People v. Baptist

Annotate this Case
NO. 4-96-0018

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Livingston County
VICTOR JEROME BAPTIST, ) No. 95CF120
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Charles H. Frank,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In June 1995, the State charged defendant, Victor Jerome
Baptist, by indictment with four counts of aggravated battery for
hitting two correctional officers. 720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(6) (West
1994). In October 1995, defendant moved to dismiss, alleging, in
part, that this prosecution constituted double jeopardy. The
trial court denied his motions. Defendant appeals, and we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In February 1995, while serving a 12-year sentence at
Pontiac Correctional Center, defendant hit two prison guards.
Following a February 1995 disciplinary hearing, the prison
adjustment committee found defendant guilty of violating prison
disciplinary rules and (1) reduced his good-time credit by one
year, and (2) sentenced defendant to two years of grade C segre-
gation.
In June 1995, the grand jury indicted defendant, charg-
ing him with four counts of aggravated battery based on the same
conduct for which prison authorities had disciplined him. At a
June 1995 hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion to
amend two of the counts to substitute defendant's name for
another name as the person charged. In October 1995, defendant
filed a motion to dismiss the amended counts, alleging that the
misnomer was a substantial defect which caused him substantial
injustice. He also filed a motion to dismiss the entire indict-
ment on double jeopardy grounds. The court denied both motions,
and defendant appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Double Jeopardy
Defendant argues that the sanctions imposed upon him
following the February 1995 prison disciplinary hearing barred
his criminal prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. In re-
sponse, the State contends that (1) the prison disciplinary sanc-
tions imposed on defendant are not "punishment" for double
jeopardy purposes, and (2) even if prison disciplinary sanctions
could be deemed punishment, criminal prosecution would not place
a defendant in jeopardy of a second punishment where, as here,
the disciplinary sanctions affect only a defendant's original
sentence. We agree with both of the State's arguments.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the United States
Supreme Court has held that application of the double jeopardy
clause is limited to proceedings which are "'essentially crimi-
nal.'" Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346, 355,
95 S. Ct. 1779, 1785 (1975), quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398, 82 L. Ed. 917, 921, 58 S. Ct. 630, 633 (1938).
Because a prison disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal
prosecution, it is not subject to the double jeopardy clause.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 951, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2975 (1974); Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1351
(10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1144 (3d
Cir. 1993).
1. Prison Disciplinary Sanctions Do Not Constitute Punishment
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb." U.S. Const., amend. V. The United States Supreme
Court has held that the clause protects individuals against three
distinct abuses: (1) prosecuting a defendant for the same
conduct after an acquittal; (2) prosecuting a defendant for the
same crime after conviction; and (3) subjecting a defendant to
multiple punishments for the same crime. United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487, 496, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1897 (1989). Defendant argues that the State committed the
third abuse by attempting to punish him pursuant to the criminal
prosecution after having already punished him for the same
conduct by placing him in segregation and reducing his good-time
credit by one year.
It is well settled that disciplinary sanctions imposed
by prison authorities for infractions of prison regulations do
not generally bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same
conduct. People v. Jocelyn, 181 Ill. App. 3d 774, 778, 537 N.E.2d 1086, 1088 (1989); see Garrity v. Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150,
1152 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255,
1259 (10th Cir. 1989); Kerns v. Parratt, 672 F.2d 690, 691-92
(8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1105-06
(3d Cir. 1971).
However, defendant contends that several recent deci-
sions addressing "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes have
overturned this rule. To support his contention that prison
disciplinary sanctions constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes, defendant cites Halper, in which the United States
Supreme Court held that a civil monetary penalty sufficiently
disproportionate to the harm caused to the government constituted
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Halper, 490 U.S. at
449-50, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 502-03, 109 S. Ct. at 1902-03. Specifi-
cally, Halper held that a civil penalty is punishment if it
"cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive
or deterrent purposes." (Emphasis added.) Halper, 490 U.S. at
448, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 502, 109 S. Ct. at 1902; see also Austin v.
