People v. Wells
Annotate this Case
SIXTH DIVISION
January 16, 1998
No. 1-96-3814
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MAURICE WELLS,
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County
Honorable
Thomas Fitzgerald,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the court:
In March of 1978, defendant, Maurice Wells, was indicted on
charges of murder and attempt murder. Following a bench trial,
defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity, and defendant
was involuntarily committed to the Illinois Department of Mental
Health. On March 16, 1984, defendant was conditionally released
from the department and placed in outpatient treatment. On
December 14, 1990, defendant was unconditionally released. On
September 19, 1995, defendant filed a petition for expungement of
his arrest records in the present cause pursuant to section 2630/5
of the Criminal Identification Act. 20 ILCS 2630/5 (West 1994).
The State objected to the petition. On September 24, 1996, the
trial court held a hearing and denied defendant's petition.
Defendant now appeals. Jurisdiction is vested in this court
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603).
The issue of whether a defendant found not guilty by reason of
insanity ("NGRI") is eligible for expungement of his or her arrest
records has not been previously addressed in Illinois.
Accordingly, we turn to the statute authorizing expungement to
determine whether such a remedy is available to defendant.
The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and
give effect to the intention of the legislature. People v. Britz,
174 Ill. 2d 163, 196, 673 N.E.2d 300 (1996), citing Bonaguro v.
County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397, 634 N.E.2d 712 (1994). To determine the legislative intent, "a court must
look first to the language of the statute and interpret that
language in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning."
People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 222, 673 N.E.2d 318 (1996).
When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts
may not read exceptions, limitations or conditions into the
statute that the legislature did not express. People v. Woodward,
175 Ill. 2d 435, 443, 677 N.E.2d 935 (1997). Further, criminal
statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused.
Woodward, 175 Ill. 2d at 444.
Section 2630/5 of the Criminal Identification Act ("Act")
provides that:
"Whenever an adult or minor prosecuted as an adult, not
having previously been convicted of any criminal offense
or municipal ordinance violation, charged with a
violation of a municipal ordinance or a felony or a
misdemeanor, is acquitted or released without being
convicted * * * the Chief Judge of the circuit wherein
the charge was brought * * * may upon verified petition
of the defendant order the record of arrest expunged from
the official records * * *." 20 ILCS 2630/5(a) (West
1994).
The expungement statute does not specifically provide relief for
defendants found NGRI. However, we find that defendants found NGRI
are eligible for relief under section 2630/5 of the Act.
In order to be eligible for expungement of arrest records, a
defendant must either be acquitted or released without a
conviction. The United States Supreme Court has held that, "[a]
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts:
(i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal
offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness."
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694, 705,
103 S. Ct. 3043, 3049 (1983). The statute in Illinois on insanity
provides that:
"When the defense of insanity has been presented during
the trial, the burden of proof is on the defendant to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
is not guilty by reason of insanity. However, the burden
of proof remains on the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the elements of each of the
offenses charged * * *." 720 ILCS 5/6-2(e) (West 1994).
We first note that a defendant found NGRI is not acquitted of the
crime charged because the State must prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the elements of each of the
offenses charged before a defendant may be found NGRI. 720 ILCS
5/6-2(e) (West 1994). However, a defendant found NGRI, upon
completion of his or her treatment, may be characterized as having
been released without a conviction. Indeed, a person found NGRI is
relieved of criminal responsibility due to a mental disease or
mental defect. 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 1994). Accordingly,
individuals found NGRI fall within the scope of the statute on
expungement. Given that we find that defendant is eligible to have
his arrest records expunged, we next turn to defendant's first
argument on appeal: whether the trial court abused its discretion
in denying defendant's petition for expungement.
In the present case, the trial court issued the following
ruling on defendant's petition for expungement:
I have considered the petition. There is certainly
arguments to be made on behalf of the petitioner, at
least based upon the record before the court, he's lived
a blameless life since this occurrence; nevertheless I
think whenever an expungement is ordered, I might note
that not every situation, in not every situation is an
expungement available simply because a person has been
acquitted or has had the conviction set aside.
