In re J.J.C.
Annotate this Case
No. 2--96--1331
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________
In re J.J.C., a Minor ) Appeal from the Circuit
) Court of Lake County.
)
) No. 96--JD--362
)
(The People of the State of )
Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee ) Honorable
v. J.J.C., a Minor, ) Margaret J. Mullen,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
_______________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:
Respondent, J.J.C., age 16, was adjudicated a delinquent minor
after the trial court found him responsible for three counts of
criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12--13(a)(1)(West 1996)). The
trial court adjudged respondent to be a ward of the court and
sentenced him to four years' incarceration and further ordered him
to undergo psychiatric treatment and specific sex offender
treatment. Respondent appeals, claiming that the trial court erred
when it (1) denied his motion to suppress his confession statement,
because the confession was neither voluntary nor knowing and
intelligent, and (2) entered the order of adjudication because
respondent was not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We
reverse and remand.
On June 27, 1996, respondent engaged in sexual relations with
the victim, also a juvenile. Prior to trial, respondent moved to
suppress statements he made at the time of his arrest. Respondent
claimed that the law enforcement officials physically and
psychologically coerced him into incriminating himself. Respondent
also claimed that he did not fully understand his rights.
A hearing on respondent's motion to suppress was held on July
25, 1996. David Schwarz, a detective with the Highland Park police
department, testified that, on June 27, 1996, he spoke with the
victim after the alleged assault occurred. Because the trial court
was focusing on the issue of probable cause, it allowed the
following hearsay testimony. The victim related to Schwarz that
she knew respondent from summer school, and while they were on
their way home from school, they stopped at a video store. The
victim's mother was outside, and the victim introduced respondent
to the victim's mother. The victim and respondent proceeded to a
bike trail, adjacent to railroad tracks. Respondent led the victim
towards the railroad tracks, where they engaged in consensual
kissing. Schwarz then related that the victim stated that
respondent forced her to engage in anal intercourse, forced her to
engage in oral sex, and then forced her to have sexual intercourse
with him.
Schwarz further testified that he and youth officer Steve
Mueller spoke with respondent on June 27, 1996, at approximately 8
p.m. Schwarz read the Miranda warnings to respondent and stated
that it appeared respondent was reading along. He testified that
when he asked respondent whether he understood, respondent replied
that he did. Schwarz also stated that he read two additional
juvenile warnings, to which respondent indicated that he understood
the warnings. Schwarz testified that, after he read the juvenile
warning which states that respondent could "consult with his
parents or legal guardian before questioning," respondent replied,
"it's none of their fucking business." Schwarz interpreted this to
mean that respondent did not wish his parents to be present.
Respondent looked at the sheet for 1« to 2 minutes and began to
initial each warning paragraph. The sheet was dated and timed June
27, 1996, at 8:07 p.m. Schwarz also read to respondent a waiver of
constitutional rights, which respondent signed at 8:09 p.m.
Schwarz further testified to respondent's version. He said
that respondent attempted anal intercourse with the victim, but
could not sustain an erection; respondent then had the victim put
her mouth on his penis; he thought he was going to ejaculate, so he
then entered her vaginally. After that, respondent told Schwarz,
he heard a woman calling for the victim, so he ran away.
Respondent agreed to put his statement in writing.
On cross-examination, Schwarz testified that he was unsure
when he became aware that respondent's parents were at the police
station, either after the interview or during the interview. He
was aware that the parents were at their residence at approximately
7 p.m. when Officer Weaver, a Highland Park police officer, was
there. When asked whether any conversation occurred regarding
having respondent's parents present, separate and apart from the
Miranda warnings, Schwarz replied there was not. He denied that
respondent made a previous statement that had been thrown out.
The State's next witness was Detective Steve Mueller, a youth
officer with the Highland Park police department. Mueller
testified regarding his interviews with the victim and the hospital
nurse attending the victim. He advised respondent of the report
and the investigation; Schwarz then began to read the Miranda
warnings to respondent. He stated that respondent appeared to
understand the questions he was asked and seemed to respond
appropriately. After respondent finished writing the statement,
Mueller met with respondent's parents and advised them of the
investigation.
On cross-examination, Mueller testified to other informal
contacts with respondent involving station adjustments, meeting and
consulting with his parents, but none involving any referrals to
juvenile court. He became aware of respondent's parents' presence
at the station after respondent made an oral statement to the
officers, but before respondent had completed the written
statement.
Officer Carl Weaver, with the Highland Park police department,
testified that he was on bike patrol when he received the dispatch
call regarding respondent. He rode to respondent's residence,
where he encountered the father and indicated to him that
respondent was needed at the station by the investigators. Officer
Weaver radioed the station and then informed the parents he would
have to take respondent into custody. The officer put respondent
in handcuffs and radioed for a patrol unit to transport respondent
to the police station; Officer O'Neal transported respondent to the
station. Weaver also advised the parents to go to the police
station as soon as possible.
The defense called Dr. Leonard Carr, a child psychiatrist and
a licensed physician, who was qualified as an expert witness. Dr.
Carr testified that respondent had been his patient since October
1995. During his course of treatment with respondent, he diagnosed
respondent as suffering from major depression with psychotic
features, conduct disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD). Dr. Carr stated that respondent is easily
distracted and impulsive, making it difficult for him to understand
and attend to directions given to him. He further stated that
respondent was hearing voices and responding to stimuli not
apparent to others, both visual and auditory hallucinations. Based
upon his diagnosis, Dr. Carr implemented a treatment plan for
respondent, which included Wellbutrin, an antidepressant
medication, and Risperdol, an antipsychotic medication.
Approximately three months prior to the date of the hearing,
respondent, on his own, ceased taking Risperdol and reduced his
intake of Wellbutrin. During the time respondent was in the
hospital as a result of the instant offense, Dr. Carr reexamined
him and reclassified him as either having bipolar disorder or
schizo-effective disorder, in addition to ADHD. Based upon his
updated diagnosis, Dr. Carr prescribed to respondent Wellbutrin and
Risperdol and added lithium carbonate, an antimanic medication.