United States, 509 U.S. 602, ___, 125 L. Ed. 2d 488, 505, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993). Defendant apparently contends that
because his disciplinary sanctions also serve retributive or
deterrent purposes, they constitute punishment. We disagree.
Halper is distinguishable because it involved a civil
sanction rather than an administrative sanction arising from a
prison disciplinary proceeding. Furthermore, Halper held that
applying the double jeopardy bar to a typical civil sanction does
not "prevent the Government from seeking and obtaining both the
full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized
criminal penalties in the same proceeding." Halper, 490 U.S. at
450, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 503, 109 S. Ct. at 1903. In contrast, as a
practical matter, applying the prohibition against double jeopar-
dy to prison disciplinary proceedings would effectively compel
the government to choose between remedial goals--instituting a
disciplinary proceeding--and punitive goals--awaiting a criminal
prosecution. United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 104 (9th Cir.
1995); see Newby, 11 F.3d at 1145. Requiring the government to
make this choice cannot be what the double jeopardy clause
intended.
The government possesses the important remedial interest
of maintaining order and encouraging compliance with prison rules
"where good order and discipline are paramount because of the
concentration of convicted criminals." Newby, 11 F.3d at 1145.
To facilitate those remedial goals, prison administrators must
have the ability to discipline a prisoner who violates institu-
tional regulations. Garrity, 41 F.3d at 1153. Combining a
prison disciplinary proceeding with a criminal prosecution is not
feasible because preparation for the latter typically takes much
longer than for the former. If the proceedings were combined,
the resulting situation would leave the prisoner who violated
prison rules without a prompt resolution of the disciplinary
charges, thereby hindering prison administration. Garrity, 41 F.3d at 1153. In addition, the two proceedings serve different
goals: the prison disciplinary process determines whether the
defendant has violated the conditions of his incarceration and is
designed to maintain institutional security and order; the crimi-
nal prosecution is designed to punish the defendant for a viola-
tion of the State's criminal laws. Garrity, 41 F.3d at 1153.
In Halper, the Supreme Court stated that the "purposes
actually served by the sanction in question" are the key to
determining whether a particular civil sanction constitutes
"punishment." Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 n.7, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 501
n.7, 109 S. Ct. at 1901 n.7. Although punitive and remedial
interests are tightly intertwined in the prison setting, disci-
plinary sanctions such as the withholding of good-time credit and
disciplinary segregation are readily explained solely in remedial
terms. Brown, 59 F.3d at 105. Both serve the government's
remedial goals of maintaining institutional order and encouraging
compliance with prison rules. In considering what is necessary
and proper to preserve institutional order and discipline and to
encourage good conduct, we defer to the judgment of prison
authorities. The Supreme Court has instructed that the adoption
and execution of policies and practices necessary to preserve
internal order and discipline, and to maintain institutional
security in the prison are "'peculiarly within the province and
professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the
absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that
the officials have exaggerated their response[,] *** courts
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such mat-
ters.'" Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447,
474, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1878-79 (1979), quoting Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 827, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495, 504, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2806
(1974).
We recognize that disciplinary sanctions also have a
deterrent effect--good-time credits, for example, are granted to
reward good behavior and are conditioned upon continuing good
behavior. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 1994). Nevertheless, such
sanctions can still be explained as serving solely the govern-
ment's remedial purpose of maintaining institutional order --they
are designed to punish only insofar as they enable the government
to fulfill its remedial goals. See Brown, 59 F.3d at 105; United
States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802, 806 (2d Cir. 1995).
Thus, the mere fact that a sanction imposed by prison officials
has a punitive component does not mean that the it constitutes
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d at 806. We agree with the following observations of the
court in Newby:
"The disciplinary sanctions imposed in this
case are not so grossly disproportionate to the
remedial goal of maintaining order and disci-
pline in the prison so as to constitute a pun-
ishment within the meaning of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause as interpreted in Halper." Newby,
11 F.3d at 1146.
Thus, we reject defendant's contention that prison
disciplinary sanctions constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes. To the extent that defendant's argument depends on the
Supreme Court's definition of punishment in Halper and Austin, we
note in passing that this foundation of the argument collapsed
following the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v.
