In re J. G.
Annotate this Case
FOURTH DIVISION
MARCH 19, 1998
No. 1--97--3480
In Re J.G., a Minor,
(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
J.G.,
Respondent-Appellant). )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County
No. 96--JD--13911
Honorable
Stuart Lubin,
Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE CERDA delivered the opinion of the court:
Respondent, J.G., was found delinquent after being found
guilty of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a)(West 1996)) for
shooting two people with a pellet gun. He was given one years'
probation, 30 days in the Juvenile Detention Center, and 20 hours
of community service. He was also ordered to have no contact
with the victims. Almost nine months later, the juvenile court
added as a condition of probation that J.G. not enter the Village
of Skokie, Illinois. On appeal, J.G. asserts that his banishment
from Skokie was improper as a condition of his probation because
it was not related to his criminal acts or to the victims.
At the hearing on J.G.'s motion to vacate the banishment
order, Probation Officer Donnelly testified that he wanted J.G.
to be barred from Skokie because his girlfriend lived there and
her parents did not want J.G. around their daughter. Donnelly
admitted that the delinquent acts for which J.G. was put on
probation did not occur in Skokie and the victims had no
connection to Skokie.
Following argument, the juvenile court denied the motion to
vacate the order, ruling that it was in J.G.'s best interest not
to be in Skokie since he had no residential or academic
connection to the Village.
Before addressing the merits of the case, we must decide
whether this appeal is moot since J.G.'s probation terminated on
December 5, 1997. A matter is moot when the issues involved in
the trial court no longer exist because intervening events have
rendered it impossible for the reviewing court to grant the
complaining party effectual relief. Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 511, 680 N.E.2d 1372 (1997). However, there is an
exception to the mootness doctrine that allows a court to resolve
an otherwise moot issue if the issue involves a substantial
public interest. Bonaguro v. Co. Officers Elct. Bd., 158 Ill. 2d 391, 395, 634 N.E.2d 712 (1994). The criteria for applying the
public interest exception are: (1) the public nature of the
question; (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination
for the purpose of guiding public officers; and (3) the
likelihood that the question will recur. Bonaguro, 158 Ill. 2d
at 395. Applying those criteria to this case, we find that the
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applies.
On the merits, J.G. asserts that the juvenile court erred
when it barred him from Skokie because that order had no nexus to
his probation, his delinquent actions, or the victims, but was
designed only to prevent him from seeing his girlfriend.
In response, the State argues that the juvenile court acted
within its discretion when it ordered J.G. to stay out of Skokie
because the statute expressly allows that action. The State
further maintains that, even if the condition were not expressly
stated in the statute, the condition must only be reasonable, not
reasonably related to the crime.
This is a case of first impression as it relates to minors.
Section 5-24 of the Juvenile Court Act sets forth 23 separate
conditions that the trial court may impose as conditions of
juvenile probation, including section 5-24(2)(r), which provides
as follows:
"(2) The court may as a condition of probation or of
conditional discharge require that the minor:
* * * *
(r) refrain from entering into a designated
geographic area except upon terms as the court finds
appropriate. The terms may include consideration of
the purpose of the entry, the time of day, other
persons accompanying the minor, and advance approval by
a probation officer, if the minor has been placed on
probation, or advance approval by the court, if the
minor has been placed on conditional discharge" 705
ILCS 405/5-24(2)(r),(t)(West 1996).
In addition to the above statute, it is well established
that the main purpose of the Act is not to punish, but to correct
and to rehabilitate. In re B.S., 192 Ill. App. 3d 886, 891, 549 N.E.2d 695 (1989). Delinquency proceedings are protective rather
than punitive in nature. In re J.C., 260 Ill. App. 3d 872, 885,
632 N.E.2d 127 (1994). Therefore, the Act should be construed in
a way that authorizes the reasonable exercise of the juvenile
court's discretion to achieve those goals. In re M.D., 220 Ill.
App. 3d 998, 1002, 581 N.E.2d 383 (1991). Absent an abuse of
discretion, the trial court's determination will not be reversed
by this court. In re S.M., 229 Ill. App. 3d 764, 768-69, 594 N.E.2d 410 (1992).
Uniting the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act with the Act's
probation provisions, we conclude that the conditions of juvenile
probation must be reasonably related to the juvenile's
rehabilitation. That approach is narrower than the conditions of
adult probation, which is codified in section 5--6--3 of the
Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/5--6--3 (West 1996).
The overall intent of section 5--6--3 is to aid the defendant in
rehabilitation and to avoid future crimes. People v. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372, 680 N.E.2d 315 (1997). Probation simultaneously
serves as punishment and rehabilitation. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372.