Dr. Carr opined that respondent's ability to comprehend and
understand would have been detrimentally affected by his
psychiatric disorders. He also opined that, when respondent was
being interviewed by the law enforcement officers in June 1996,
respondent did not understand the concept of rights and warnings
and relinquishing his rights based upon the warnings. Dr. Carr
also stated that respondent would not have been able to understand
the consequences of his behavior, even if the Miranda warnings were
read and explained to him. Dr. Carr opined that respondent could
not have freely or voluntarily relinquished his rights at the time
of his interview.
On cross-examination, Dr. Carr testified that a person
suffering from a psychotic situation could be able to speak clearly
and unhesitantly. He stated that he based his opinion on his
diagnosis, psychological testing, and his conversations with
respondent. Dr. Carr described respondent as being intimidated by
authority figures and believing that he could not resist them.
When asked whether respondent's ability to comprehend would be
increased if an instruction was read to him repeatedly, Dr. Carr
responded no for two reasons: (1) that respondent's lowest
abilities were reading comprehension and understanding, and (2)
that respondent experiences hallucinations, confusing the ability
to make appropriate judgments about the situation. Dr. Carr
concluded by stating that respondent could not comprehend the true
and real meaning of the Miranda warnings.
Respondent's mother testified that she was home on June 27,
1996, with respondent, when Weaver requested that she and her
husband (the father) take respondent to the station for questioning
and that Mueller wanted to speak with them. The mother witnessed
Weaver conversing on the walkie-talkie and heard him say that
respondent was in his custody. After his conversation, Weaver
approached respondent and pulled his belt from his pants. The
mother objected, stating that his pants would fall down. She also
stated that, because he is a minor, she wanted to be with him when
the officer took him to the police station. Weaver then put
handcuffs on respondent. The mother testified that she again
indicated to Weaver that respondent was a minor and requested to
take respondent to the station or be with him. Her requests were
denied.
After respondent left in the police vehicle, the mother
returned to the house, and she and the father drove to the station.
The mother stated that they arrived at the station at approximately
8 p.m. and the father informed the police officer at the window
that they were there to see Mueller about respondent. The officer
informed Mueller and directed the mother and father to wait. The
mother testified that they waited an hour to an hour and a half
before speaking with Mueller. When the mother requested to see
respondent, Mueller told them no, that respondent had already read
his Miranda warnings and had signed a statement.
On cross-examination, the mother testified that respondent
attends special education classes at Highland Park high school and
recently completed his sophomore year. She admitted that, when she
was speaking with Weaver and indicated to him her desire to be with
respondent, respondent did not indicate his desire to have her
present.
Respondent's father testified next. He stated that on June
27, 1996, he was returning home from work and exercising and saw
Weaver and his wife talking. When the father asked what was going
on, Weaver replied that he did not have complete information, but
that the mother and father should take respondent to the station
for questioning by Mueller. The father asked whether he could
shower first, and the officer indicated that he could. Within a
matter of minutes, the father testified, the mother informed him
that the police had handcuffed respondent and taken him to the
station in a squad car.
Upon arriving at the station, the father requested to speak
with Mueller. He saw the police officer telephone Mueller and
inform him of their presence; they were directed to wait. Between
9:15 and 9:30 p.m., they spoke briefly with Mueller, who told them
that respondent had made a statement and had signed the Miranda
warnings. The father further testified that he was not allowed to
see respondent the remainder of the day after the time he was taken
into custody from their residence.
On cross-examination, the father testified that on two
previous occasions he and the mother were present during a police
interview with respondent. On those occasions, the mother simply
told respondent to initial the Miranda warning paragraphs and write
out a statement; respondent complied.
In rebuttal, Officer Tim Wilinski from the Highland Park
police department testified to incidents occurring in June 1995 and
in August 1995 involving respondent. He discussed the procedures
used to read Miranda warnings to respondent and that subsequent to
that respondent would initial each paragraph.
Mueller testified in rebuttal that he was not aware of the
parents' presence at the station until approximately 8:45 p.m. He
stated that the parents did not inform him of respondent's mental
disabilities or respondent's ability to waive his rights. He
stated that respondent did not request to see his parents, and once
Mueller informed respondent of their presence, respondent
purportedly told him "that he didn't want to meet with his parents
because the incident was between himself, the police and this girl
that was involved."
Weaver testified in rebuttal that he could not recall whether
he told the parents to take their time getting ready before going
to the station on June 27, 1996. He testified that the mother
never informed him that she wanted to be with respondent or that he
was a minor.
After hearing arguments, the trial court found that respondent
was experienced with police, criminal investigations, and Miranda
warnings, stating that he had previously initialed and waived his
rights on more than one occasion. The trial court further found
that his parents were not prevented from seeing him, that there was
no coercion, and that respondent's will was not overborne. The
trial court determined that respondent did not want his parents
present. The trial court also did not believe the expert's
testimony regarding respondent's lack of understanding, but did
find credible the testimony of the officers. Based upon these
findings, the trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found respondent
committed the offense of criminal sexual assault and adjudicated
him a delinquent minor. On October 17, 1996, the trial court
denied respondent's motion to enter judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. On October 24, 1996, the trial court denied respondent's
motion to reconsider, and respondent timely appealed.
Respondent contends that the trial court erred by finding that
his confession on June 27, 1996, was made knowingly and
voluntarily. In support of his contention, respondent argues that
he was interrogated without the presence of his parents,
notwithstanding his parents' desire to confer with him and be with
him at the station. Respondent also argues that Dr. Carr's
testimony regarding respondent's mental capacity and mental
disorders establishes that he could not have knowingly and
intelligently waived his constitutional rights.