I believe the balance that is always required in
this instance is to balance the right of the public, the
public's right and desire to remain safe against the
individual needs of the defendant.
In this instance the defendant's -- [sic] nature of
the defendant's acquittal was that he committed the acts
that constituted the offense but was not legally
responsible for them because of a then existing mental
condition, the active question was one of taking another
human being's life.
Weighing and balancing the conflicting interests in
this case, I would come down on the side of the
respondent prosecution, and petition to expunge will
therefore be denied.
Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in reading a public
safety exception into the expungement statute. We disagree.
Initially, we note that under the expungement statute, a trial
court is not required to hold a hearing. 20 ILCS 2630/5(a) (West
1994). Further, the statute on expungement is discretionary in
nature. Such a conclusion is mandated by the plain language of the
statute which provides that the trial court may upon verified
petition of the defendant order the record of arrest expunged from
the official records. 20 ILCS 2630/5(a) (West 1994). See People
v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393, 686 N.E.2d 584 (1997) (legislative
use of the word "may" is generally regarded as indicating a
permissive or directory reading, whereas use of the word "shall" is
generally considered to express a mandatory reading). The trial
court is not required to grant an individual found NGRI relief
under the statute. Rather, the trial court may exercise discretion
in reaching its decision.
Given that we find that the decision of whether to grant a
petition to expunge is discretionary in nature, we now turn to what
factors are appropriate for consideration when ruling on a
petition. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has proved to be
instructive on this issue.
In Commonwealth v. W.P., 417 Pa. Super. 192, 612 A.2d 438
(1992), the defendant filed a petition for expungement of his
criminal record after having been found not guilty by reason of
insanity of the offenses of aggravated assault, simple assault,
possession of an instrument of crime, possession of an instrument
of crime with a weapon and recklessly endangering another person.
Upon reviewing the trial court's denial of the petition, the
superior court noted that in order for expungement to be granted,
a court must be satisfied that the individual's interest in being
free from the criminal record outweighs the State's interest in
retaining it. W.P., 612 A.2d at 441. The court then identified
the following factors which should be considered when evaluating a
petition to expunge: the strength of the State's case against the
petitioner, the State's reasons for wishing to retain the records,
the petitioner's age, criminal record, and employment history, the
length of time that has elapsed between the arrest and the petition
to expunge, and the specific adverse consequences the petitioner
may endure should expungement be denied. W.P., 612 A.2d at 441.
The court then noted that this list of factors is not exhaustive,
and that each case should be addressed on an individual basis.
W.P., 612 A.2d at 441.
We adopt the approach established by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania when addressing petitions for expungement by
defendants found NGRI. Upon applying the factors set forth in In
Commonwealth v. W.P. to the present cause, we find that the State's
interest in retaining defendant's criminal records outweighs
defendant's interest in having the records expunged. Initially, we
note that the trial court's consideration of the public's safety
was entirely appropriate. As discussed above, the list of factors
set forth above is not exhaustive, and each petition to expunge
should be considered on an individual basis.
Further, in the present cause, defendant was found NGRI of two
charges of murder and one charge of attempt murder. While
defendant's motion in support of his petition to expunge reflects
that defendant has lived a crime-free life since 1977 when the
murders in question occurred, that defendant was 60 years old at
the time of petition, and that defendant received a masters degree
in education, we find that the State's interest in maintaining the
arrest records of an individual found NGRI of a double murder and
an attempt murder outweighs defendant's interest. Accordingly, the
denial of defendant's petition to expunge is affirmed.
Defendant also maintains that his constitutional rights to due
process, equal protection, and privacy were violated by the trial
court's denial of his petition to expunge. We find each of these
arguments unavailing.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the decision of the
circuit county of Cook County.
Affirmed.
