Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc.
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SECOND DIVISION
June 30, 2009
No. 1-04-1762
TERRY E. READY, Special Administrator of the
Estate of Michael P. Ready, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
UNITED/GOEDECKE SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant and Counterplaintiff
(BMW Constructors, Inc., and Midwest Generation
EME, L.L.C.,
Defendants;
Midwest Generation EME, L.L.C., BMW Constructors,
Inc., Midwest Generation L.L.C., Edison Mission
Energy Services, Inc.,
Counterdefendants).
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Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County
No. 00 L 4797
Honorable
Mary A. Mulhern, Judge
Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE KARNEZIS delivered the opinion of the court:
This cause has been remanded to this court for a ruling on whether defendant
United/Goedecke Services, Inc. (United), was deprived of presenting a sole proximate
cause defense. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
We note that the facts in this case are fully set forth in the supreme court's
modified opinion, so we briefly set forth only those facts relevant to the issue on
remand.1 Plaintiff, Terry E. Ready, special administrator of the estate of Michael P.
Ready (Ready), sued defendants United/Goedecke Services, Inc., BMW Constructors,
Inc. (BMW), and Midwest Generation EME, L.L.C. (Midwest), as a result of an accident
1
See Ready v. United Goedecke Services, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d 369 (2009).
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in which Ready was killed. Ready's accident occurred at Midwest's factory in Joliet,
Illinois. Ready was a mechanic employed by Midwest Generation, L.L.C., whose parent
company was defendant Midwest. Ready was working on a pipe-refitting-project at the
factory. As part of the project, scaffolding material had to be raised from the ground
floor to the eighth floor, where a scaffold would be assembled so that the pipe-refitting
work could be performed. Midwest hired BMW as the general contractor for the project
and BMW hired United as the scaffolding subcontractor to erect the scaffolding. Ready
was killed when one of the beams that was to be used for scaffolding fell eight stories
and struck him.
Plaintiff settled her claims prior to trial with defendants Midwest and BMW.
United did not object to the settlements and the circuit court found they were made in
good faith. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $14,230,000. It
assessed Ready's contributory negligence at 35%, which reduced the judgment to
$9,250,000. The circuit court allowed a setoff of approximately $1,112,502, which was
the total amount paid to plaintiff by the settling defendants.
On remand, we address United's contention that it was deprived of a sole
proximate cause defense when the circuit court excluded evidence of the conduct of
defendants Midwest and BMW, and also refused United's jury instruction on sole
proximate cause.2
2
We note that the supreme court's opinion framed the issue that we should
address on remand as "United's concern that it was deprived of a sole proximate cause
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Conduct of Settling Defendants
Prior to trial, plaintiff filed several motions in limine seeking to bar the introduction
of any evidence at trial relating to the conduct of Midwest and BMW. The circuit court
granted the motions, finding that any evidence relating to Midwest and BMW was
irrelevant because they had settled with plaintiff prior to trial.
The trial court's ruling on evidentiary motions such as motions in limine are left to
the court's discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that
discretion. In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 460 (2008).
Our supreme court's recent opinion in Nolan v. Weil-McLain, No. 103137 (April
16, 2009), is instructive. In Nolan, the plaintiff sued numerous corporations alleging
that the decedent developed an asbestos-related disease after being negligently
exposed to the defendants' asbestos-containing products during his 38-year career. All
the defendants except Weil-McLain settled with plaintiff prior to trial. Weil-McLain filed
a motion in limine to present evidence at trial that the sole proximate cause of the
defense when the trial court refused its request for an instruction on sole proximate
cause." Ready, 232 Ill. 2d at 385. After reviewing the briefs submitted to this court in
the original appeal, it is abundantly clear that United's sole proximate cause defense
argument had two components: the circuit court's exclusion of evidence regarding the
conduct of the settling defendants, and the circuit court's refusal to instruct the jury on
sole proximate cause. Therefore, we address both of United's arguments regarding
their sole proximate cause defense.
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decedent's death was his exposure to asbestos-containing products of nonparty
entities. The trial court denied the motion, barring Weil-McLain from introducing
evidence of decedent's other asbestos exposures. The supreme court reversed and
remanded for a new trial, holding that Weil-McLain should have been permitted to
present evidence to establish that the conduct of another entity was the sole proximate
cause of the decedent's injury. Nolan, slip op. at 22. The court found that it was error
to exclude the evidence when proximate cause was disputed and the defendant
pursued a sole proximate cause defense, following its prior decision in Leondardi v.
Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1995). Nolan, slip op. at 19. The court
additionally noted that there was no special exception for certain types of tort cases,
such as medical malpractice or asbestos-injury cases, and that the general principles of
tort law set forth in those cases were universally applicable to all tort actions. Nolan,
slip op. at 21.
In Leonardi, the plaintiff's decedent suffered irreversible brain damage shortly
after giving birth and died several years later. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the
hospital where she received treatment and against several physicians. The plaintiff
settled with one defendant, Dr. Tierney, prior to trial and he was dismissed from the
suit. Before trial, the plaintiff filed a motion in limine seeking to bar evidence regarding
the alleged negligence of any person other than the named defendants. The trial court
denied the motion and at trial allowed the defendants to question several witnesses
regarding Dr. Tierney's duties and responsibilities as decedent's attending physician.
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The jury returned a verdict for defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the
court's denial of its motion in limine was erroneous because evidence of Dr. Tierney's
conduct was irrelevant and, therefore inadmissible. The supreme court found the trial
court's order proper because the defense theory at trial was that Dr. Tierney was the
sole proximate cause of decedent's injuries and the defendants denied that they were
even partly a proximate cause of the decedent's injuries. Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 93.
The court further stated that "an answer which denies that an injury was the result of or
caused by the defendant's conduct is sufficient to permit the defendant in support of his
position to present evidence that the injury was the result of another cause." Leonardi,
168 Ill. 2d at 94. The court also stated that the sole proximate cause defense merely
focuses the attention of a properly instructed jury on the plaintiff's duty to prove that the
defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d
at 94.
Here, pursuant to the supreme court's decisions in Nolan and Leonardi, we find
that the circuit court should not have excluded evidence of Midwest and BMW's
conduct. It was an abuse of discretion for the court to grant plaintiff's motions in limine
as to that issue. As the court stated in Leonardi, an answer that is a general denial that
an injury was the result of or caused by the defendant's conduct is sufficient to permit
the defendant, in support of its position, to present evidence that the injury was the
result of another cause. United's denial of liability was sufficient to permit it to present
evidence that Ready's death was the result of another entity's conduct.
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Further, we find that the error was not harmless. United notes in its brief that if it
had been able to present evidence of Midwest and BMW's conduct, then the jury could
have ultimately found in favor of United. With respect to Midwest's conduct, United
notes that the evidence would have shown that Midwest was in charge of operating the
tugger and deciding how the signaling would be done. The jury could have also heard
that Midwest's workers failed to barricade off the tugger bay where Ready was struck by
the beam. With respect to BMW's conduct, United notes that the evidence would have
shown that BMW should have provided a crane to lift the beams outside the factory as
required by the contract and discussed in the pre-bid meeting. We agree that had the
jury heard the "whole story," its verdict may have been different.
Because we have determined that a new trial is in order, we need not address
United's contention that the circuit court erred when it refused United's jury instruction
on sole proximate cause. Nevertheless, to the extent that this issue may again occur
on retrial, we direct the circuit court that a determination regarding the instruction given
will depend upon the evidence adduced at retrial. See Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 100 (a
litigant has the right to have the jury clearly and fairly instructed upon each theory that
was supported by the evidence).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand the cause for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
HOFFMAN, and THEIS, J.J., concur.
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REPORTER OF DECISIONS - ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT
TERRY E. READY, Special Administrator of the Estate of Michael P. Ready, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
UNITED/GOEDECKE SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant and Counterplaintiff,
(BMW Constructors, Inc., and Midwest Generation EME, L.L.C.,
Defendants;
Midwest Generation EME, L.L.C., BMW Constructors, Inc., Midwest Generation L.L.C.,
Edison Mission Energy Services, Inc.,
Counterdefendants).
No. 1-04-1762
Appellate Court of Illinois
First District, Second Division
June 30, 2009
PRESIDING JUSTICE KARNEZIS delivered the opinion of the court.
HOFFMAN, and THEIS, J.J., concur.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
The Honorable Mary A. Mulhern, Judge Presiding.
For APPELLEE, Power Rogers & Smith, P.C. (Joseph A. Power, Jr., Devon C. Bruce,
of counsel)
For APPELLANT United/Goedecke Services, Inc., Clausen Miller, P.C. (Appellate
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Counsel) (Edward M. Kay, Barbara I. Michaelides, Paula M. Carstensen, Paul V.
Esposito, of counsel)
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