Persons subjected to custodial police interrogation regarding
matters that might tend to incriminate them are entitled to the
procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). Specifically, they must
be warned, prior to questioning, that they have a right to remain
silent, that any statement made may be used as evidence against
them, and that they have a right to counsel, either retained or
appointed. These rights may be waived, if the waiver is made
knowingly and intelligently. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 724, 86 S. Ct. at 1628. The determination of whether an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel has been made must
depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938).
Juvenile defendants are also protected by the privilege
against self-incrimination, and the State bears the burden to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that a confession was given
knowingly and intelligently. In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d 965, 974
(1996), citing People v. Anderson, 276 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6 (1995).
Procuring an incriminating statement by a juvenile in the absence
of counsel requires great care to assure that the juvenile's
statement was neither coerced, suggested, nor the product of fright
or despair. In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550 (1996),
citing People v. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d 470, 476 (1977). In cases
involving juveniles, courts must be particularly careful because
" `the coerciveness of a situation is thereby enhanced. " People
v. Montanez, 273 Ill. App. 3d 844, 850 (1995), quoting People v.
Cole, 168 Ill. App. 3d 172, 179 (1988).
In determining whether a statement has been voluntarily given,
our court looks at the "totality of the circumstances." People v.
Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 451 (1996). " `The test of voluntariness is
whether the statement was made freely, voluntarily and without
compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the defendant's
will was overcome at the time [she or] he confessed. " People v.
Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 181 (1996), quoting People v. Clark, 114 Ill. 2d 450, 457 (1986). Factors to consider include the age,
education, and intelligence of the accused, the duration of
questioning, and whether the accused was informed of her or his
constitutional rights or was subjected to any physical punishment.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854,
862, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047 (1973); People v. Martin, 102 Ill. 2d 412, 427 (1984). Other relevant individual aspects include
emotional characteristics, previous experience with the criminal
justice system, and whether the confession was induced by police
deception. People v. MacFarland, 228 Ill. App. 3d 107, 117 (1992).
Relevant factors pertaining to the nature of the interrogation
include whether the defendant was subjected to physical punishment,
offers of leniency, other offers or promises to induce a
confession, falsely aroused sympathy, prior refusals to answer
questions, and whether defendant was informed of her or his
constitutional rights. MacFarland, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 117.
In cases involving juveniles, additional factors must be
considered, such as the time of day and the presence of a parent or
other adult concerned about the juvenile's welfare. In re Lashun
H., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 551, citing People v. Brown, 235 Ill. App.
3d 479 (1992). The disposition does not rest on one fact alone;
the question must be answered based on the circumstances of each
case. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 427,
95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1975); People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423,
447-48 (1992). We note that, in reviewing the trial court's
decision, we may consider the entire record, including trial
testimony. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 501 (1996), citing
People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 480 (1984). We will not
disturb a finding by the trial court denying a motion to suppress
a statement unless its finding is contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence. People v. Pico, 287 Ill. App. 3d 607, 612-13
(1997); see also In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 551, citing
People v. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d 1 (1983).
The presence or absence of a parent is a factor to consider
when determining the voluntariness of a confession; however, there
is no per se rule that a parent or guardian be present. People v.
Gardner, 282 Ill. App. 3d 209, 218 (1996). However, if parents,
guardians, or concerned adults indicate an interest by their
presence, then they should be allowed to confer with that child
before any questioning occurs. In re V.L.T., No. 2--95--1582, slip
op. at 14 (Ill. October 10, 1997); In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d at
974-75; In re S.D.S., 103 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1012 (1982). Courts
have held that conduct by law enforcement personnel that frustrates
parents' attempts to confer with their child prior to or during
questioning is a significant factor in determining whether a
confession was given voluntarily. In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App.
3d at 553.
In People v. Knox, 186 Ill. App. 3d 808 (1989), the defendant,
a juvenile, was arrested at his home at 9:40 p.m. Approximately
one-half hour later, the defendant's mother arrived at the police
station. She identified herself at the front desk and was told to
wait. At midnight, she was informed that the defendant had already
confessed and she should go home.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, but
the reviewing court reversed, finding that the police had
"contributed significantly to eliminating any opportunity defendant
had from speaking to his mother at the police station." Knox, 186
Ill. App. 3d at 813. The Knox court stated:
"We do not believe such conduct by police is consistent
with the great care required where a juvenile's incriminating
statement is received. At worst, the police purposefully
precluded defendant's mother from contact with defendant by
neglecting to see if defendant's mother had arrived until
after such time as defendant had completed his confession. At
best, the police simply subjected defendant to the same
routine questioning of a criminal suspect without special
regard for his youth. Either scenario is impermissible and
casts some doubt over the voluntariness of defendant's
statement." Knox, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 814.
We find In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d 545 (1996),
persuasive. In that case, the respondent, a 14-year-old male, was
charged with first-degree murder. The day after the shooting,
police officers took the respondent to the station for questioning,
which began at 3:30 a.m. At approximately 6:15 a.m., the
respondent made an incriminating statement. At a pretrial hearing,
the respondent sought to have his statement suppressed, which the
trial court denied. Subsequently, the trial court adjudicated
respondent a delinquent for first-degree murder. The reviewing
court reversed, holding that the respondent's confession was not
voluntary. The reviewing court noted that the respondent was never
requested to sign a formal waiver of his rights, his confession was
never reduced to writing, and it was never given to the respondent
to review and sign. The respondent's mother was prevented from
seeing him until after he confessed. When the respondent was
finally allowed an opportunity to confer with his mother, he told
her he was not the shooter. The reviewing court combined those
factors, including the coercive nature of the encounter and the
respondent's youth, considered the respondent's learning disability
and minimal prior contact with the juvenile justice system, and
concluded that the respondent's confession was not voluntarily
given. In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 552-55.
