser and has
neither participated in services nor had a relationship with her in the past.
Sereatha testified at the hearing that she would not allow A.C. contact with her
father until he had “proven” himself and the court allows. Letters from Maurice,
1
At the dispositional hearing, the State, through the DHS, was represented by the
county attorney. However, on appeal, the attorney general has defended the juvenile
court’s decision. There is no explanation why the attorney general has failed to advance
the position taken by the county attorney and the DHS. Therefore, the county attorney
joined in the brief submitted by the guardian ad litem
5
however, indicate he remains in contact with his grandparents and intends to
move into their home and establish a relationship with his daughter.
Finally, Sereatha and Roger themselves have no relationship with A.C.
Though one service provider testified they asked for custody of A.C. early in the
case, they never asked about visitation.
We therefore agree with the county attorney, DHS, and the guardian ad
litem that A.C. should not be placed with Sereatha and Roger. We have also
reviewed the intervention issue and conclude that the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for the foster parents to intervene.
First of all, we note that the right of intervention is not unconditional. Second, we
agree with the county attorney that the foster parents’ rights have been
adequately represented by the guardian ad litem. If the foster parents disagree
that their rights are being adequately represented, they can file another petition
for intervention. The juvenile court’s ruling placing A.C. with Sereatha and Roger
is reversed and remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Vogel, J., concurs; Sackett, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
6
SACKETT, C.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
I concur in part and dissent in part.
I agree with the majority that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the motion of the foster parents to intervene. I recognize, as the foster
parents argue, that they have a statutory right to intervene under Iowa Code
section 232.91 (2005), which includes foster parents in the list of those who “may
petition the court to be made a party to proceedings under this division.”
I
disagree with the foster parents’ argument that they fall within the language of
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.407(1)(a), which provides “[w]hen a statute
confers as unconditional right to intervene.”
While the language of section
232.91 allows foster parents to petition to be made a party, it does not give them
an unconditional right to intervene.
I also recognize the foster parents are suitable persons to be considered
for placement under section 232.102(1), and thus fall within the language of the
rule as having an interest in the proceedings.
The foster parents reason that under A.G., 588 N.W.2d 403, 404 (Iowa
1998), we should reverse. In A.G., 588 N.W.2d at 404, the court reversed a
juvenile court decision that had denied a grandmother the right to intervene in a
child in need of assistance proceeding and in doing so said:
Iowa Code section 232.102(1)(a) allows the juvenile court to
consider placing a child in need of assistance in the custody of a
“relative or other suitable person.” This statutory provision gives
A.S., as A.G.’s grandmother, a “legal interest” in the outcome of the
dispositional hearing. Moreover, this interest would be directly
affected by the court’s decision on custody in the CINA proceeding.
Therefore, under rule [1.407] A.S. had a right to intervene, leaving
no room for a discretionary denial of intervention by the juvenile
court.
7
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 75 was applicable when the supreme court
decided A.G. This rule was amended in 1997. Before amendment, rule 75
provided:
Any person interested in the subject matter of the litigation, or the
success of either party to the action, or against both parties, may
intervene at any time before trial begins, by joining with plaintiff or
defendant or claiming adversely to both.
We must look to current rule 1.407(1) which addresses intervention of right:
(1) Intervention of right. Upon timely application, anyone
shall be permitted to intervene in an action under any of the
following circumstances:
a. When a statute confers an unconditional right to
intervene.
b. When the applicant claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the
applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.
The comment to the rule notes the amendments in the language “allow the trial
court more discretion in determining whether to allow intervention.” Iowa R. Civ.
P. 1.407, cmt.
I therefore conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to intervene for several reasons:
(1) the foster parents’ right of
intervention is not unconditional; (2) the interests of the foster parents are
adequately represented by the guardian ad litem, who seeks to maintain Alexis’s
placement with the foster parents’ and (3) the matter was appealed before the
juvenile court acted on the motion for intervention, and the supreme court has
8
allowed the foster parents to intervene on appeal. 2 I find no reason to reverse
the juvenile court on this issue.
I dissent insomuch as I agree with the State that the decision of the
juvenile court should be affirmed.
At the time Alexis was found to be a child in need of assistance, her
paternal great-grandparents, Sereatha and Roger, requested she be placed with
them in Illinois. The Department of Human Services placed Alexis in foster care
instead, because it thought placement with Sereatha and Roger in Illinois would
hinder reunification efforts with her mother Casey, who lived in Iowa.
Casey stopped participating in services aimed at reunification. Sereatha
and Roger participated in a home study that concluded they “would provide a
loving and stable home” for Alexis. Maurice renewed his request for modification
of the dispositional order and asked that Alexis be placed with Sereatha and
Roger. Sereatha testified at the hearing on modifying the dispositional order that
she would protect Alexis from her parents and comply with court orders. The
court made a finding it believed Sereatha. It also expressly accepted the opinion
of the Illinois service worker who did the home study that the great-grandparents
“would provide a loving and stable home.” The court considered the age and
health of Sereatha and Roger, that they parented three of their grandchildren,
and the concerns the Department of Human Services and the guardian ad litem
2
At the time the juvenile court heard and ruled on the motion to intervene, the matter at
issue was before the appellate courts. The supreme court allowed the foster parents to
intervene in the appellate proceedings. The question of whether the juvenile court had
jurisdiction to hear the motion to intervene is not raised and I find it unnecessary to
address it.
9
expressed about placing Alexis with Sereatha and Roger. The court ordered that
custody of Alexis be placed with Sereatha and Roger.
The guardian ad litem and the foster parents argued the juvenile court did
not properly consider the ability of the great-grandparents to parent Alexis, given
their parenting history, age, and health.
They also argued the court did not
properly consider the opinions of the Department of Human Services concerning
placement.
The State responded that the juvenile court expressly found the testimony
of Sereatha and the home study worker to be credible, and the appellate courts
give weight to such credibility determinations. It argued “the guardian ad litem
has not provided this court with sufficient reason to substitute its judgment for
that of the juvenile court.”
From my de novo review of the record, I find the juvenile court carefully
considered the evidence before it, including the concerns of the guardian ad litem
and the Department of Human Services. It believed Sereatha when she testified
she would obey court orders and protect Alexis from her parents. The guardian
ad litem made numerous citations to letters from the father indicating his desire
to be with his daughter and to be a part of her life as evidence Alexis will be at
risk of harm from contact with her parents if placed with Sereatha and Roger. I
have considered the father’s letters. They were written during the period when
the Department was still pursuing reunification with the mother. I give deference
to the juvenile court’s credibility determination concerning Sereatha. She has
recognized Alexis needs to be protected from her parents.
10
The juvenile court believed the home study conclusion that the greatgrandparents can provide Alexis with a “loving and stable home.” See In re N.M.,
528 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Iowa 1997) “[C]hapter 232 favors relative placements over
nonrelative placements.”). The guardian ad litem argues the age and health of
the great-grandparents means Alexis will not have them available to parent her
when she is an adolescent. The guardian ad litem also asserts the home study
did not evaluate Sereatha and Roger’s daughter-in-law, who is listed as the
contingent caretaker for Alexis. The daughter-in-law is a registered nurse who
has two older children. The home study adequately evaluated the proposed
placement of Alexis with her great-grandparents. Giving appropriate weight to
the express credibility findings of the court, I would affirm the dispositional order
of October 20, 2005. The juvenile court set a time period for transfer of custody
which may no longer be reasonable. I would remand to the juvenile court to
revisit this issue.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