Protection of the public from the type of conduct that led to a
defendant's conviction is one of the goals of probation. Meyer,
176 Ill. 2d 372.
Although adult offenders and juveniles adjudicated
delinquent need not be treated similarly since they are not
similarly situated and the Juvenile Court Act offers unique
benefits to juvenile offenders that are not available to adult
offenders (In re B.S., 192 Ill. App. 3d at 893), there are
certain principles that relate to both adult offenders and
juveniles found to be delinquent. To be reasonable, a condition
of probation must not be overly broad when viewed in the light of
the desired goal or the means to that end. People v. Harris, 238
Ill. App. 3d 575, 581, 606 N.E.2d 392 (1992). In evaluating
whether a probationer's rights should be restricted, courts
determine whether (1) the condition of probation reasonably
relates to the intended purpose of the legislation, to foster
rehabilitation; (2) the value to the public of the imposition of
this condition manifestly outweighs any impairment of a
probationer's constitutional rights; and (3) there are any
alternative means that are less subversive to the probationer's
constitutional rights that would still comport with the purposes
of the legislation conferring the benefit of probation. Harris,
238 Ill. App. 3d at 581.
There are no cases in Illinois that involve barring a
juvenile from a certain geographic area as a condition of
probation. However, there are two cases that involve adult
probationers being barred from certain geographical areas as a
condition of probation. See People v. Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d
575, 606 N.E.2d 392 (1992), People v. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d
456, 542 N.E.2d 1253 (1989). Also helpful is People v. Meyer,
176 Ill. 2d 372, 680 N.E.2d 315 (1997), and People v. Ferrell,
277 Ill. App. 3d 74, 79, 659 N.E.2d 992 (1995).
Given the statutes, the cases, and the purpose of juvenile
probation, we find that any condition of juvenile probation must
be reasonably related to the juvenile's rehabilitation. In some
cases, this may also include being reasonably related to the
crime. Examples of express conditions that are related to
rehabilitation, but not to the crime, are requiring a juvenile to
work or pursue a course of study or vocational training, to
undergo medical or psychiatric treatment, to attend or reside in
a facility established for the instruction of persons on
probation, to support any dependents he or she may have, to
reside with his or her parents or in a foster home, to attend
school, or to attend a non-residential program for youth. 705
ILCS 405/5-24(2)(West 1996).
Not only did the banishment condition in this case have
nothing to do with J.G.'s delinquent acts or rehabilitation, the
victims were not associated with Skokie. Other than the
probation officer's statement that J.G's girlfriend lived in
Skokie and her parents wanted to keep J.G. away from their
daughter, there was no explanation for the additional condition.
There was no evidence that J.G. had harmed or threatened to harm
his girlfriend or her parents; or had committed any delinquent
acts in Skokie. Not only is this condition not reasonably
related to J.G.'s rehabilitation, but there is no evidence that
this condition is reasonably related to the crime. Therefore,
the condition is not reasonable and was an abuse of discretion.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court's
judgment and vacate the condition of probation.
Reversed and vacated.
Wolfson, J., and South, J., concur.
MARCH 19, 1998
No. 1--97--3480
In Re J.G., a Minor,
(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
J.G.,
Respondent-Appellant). )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County
No. 96--JD--13911
Honorable
Stuart Lubin,
Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE CERDA delivered the opinion of the court:
Respondent, J.G., was found delinquent after being found
guilty of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a)(West 1996)) for
shooting two people with a pellet gun. He was given one years'
probation, 30 days in the Juvenile Detention Center, and 20 hours
of community service. He was also ordered to have no contact
with the victims. Almost nine months later, the juvenile court
added as a condition of probation that J.G. not enter the Village
of Skokie, Illinois. On appeal, J.G. asserts that his banishment
from Skokie was improper as a condition of his probation because
it was not related to his criminal acts or to the victims.
At the hearing on J.G.'s motion to vacate the banishment
order, Probation Officer Donnelly testified that he wanted J.G.
to be barred from Skokie because his girlfriend lived there and
her parents did not want J.G. around their daughter. Donnelly
admitted that the delinquent acts for which J.G. was put on
probation did not occur in Skokie and the victims had no
connection to Skokie.
Following argument, the juvenile court denied the motion to
vacate the order, ruling that it was in J.G.'s best interest not
to be in Skokie since he had no residential or academic
connection to the Village.
Before addressing the merits of the case, we must decide
whether this appeal is moot since J.G.'s probation terminated on
December 5, 1997. A matter is moot when the issues involved in
the trial court no longer exist because intervening events have
rendered it impossible for the reviewing court to grant the
complaining party effectual relief. Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 511, 680 N.E.2d 1372 (1997). However, there is an
exception to the mootness doctrine that allows a court to resolve
an otherwise moot issue if the issue involves a substantial
public interest. Bonaguro v. Co. Officers Elct. Bd., 158 Ill. 2d 391, 395, 634 N.E.2d 712 (1994). The criteria for applying the
public interest exception are: (1) the public nature of the
question; (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination
for the purpose of guiding public officers; and (3) the
likelihood that the question will recur. Bonaguro, 158 Ill. 2d
at 395. Applying those criteria to this case, we find that the
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applies.
On the merits, J.G. asserts that the juvenile court erred
when it barred him from Skokie because that order had no nexus to
his probation, his delinquent actions, or the victims, but was
designed only to prevent him from seeing his girlfriend.
In response, the State argues that the juvenile court acted
within its discretion when it ordered J.G. to stay out of Skokie
because the statute expressly allows that action. The State
further maintains that, even if the condition were not expressly
stated in the statute, the condition must only be reasonable, not
reasonably related to the crime.