We turn now to the particular circumstances surrounding
respondent's statement. Initially, we note that respondent's
statement contains the necessary statutory language, satisfying the
elements of the offense of criminal sexual assault (see 720 ILCS
5/12--13(a)(1)(West 1996)). We have reviewed the circumstances
surrounding respondent's confession and conclude that the trial
court's determination that respondent's confession was voluntary is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. The coercive nature
of the juvenile respondent's encounter with the police began
immediately at respondent's home when Weaver took respondent into
custody and pulled respondent's belt off. It continued by placing
respondent into handcuffs and transporting him in a squad car to
the station, rather than allowing respondent's parents to drive
respondent to the station or allowing respondent's mother the
opportunity to ride with him. The record reflects that, in less
than 10 minutes' time, respondent was brought in to the station,
was read his Miranda warnings, was read the constitutional waiver,
was read two additional juvenile warnings, which respondent also
purportedly read before initialing each warning paragraph, signing,
dating, and timing the sheets, without any apparent concern to the
whereabouts of his parents, whether they were notified, whether
they were coming in to the station, or whether they wished to
confer with their child before he would be subjected to police
interrogation.
Upon arrival at the station, respondent's parents immediately
notified an officer of their presence and their desire to confer
with their child. The police officer's response to them was to sit
and wait, which they did, for more than one hour. Even after the
wait, they still were not allowed to see their child for the
remainder of the evening.
The State argues that a youth officer was present the entire
time during the respondent's interrogation. Contra Knox, 186 Ill.
App. 3d 808 (1989). The presence of a youth officer is a
significant factor in demonstrating voluntariness. See In re
Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 557. However, the presence of a
youth officer does not per se make a juvenile's confession
voluntary. Gardner, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 218. In the present case,
Mueller, the youth officer, was present; however, the record is
silent of indicia on the part of the youth officer affirmatively
protecting respondent's rights.
The State contends that respondent did not want his parents
present, that he read and signed the Miranda warnings, and wrote
his statement, all on his own accord. The State contends that when
respondent declared "it's none of their fucking business," it meant
that respondent did not wish to consult with his parents. The
State cites two out-of-state cases for authority for the
proposition that a confession should not be deemed involuntary
where the parents are not present at an interrogation wholly or
partly because the juvenile does not desire them to be present.
While a juvenile's purported desire not to have her or his parents
present during an interrogation is certainly a factor in
determining voluntariness, it is no more than that, one factor, of
the many our court reviews in considering the totality of the
circumstances.
We believe that the police read too much into respondent's
statement. Simply because respondent said it was none of his
parents' business does not necessarily mean he did not wish to
consult with them. It does, however, support the proposition that
the police subjected respondent to the same routine interrogation
of an adult suspect without any special regard for his youth. See
Knox, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 814. Further, the State's interpretation
blatantly disregards the interest of the parents in wishing to
confer with their child before questioning. See In re V.L.T., No.
2--95--1582 (Ill. October 10, 1997); In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d
965 (1996); In re S.D.S., 103 Ill. App. 3d 1008 (1982). We
determine that the police in this case clearly frustrated
respondent's parents' attempts to confer with their child prior to
or during questioning. Moreover, we hold that when a juvenile's
parents are present, request to confer with their child, and are
effectively refused by the law enforcement authorities, the
presumption arises that the juvenile's will is overborne.
Respondent in this case was even more susceptible than the
general population of 16-year-olds because of his learning
disabilities. Dr. Carr, who had been treating respondent for
approximately eight months prior to the incident, diagnosed
respondent with ADHD and prescribed various psychotropic
medications to respondent. Approximately two months prior to the
incident, respondent, on his own, ceased taking his antipsychotic
medication and reduced his intake of antidepressant medication.
The record reflects that respondent has attended special education
classes for nearly all of his years of schooling. As a result of
respondent's psychiatric disorders, combined with the withdrawal of
the psychotropic medication, respondent's vulnerability should have
been even more apparent. We note that evidence of limited mental
capacity alone does not indicate that respondent was incapable of
waiving his constitutional rights and making a voluntary
confession. See People v. Tackett, 246 Ill. App. 3d 622, 626
(1993). However, it is another factor we consider under the
totality of the circumstances.
Further, respondent's prior contacts with the police were
minimal and not such that the intimidation inherent in this type of
encounter would be lessened. This was respondent's first referral
to juvenile court. Respondent had previous station adjustments,
but station adjustments are merely verbal warnings from the police,
occurring when a juvenile is brought into the police station, but
later released when the police have decided not to refer the matter
to juvenile court. See People v. D.B., 202 Ill. App. 3d 194, 203
(1990). During these various station adjustments, respondent's
parents, either alone or together, were present with respondent.
On one occasion, the mother testified, she simply told respondent
to sign the waiver, to which he complied. Thus, these prior
experiences would not have given respondent the sophistication or
insight of how to conduct himself while being interrogated by
police in a criminal sexual assault case. To the contrary,
respondent could have been led to believe that this occasion was no
different from the other times he was brought in, admonished, and
released.
Based on the facts and circumstances presented, we find that
the evidence clearly demonstrates that the trial court's finding
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we
determine that respondent's statement was not voluntary, and the
adjudication of delinquency must be reversed.
Finally, respondent contends that he was not found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. We have reviewed the entire
adjudication hearing record. In considering the sufficiency of the
evidence, we ask only whether all the evidence, viewed most
favorably to the prosecution, is sufficient to convince any
rational trier of fact that the elements of the offense have been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Green, 288 Ill. App.
3d 402, 405 (1997). We do not reevaluate the witnesses'
credibility or the weight to be accorded the evidence. Green, 288
Ill. App. 3d at 405. Thus, while there may be disagreements
concerning the timeliness of the report of the conduct and the
issue of consent, we cannot find that the evidence here was
insufficient to support the offense of criminal sexual assault.
Our holding does not, however, constitute an implication as to
respondent's guilt or innocence which would be binding on retrial,
but is intended only to protect respondent from the risk of double
jeopardy. See People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289 (1979). This cause
is remanded for a new adjudication hearing with directions to
suppress respondent's statement.
The order of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed, and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
GEIGER, P.J., and McLAREN, J., concur.
