Gantz v. McHenry County Sheriff's Dept. Merit Comm'n

No. 2--97-0454

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

DEAN GANTZ et al., ) Appeal from the Circuit
) Court of McHenry County.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. ) No. 96--LA--132
)
THE McHENRY COUNTY SHERIFF S )
DEPARTMENT MERIT COMMISSION; THE )
COUNTY OF McHENRY; and WILLIAM )
MULLEN, Sheriff of McHenry County, ) Honorable
) Terrence J. Brady,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Dean Gantz et al., filed a three-count complaint
seeking declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. The
crux of the complaint was that plaintiffs, nonmerited deputies
working at the McHenry County jail, were entitled to the same
compensation under a 1990-to-1993 collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) as the merited deputies who worked at the county jail.
Defendants McHenry County Sheriff s Commission Merit Commission
(Merit Commission), McHenry County (County), and William Mullen,
the sheriff of McHenry County (sheriff), filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint. After a hearing, the trial court found that
plaintiffs complaint was barred on three grounds: (1) the running
of the statute of limitations under the Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8--101 (West
1994)); (2) the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, i.e.,
preemption of collective bargaining issues under the Illinois
Public Labor Relations Act (the Act) (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West
1994)); and (3) res judicata, where a prior arbitration decision
based upon the same facts and parties had already disposed of the
issues raised in plaintiffs complaint.
The record reveals the following facts. Plaintiffs were 55
correctional officers assigned to work at the McHenry County jail.
All plaintiffs were hired after an ordinance was adopted by the
County on February 16, 1988. The ordinance removed all
correctional officers from the jurisdiction of the Merit
Commission. The last of the plaintiffs hired took his position
over a year before the filing of the subject complaint on June 5,
1996. None of the plaintiffs was hired or certified through the
Merit Commission. Plaintiffs principal duties were to operate and
maintain the County jail.
Approximately six merited deputy sheriffs were assigned to the
County jail and performed the same duties as the nonmerited
deputies. However, these merited deputy sheriffs were hired before
1988 and were certified by the Merit Commission. Together, the
nonmerited and merited deputies working at the County jail
constituted a bargaining unit, which was designated the
Corrections Officer Bargaining Unit (the Unit).
The Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, on
behalf of and with Lodge No. 119 (the Union), was the exclusive
representative for all bargaining units in the sheriff s
department. Since 1987, the Union, the County, and the sheriff had
worked out CBAs covering, inter alia, the employees within the
Unit. In the 1990-to-1993 CBA, which is the focus of this appeal,
the Union, the County, and the sheriff expressly bargained for a
dual rate of pay for work performed at the County jail by the
merited and nonmerited deputies. Despite the fact that merited and
nonmerited deputies performed the same duties, the merited deputies
received a higher rate of pay than the nonmerited deputies. Under
the CBA covering 1993 to 1996, the rate of pay for these two
classifications of employees within the Unit was made equal, and
plaintiffs make no claim for additional pay under the latter CBA.
The Union filed a grievance on November 4, 1993, just as the
1990-to-1993 contract was expiring and when negotiations for the
1993-to-1996 agreement were commencing. This grievance was brought
pursuant to the terms and conditions of the 1990-to-1993 CBA. The
grievance alleged that, under said CBA, the nonmerited deputies
should have been deemed merited deputies, i.e., they should have
received the same compensation as the merited deputies working at
the County jail. On January 11 and 12, 1996, the arbitrator held
a hearing on the grievance. On July 31, 1996, the arbitrator
issued a decision which denied the grievance. The arbitrator
found, inter alia, that the Union and the grievants had no basis to
complain about the dual pay scale within the Unit because the
latter were paid according to the wage scale that was bargained for
under the subject CBA. Subsequently, plaintiffs brought the
subject cause of action against defendants in the trial court.
We first address plaintiffs argument that the trial court
erred in granting the motion to dismiss on the basis that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. This general issue can be broken down
into three subissues, namely, (1) whether the plaintiffs
allegations, in effect, amount to a charge of breach of the duty of
fair representation against the Union and, thus, plaintiffs
complaint comes within the Illinois State Labor Relations Board s
(ISLRB s) jurisdiction; (2) whether the ISLRB has exclusive
jurisdiction over the collective bargaining issues raised by
plaintiffs; and (3) whether the grievance portion of the subject
CBA permits plaintiffs to pursue a cause of action in the courts.
Interestingly, plaintiffs briefs never directly address the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction. However, defendants briefs,
particularly those of the sheriff and the County, argue extensively
that the issue of unequal wages between the merited and nonmerited
deputies within the Unit was a matter under the jurisdiction of the
ISLRB. Specifically, defendants assert that plaintiffs have been
paid under the terms of the 1990-to-1993 CBA, which were negotiated
by the Union, the sheriff, and the County in full accordance with
the Act. They contend that plaintiffs complaint seeks to achieve
through litigation in the courts what plaintiffs could not gain
through negotiations by their exclusive bargaining representative,
the Union. Defendants maintain that plaintiffs argument is with
the Union, which, according to defendants, essentially breached its
duty of fair representation by negotiating a CBA that permitted a
two-tier wage scale for merited and nonmerited deputies.
Defendants argue that the proper forum for plaintiffs concerns is
the ISLRB.
We now address the first subissue, i.e., whether plaintiffs
had essentially alleged a breach of the duty of fair representation
against the Union, a claim that was under the ISLRB s jurisdiction.
In the instant appeal, there is no dispute that plaintiffs were
members of a bargaining unit that was represented by the Union.
There is no dispute that the Union, the sheriff, and the County
fashioned CBAs for all the units of the sheriff s department for
