Community & Economic Development Ass'n v. Bd. of Review
Annotate this Case
SECOND DIVISION
July 7, 1998
No. 1-96-2790
COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ) Appeal from the
ASSOCIATION OF COOK COUNTY, ) Circuit Court of
ILLINOIS, INC., ) Cook County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. )
)
BOARD OF REVIEW, STATE OF ILLINOIS )
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, ) Honorable
ANNIE WELLS and MARY HENDERSON, ) Lester A. Bonaguro,
) Judge Presiding.
Defendants-Appellees, )
PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff Community and Economic Development Association of Cook
County, Inc. (CEDA), appeals from a circuit court order affirming a
decision of the Board of Review of the State of Illinois Department
of Employment Security (board of review). The board of review found
that Annie Wells and Mary Henderson, employees in CEDA's Head Start
program, were eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits
during the summer months when they do not receive compensation from
CEDA, since the Head Start program does not qualify as an educational
institution. We affirm.
Prior to the summer of 1986, Wells and Henderson, worked at the
Head Start program throughout the entire year, without summer breaks.
Due to a cut in federal funding, the program was changed to run from
September through May. In the summer of 1987, Wells and Henderson
filed claims for unemployment insurance for the summer months for
which they were not working and not being paid by CEDA. The claims
adjusters denied both Wells' and Henderson's claims for benefits based
on section 612(B)(2) of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (ACT)
(820 ILCS 405/612(B)(2)(West 1996)), which provides:
"2. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits on
the basis of wages for service in employment in any capacity
*** performed for an educational institution, *** during a
period between two successive academic years or terms, if
the individual performed such service in the first of such
academic years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance
that the individual will perform such service in the second
of such academic years or terms." 820 ILCS 405/612(B)(2)
(West 1996).
The claims adjusters determined that CEDA's Head Start program was
an educational institution within the meaning of section 612(B)(2)
and that Wells and Henderson were expected to return to work in the
fall.
Both Wells and Henderson appealed to the appeals division of the
Department of Employment Security. The referees in both cases
determined that Wells and Henderson were not disqualified from
receiving unemployment compensation benefits because CEDA was a
social agency and not an educational institution. CEDA appealed the
referees' decisions to the board of review and the board of review
affirmed the referees' decisions.
CEDA filed suit seeking judicial review and reversal of the
board of review's decisions. The circuit court ordered the cases
remanded to the board of review for the development of a more
detailed factual record. The circuit court ordered the board of
review to render decisions on Wells' and Henderson's claims after
conducting a consolidated hearing where evidence was presented
concerning: (1) the daily program at CEDA's Head Start; (2) the
program's licensing; (3) a reference to Head Start as an educational
institution in Wells' application for benefits; (4) what Wells
taught; (5) what Henderson supervised; (6) what the children learned;
(7) the significance of a certificate in child development; and (8)
CEDA's explanation of an earlier board of review decision addressing
the definition of educational institution.
A hearing was held and the referee set aside the claims
adjuster s decisions on the ground that CEDA's Head Start program
was a social agency and was not an educational institution within
the meaning of section 612(B)(2) of the Act because it was not under
the supervision or control of any board of education or school
authority. CEDA appealed this decision to the board of review and
the board of review affirmed the referee's decision that Wells and
Henderson are entitled to apply for unemployment benefits since
CEDA's Head Start program was not an educational institution.
Wells then filed another claim for unemployment benefits and
the claims adjuster determined that section 612(B)(2) of the Act did
not disqualify Wells from receiving benefits. CEDA appealed and the
referee affirmed the decision, and after an appeal to the board of
review, the board of review also affirmed. CEDA then filed a
complaint seeking judicial review of the board of review's decisions.
The circuit court affirmed the board of review's decisions, finding
that CEDA's Head Start Program was not an educational institution
within the meaning of section 612(B)(2) of the ACT. CEDA appeals.
The findings and conclusions of the board on questions of fact
are considered prima facie true and correct, and, therefore, a
reviewing court's determination is limited to whether those findings
are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Abrahamson v.
Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 606 N.E.2d 1111 (1992); Jack Bradley, Inc. v. Department of Employment
Security, 146 Ill. 2d 61, 585 N.E.2d 123 (1991). An administrative
decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence unless
the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88. The mere fact that an opposite conclusion is reasonable
or that the reviewing court might have ruled differently does not
justify reversal of the administrative findings. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88. If the record contains evidence supporting the agency's
decision, it must be affirmed. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88.
Moreover, when courts review an agency's interpretation of a
statute that the agency is empowered to administer, courts accord the
agency's interpretation deference. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 91.
An agency's interpretation of a statute will be overturned only if
it is clearly erroneous. Bailey & Associates, Inc. v. Department of
Employment Security, 289 Ill. App. 3d 310, 316, 683 N.E.2d 1204
(1997).
The purpose of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act is to
provide compensation benefits to an unemployed individual in order
to relieve economic distress caused by involuntary unemployment.
Kelley v. Department of Labor, 160 Ill. App. 3d 958, 513 N.E.2d 988
(1987). The Act is to be liberally construed in favor of providing
benefits. Jack Bradley, 146 Ill. 2d at 75.
The Act does not define educational institution and the issue
of what constitutes an educational institution under section
612(B)(2) has not been addressed in Illinois. The term "educational
institution" is, however, defined in Illinois Department of
Employment Security administrative regulations. The benefit rules
provide:
"'Educational Institution' under section 211.1 or 211.2
of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, pars. 321.1 and
321.2) has for its primary function the presentation of
formal instruction and normally maintains a regular
facility and curriculum and normally has a regularly
enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the
place where its educational activities are regularly
carried on." 56 Ill. Adm. Code 2915.1 (1996).
Moreover, Ray Schools-Chicago-Inc.v. Cummins, 12 Ill. 2d 376, 146 N.E.2d 42 (1957), provides us with some guidance in determining what
constitutes an educational institution. In Ray, a nonprofit
corporation claimed that it was not required to pay employer
contributions by virtue of an exception in the Act for institutions
operated exclusively for educational purposes. The court disagreed,
noting that there is a need to strictly limit provisions allowing
employers to avoid paying benefit contributions and that exemption
provisions are strictly construed against one claiming exemptions.
The Ray court held that specialized schools that do not fit into the
general scheme of education founded by the state and supported by
public taxation do not qualify for exemption from benefit
contributions, even if some of the curriculum overlaps with that
offered in a traditional school. In order to qualify for the
educational exception the court stated that "there must be a
corresponding and substantial benefit to the public which justifies
the granting of an exemption, and the course of instruction and
methods must be such as to bring the institutions within the
ordinary and accepted meaning of a school or educational
institution." Ray, 12 Ill. 2d at 383. The court stated that the
teaching of but a small part of the instruction given in ordinary
schools does not qualify a program as an educational institution for
which exemption was intended. Ray, 12 Ill. 2d at 384. See Coyne
Electrical School v. Paschen, 12 Ill. 2d 387, 392, 146 N.E.2d 73
(1957)(constitutional provision exempting from tax property used
exclusively for school purposes requires qualifying institution to
provide "first, a course of study which fits into the general scheme
of education founded by the State and supported by public taxation;
and second, a course of study which substantially lessens what would
otherwise be a governmental function and obligation").
Other jurisdictions have specifically addressed whether Head
Start programs constitute educational institutions. In Texas
Employment Comm'n v. Child, Inc., 738 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987), the court affirmed the employment commission's finding that
a Head Start program was not an educational institution, and thus
its employees were eligible for unemployment benefits during summer
recess. In finding that the commission s ruling that the Head Start
program was not an educational institution was reasonable, the court
noted the commission's findings that: (1) none of the individuals
working with the children held teaching certificates; (2) none of
the children were required by law to attend school; and (3) the
educational aspect of the program was merely incidental to the
primary purpose of bringing the children to a level of social
development where they could better cope with the environment of a
primary school. See also Industrial Comm'n v. Board of County
Commissioners, 690 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1984)(agency regulation excluded
Head Start programs from definition of educational institution
because services that met the educational needs of disadvantaged
children are incidental to services addressing children's physical,
social, medical, emotional, and nutritional needs).