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________
In re J.J.C., a Minor ) Appeal from the Circuit
) Court of Lake County.
)
) No. 96--JD--362
)
(The People of the State of )
Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee ) Honorable
v. J.J.C., a Minor, ) Margaret J. Mullen,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
_______________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:
Respondent, J.J.C., age 16, was adjudicated a delinquent minor
after the trial court found him responsible for three counts of
criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12--13(a)(1)(West 1996)). The
trial court adjudged respondent to be a ward of the court and
sentenced him to four years' incarceration and further ordered him
to undergo psychiatric treatment and specific sex offender
treatment. Respondent appeals, claiming that the trial court erred
when it (1) denied his motion to suppress his confession statement,
because the confession was neither voluntary nor knowing and
intelligent, and (2) entered the order of adjudication because
respondent was not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We
reverse and remand.
On June 27, 1996, respondent engaged in sexual relations with
the victim, also a juvenile. Prior to trial, respondent moved to
suppress statements he made at the time of his arrest. Respondent
claimed that the law enforcement officials physically and
psychologically coerced him into incriminating himself. Respondent
also claimed that he did not fully understand his rights.
A hearing on respondent's motion to suppress was held on July
25, 1996. David Schwarz, a detective with the Highland Park police
department, testified that, on June 27, 1996, he spoke with the
victim after the alleged assault occurred. Because the trial court
was focusing on the issue of probable cause, it allowed the
following hearsay testimony. The victim related to Schwarz that
she knew respondent from summer school, and while they were on
their way home from school, they stopped at a video store. The
victim's mother was outside, and the victim introduced respondent
to the victim's mother. The victim and respondent proceeded to a
bike trail, adjacent to railroad tracks. Respondent led the victim
towards the railroad tracks, where they engaged in consensual
kissing. Schwarz then related that the victim stated that
respondent forced her to engage in anal intercourse, forced her to
engage in oral sex, and then forced her to have sexual intercourse
with him.
Schwarz further testified that he and youth officer Steve
Mueller spoke with respondent on June 27, 1996, at approximately 8
p.m. Schwarz read the Miranda warnings to respondent and stated
that it appeared respondent was reading along. He testified that
when he asked respondent whether he understood, respondent replied
that he did. Schwarz also stated that he read two additional
juvenile warnings, to which respondent indicated that he understood
the warnings. Schwarz testified that, after he read the juvenile
warning which states that respondent could "consult with his
parents or legal guardian before questioning," respondent replied,
"it's none of their fucking business." Schwarz interpreted this to
mean that respondent did not wish his parents to be present.
Respondent looked at the sheet for 1« to 2 minutes and began to
initial each warning paragraph. The sheet was dated and timed June
27, 1996, at 8:07 p.m. Schwarz also read to respondent a waiver of
constitutional rights, which respondent signed at 8:09 p.m.
Schwarz further testified to respondent's version. He said
that respondent attempted anal intercourse with the victim, but
could not sustain an erection; respondent then had the victim put
her mouth on his penis; he thought he was going to ejaculate, so he
then entered her vaginally. After that, respondent told Schwarz,
he heard a woman calling for the victim, so he ran away.
Respondent agreed to put his statement in writing.
On cross-examination, Schwarz testified that he was unsure
when he became aware that respondent's parents were at the police
station, either after the interview or during the interview. He
was aware that the parents were at their residence at approximately
7 p.m. when Officer Weaver, a Highland Park police officer, was
there. When asked whether any conversation occurred regarding
having respondent's parents present, separate and apart from the
Miranda warnings, Schwarz replied there was not. He denied that
respondent made a previous statement that had been thrown out.
The State's next witness was Detective Steve Mueller, a youth
officer with the Highland Park police department. Mueller
testified regarding his interviews with the victim and the hospital
nurse attending the victim. He advised respondent of the report
and the investigation; Schwarz then began to read the Miranda
warnings to respondent. He stated that respondent appeared to
understand the questions he was asked and seemed to respond
appropriately. After respondent finished writing the statement,
Mueller met with respondent's parents and advised them of the
investigation.
On cross-examination, Mueller testified to other informal
contacts with respondent involving station adjustments, meeting and
consulting with his parents, but none involving any referrals to
juvenile court. He became aware of respondent's parents' presence
at the station after respondent made an oral statement to the
officers, but before respondent had completed the written
statement.
Officer Carl Weaver, with the Highland Park police department,
testified that he was on bike patrol when he received the dispatch
call regarding respondent. He rode to respondent's residence,
where he encountered the father and indicated to him that
respondent was needed at the station by the investigators. Officer
Weaver radioed the station and then informed the parents he would
have to take respondent into custody. The officer put respondent
in handcuffs and radioed for a patrol unit to transport respondent
to the police station; Officer O'Neal transported respondent to the
station. Weaver also advised the parents to go to the police
station as soon as possible.
The defense called Dr. Leonard Carr, a child psychiatrist and
a licensed physician, who was qualified as an expert witness. Dr.
Carr testified that respondent had been his patient since October
1995. During his course of treatment with respondent, he diagnosed
respondent as suffering from major depression with psychotic
features, conduct disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD). Dr. Carr stated that respondent is easily
distracted and impulsive, making it difficult for him to understand
and attend to directions given to him. He further stated that
respondent was hearing voices and responding to stimuli not
apparent to others, both visual and auditory hallucinations. Based
upon his diagnosis, Dr. Carr implemented a treatment plan for
respondent, which included Wellbutrin, an antidepressant
medication, and Risperdol, an antipsychotic medication.
Approximately three months prior to the date of the hearing,
respondent, on his own, ceased taking Risperdol and reduced his
intake of Wellbutrin. During the time respondent was in the
hospital as a result of the instant offense, Dr. Carr reexamined
him and reclassified him as either having bipolar disorder or
schizo-effective disorder, in addition to ADHD. Based upon his
updated diagnosis, Dr. Carr prescribed to respondent Wellbutrin and
Risperdol and added lithium carbonate, an antimanic medication.