the years 1990 to 1993 and that plaintiffs unit ratified the CBA,
which provided, inter alia, for plaintiffs wages and working
conditions. As noted above, the crux of plaintiffs cause of
action is that they were improperly relegated to a wage scale
inferior to that of merited deputies working in the jail. In this
context, we find that such an assertion is tantamount to alleging
a breach of the duty of fair representation against the Union in
fashioning the subject CBA.
In Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts v. State &
Municipal Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union, Local 726,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, 167 Ill. 2d 180,
193-94 (1995), the supreme court stated:
The Act prohibits employers and labor organizations and
their agents from engaging in unfair labor practices, and the
Act contains procedures for resolving claims of that nature.
[Citation.] Under those provisions, an employer may not, for
example, refuse to bargain in good faith with the exclusive
representative of an employee group or violate an order
concerning a representation election. [Citation.] Nor may an
employer interfere with rights granted to employees by the Act
or discriminate against an employee for engaging in protected
activity. [Citation.] The Act prohibits corresponding forms
of misconduct by labor organizations and their members.
[Citation.] Unfair labor practice charges are to be filed with
the appropriate labor board, which may investigate the charge,
hear evidence, and grant relief. Review of a labor board s
disposition of an unfair labor practice charge lies directly
to the appellate court. [Citation.] The boards may also
institute proceedings in circuit court to enforce their
dispositional orders. (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, the Act imposes upon exclusive representatives the
duty of fair representation[,] and *** an exclusive bargaining
representative commits an unfair labor practice pursuant to section
10(b)(1) of the Act when it fails to fairly represent the interest
of all members of a bargaining unit as required by section 6(d) of
the Act. (Emphasis added.) Foley v. American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, 199 Ill. App. 3d 6, 8-9
(1990).
Further, section 6(d) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Labor organizations recognized by the public employer as
the exclusive representative or so designated in accordance
with the provisions of this Act are responsible for
representing the interests of all public employees in the
unit. (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 315/6(d) (West 1994).
Admittedly, the Act is relatively silent on what constitutes
a breach of the duty of fair representation by an exclusive
representative. However, we infer from its language that the
Union s bargaining of a CBA under which nonmerited deputies earned
less than merited deputies even though they did the exact same work
is an example of an alleged breach of the duty of fair
representation, which should be addressed to the ISLRB, not the
circuit court.
In Foley, the appellate court described some compelling
reasons why such actions should go the ISLRB rather than to circuit
courts.
Inconsistent judgments and forum shopping will be inevitable
if we pronounce a rule whereby breach of the duty of fair
representation claims can be maintained in the circuit courts,
as well as before the Board. Furthermore, our already
overburdened court system would face increased amounts of
unnecessary litigation. Foley, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 11.
In the next subissue, defendants argue that the Act gives the
ISLRB exclusive jurisdiction over the matters related to collective
bargaining. The defendants cite the Act, which provides in
pertinent part:
(a) There is created the Illinois State Labor Relations
Board *** which shall have jurisdiction over collective
bargaining matters between employee organizations *** and
units of local government. (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 315/5(a)
(West 1994).
The Act further provides:
(a) In case of any conflict between the provisions of
this Act and any other law, executive order or administrative
regulation relating to wages, hours and conditions of
employment and employment relations, the provisions of this
Act or any collective bargaining agreement negotiated
thereunder shall prevail and control. ***
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) above, any
collective bargaining contract between a public employer and
a labor organization executed pursuant to this Act shall
supersede any contrary statutes, charters, ordinances, rules
or regulations relating to wages, hours and conditions of
employment and employment relations adopted by the public
employer or its agents. *** 5 ILCS 315/15(a), (b) (West
1994).
It is clear from this statutory language that, in disputes
arising from CBAs, the ISLRB has jurisdiction over the subject
claims. In the instant appeal, plaintiffs failure to submit
initially their claims concerning the 1990-to-1993 CBA to the ISLRB
further served to divest the circuit court of subject matter
jurisdiction over plaintiffs cause of action.
Regarding the final subissue, defendants point to the
following language found in the CBA. (Here we must note that the
1990-to-1993 CBA is not part of the appellate record. However, the
1993-to-1996 CBA is in the record, and apparently it contains the
same language as the relevant portions of the prior CBA. The
parties do not argue that the subject language of the 1993-to-1996
CBA is materially different from that of the 1990-to-1993 CBA.)
The decision and award of the arbitrator shall be made within
(45) days following the [arbitration] hearing and shall be
final and binding on the Employer, the Lodge/Council and the
Employee or Employees involved. (Emphasis added.)
This language from the subject CBA leaves no doubt that all
the parties contracted away their right to take their claims
further than arbitration. The CBA clearly states that the
arbitrator s decision is final and binding on the parties.
Plaintiffs are part of a bargaining unit that agreed to be bound by
the arbitrator s decision. This attempt to pull an end around on
the finality of the arbitrator s decision directly contradicts the
CBA.
We conclude that, in regard to each of the three subissues,
defendants prevail in their contention that the trial court was
without subject matter jurisdiction over the instant cause of
action. As the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case,
this court does not have jurisdiction to review its decision and
must dismiss the appeal. Greer v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm n,
185 Ill. App. 3d 219, 221 (1989).
Appeal dismissed.
GEIGER, P.J., and BOWMAN, J., concur.