In contrast, the court in Simpson v. Iowa Department of Job
Service, 327 N.W.2d 775 (Iowa 1982), affirmed the Department of Job
Services' denial of Head Start employees' claims for unemployment
benefits, finding that the Head Start program was an educational
institution since there were aspects of the program that constitute
academic training. The court found significant that although the
program had not been approved, licensed or issued a permit to
operate as a school, it was issued a preschool license by the
Department of Social Services, and its program included the teaching
of language, speaking and self-expression skills. Likewise, in In
re Huntley, 41 N.C. App. 709, 255 S.E.2d 574 (1979), the court
affirmed the Employment Security Commission's denial of a Head Start
employee's claim for unemployment benefits on the basis that the
program provided education in the broad sense of the word. The
court noted that the particular characteristics of each Head Start
program must be examined in order to determine if it qualifies as an
educational institution.
In the instant case, the board of review noted that the Head
Start program was operated by a private, not-for-profit community
and economic development association, and was designed as a pre-
school program, primarily for economically disadvantaged children,
ages three to five, to enhance the children's potential to succeed
in school by providing development services to meet their
intellectual, social and health needs. The Head Start program
consisted of two half-day sessions, approximately three hours in
duration.
CEDA's Head Start program is licensed by the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services as a child care
institution under the state Child Care Act of 1969. 225 ILCS 10/1
et seq. (West 1996). Employees of a child care institution are
required to possess a child development associate credential issued
by the National Association for the Education of Young Children, an
organization contracted to provide this credential by the United
States Department of Health and Human Services. Such employees are
not required to undergo a four-year college education to obtain the
credential nor are they required to possess a teachers' certificate
from the State Board of Education for the program, as is required to
teach in a public school. Moreover, the Head Start program was not
regulated or administered by the State Board of Education in any
manner.
During the class sessions, children learn through play and
activities with other children, while being supervised by a child
development worker. A written child development plan is prepared
with respect to each child's progress in cognitive, motor/movement,
social/emotional, and language development areas. Children are
screened and their individual development and activities are tracked
and documented in such areas as interaction with adults, self-image,
peer interaction, self-help, language reception and expression,
recognition and discrimination, symbolization and imitation, concept
development, quantitative skills, gross motor skills and fine motor
skills.
Session involve teaching good hygiene, song, discussion, motor
activities, story telling and language activities. Children also
participate in a free-choice period during which they may draw, use
binoculars and magnets, play with puzzles and blocks, play dress-up
and taste a variety of foods. Parent volunteers are considered
critical members of the program team, and the child development
worker visits the parents' home on a regular basis. The program
also provides support services in the areas of health, family,
development, resource, nutrition, and special needs to the child and
family.
Based on these factors, the board of review determined that
Wells and Henderson s work for CEDA s Head Start program did not
constitute services performed by an educational institution. The
board of review emphasized that the primary purpose of CEDA's Head
Start program was to bring the children to a level of social
development where they could better cope with the environment of a
primary school. The evidence did not establish that the primary
function of the program was the presentation of formal instruction
as required for the program to be an educational institution. The
board of review found that the educational aspect of the program was
incidental to the social development services provided in the
program.
We find that the board of review's determination that CEDA's
Head Start program does not qualify as an educational institution
under section 612(B)(2) was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence or clearly erroneous. While there is an educational
component to CEDA s Head Start program, this component is incidental
to the main function of the program, which is to provide social
development services. The Head Start program did not provide formal
instruction. Rather, the children enrolled in the program primarily
learn through play and interacting with other children and adults.
Moreover, the children enrolled in the program are not of an age
required to attend school. Thus, their presence in the Head Start
program does not lessen the government's burden to educate the
children.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the
trial court's order finding that the Board s determination that
CEDA's Head Start program was a child care institution rather than
an educational institution was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence or contrary to law.
Affirmed.
