In re Marriage of Sweders

No. 3--97--0528
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IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

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In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
KANDYCE L. SWEDERS, n/k/a ) of Du Page County.
Kandyce L. De Witt, )
)
Petitioner-Appellant, ) No. 82--MR--262
)
and )
)
PETER A.P. SWEDERS, SR., ) Honorable
) Terence M. Sheen,
Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
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JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:
The petitioner appeals the trial court's decision ordering her
to pay child support for her son, Adam Kane Sweders, until he
reaches the age of 22 or otherwise becomes emancipated under the
terms of the marital settlement agreement entered in the original
judgment of dissolution. We affirm.
The petitioner, Kandyce L. Sweders (Wife), and the respondent,
Peter A.P. Sweders (Husband), married on August 7, 1970. Three
children were born to the parties during the marriage: Peter August
Sweders, Jr. (April 13, 1974), Todd Andrew Sweders (November 1,
1975), and Adam Kane Sweders (July 6, 1979). On April 8, 1982, a
judgment for dissolution of marriage was entered by the circuit
court of Cook County, Illinois. The judgment was subsequently
entered in Du Page County. The judgment incorporated a settlement
agreement entered into by the parties. The agreement provided,
inter alia, that "the care, custody, control[,] and education of
the children shall be with the Wife." The parties also agreed that
the Husband would pay the Wife $2,000 a month "for support and
maintenance of the Wife and the children." The settlement
agreement included the following provision regarding support
payments:
"3.02 Upon the occurrence of any of the following
conditions, the monthly payment shall be reduced in the amount
hereinafter set forth:
a. In the event that the Wife should remarry, then the
monthly payment will be reduced by $500.
b. If custody of any of the children shall change to the
Husband, then the monthly payment shall be reduced by
$333.33 for each such child.
c. If the Husband shall have custody of all of the
children at any time and more than five years have passed
since the entry of the judgment of dissolution, then all
payment shall cease.
***
e. When a child becomes emancipated then the monthly
payment shall be reduced by $333.33 for each such child.
f. When all of the children become emancipated, then all
payment shall cease; provided, however, that if the Wife
has not remarried, the monthly payments shall be at least
$1,000 for five years after the entry of the judgment of
dissolution."
The agreement contained the following provision regarding the
emancipation of the children:
"3.03 A child shall be deemed to be emancipated on the
first to occur of any of the following events:
a. The child's reaching majority or completing his
education, whichever is later but not beyond age 22;
b. The child's marriage;
c. The child's having a permanent residence away from
the permanent residence of the Wife (a residence at
school is not a permanent residence[)];
d. The child's death;
e. Upon entering any military type service." (Emphasis
added.)
The agreement contained the following provision regarding the post-
high school education of the children:
"3.06 The Husband and Wife shall pay for the trade
school, college and professional school education expenses of
the children. Education expenses shall include but not be
limited to tuition, room and board, books, supplies,
registration and other required fees, utilities, social dues
and transportation expenses. The Husband's and Wife's
obligations hereunder are conditioned on their financial
ability to pay. Decisions affecting the education of each
child, including the choice of school, shall be made jointly
by the parties, who shall consider the expressed preference of
the child."
The Husband's child support obligation was modified on April
30, 1985, and again on July 17, 1987. However, the agreed order of
July 16, 1987, stated that "all other terms of the Judgment for
Dissolution of Marriage shall remain in full force and effect."
On May 21, 1996, the trial court entered another agreed order,
which awarded custody of the youngest child, Adam, to the Husband
and terminated child support for all three children. On February
4, 1997, the trial court entered an agreed order directing the Wife
to pay the Husband $598.38 per month for child support for Adam.
The termination date was reserved for a subsequent hearing.