GREIMAN, P.J., and THEIS, J. concur.
January 16, 1998
No. 1-96-3814
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MAURICE WELLS,
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County
Honorable
Thomas Fitzgerald,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the court:
In March of 1978, defendant, Maurice Wells, was indicted on
charges of murder and attempt murder. Following a bench trial,
defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity, and defendant
was involuntarily committed to the Illinois Department of Mental
Health. On March 16, 1984, defendant was conditionally released
from the department and placed in outpatient treatment. On
December 14, 1990, defendant was unconditionally released. On
September 19, 1995, defendant filed a petition for expungement of
his arrest records in the present cause pursuant to section 2630/5
of the Criminal Identification Act. 20 ILCS 2630/5 (West 1994).
The State objected to the petition. On September 24, 1996, the
trial court held a hearing and denied defendant's petition.
Defendant now appeals. Jurisdiction is vested in this court
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603).
The issue of whether a defendant found not guilty by reason of
insanity ("NGRI") is eligible for expungement of his or her arrest
records has not been previously addressed in Illinois.
Accordingly, we turn to the statute authorizing expungement to
determine whether such a remedy is available to defendant.
The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and
give effect to the intention of the legislature. People v. Britz,
174 Ill. 2d 163, 196, 673 N.E.2d 300 (1996), citing Bonaguro v.
County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397, 634 N.E.2d 712 (1994). To determine the legislative intent, "a court must
look first to the language of the statute and interpret that
language in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning."
People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 222, 673 N.E.2d 318 (1996).
When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts
may not read exceptions, limitations or conditions into the
statute that the legislature did not express. People v. Woodward,
175 Ill. 2d 435, 443, 677 N.E.2d 935 (1997). Further, criminal
statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused.
Woodward, 175 Ill. 2d at 444.
Section 2630/5 of the Criminal Identification Act ("Act")
provides that:
"Whenever an adult or minor prosecuted as an adult, not
having previously been convicted of any criminal offense
or municipal ordinance violation, charged with a
violation of a municipal ordinance or a felony or a
misdemeanor, is acquitted or released without being
convicted * * * the Chief Judge of the circuit wherein
the charge was brought * * * may upon verified petition
of the defendant order the record of arrest expunged from
the official records * * *." 20 ILCS 2630/5(a) (West
1994).
The expungement statute does not specifically provide relief for
defendants found NGRI. However, we find that defendants found NGRI
are eligible for relief under section 2630/5 of the Act.
In order to be eligible for expungement of arrest records, a
defendant must either be acquitted or released without a
conviction. The United States Supreme Court has held that, "[a]
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts:
(i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal
offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness."
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694, 705,
103 S. Ct. 3043, 3049 (1983). The statute in Illinois on insanity
provides that:
"When the defense of insanity has been presented during
the trial, the burden of proof is on the defendant to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
is not guilty by reason of insanity. However, the burden
of proof remains on the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the elements of each of the
offenses charged * * *." 720 ILCS 5/6-2(e) (West 1994).
We first note that a defendant found NGRI is not acquitted of the
crime charged because the State must prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the elements of each of the
offenses charged before a defendant may be found NGRI. 720 ILCS
5/6-2(e) (West 1994). However, a defendant found NGRI, upon
completion of his or her treatment, may be characterized as having
been released without a conviction. Indeed, a person found NGRI is
relieved of criminal responsibility due to a mental disease or
mental defect. 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 1994). Accordingly,
individuals found NGRI fall within the scope of the statute on
expungement. Given that we find that defendant is eligible to have
his arrest records expunged, we next turn to defendant's first
argument on appeal: whether the trial court abused its discretion
in denying defendant's petition for expungement.
In the present case, the trial court issued the following
ruling on defendant's petition for expungement:
I have considered the petition. There is certainly
arguments to be made on behalf of the petitioner, at
least based upon the record before the court, he's lived
a blameless life since this occurrence; nevertheless I
think whenever an expungement is ordered, I might note
that not every situation, in not every situation is an
expungement available simply because a person has been
acquitted or has had the conviction set aside.
