North v. Hinkle

No. 2--97--0225

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

RHONDA S. NORTH, CARL J. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
McCAFFREY, and CHRISTOPHER A. ) of Lee County.
JACOBS, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. ) No. 97--MR--0004
)
DARLENE HINKLE, as City Clerk )
for the City of Amboy and as )
Local Election Official, ) Honorable
) Tomas M. Magdich,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.


JUSTICE DOYLE delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs, Rhonda S. North, Carl J. McCaffrey, and
Christopher A. Jacobs, sought a writ of mandamus to compel
defendant, Darlene Hinkle, as the city clerk of the City of Amboy,
to certify plaintiffs names for placement on the ballot for
Amboy s April 7, 1997, municipal election. The trial court denied
plaintiffs request, and plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.
I. FACTS
The facts of this case are not in dispute. The plaintiffs
sought to have their names placed on the ballot for the City of
Amboy s April 7, 1997, municipal election. Plaintiff Rhonda S.
North was running for city clerk, and plaintiffs Carl J. McCaffrey
and Christopher A. Jacobs were running for seats as aldermen. On
the last day for the filing of nominating papers, each of the
plaintiffs filed with defendant a nonpartisan petition for
nomination and a statement of economic interest. However, none
of the plaintiffs filed a statement of candidacy. Shortly
thereafter, defendant certified the names for the April 7, 1997,
ballot and did not include any of the plaintiffs names in that
certification.
Plaintiffs then filed a complaint for mandamus to compel
defendant to certify their names for the ballot. Plaintiffs argued
that defendant lacked the authority to withhold plaintiffs names
from the ballot. In support, plaintiffs cited section 10--15 of
the Election Code (the Code) (10 ILCS 5/10--15 (West 1996)). Under
this section, plaintiffs argued, defendant can withhold a
candidate s name from the ballot only if an objection to that
candidate s nominating papers has been properly filed. Because no
objections were filed against plaintiffs papers, defendant was
legally obligated to certify their names for the ballot.
In response, defendant argued that, under section 10--8 of the
Code (10 ILCS 5/10--8 (West 1996)), she has a duty to determine
whether a candidate s nominating papers are in apparent conformity
with the Code when filed. If they are, defendant may withhold that
candidate s name from the ballot only if an objection has been
filed. However, if the papers do not apparently conform to the
Code, defendant is under no obligation to certify that candidate s
name for the ballot. Defendant contends that this is critical
because, although section 10--5 of the Code (10 ILCS 5/10--5 (West
1996)) states that all nominating papers must include a statement
of candidacy, plaintiffs did not file statements of candidacy.
Therefore, plaintiffs nominating papers were not in apparent
conformity with the Code and defendant was under no obligation to
certify their names for the ballot.
The trial court agreed with defendant. In its memorandum
order, the trial court explained that, because plaintiffs neglected
to file statements of candidacy, their nominating papers were not
in apparent conformity with the Code. Absent apparent
conformity, defendant was under no obligation to certify
plaintiffs names for the ballot. The trial court therefore denied
plaintiffs request for a writ of mandamus. This timely appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Mootness
At the outset, we note that the April 7, 1997, election
already has occurred and that all of the offices sought by
plaintiffs in that election have been filled. Nevertheless, we
will not treat this cause as moot.
One exception to the mootness doctrine allows a court to
resolve an otherwise moot issue if the issue involves a substantial
public interest. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 395 (1994). The criteria for the application of the
public interest exception are (1) the public nature of the
question, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination
for the purpose of guiding public officers, and (3) the likelihood
that the question will recur. Bonaguro, 158 Ill. 2d at 395.
In this case, we are satisfied that the public interest
criteria have been met. The procedures for certifying candidates
for election to public office are doubtless of substantial public
interest. In addition, the Illinois courts have not directly
addressed the issue presented by this case in more than 80 years.
Finally, we are convinced that the facts of this case are not
unusual and are likely to recur. Accordingly, we will address the
merits of this appeal. See Bonaguro, 158 Ill. 2d at 395-96.
B. Certification of Candidates
The issue presented in this case is whether the trial court
properly concluded that, under section 10--8 of the Code, defendant
possessed the authority to determine whether plaintiffs nominating
papers apparently conformed to the Code s requirements. The
construction of a statute is a question of law, and therefore our
review is de novo. Peterson v. Aldi, Inc., 288 Ill. App. 3d 57, 63
(1997).
The procedures for certifying a candidate s nominating papers
are set forth, in relevant part, in sections 10--8 and 10--15 of
the Code. Section 10--15 states:
[E]ach local election official with whom certificates of
nomination or nominating petitions have been filed shall
certify *** the names of all candidates entitled to be printed
on the ballot. 10 ILCS 5/10--15 (West 1996).
Of course, this language begs the question of which candidates
names are entitled to be printed on the ballot. To answer this
question, we must turn to section 10--8 of the Code. Section 10--8
states:
Certificates of nomination and nomination papers ***,
being filed as required by this Code, and being in apparent
conformity with the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed to
be valid unless objection thereto is duly made in writing."
(Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/10--8 (West 1996).
Thus, as we read the Code, the candidates whose names are entitled
to be printed on the ballot are those whose nominating papers are
(1) filed as required by the Code, (2) in apparent conformity with
the Code when filed, and (3) not subject to a duly filed objection.
In this case, there is no dispute that plaintiffs followed the
appropriate procedures for filing their nominating papers.
Plaintiffs filed their papers on time and with the appropriate
local election official. In addition, the parties agree both that
no objections were filed against plaintiffs nominating papers and
that the local electoral board did not invalidate those papers.
The dispute thus arises over whether plaintiffs nominating papers