Dr. Carr opined that respondent's ability to comprehend and
understand would have been detrimentally affected by his
psychiatric disorders. He also opined that, when respondent was
being interviewed by the law enforcement officers in June 1996,
respondent did not understand the concept of rights and warnings
and relinquishing his rights based upon the warnings. Dr. Carr
also stated that respondent would not have been able to understand
the consequences of his behavior, even if the Miranda warnings were
read and explained to him. Dr. Carr opined that respondent could
not have freely or voluntarily relinquished his rights at the time
of his interview.
On cross-examination, Dr. Carr testified that a person
suffering from a psychotic situation could be able to speak clearly
and unhesitantly. He stated that he based his opinion on his
diagnosis, psychological testing, and his conversations with
respondent. Dr. Carr described respondent as being intimidated by
authority figures and believing that he could not resist them.
When asked whether respondent's ability to comprehend would be
increased if an instruction was read to him repeatedly, Dr. Carr
responded no for two reasons: (1) that respondent's lowest
abilities were reading comprehension and understanding, and (2)
that respondent experiences hallucinations, confusing the ability
to make appropriate judgments about the situation. Dr. Carr
concluded by stating that respondent could not comprehend the true
and real meaning of the Miranda warnings.
Respondent's mother testified that she was home on June 27,
1996, with respondent, when Weaver requested that she and her
husband (the father) take respondent to the station for questioning
and that Mueller wanted to speak with them. The mother witnessed
Weaver conversing on the walkie-talkie and heard him say that
respondent was in his custody. After his conversation, Weaver
approached respondent and pulled his belt from his pants. The
mother objected, stating that his pants would fall down. She also
stated that, because he is a minor, she wanted to be with him when
the officer took him to the police station. Weaver then put
handcuffs on respondent. The mother testified that she again
indicated to Weaver that respondent was a minor and requested to
take respondent to the station or be with him. Her requests were
denied.
After respondent left in the police vehicle, the mother
returned to the house, and she and the father drove to the station.
The mother stated that they arrived at the station at approximately
8 p.m. and the father informed the police officer at the window
that they were there to see Mueller about respondent. The officer
informed Mueller and directed the mother and father to wait. The
mother testified that they waited an hour to an hour and a half
before speaking with Mueller. When the mother requested to see
respondent, Mueller told them no, that respondent had already read
his Miranda warnings and had signed a statement.
On cross-examination, the mother testified that respondent
attends special education classes at Highland Park high school and
recently completed his sophomore year. She admitted that, when she
was speaking with Weaver and indicated to him her desire to be with
respondent, respondent did not indicate his desire to have her
present.
Respondent's father testified next. He stated that on June
27, 1996, he was returning home from work and exercising and saw
Weaver and his wife talking. When the father asked what was going
on, Weaver replied that he did not have complete information, but
that the mother and father should take respondent to the station
for questioning by Mueller. The father asked whether he could
shower first, and the officer indicated that he could. Within a
matter of minutes, the father testified, the mother informed him
that the police had handcuffed respondent and taken him to the
station in a squad car.
Upon arriving at the station, the father requested to speak
with Mueller. He saw the police officer telephone Mueller and
inform him of their presence; they were directed to wait. Between
9:15 and 9:30 p.m., they spoke briefly with Mueller, who told them
that respondent had made a statement and had signed the Miranda
warnings. The father further testified that he was not allowed to
see respondent the remainder of the day after the time he was taken
into custody from their residence.
On cross-examination, the father testified that on two
previous occasions he and the mother were present during a police
interview with respondent. On those occasions, the mother simply
told respondent to initial the Miranda warning paragraphs and write
out a statement; respondent complied.
In rebuttal, Officer Tim Wilinski from the Highland Park
police department testified to incidents occurring in June 1995 and
in August 1995 involving respondent. He discussed the procedures
used to read Miranda warnings to respondent and that subsequent to
that respondent would initial each paragraph.
Mueller testified in rebuttal that he was not aware of the
parents' presence at the station until approximately 8:45 p.m. He
stated that the parents did not inform him of respondent's mental
disabilities or respondent's ability to waive his rights. He
stated that respondent did not request to see his parents, and once
Mueller informed respondent of their presence, respondent
purportedly told him "that he didn't want to meet with his parents
because the incident was between himself, the police and this girl
that was involved."
Weaver testified in rebuttal that he could not recall whether
he told the parents to take their time getting ready before going
to the station on June 27, 1996. He testified that the mother
never informed him that she wanted to be with respondent or that he
was a minor.
After hearing arguments, the trial court found that respondent
was experienced with police, criminal investigations, and Miranda
warnings, stating that he had previously initialed and waived his
rights on more than one occasion. The trial court further found
that his parents were not prevented from seeing him, that there was
no coercion, and that respondent's will was not overborne. The
trial court determined that respondent did not want his parents
present. The trial court also did not believe the expert's
testimony regarding respondent's lack of understanding, but did
find credible the testimony of the officers. Based upon these
findings, the trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found respondent
committed the offense of criminal sexual assault and adjudicated
him a delinquent minor. On October 17, 1996, the trial court
denied respondent's motion to enter judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. On October 24, 1996, the trial court denied respondent's
motion to reconsider, and respondent timely appealed.
Respondent contends that the trial court erred by finding that
his confession on June 27, 1996, was made knowingly and
voluntarily. In support of his contention, respondent argues that
he was interrogated without the presence of his parents,
notwithstanding his parents' desire to confer with him and be with
him at the station. Respondent also argues that Dr. Carr's
testimony regarding respondent's mental capacity and mental
disorders establishes that he could not have knowingly and
intelligently waived his constitutional rights.