RAKOWSKI, J., concurs.
TULLY, J., dissents.
JUSTICE TULLY, dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent. I cannot accept the majority's
conclusion that the trial court's findings are not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. After reviewing the evidence, I
believe the trial court and the majority have reached an incorrect
result in finding that the Head Start program was not an educational
institution.
Black's Law Dictionary 512 (6th ed. 1990) states that education
"[c]omprehends not merely the instruction received at school or
college, but the whole course of training; moral, ***intellectual,
and physical. Education may be particularly directed to either the
mental, moral, or physical powers and faculties, but in its broadest
and best sense it relates to them all." Further, it defines
educational purposes, in pertinent part, as "not limited to such
school properties as would relieve some substantial educational
burden from the state." Black's Law Dictionary 512 (6th ed. 1990).
Even though, as the majority reasons, the Head Start program does
not lessen the government's burden to educate children, I do not
believe that fact should act as a limiting factor to its educational
purposes. I believe that the Head Start program provides education
in the broadest and best sense of the word. The program includes
the teaching of moral, intellectual, social and health skills.
Accordingly, this program is exactly what the legislature intended
to fit within the meaning of educational institution when it drafted
the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act.
As the majority noted, the purpose of the ACT is to provide
compensation benefits to an unemployed individual in order to
relieve economic distress caused by involuntary unemployment. Kelly
v. Department of Labor, 160 Ill. App. 3d 958, 513 N.E.2d 988 (1987).
The spirit and intent of the ACT is to provide unemployment benefits
to individuals involuntarily unemployed until they can secure
employment. Here, the teachers chose to remain in a field where the
work ordinarily does not provide year-round employment. They should
not be allowed to receive unemployment benefits when there is a
reasonable assurance that the teacher will teach in successive
academic years and nothing is prohibiting them from seeking another
job during the summer months. This type of temporary unemployment
is precisely what the legislature intended to except from
unemployment and allowing school teachers to collect this benefit
undercuts the very spirit of the ACT.
In light of the foregoing, I would reverse the judgment of the
circuit court of Cook County and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this view.
July 7, 1998
No. 1-96-2790
COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ) Appeal from the
ASSOCIATION OF COOK COUNTY, ) Circuit Court of
ILLINOIS, INC., ) Cook County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. )
)
BOARD OF REVIEW, STATE OF ILLINOIS )
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, ) Honorable
ANNIE WELLS and MARY HENDERSON, ) Lester A. Bonaguro,
) Judge Presiding.
Defendants-Appellees, )
PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff Community and Economic Development Association of Cook
County, Inc. (CEDA), appeals from a circuit court order affirming a
decision of the Board of Review of the State of Illinois Department
of Employment Security (board of review). The board of review found
that Annie Wells and Mary Henderson, employees in CEDA's Head Start
program, were eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits
during the summer months when they do not receive compensation from
CEDA, since the Head Start program does not qualify as an educational
institution. We affirm.
Prior to the summer of 1986, Wells and Henderson, worked at the
Head Start program throughout the entire year, without summer breaks.
Due to a cut in federal funding, the program was changed to run from
September through May. In the summer of 1987, Wells and Henderson
filed claims for unemployment insurance for the summer months for
which they were not working and not being paid by CEDA. The claims
adjusters denied both Wells' and Henderson's claims for benefits based
on section 612(B)(2) of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (ACT)
(820 ILCS 405/612(B)(2)(West 1996)), which provides:
"2. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits on
the basis of wages for service in employment in any capacity
*** performed for an educational institution, *** during a
period between two successive academic years or terms, if
the individual performed such service in the first of such
academic years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance
that the individual will perform such service in the second
of such academic years or terms." 820 ILCS 405/612(B)(2)
(West 1996).
The claims adjusters determined that CEDA's Head Start program was
an educational institution within the meaning of section 612(B)(2)
and that Wells and Henderson were expected to return to work in the
fall.
