People v. Chatman

June 1, 1998
No. 2--97--0672

________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) No. 95--CF--2250
v. )
)
ANNIE CHATMAN, a/k/a Annie )
Rollins, ) Honorable
) Judith M. Brawka,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
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JUSTICE COLWELL delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals an order dismissing an indictment against
defendant, Annie Chatman, a/k/a Annie Rollins (see 145 Ill. 2d R.
604(a)(1)). Defendant was charged with three counts of possession
of cocaine, a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West
1994)). The trial court concluded that, because the State admitted
that it could prove only that defendant had had cocaine in her
system, any conviction would unconstitutionally punish her for being
a drug user rather than for committing a wrongful act within the
jurisdiction. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758, 82 S. Ct. 1417 (1962); People v. Davis, 27 Ill. 2d 57
(1963). Therefore, the court held the statute unconstitutional as
applied and dismissed the indictment.
On appeal, the State argues that the dismissal was unauthorized
by statute and amounted to an improper pretrial adjudication of the
sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant responds that due process
warranted the dismissal of the indictment because the State
conceded that it had no evidence that would allow it to obtain a
constitutionally valid conviction.
We hold that the trial court exceeded its authority in
dismissing the indictment, and we reverse its judgment and remand
the cause for further proceedings.
The history of this case requires discussion in some detail.
On October 31, 1995, a grand jury indicted defendant on three counts
of unlawful possession of less than 15 grams of a substance
containing cocaine. The indictment gave the dates of the alleged
offenses as [o]n or about March 1, 1992 to December 2, 1992"; [o]n
or about April 1, 1993 to January 1, 1994"; and [o]n or about
January 1, 1995 to October 1, 1995. In October 1996, defendant
demanded a bill of particulars; three months later, the State
replied that it did not yet know the exact location of the offenses,
except that all took place partly at Copley Hospital.
On March 6, 1997, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment.
She asserted that the State s tendered discovery appeared to imply
that its evidence consisted of blood or urine test results showing
that defendant had been addicted to or under the influence of
cocaine. From this, defendant argued that the State was attempting
to secure a possession conviction based solely on defendant s status
as a cocaine addict or user, a result Robinson and Davis forbade.
Defendant soon withdrew the motion to dismiss and substituted a
motion to declare the possession statute unconstitutional as
applied. On March 11, 1997, the court heard arguments on the
motion. Assistant State s Attorney Barsanti, conceding that I
don t have any drugs. acknowledged that, under Robinson and Davis,
a valid conviction would require evidence beyond drug tests showing
that defendant had cocaine in her system at certain times. The
State would have to prove that defendant actually possessed drugs
in Illinois, and merely having cocaine in her blood was not
possession. However, Barsanti represented that the State would
produce admissions and other evidence beyond what it had disclosed
to date. Noting these representations, the trial court denied
defendant s motion. The court stated that a valid conviction
required evidence in addition to the blood or urine tests; however,
the State might present the required evidence. Whether the State
could prove its case was the ultimate issue to be resolved by the
trial (or on a motion for a directed verdict), not by a pretrial
proceeding.
At a hearing, on June 6, 1997,the following exchange ensued:
MR. BARSANTI: I m offering this as what I believe the
People s proof would show, is in essence a child with cocaine
in its system and the mother with cocaine in her system on the
day or shortly after the birth of the child.
The statements that the Defendant made, allegedly made
*** would not be specifically corroborative of that corpus
delicti, and the witness who we believe may be able to shed
light on the situation is unattainable at this time *** --
THE COURT: Unattainable at this time or forever?
MR. BARSANTI: Let me rephrase.
The witness who I believe would have information who
[sic] could corroborate this corpus delicti, I don t have
those statements from that witness, Judge, and I don t know
where that witness is right now. So for me to say that
statement is going to come from that person would be
speculation.
THE COURT: All right. Actually that puts me back into a
fact situation.
The prior ruling was based on *** the State s
representation *** that this would be one piece of
circumstantial evidence reflecting on the matter. If the
witness is currently not available, that doesn t mean that she
would never be available. *** I still believe that issues
relating to those of fact are trial issues. They re not [to
be decided] on a motion to dismiss.
MR. BARSANTI: Well, Judge, maybe I can straighten it out
this way.
THE COURT: If you tell me that you have no such evidence,
and you will not--
MR. BARSANTI: I have no evidence, Judge. I guess I m
putting more emphasis on the speculation on this than would be
accurate. You could say that about any case. I would say
about any case maybe I m going to come up with a smoking gun
tomorrow ***. That s speculation.
*** The People would be willing to stipulate that we do
not have a statement at this time, and that I have no
indication we would ever get one. *** So at this point in time
*** our evidence would [be] solely that this woman had a
cocaine baby ***. That would be the People s position, and
that we would have no other evidence to indicate *** some of
the factual elements [we] have to actually establish at trial.
Barsanti reiterated that the tests proving that defendant had
cocaine in her system would not directly establish possession but
would allow a fact finder to infer that defendant possessed cocaine
some time before each test. However, he conceded the State had no
evidence of where defendant possessed or used the cocaine.
The trial court reversed its earlier ruling and dismissed the
indictment, concluding that the explanation of what the State s
evidence is expected to be made this case indistinguishable from
Robinson or Davis. According to the prosecutor s own
representations, the corpus delicti was a blood test, with no other
corroborating evidence. This evidence could support a conviction
only if the State could criminalize a person s mere status as a drug
user without any proof that she committed an illegal act, such as
possessing the cocaine, within the jurisdiction. This, however, is
what Robinson and Davis disallow.