Persons subjected to custodial police interrogation regarding
matters that might tend to incriminate them are entitled to the
procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). Specifically, they must
be warned, prior to questioning, that they have a right to remain
silent, that any statement made may be used as evidence against
them, and that they have a right to counsel, either retained or
appointed. These rights may be waived, if the waiver is made
knowingly and intelligently. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 724, 86 S. Ct. at 1628. The determination of whether an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel has been made must
depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938).
Juvenile defendants are also protected by the privilege
against self-incrimination, and the State bears the burden to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that a confession was given
knowingly and intelligently. In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d 965, 974
(1996), citing People v. Anderson, 276 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6 (1995).
Procuring an incriminating statement by a juvenile in the absence
of counsel requires great care to assure that the juvenile's
statement was neither coerced, suggested, nor the product of fright
or despair. In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550 (1996),
citing People v. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d 470, 476 (1977). In cases
involving juveniles, courts must be particularly careful because
" `the coerciveness of a situation is thereby enhanced. " People
v. Montanez, 273 Ill. App. 3d 844, 850 (1995), quoting People v.
Cole, 168 Ill. App. 3d 172, 179 (1988).
In determining whether a statement has been voluntarily given,
our court looks at the "totality of the circumstances." People v.
Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 451 (1996). " `The test of voluntariness is
whether the statement was made freely, voluntarily and without
compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the defendant's
will was overcome at the time [she or] he confessed. " People v.
Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 181 (1996), quoting People v. Clark, 114 Ill. 2d 450, 457 (1986). Factors to consider include the age,
education, and intelligence of the accused, the duration of
questioning, and whether the accused was informed of her or his
constitutional rights or was subjected to any physical punishment.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854,
862, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047 (1973); People v. Martin, 102 Ill. 2d 412, 427 (1984). Other relevant individual aspects include
emotional characteristics, previous experience with the criminal
justice system, and whether the confession was induced by police
deception. People v. MacFarland, 228 Ill. App. 3d 107, 117 (1992).
Relevant factors pertaining to the nature of the interrogation
include whether the defendant was subjected to physical punishment,
offers of leniency, other offers or promises to induce a
confession, falsely aroused sympathy, prior refusals to answer
questions, and whether defendant was informed of her or his
constitutional rights. MacFarland, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 117.
In cases involving juveniles, additional factors must be
considered, such as the time of day and the presence of a parent or
other adult concerned about the juvenile's welfare. In re Lashun
H., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 551, citing People v. Brown, 235 Ill. App.
3d 479 (1992). The disposition does not rest on one fact alone;
the question must be answered based on the circumstances of each
case. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 427,
95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1975); People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423,
447-48 (1992). We note that, in reviewing the trial court's
decision, we may consider the entire record, including trial
testimony. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 501 (1996), citing
People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 480 (1984). We will not
disturb a finding by the trial court denying a motion to suppress
a statement unless its finding is contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence. People v. Pico, 287 Ill. App. 3d 607, 612-13
(1997); see also In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 551, citing
People v. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d 1 (1983).
The presence or absence of a parent is a factor to consider
when determining the voluntariness of a confession; however, there
is no per se rule that a parent or guardian be present. People v.
Gardner, 282 Ill. App. 3d 209, 218 (1996). However, if parents,
guardians, or concerned adults indicate an interest by their
presence, then they should be allowed to confer with that child
before any questioning occurs. In re V.L.T., No. 2--95--1582, slip
op. at 14 (Ill. October 10, 1997); In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d at
974-75; In re S.D.S., 103 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1012 (1982). Courts
have held that conduct by law enforcement personnel that frustrates
parents' attempts to confer with their child prior to or during
questioning is a significant factor in determining whether a
confession was given voluntarily. In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App.
3d at 553.
In People v. Knox, 186 Ill. App. 3d 808 (1989), the defendant,
a juvenile, was arrested at his home at 9:40 p.m. Approximately
one-half hour later, the defendant's mother arrived at the police
station. She identified herself at the front desk and was told to
wait. At midnight, she was informed that the defendant had already
confessed and she should go home.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, but
the reviewing court reversed, finding that the police had
"contributed significantly to eliminating any opportunity defendant
had from speaking to his mother at the police station." Knox, 186
Ill. App. 3d at 813. The Knox court stated:
"We do not believe such conduct by police is consistent
with the great care required where a juvenile's incriminating
statement is received. At worst, the police purposefully
precluded defendant's mother from contact with defendant by
neglecting to see if defendant's mother had arrived until
after such time as defendant had completed his confession. At
best, the police simply subjected defendant to the same
routine questioning of a criminal suspect without special
regard for his youth. Either scenario is impermissible and
casts some doubt over the voluntariness of defendant's
statement." Knox, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 814.
We find In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d 545 (1996),
persuasive. In that case, the respondent, a 14-year-old male, was
charged with first-degree murder. The day after the shooting,
police officers took the respondent to the station for questioning,
which began at 3:30 a.m. At approximately 6:15 a.m., the
respondent made an incriminating statement. At a pretrial hearing,
the respondent sought to have his statement suppressed, which the
trial court denied. Subsequently, the trial court adjudicated
respondent a delinquent for first-degree murder. The reviewing
court reversed, holding that the respondent's confession was not
voluntary. The reviewing court noted that the respondent was never
requested to sign a formal waiver of his rights, his confession was
never reduced to writing, and it was never given to the respondent
to review and sign. The respondent's mother was prevented from
seeing him until after he confessed. When the respondent was
finally allowed an opportunity to confer with his mother, he told
her he was not the shooter. The reviewing court combined those
factors, including the coercive nature of the encounter and the
respondent's youth, considered the respondent's learning disability
and minimal prior contact with the juvenile justice system, and
concluded that the respondent's confession was not voluntarily
given. In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 552-55.