Ursery, 518 U.S. ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
2. Prison Disciplinary Sanctions Are Part of Original Sentence
Even if we were to assume that the sanctions of reducing
defendant's good-time credit and assigning disciplinary segrega-
tion were punitive, these sanctions constitute part of
defendant's punishment for his original conviction. Thus, they
do not bar defendant's criminal prosecution because any punish-
ment resulting from the criminal prosecution will not result in a
second punishment for the same conduct.
We first note that reducing a defendant's good-time
credit is analogous to revoking parole, because it changes the
conditions of a defendant's incarceration. Parole revocation
does not violate the double jeopardy clause (United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328, 346, 101 S. Ct. 426, 437 (1980); People v. Vahle, 60 Ill. App. 3d 391, 395, 376 N.E.2d 766, 769 (1978)) because parole and probation are part of
the original sentence (Brown, 59 F.3d at 104-05). Their continu-
ance is conditioned on compliance with stated conditions, and if
the defendant does not comply with those conditions, parole and
probation may be revoked. See 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7, 3-3-9, 5-6-3, 5-
6-4 (West 1994). Revocation of parole or probation is regarded
as reinstatement of the sentence or delayed sentencing for the
underlying crime, not as punishment for the conduct leading to
the revocation. Vahle, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 395, 376 N.E.2d at
769; Brown, 59 F.3d at 104. Revocation does not extend the
original sentence, but simply alters the conditions under which
the defendant serves it. Thus, the fact that the events which
lead to revocation may also constitute a second crime does not
mean the revocation itself is punishment for the second crime.
See Vahle, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 395-96, 376 N.E.2d at 769.
Similarly, compliance with conditions for awarding good-
time credit is one of the terms of the original sentence. See
720 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 1994) (providing that a prisoner's sen-
tence may be reduced by credit for good conduct). Withholding
such credits--even though it may have a punitive effect--does not
alter the original sentence; it only means the prisoner must
serve a larger part of that sentence in prison. Brown, 59 F.3d
at 105.
With regard to disciplinary segregation, changes in
conditions of incarceration do not constitute a second punishment
for the same offense. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 220
n.14, 70 L. Ed. 2d 345, 361 n.14, 102 S. Ct. 233, 245 n.14
(1981). "Confinement in any of the State's institutions is
within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction
has authorized the State to impose." See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451, 459, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2538 (1976)
(holding that a transfer between prisons generally does not
implicate the due process clause). Thus, changing the place or
conditions of defendant's confinement based upon an administra-
tive determination that his disruptive conduct required a more
structured environment--even if "punitive"--did not alter his
original sentence. Accordingly, such a change does not bar
criminal prosecution for that same disruptive conduct. Brown, 59 F.3d at 105.
B. Motion To Dismiss
Last, defendant argues that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss counts III and IV of the indict-
ment, asserting that the court should have denied the State's
motion to amend the counts to substitute defendant's name for
Curt Davis as the person charged. Defendant contends that the
misnomer was a substantial defect that resulted in substantial
injustice to him pursuant to section 114-1(a)(10) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114-1(a)(10) (West 1994)).
The State responds that the court's denial of defendant's motion
to dismiss those counts constitutes neither a final judgment nor
an appealable interlocutory order; thus, this court lacks juris-
diction to entertain the matter. We agree with the State.
Subject to certain exceptions, appellate courts are
without jurisdiction to review judgments, orders, or decrees
which are not final. See People v. Lamkey, 240 Ill. App. 3d 435,
440, 608 N.E.2d 406, 410 (1992). A trial court's ruling denying
a defendant's motion to dismiss criminal charges is not a final
order or judgment, nor is it an interlocutory order appealable as
a statutory exception. People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194, 199,
650 N.E.2d 1006, 1009 (1995); 145 Ill. 2d R. 604. Therefore,
however dubious defendant's argument may be, we cannot address
it because it is not properly before us in this appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
Affirmed.
McCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.