Both Wells and Henderson appealed to the appeals division of the
Department of Employment Security. The referees in both cases
determined that Wells and Henderson were not disqualified from
receiving unemployment compensation benefits because CEDA was a
social agency and not an educational institution. CEDA appealed the
referees' decisions to the board of review and the board of review
affirmed the referees' decisions.
CEDA filed suit seeking judicial review and reversal of the
board of review's decisions. The circuit court ordered the cases
remanded to the board of review for the development of a more
detailed factual record. The circuit court ordered the board of
review to render decisions on Wells' and Henderson's claims after
conducting a consolidated hearing where evidence was presented
concerning: (1) the daily program at CEDA's Head Start; (2) the
program's licensing; (3) a reference to Head Start as an educational
institution in Wells' application for benefits; (4) what Wells
taught; (5) what Henderson supervised; (6) what the children learned;
(7) the significance of a certificate in child development; and (8)
CEDA's explanation of an earlier board of review decision addressing
the definition of educational institution.
A hearing was held and the referee set aside the claims
adjuster s decisions on the ground that CEDA's Head Start program
was a social agency and was not an educational institution within
the meaning of section 612(B)(2) of the Act because it was not under
the supervision or control of any board of education or school
authority. CEDA appealed this decision to the board of review and
the board of review affirmed the referee's decision that Wells and
Henderson are entitled to apply for unemployment benefits since
CEDA's Head Start program was not an educational institution.
Wells then filed another claim for unemployment benefits and
the claims adjuster determined that section 612(B)(2) of the Act did
not disqualify Wells from receiving benefits. CEDA appealed and the
referee affirmed the decision, and after an appeal to the board of
review, the board of review also affirmed. CEDA then filed a
complaint seeking judicial review of the board of review's decisions.
The circuit court affirmed the board of review's decisions, finding
that CEDA's Head Start Program was not an educational institution
within the meaning of section 612(B)(2) of the ACT. CEDA appeals.
The findings and conclusions of the board on questions of fact
are considered prima facie true and correct, and, therefore, a
reviewing court's determination is limited to whether those findings
are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Abrahamson v.
Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 606 N.E.2d 1111 (1992); Jack Bradley, Inc. v. Department of Employment
Security, 146 Ill. 2d 61, 585 N.E.2d 123 (1991). An administrative
decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence unless
the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88. The mere fact that an opposite conclusion is reasonable
or that the reviewing court might have ruled differently does not
justify reversal of the administrative findings. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88. If the record contains evidence supporting the agency's
decision, it must be affirmed. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88.
Moreover, when courts review an agency's interpretation of a
statute that the agency is empowered to administer, courts accord the
agency's interpretation deference. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 91.
An agency's interpretation of a statute will be overturned only if
it is clearly erroneous. Bailey & Associates, Inc. v. Department of
Employment Security, 289 Ill. App. 3d 310, 316, 683 N.E.2d 1204
(1997).
The purpose of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act is to
provide compensation benefits to an unemployed individual in order
to relieve economic distress caused by involuntary unemployment.
Kelley v. Department of Labor, 160 Ill. App. 3d 958, 513 N.E.2d 988
(1987). The Act is to be liberally construed in favor of providing
benefits. Jack Bradley, 146 Ill. 2d at 75.
The Act does not define educational institution and the issue
of what constitutes an educational institution under section
612(B)(2) has not been addressed in Illinois. The term "educational
institution" is, however, defined in Illinois Department of
Employment Security administrative regulations. The benefit rules
provide:
"'Educational Institution' under section 211.1 or 211.2
of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, pars. 321.1 and
321.2) has for its primary function the presentation of
formal instruction and normally maintains a regular
facility and curriculum and normally has a regularly
enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the
place where its educational activities are regularly
carried on." 56 Ill. Adm. Code 2915.1 (1996).
Moreover, Ray Schools-Chicago-Inc.v. Cummins, 12 Ill. 2d 376, 146 N.E.2d 42 (1957), provides us with some guidance in determining what
constitutes an educational institution. In Ray, a nonprofit
corporation claimed that it was not required to pay employer
contributions by virtue of an exception in the Act for institutions
operated exclusively for educational purposes. The court disagreed,
noting that there is a need to strictly limit provisions allowing
employers to avoid paying benefit contributions and that exemption
provisions are strictly construed against one claiming exemptions.
