People v. Martinez

No. 2--96--0912
________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT
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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 96--TR--3637
)
v. )
)
SIMON MARTINEZ, ) Honorable
) Cary B. Pierce,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
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JUSTICE INGLIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a stipulated bench trial, defendant, Simon Martinez,
was convicted of driving while his license was suspended (625 ILCS
5/6--303(a) (West 1996)) and was sentenced to one year of court
supervision and a $150 fine. He appeals his conviction, contending
that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his
license was suspended at the time of the offense. We affirm.
At trial, defendant stipulated to the following evidence.
Defendant was driving a vehicle on January 8, 1996, when he was
stopped by the police. Defendant's privilege to operate a motor
vehicle had been summarily suspended on August 17, 1995. The length
of the suspension was three months, and the provisional
reinstatement date was November 17, 1995. Defendant failed to pay
the reinstatement fee and, as a result, the suspension was still in
force on January 8, 1996.
On appeal, defendant contends that he was not guilty of the
offense because his license was no longer suspended on January 8,
1996. According to defendant, the failure to pay the reinstatement
fee did not extend the suspension period beyond November 17, 1995.
The facts are undisputed and the only issue on appeal involves the
interpretation of a statute. Because the construction of a statute
is a question of law, our review is de novo. People v. Robinson,
172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996).
To determine whether defendant's license was suspended, we
must analyze the relevant sections of the Illinois Vehicle Code
(Code) (625 ILCS 5/1--100 et seq. (West 1996)). The primary rule
of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislative intent. People v. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d 163, 196 (1996).
To determine that intent, we first look to the language of the
statute, which is given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v.
Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 222 (1996). We must also consider all
parts of the statute together (People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348,
357 (1996)) and, where possible, give every word or phrase some
reasonable meaning (Opyt's Amoco, Inc. v. Village of South Holland,
149 Ill. 2d 265, 277 (1992)). Criminal statutes are construed
strictly in favor of the defendant, and courts should take nothing
by intendment or implication beyond the obvious or literal meaning
of the statute. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 444 (1997).
Defendant relies on People v. Garbo, 288 Ill. App. 3d 519, 521
(1997), in which the Appellate Court, Fourth District, interpreted
section 6--208.1 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/6--208.1 (West 1996)) as
not providing for the extension of the suspension upon the failure
to pay the reinstatement fee. Garbo relied on People v. Johnson,
115 Ill. App. 3d 987, 989, in which the appellate court ruled that,
under section 1--204 (625 ILCS 5/1--204 (West 1996)), because a
suspension is a temporary sanction, the failure to pay the fee does
not extend the period of the suspension. Johnson distinguished
license suspensions from license revocations. Cf. People v.
Morrison, 149 Ill. App. 3d 282, 284 (1986) (license remains revoked
until license holder pays reinstatement fee).
Johnson predates the legislative amendments to the Code adding
sections 1--203.1 and 6--208.1 (625 ILCS 5/1--203.1, 5/6--208.1
(West 1996)). Defendant's license was suspended pursuant to
section 6--208.1. Under section 6--208.1(a), a person whose
privilege to drive a motor vehicle has been summarily suspended is
not eligible for restoration of the privilege until the expiration
of a certain period. 625 ILCS 5/6--208.1(a) (West 1996). Section
6--208.1(c) provides that "[f]ull driving privileges may not be
restored until all applicable reinstatement fees *** have been paid
to the Secretary of State and the appropriate entry made to the
driver's record." 625 ILCS 5/6--208.1(c) (West 1996).
The summary alcohol- or drug-related suspension of a driver's
privileges is "[t]he withdrawal by the circuit court of a person's
license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public
highways for the periods provided in Section 6--208.1.
Reinstatement after the suspension period shall occur after all
appropriate fees have been paid, unless the court notifies the
Secretary of State that the person should be disqualified." 625
ILCS 5/1--203.1 (West 1996). This section makes clear that the
suspension is not automatically rescinded upon the termination of
the suspension period. We conclude that this language is clear and
unambiguous: until the reinstatement fees have been paid, the
suspension remains in effect.
We disagree with the Garbo court's conclusion that the
legislature did not intend to change the law following the decision
in Johnson because the legislature did not amend section 6--209 of
the Code (625 ILCS 5/6--209 (West 1996)). "A judicial
interpretation of a statute is considered part of the statute
itself until the legislature amends it contrary to that
interpretation." Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 444. When a statute is
enacted after a judicial decision, it must be presumed that the
legislature was aware of the prevailing case law. Fink v. Ryan,
174 Ill. 2d 302, 308 (1996). Moreover, it is presumed that the
legislature intended to change the law when it made material
changes to a statute. Board of Trustees v. Department of Human
Rights, 159 Ill. 2d 206, 213 (1994).
The legislative amendments here are substantial and added
entirely new sections. Moreover, Johnson's construction of section
6--209 is consistent with the new enactments in that Johnson stated
that, under section 6--209, the holder of a revoked license must
pay a reinstatement fee before the revoked license will be
reinstated. See Johnson, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 989. Thus, there was
no need for the legislature to amend that section. We therefore
find Johnson distinguishable, and we decline to follow Garbo.
Finally, we believe that our interpretation comports with the
legislative intent. If the suspension terminated automatically on
a particular date, there would be no incentive for the license
holder to pay the reinstatement fee. Moreover, if the suspension
terminated automatically, that would render null the statutory
language providing for the court's power to notify the Secretary of
State that the person should be disqualified from reinstatement.
See 625 ILCS 5/1--203.1 (West 1996).
Because we conclude that a summary suspension does not
terminate until the license holder pays the reinstatement fee,
defendant's license was still suspended on the date he was
arrested. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support his
conviction of driving while his license was suspended.
The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
McLAREN and DOYLE, JJ., concur.