We turn now to the particular circumstances surrounding
respondent's statement. Initially, we note that respondent's
statement contains the necessary statutory language, satisfying the
elements of the offense of criminal sexual assault (see 720 ILCS
5/12--13(a)(1)(West 1996)). We have reviewed the circumstances
surrounding respondent's confession and conclude that the trial
court's determination that respondent's confession was voluntary is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. The coercive nature
of the juvenile respondent's encounter with the police began
immediately at respondent's home when Weaver took respondent into
custody and pulled respondent's belt off. It continued by placing
respondent into handcuffs and transporting him in a squad car to
the station, rather than allowing respondent's parents to drive
respondent to the station or allowing respondent's mother the
opportunity to ride with him. The record reflects that, in less
than 10 minutes' time, respondent was brought in to the station,
was read his Miranda warnings, was read the constitutional waiver,
was read two additional juvenile warnings, which respondent also
purportedly read before initialing each warning paragraph, signing,
dating, and timing the sheets, without any apparent concern to the
whereabouts of his parents, whether they were notified, whether
they were coming in to the station, or whether they wished to
confer with their child before he would be subjected to police
interrogation.
Upon arrival at the station, respondent's parents immediately
notified an officer of their presence and their desire to confer
with their child. The police officer's response to them was to sit
and wait, which they did, for more than one hour. Even after the
wait, they still were not allowed to see their child for the
remainder of the evening.
The State argues that a youth officer was present the entire
time during the respondent's interrogation. Contra Knox, 186 Ill.
App. 3d 808 (1989). The presence of a youth officer is a
significant factor in demonstrating voluntariness. See In re
Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 557. However, the presence of a
youth officer does not per se make a juvenile's confession
voluntary. Gardner, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 218. In the present case,
Mueller, the youth officer, was present; however, the record is
silent of indicia on the part of the youth officer affirmatively
protecting respondent's rights.
The State contends that respondent did not want his parents
present, that he read and signed the Miranda warnings, and wrote
his statement, all on his own accord. The State contends that when
respondent declared "it's none of their fucking business," it meant
that respondent did not wish to consult with his parents. The
State cites two out-of-state cases for authority for the
proposition that a confession should not be deemed involuntary
where the parents are not present at an interrogation wholly or
partly because the juvenile does not desire them to be present.
While a juvenile's purported desire not to have her or his parents
present during an interrogation is certainly a factor in
determining voluntariness, it is no more than that, one factor, of
the many our court reviews in considering the totality of the
circumstances.
We believe that the police read too much into respondent's
statement. Simply because respondent said it was none of his
parents' business does not necessarily mean he did not wish to
consult with them. It does, however, support the proposition that
the police subjected respondent to the same routine interrogation
of an adult suspect without any special regard for his youth. See
Knox, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 814. Further, the State's interpretation
blatantly disregards the interest of the parents in wishing to
confer with their child before questioning. See In re V.L.T., No.
2--95--1582 (Ill. October 10, 1997); In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d
965 (1996); In re S.D.S., 103 Ill. App. 3d 1008 (1982). We
determine that the police in this case clearly frustrated
respondent's parents' attempts to confer with their child prior to
or during questioning. Moreover, we hold that when a juvenile's
parents are present, request to confer with their child, and are
effectively refused by the law enforcement authorities, the
presumption arises that the juvenile's will is overborne.
Respondent in this case was even more susceptible than the
general population of 16-year-olds because of his learning
disabilities. Dr. Carr, who had been treating respondent for
approximately eight months prior to the incident, diagnosed
respondent with ADHD and prescribed various psychotropic
medications to respondent. Approximately two months prior to the
incident, respondent, on his own, ceased taking his antipsychotic
medication and reduced his intake of antidepressant medication.
The record reflects that respondent has attended special education
classes for nearly all of his years of schooling. As a result of
respondent's psychiatric disorders, combined with the withdrawal of
the psychotropic medication, respondent's vulnerability should have
been even more apparent. We note that evidence of limited mental
capacity alone does not indicate that respondent was incapable of
waiving his constitutional rights and making a voluntary
confession. See People v. Tackett, 246 Ill. App. 3d 622, 626
(1993). However, it is another factor we consider under the
totality of the circumstances.
Further, respondent's prior contacts with the police were
minimal and not such that the intimidation inherent in this type of
encounter would be lessened. This was respondent's first referral
to juvenile court. Respondent had previous station adjustments,
but station adjustments are merely verbal warnings from the police,
occurring when a juvenile is brought into the police station, but
later released when the police have decided not to refer the matter
to juvenile court. See People v. D.B., 202 Ill. App. 3d 194, 203
(1990). During these various station adjustments, respondent's
parents, either alone or together, were present with respondent.
On one occasion, the mother testified, she simply told respondent
to sign the waiver, to which he complied. Thus, these prior
experiences would not have given respondent the sophistication or
insight of how to conduct himself while being interrogated by
police in a criminal sexual assault case. To the contrary,
respondent could have been led to believe that this occasion was no
different from the other times he was brought in, admonished, and
released.
Based on the facts and circumstances presented, we find that
the evidence clearly demonstrates that the trial court's finding
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we
determine that respondent's statement was not voluntary, and the
adjudication of delinquency must be reversed.
Finally, respondent contends that he was not found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. We have reviewed the entire
adjudication hearing record. In considering the sufficiency of the
evidence, we ask only whether all the evidence, viewed most
favorably to the prosecution, is sufficient to convince any
rational trier of fact that the elements of the offense have been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Green, 288 Ill. App.
3d 402, 405 (1997). We do not reevaluate the witnesses'
credibility or the weight to be accorded the evidence. Green, 288
Ill. App. 3d at 405. Thus, while there may be disagreements
concerning the timeliness of the report of the conduct and the
issue of consent, we cannot find that the evidence here was
insufficient to support the offense of criminal sexual assault.
Our holding does not, however, constitute an implication as to
respondent's guilt or innocence which would be binding on retrial,
but is intended only to protect respondent from the risk of double
jeopardy. See People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289 (1979). This cause
is remanded for a new adjudication hearing with directions to
suppress respondent's statement.
The order of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed, and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
GEIGER, P.J., and McLAREN, J., concur.
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