I believe the balance that is always required in
this instance is to balance the right of the public, the
public's right and desire to remain safe against the
individual needs of the defendant.
In this instance the defendant's -- [sic] nature of
the defendant's acquittal was that he committed the acts
that constituted the offense but was not legally
responsible for them because of a then existing mental
condition, the active question was one of taking another
human being's life.
Weighing and balancing the conflicting interests in
this case, I would come down on the side of the
respondent prosecution, and petition to expunge will
therefore be denied.
Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in reading a public
safety exception into the expungement statute. We disagree.
Initially, we note that under the expungement statute, a trial
court is not required to hold a hearing. 20 ILCS 2630/5(a) (West
1994). Further, the statute on expungement is discretionary in
nature. Such a conclusion is mandated by the plain language of the
statute which provides that the trial court may upon verified
petition of the defendant order the record of arrest expunged from
the official records. 20 ILCS 2630/5(a) (West 1994). See People
v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393, 686 N.E.2d 584 (1997) (legislative
use of the word "may" is generally regarded as indicating a
permissive or directory reading, whereas use of the word "shall" is
generally considered to express a mandatory reading). The trial
court is not required to grant an individual found NGRI relief
under the statute. Rather, the trial court may exercise discretion
in reaching its decision.
Given that we find that the decision of whether to grant a
petition to expunge is discretionary in nature, we now turn to what
factors are appropriate for consideration when ruling on a
petition. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has proved to be
instructive on this issue.
In Commonwealth v. W.P., 417 Pa. Super. 192, 612 A.2d 438
(1992), the defendant filed a petition for expungement of his
criminal record after having been found not guilty by reason of
insanity of the offenses of aggravated assault, simple assault,
possession of an instrument of crime, possession of an instrument
of crime with a weapon and recklessly endangering another person.
Upon reviewing the trial court's denial of the petition, the
superior court noted that in order for expungement to be granted,
a court must be satisfied that the individual's interest in being
free from the criminal record outweighs the State's interest in
retaining it. W.P., 612 A.2d at 441. The court then identified
the following factors which should be considered when evaluating a
petition to expunge: the strength of the State's case against the
petitioner, the State's reasons for wishing to retain the records,
the petitioner's age, criminal record, and employment history, the
length of time that has elapsed between the arrest and the petition
to expunge, and the specific adverse consequences the petitioner
may endure should expungement be denied. W.P., 612 A.2d at 441.
The court then noted that this list of factors is not exhaustive,
and that each case should be addressed on an individual basis.
W.P., 612 A.2d at 441.
We adopt the approach established by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania when addressing petitions for expungement by
defendants found NGRI. Upon applying the factors set forth in In
Commonwealth v. W.P. to the present cause, we find that the State's
interest in retaining defendant's criminal records outweighs
defendant's interest in having the records expunged. Initially, we
note that the trial court's consideration of the public's safety
was entirely appropriate. As discussed above, the list of factors
set forth above is not exhaustive, and each petition to expunge
should be considered on an individual basis.
Further, in the present cause, defendant was found NGRI of two
charges of murder and one charge of attempt murder. While
defendant's motion in support of his petition to expunge reflects
that defendant has lived a crime-free life since 1977 when the
murders in question occurred, that defendant was 60 years old at
the time of petition, and that defendant received a masters degree
in education, we find that the State's interest in maintaining the
arrest records of an individual found NGRI of a double murder and
an attempt murder outweighs defendant's interest. Accordingly, the
denial of defendant's petition to expunge is affirmed.
Defendant also maintains that his constitutional rights to due
process, equal protection, and privacy were violated by the trial
court's denial of his petition to expunge. We find each of these
arguments unavailing.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the decision of the
circuit county of Cook County.
Affirmed.
GREIMAN, P.J., and THEIS, J. concur.
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