This is a case of first impression as it relates to minors.
Section 5-24 of the Juvenile Court Act sets forth 23 separate
conditions that the trial court may impose as conditions of
juvenile probation, including section 5-24(2)(r), which provides
as follows:
"(2) The court may as a condition of probation or of
conditional discharge require that the minor:
* * * *
(r) refrain from entering into a designated
geographic area except upon terms as the court finds
appropriate. The terms may include consideration of
the purpose of the entry, the time of day, other
persons accompanying the minor, and advance approval by
a probation officer, if the minor has been placed on
probation, or advance approval by the court, if the
minor has been placed on conditional discharge" 705
ILCS 405/5-24(2)(r),(t)(West 1996).
In addition to the above statute, it is well established
that the main purpose of the Act is not to punish, but to correct
and to rehabilitate. In re B.S., 192 Ill. App. 3d 886, 891, 549 N.E.2d 695 (1989). Delinquency proceedings are protective rather
than punitive in nature. In re J.C., 260 Ill. App. 3d 872, 885,
632 N.E.2d 127 (1994). Therefore, the Act should be construed in
a way that authorizes the reasonable exercise of the juvenile
court's discretion to achieve those goals. In re M.D., 220 Ill.
App. 3d 998, 1002, 581 N.E.2d 383 (1991). Absent an abuse of
discretion, the trial court's determination will not be reversed
by this court. In re S.M., 229 Ill. App. 3d 764, 768-69, 594 N.E.2d 410 (1992).
Uniting the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act with the Act's
probation provisions, we conclude that the conditions of juvenile
probation must be reasonably related to the juvenile's
rehabilitation. That approach is narrower than the conditions of
adult probation, which is codified in section 5--6--3 of the
Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/5--6--3 (West 1996).
The overall intent of section 5--6--3 is to aid the defendant in
rehabilitation and to avoid future crimes. People v. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372, 680 N.E.2d 315 (1997). Probation simultaneously
serves as punishment and rehabilitation. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372.
Protection of the public from the type of conduct that led to a
defendant's conviction is one of the goals of probation. Meyer,
176 Ill. 2d 372.
Although adult offenders and juveniles adjudicated
delinquent need not be treated similarly since they are not
similarly situated and the Juvenile Court Act offers unique
benefits to juvenile offenders that are not available to adult
offenders (In re B.S., 192 Ill. App. 3d at 893), there are
certain principles that relate to both adult offenders and
juveniles found to be delinquent. To be reasonable, a condition
of probation must not be overly broad when viewed in the light of
the desired goal or the means to that end. People v. Harris, 238
Ill. App. 3d 575, 581, 606 N.E.2d 392 (1992). In evaluating
whether a probationer's rights should be restricted, courts
determine whether (1) the condition of probation reasonably
relates to the intended purpose of the legislation, to foster
rehabilitation; (2) the value to the public of the imposition of
this condition manifestly outweighs any impairment of a
probationer's constitutional rights; and (3) there are any
alternative means that are less subversive to the probationer's
constitutional rights that would still comport with the purposes
of the legislation conferring the benefit of probation. Harris,
238 Ill. App. 3d at 581.
There are no cases in Illinois that involve barring a
juvenile from a certain geographic area as a condition of
probation. However, there are two cases that involve adult
probationers being barred from certain geographical areas as a
condition of probation. See People v. Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d
575, 606 N.E.2d 392 (1992), People v. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d
456, 542 N.E.2d 1253 (1989). Also helpful is People v. Meyer,
176 Ill. 2d 372, 680 N.E.2d 315 (1997), and People v. Ferrell,
277 Ill. App. 3d 74, 79, 659 N.E.2d 992 (1995).
Given the statutes, the cases, and the purpose of juvenile
probation, we find that any condition of juvenile probation must
be reasonably related to the juvenile's rehabilitation. In some
cases, this may also include being reasonably related to the
crime. Examples of express conditions that are related to
rehabilitation, but not to the crime, are requiring a juvenile to
work or pursue a course of study or vocational training, to
undergo medical or psychiatric treatment, to attend or reside in
a facility established for the instruction of persons on
probation, to support any dependents he or she may have, to
reside with his or her parents or in a foster home, to attend
school, or to attend a non-residential program for youth. 705
ILCS 405/5-24(2)(West 1996).
Not only did the banishment condition in this case have
nothing to do with J.G.'s delinquent acts or rehabilitation, the
victims were not associated with Skokie. Other than the
probation officer's statement that J.G's girlfriend lived in
Skokie and her parents wanted to keep J.G. away from their
daughter, there was no explanation for the additional condition.
There was no evidence that J.G. had harmed or threatened to harm
his girlfriend or her parents; or had committed any delinquent
acts in Skokie. Not only is this condition not reasonably
related to J.G.'s rehabilitation, but there is no evidence that
this condition is reasonably related to the crime. Therefore,
the condition is not reasonable and was an abuse of discretion.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court's
judgment and vacate the condition of probation.
Reversed and vacated.
Wolfson, J., and South, J., concur.
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