The Ray court held that specialized schools that do not fit into the
general scheme of education founded by the state and supported by
public taxation do not qualify for exemption from benefit
contributions, even if some of the curriculum overlaps with that
offered in a traditional school. In order to qualify for the
educational exception the court stated that "there must be a
corresponding and substantial benefit to the public which justifies
the granting of an exemption, and the course of instruction and
methods must be such as to bring the institutions within the
ordinary and accepted meaning of a school or educational
institution." Ray, 12 Ill. 2d at 383. The court stated that the
teaching of but a small part of the instruction given in ordinary
schools does not qualify a program as an educational institution for
which exemption was intended. Ray, 12 Ill. 2d at 384. See Coyne
Electrical School v. Paschen, 12 Ill. 2d 387, 392, 146 N.E.2d 73
(1957)(constitutional provision exempting from tax property used
exclusively for school purposes requires qualifying institution to
provide "first, a course of study which fits into the general scheme
of education founded by the State and supported by public taxation;
and second, a course of study which substantially lessens what would
otherwise be a governmental function and obligation").
Other jurisdictions have specifically addressed whether Head
Start programs constitute educational institutions. In Texas
Employment Comm'n v. Child, Inc., 738 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987), the court affirmed the employment commission's finding that
a Head Start program was not an educational institution, and thus
its employees were eligible for unemployment benefits during summer
recess. In finding that the commission s ruling that the Head Start
program was not an educational institution was reasonable, the court
noted the commission's findings that: (1) none of the individuals
working with the children held teaching certificates; (2) none of
the children were required by law to attend school; and (3) the
educational aspect of the program was merely incidental to the
primary purpose of bringing the children to a level of social
development where they could better cope with the environment of a
primary school. See also Industrial Comm'n v. Board of County
Commissioners, 690 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1984)(agency regulation excluded
Head Start programs from definition of educational institution
because services that met the educational needs of disadvantaged
children are incidental to services addressing children's physical,
social, medical, emotional, and nutritional needs).
In contrast, the court in Simpson v. Iowa Department of Job
Service, 327 N.W.2d 775 (Iowa 1982), affirmed the Department of Job
Services' denial of Head Start employees' claims for unemployment
benefits, finding that the Head Start program was an educational
institution since there were aspects of the program that constitute
academic training. The court found significant that although the
program had not been approved, licensed or issued a permit to
operate as a school, it was issued a preschool license by the
Department of Social Services, and its program included the teaching
of language, speaking and self-expression skills. Likewise, in In
re Huntley, 41 N.C. App. 709, 255 S.E.2d 574 (1979), the court
affirmed the Employment Security Commission's denial of a Head Start
employee's claim for unemployment benefits on the basis that the
program provided education in the broad sense of the word. The
court noted that the particular characteristics of each Head Start
program must be examined in order to determine if it qualifies as an
educational institution.
In the instant case, the board of review noted that the Head
Start program was operated by a private, not-for-profit community
and economic development association, and was designed as a pre-
school program, primarily for economically disadvantaged children,
ages three to five, to enhance the children's potential to succeed
in school by providing development services to meet their
intellectual, social and health needs. The Head Start program
consisted of two half-day sessions, approximately three hours in
duration.
CEDA's Head Start program is licensed by the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services as a child care
institution under the state Child Care Act of 1969. 225 ILCS 10/1
et seq. (West 1996). Employees of a child care institution are
required to possess a child development associate credential issued
by the National Association for the Education of Young Children, an
organization contracted to provide this credential by the United
States Department of Health and Human Services. Such employees are
not required to undergo a four-year college education to obtain the
credential nor are they required to possess a teachers' certificate
from the State Board of Education for the program, as is required to
teach in a public school. Moreover, the Head Start program was not
regulated or administered by the State Board of Education in any
manner.