were in apparent conformity with the Code when filed and whether
defendant possesses the authority to make that determination.
The resolution of this issue is controlled by the Illinois
Supreme Court s decision in People ex rel. Giese v. Dillon, 266 Ill. 272, 275-76 (1914). Although the court rendered Dillon prior
to the legislature s enactment of the Code in its current form, the
issue in Dillon is identical to that presented in this appeal. In
addition, despite its octogenarian distinction, the analysis set
forth in Dillon remains both sensible and relevant.
In Dillon, the residents of La Salle filed a petition with the
town clerk to have the question, Shall this town become anti-
saloon territory? placed upon the ballot. Dillon, 266 Ill. at
273. When the clerk refused to place the question on the ballot,
the residents filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the
clerk to place the question on the ballot. Dillon, 266 Ill. at
273. In response to the petition, the clerk argued that he was
under no obligation to place the question on the ballot because the
submitted petition did not comply with the law. Dillon, 266 Ill.
at 274. Specifically, the clerk argued that (1) the signatures on
the ballot were not those of legal voters and were not given in
person, and (2) the sworn statements at the bottom of each page
were neither signed by a resident of La Salle nor sworn to by an
officer having authority to administer an oath. Dillon, 266 Ill.
at 274.
In affirming the trial court s granting of the writ of
mandamus, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that the
responsibility for determining whether an election petition
apparently conforms to the law rests with the town clerk. Dillon,
266 Ill. at 275-76. Specifically, the clerk s duty is to
determine whether, upon the face of the petition, it is in
compliance with the law. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276. If the
petition on its face appears to comply with the statutory
requisites, the clerk may not look outside the petition to
determine whether in fact it does comply; he must submit the
question to the voters. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276. Because the
validity of signatures and the authority of officers cannot be
determined by examining the face of an election petition, the court
concluded that the petition was in apparent conformity with the law
and thus that the clerk was obligated to submit the question to the
voters. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276.
However, the court continued, had the petition not appeared on
its face to have complied with the statutory requisites, the clerk
would have had no duty to submit the question to the voters.
Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276. For example, by examining the face of the
petition, a clerk can determine whether it contains the requisite
number of signatures. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276. If it does not,
the petition is not in apparent conformity with the election
statutes and the clerk has no duty to certify the question for the
ballot. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276.
In this case, plaintiffs concede that their nominating papers
were not in apparent conformity with the Code when filed. Indeed,
although section 10--5 of the Code states that all nominating
papers shall include a statement of candidacy (10 ILCS 5/10--5
(West 1996)), plaintiffs did not file statements of candidacy with
their papers. Whether nominating papers include statements of
candidacy is not a question whose resolution demands a convening of
the local electoral board. On the contrary, this is precisely the
type of question that can be answered by a facial examination of
the papers themselves. Plaintiffs nominating papers were not in
apparent conformity with the Code, and defendant was empowered to
make that ministerial determination. See Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276.
Having made that determination, defendant was under no obligation
to certify plaintiffs names for the ballot. See Dillon, 266 Ill.
at 276.
As our conclusion suggests, we find plaintiffs position
unconvincing. First, plaintiffs reading of section 10--8 is
contradicted by the plain language of that section. Section 10--8
does not state that all nominating papers are deemed valid unless
they are subject to a duly filed objection. Rather, the Code
states that all nominating papers, being filed as required by this
Code, and being in apparent conformity with the provisions of this
Act, are deemed valid unless they are subject to a duly filed
objection. (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/10--8 (West 1996).
Clearly, section 10--8 contemplates that the question of whether
papers were duly filed and in apparent conformity with the law when
filed is a threshold question that will be answered through a
procedure other than statutory objection. Otherwise, the
qualification, being filed as required by this Code, and being in
apparent conformity with the provisions of this Act, aside from
making no sense, would be wholly superfluous. A statute must be
construed to avoid absurd results, and an interpretation that
renders any part of that statute superfluous must be avoided.
Cummings v. City of Waterloo, 289 Ill. App. 3d 474, 480 (1997).
Because plaintiffs reading of section 10--8 renders both absurdity
and superfluity, we decline to adopt that reading.
We also emphasize that our conclusion is supported not only by
the language of the Code and the decision in Dillon but also by
concerns for public policy. Consider the consequences if we were
to abandon Dillon and adopt the rule urged by plaintiffs, namely,
that a local election official must certify all nominating papers
unless a written objection to those papers is duly filed. A
candidate who filed his nominating papers 30 days after the
deadline would be entitled to have his name appear on the ballot
unless some member of the public took affirmative steps to
challenge those papers. Any scrap of paper containing only a
scribbled name and the words nominating papers would have to be
treated as valid, at least until the local electoral board ruled
otherwise. Clearly, this rule is unworkable. There must be a
gatekeeper to turn away nominating papers that do not even purport
to conform to the law. As did the court in Dillon, we believe that
the local election official serves this function.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, because plaintiffs nominating papers were
facially deficient, defendant was under no obligation to certify
plaintiffs names for the ballot. The trial court therefore
properly denied plaintiffs request for a writ of mandamus.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Lee County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
INGLIS and McLAREN, JJ., concur.