The court noted that normally the sufficiency of the State s
evidence is to be tested at trial, not by a pretrial motion.
However, under the undisputed facts here, dismissing the charges was
the only proper relief from an impermissible prosecution.
On appeal, the State argues that the trial court exceeded its
authority by dismissing the indictment because the State s evidence
was insufficient. As the State observes, under Illinois law, a
trial court may not inquire into the adequacy of the evidence
supporting an indictment that is valid on its face. People v.
Fassler, 153 Ill. 2d 49, 60-61 (1992); People v. Creque, 72 Ill. 2d 515, 522 (1978); see also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,
100 L. Ed. 397, 76 S. Ct. 406 (1956). Thus, the State reasons, the
court erred in dismissing the charges, however tenuous the evidence
for them may have been.
Defendant replies that, under the extraordinary circumstances
here, due process required the court to act as it did. Defendant
observes that, almost two years after obtaining the indictment, the
State had not discovered enough evidence to allow a jury to convict
defendant on any of the charges. She maintains that it would offend
basic fairness to allow the State to pursue a frivolous
prosecution at her continued expense.
The parties agree on the substantive law underlying defendant s
claim that the prosecution is unconstitutional. In Robinson, the
defendant was convicted under a California law making it illegal to
be under the influence of, or addicted to, narcotics. The law did
not require proof that the defendant actually used or possessed any
narcotics within the state or committed any other antisocial act
there. His presence and his addiction were sufficient. The Supreme
Court invalidated the law, ruling that, despite the state s
undoubted power to control the possession and use of narcotics
within the jurisdiction, it would be cruel and unusual punishment
to make a crime out of a person s mere status as a drug user or
addict. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67, 8 L. Ed. 2d at 763, 82 S. Ct.
at 1420-21. Davis followed Robinson, striking down an Illinois law,
similar to the law invalidated in Robinson.
As the State conceded at the trial level, it may not obtain
convictions of cocaine possession merely by proving that defendant
was a cocaine user or cocaine addict while she was within the
jurisdiction. The State also conceded that its evidence to date--
essentially, the test results--did not prove defendant possessed
cocaine within the jurisdiction as the indictment charged. We agree
with the parties and the trial court that this evidence would not
support a conviction on any of the charges. It proves only that
defendant possessed cocaine in her bloodstream while she was
present in the jurisdiction. Reading the statute to criminalize
this form of possession would run afoul of Robinson and Davis.
At issue on appeal is not the substantive law but the
procedural law. The parties dispute whether the trial court could
dismiss the charges under these circumstances. On this score, it
is settled that a trial court may dismiss an indictment only for one
of the reasons under section 114--1(a) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114--1(a) (West 1996)) or where there
has been a clear denial of due process. People v. Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d 449, 455 (1977). Defendant does not claim that the trial court
could have relied on section 114--1(a), so the question is whether
refusing to dismiss the indictment would have 'effect[ed] a
deprivation of due process or result[ed] in a miscarriage of
justice. Fassler, 153 Ill. 2d at 58, quoting People v. Sears,
49 Ill. 2d 14, 31 (1971).
Under Illinois law, due process requires only that the grand
jury heard any evidence tending to connect the defendant with the
offense charged. Fassler, 153 Ill. 2d at 61; People v. Rodgers,
92 Ill. 2d 283, 290 (1982). In announcing this limited rule, our
supreme court recognized that a wrongful indictment inflicts
injuries that an eventual acquittal does not fully redress.
Rodgers, 92 Ill. 2d at 289-90; see In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458-59
(1947), cert. dismissed, 332 U.S. 807, 92 L. Ed. 384, 68 S. Ct. 105
(1947). Nonetheless, no case holds that such injury requires
dismissing an indictment that is not utterly empty.
The courts reluctance to allow challenges to the sufficiency
of the evidence is grounded in part in a desire to avoid precisely
what occurred in the case before us: holding a preliminary bench
trial on the case s ultimate merits. See Costello, 350 U.S. at 363,
100 L. Ed. at 402-03, 76 S. Ct. at 408-09; People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill. 2d 322, 331 (1982); Creque, 72 Ill. 2d at 527. This reluctance
extends to situations where the operative facts are not in dispute.
In People v. Finley, 209 Ill. App. 3d 968 (1991), the appellate
court reversed the dismissal of an indictment even after it
apparently concluded that, as a matter of law, the evidence was
insufficient to support the charge. The defendant was indicted for
felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), with the felony
classification based on two prior convictions of DUI. The trial
court dismissed the indictment because one of the prior convictions
was obtained in violation of the defendant s right to counsel. The
appellate court agreed with the trial court that the use of the
prior conviction was improper, but it disagreed with the trial
court s choice of remedy. Due process required only that there be
some evidence against the defendant; the trial court s reasoning to
the contrary notwithstanding, due process did not require the
dismissal of a charge that apparently could not be proved. Finley,
209 Ill. App. 3d at 974-75.
Here, even if the trial court had reason to believe that the
State s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law, that
conclusion cannot support the court s action. We acknowledge that
what the court did may have intuitive appeal and that the end result
of this prosecution may well be the same. Nonetheless, the trial
court exceeded its authority, and we could not uphold its action
without encouraging defendants to demand the sort of preliminary
trial on the merits that our courts have sought to prevent.
Finally, we note that a defendant does not lack all recourse against
a poorly founded prosecution; a demand for a speedy trial (see 725
ILCS 5/103--5 (West 1996)) is available to require the State to
proceed on what evidence it has within a reasonable time. What is
not available is the dismissal of an indictment that is otherwise
proper.
The judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed,
and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
DOYLE and THOMAS, JJ., concur.