After a hearing on February 27, 1997, the trial court found
that, absent an earlier termination date due to the emancipation of
Adam under the terms of the agreement, the Wife's obligation to pay
child support for Adam would continue until he reached the age of
22 or otherwise became emancipated under the terms of the marital
settlement agreement. The trial court reasoned that it was
obligated to follow the provision regarding emancipation set forth
in the agreement because the agreement was incorporated in the
original judgment for dissolution of marriage. The trial court
denied the Wife s motion for reconsideration. The Wife appealed
both decisions.
On appeal, the Wife does not challenge the trial court's order
requiring the Wife to pay child support. She argues only that the
trial court erred in ordering her to pay child support for Adam
until he reaches the age of 22 or otherwise becomes emancipated
under the terms of the agreement. The Wife claims that she did not
agree to pay child support beyond the age of majority, that is,
beyond the age of 18. The Husband claims that the termination of
child support is controlled by the marital settlement agreement
that was incorporated in the original judgment. The Husband claims
that the trial court properly applied the agreement. We agree with
the Husband.
Section 510(d) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/510(d) (West 1996)), which
controls the termination of child support, provides:
"Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided
in a judgment, provisions for the support of a child are
terminated by emancipation of the child[.]" 750 ILCS 5/510(d)
(West 1996).
Generally, a child becomes emancipated when he reaches the age of
18, at which time the child attains majority. In re Marriage of
Ferraro, 211 Ill. App. 3d 797, 799-800, (1991). Thus, we must
determine whether the parties agreed to a different termination
time than that set forth in section 510(d) of the Marriage Act.
The general rules of contract interpretation apply to marital
settlement agreements. In re Marriage of Frain, 258 Ill. App. 3d
475, 478 (1994). In interpreting a contract, a court must
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties. Frain, 258
Ill. App. 3d at 478. The language of the contract is the best
indication of the parties intent. Frain, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 478.
Thus, where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, a
court must give the terms their ordinary and natural meaning.
Frain, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 478. The interpretation of a marital
settlement agreement is a question of law. In re Estate of Braun,
222 Ill. App. 3d 178, 184 (1991).
The Wife does not claim that the terms of the contract are
ambiguous. Rather, she argues that the definition of the term
"emancipated" contained in the marital settlement agreement applies
only to the Husband and not to her. However, it is uncontroverted
that the agreement does not expressly contain this limitation. A
strong presumption exists against provisions that could easily have
been included in the agreement but were not. Prime Group, Inc. v.
Northern Trust Co., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1069 (1991). The
agreement contains a section that addresses the issue of support
that is to be paid by the Husband. Then, in a separate section,
without mention of either party, the agreement defines the term
"emancipated." Because the agreement does not limit the definition
of the term to the Husband only and the Wife has failed to overcome
the presumption against the inclusion of this limitation, the
Wife's argument fails. See Prime Group, Inc., 215 Ill. App. 3d at
1069.
Assuming, arguendo, the agreement is susceptible to the Wife's
interpretation, her interpretation cannot prevail. This court
recently restated the following well-settled principle:
"[T]o the extent that a contract is susceptible of two
interpretations, one of which makes it fair, customary, and
such as prudent persons would naturally execute, while the
other makes it inequitable, unusual, or such as reasonable
persons would not be likely to enter into, the interpretation
which makes a rational and probable agreement must be
preferred." Foxfield Realty, Inc. v. Kubala, 287 Ill. App. 3d
519, 524 (1997).
The Wife urges this court to hold that the definition of a term
contained in the marital settlement agreement applies only to the
Husband, absent an express provision expressing such intent. This
interpretation would clearly result in an unusual, unreasonable,
absurd, and inequitable result, inconsistent with a child's right
to support from both parents. See In re Marriage of Maczko, 263
Ill. App. 3d 991, 994 (1992). Thus, we determine that the trial
court properly rejected the Wife's interpretation and ordered the
Wife to pay child support until Adam graduates from college or
otherwise becomes emancipated under the terms of the marital
settlement agreement.
The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
GEIGER, P.J., and INGLIS, J., concur.