During the class sessions, children learn through play and
activities with other children, while being supervised by a child
development worker. A written child development plan is prepared
with respect to each child's progress in cognitive, motor/movement,
social/emotional, and language development areas. Children are
screened and their individual development and activities are tracked
and documented in such areas as interaction with adults, self-image,
peer interaction, self-help, language reception and expression,
recognition and discrimination, symbolization and imitation, concept
development, quantitative skills, gross motor skills and fine motor
skills.
Session involve teaching good hygiene, song, discussion, motor
activities, story telling and language activities. Children also
participate in a free-choice period during which they may draw, use
binoculars and magnets, play with puzzles and blocks, play dress-up
and taste a variety of foods. Parent volunteers are considered
critical members of the program team, and the child development
worker visits the parents' home on a regular basis. The program
also provides support services in the areas of health, family,
development, resource, nutrition, and special needs to the child and
family.
Based on these factors, the board of review determined that
Wells and Henderson s work for CEDA s Head Start program did not
constitute services performed by an educational institution. The
board of review emphasized that the primary purpose of CEDA's Head
Start program was to bring the children to a level of social
development where they could better cope with the environment of a
primary school. The evidence did not establish that the primary
function of the program was the presentation of formal instruction
as required for the program to be an educational institution. The
board of review found that the educational aspect of the program was
incidental to the social development services provided in the
program.
We find that the board of review's determination that CEDA's
Head Start program does not qualify as an educational institution
under section 612(B)(2) was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence or clearly erroneous. While there is an educational
component to CEDA s Head Start program, this component is incidental
to the main function of the program, which is to provide social
development services. The Head Start program did not provide formal
instruction. Rather, the children enrolled in the program primarily
learn through play and interacting with other children and adults.
Moreover, the children enrolled in the program are not of an age
required to attend school. Thus, their presence in the Head Start
program does not lessen the government's burden to educate the
children.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the
trial court's order finding that the Board s determination that
CEDA's Head Start program was a child care institution rather than
an educational institution was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence or contrary to law.
Affirmed.
RAKOWSKI, J., concurs.
TULLY, J., dissents.
JUSTICE TULLY, dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent. I cannot accept the majority's
conclusion that the trial court's findings are not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. After reviewing the evidence, I
believe the trial court and the majority have reached an incorrect
result in finding that the Head Start program was not an educational
institution.
Black's Law Dictionary 512 (6th ed. 1990) states that education
"[c]omprehends not merely the instruction received at school or
college, but the whole course of training; moral, ***intellectual,
and physical. Education may be particularly directed to either the
mental, moral, or physical powers and faculties, but in its broadest
and best sense it relates to them all." Further, it defines
educational purposes, in pertinent part, as "not limited to such
school properties as would relieve some substantial educational
burden from the state." Black's Law Dictionary 512 (6th ed. 1990).
Even though, as the majority reasons, the Head Start program does
not lessen the government's burden to educate children, I do not
believe that fact should act as a limiting factor to its educational
purposes. I believe that the Head Start program provides education
in the broadest and best sense of the word. The program includes
the teaching of moral, intellectual, social and health skills.
Accordingly, this program is exactly what the legislature intended
to fit within the meaning of educational institution when it drafted
the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act.
As the majority noted, the purpose of the ACT is to provide
compensation benefits to an unemployed individual in order to
relieve economic distress caused by involuntary unemployment. Kelly
v. Department of Labor, 160 Ill. App. 3d 958, 513 N.E.2d 988 (1987).
The spirit and intent of the ACT is to provide unemployment benefits
to individuals involuntarily unemployed until they can secure
employment. Here, the teachers chose to remain in a field where the
work ordinarily does not provide year-round employment. They should
not be allowed to receive unemployment benefits when there is a
reasonable assurance that the teacher will teach in successive
academic years and nothing is prohibiting them from seeking another
job during the summer months. This type of temporary unemployment
is precisely what the legislature intended to except from
unemployment and allowing school teachers to collect this benefit
undercuts the very spirit of the ACT.
In light of the foregoing, I would reverse the judgment of the
circuit court of Cook County and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this view.
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