Niles Township High School District 219 Board of Education v. Niles Township Federation of Teachers

THIRD DIVISION
DECEMBER 31, 1997

No. 1-96-4041

NILES TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 219
BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NILES TOWNSHIP FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
LOCAL 1274, IFT/AFT, AFL/CIO, NILES
TOWNSHIP SUPPORT STAFF, LOCAL 1274
IFT/AFT, AFL/CIO,

Defendant-Appellees.)
)
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)
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)
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)Petition for Review
of an Order of the
Illinois Educational
Labor Relations
Board

IELRB Nos. 97-CB-
0011-C & 97-CB-0012-
C.



JUSTICE LEAVITT delivered the opinion of the court:
On October 21, 1996, Niles Township High School District 219
(the District) filed two unfair labor practice charges with the
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (the IELRB). Together,
the charges named all of the appellees in this action as
respondents. In the charges, the District alleged the appellees
violated various provisions of the Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Act (the IELRA). Specifically, the District claimed, in
both charges, the appellees violated the IELRA by striking before
fulfilling statutory preconditions set forth in section 13(b) of
that act. 115 ILCS 5/13(b) (West 1996).
The District asked the IELRB to seek an injunction in the
circuit court pursuant to section 16(d) of the IELRA preventing the
appellees from striking. That section provides the IELRB "may,"
upon issuance of a complaint, petition the circuit court for
appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order. 115 ILCS
5/16(d). The parties briefed and argued the issue of whether the
IELRB should seek injunctive relief in the circuit court. On
October 29, 1996, the IELRB issued its decision denying the
District's request that it seek injunctive relief. The IELRB found
there was not reasonable cause to believe the IELRA had been
violated, and there was no significant likelihood the District
would prevail on the merits of its complaint.
On November 26, 1996, the District filed a petition for appeal
with this court seeking review of the IELRB's October 29 order
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 335. The issue before us is whether
we have jurisdiction to entertain the District's appeal. Put
another way, we must determine whether the IELRB's October 29
action constituted a "final" and thus appealable order.
Supreme Court Rule 335 merely sets forth the procedure for
statutory direct review of administrative agency orders. 134 Ill.
2d R. 307. It does not provide a remedy. Section 16 of the IELRA,
however, does provide an avenue for appellate relief. It allows a
party "aggrieved by a final order of the [IELRB]" to seek appellate
review of that order "in accordance with the provisions of the
Administrative Review Law." 115 ILCS 5/16(a). The applicable
Administrative Review Law provision, section 3-101, defines final
agency orders as those which "affect the legal rights, duties or
privileges of parties and which terminate the proceedings before
the administrative agency." 735 ILCS 5/3-101.
The IELRA defines the procedure for handling an unfair labor
practice complaint. Once such a complaint is issued, the IELRB is
required to hold a hearing on the charge at which time the parties
may present evidence. 115 ILCS 5/15. The IELRB ultimately issues
an order either finding an unfair labor practice and providing a
remedy, or deciding the allegation of an unfair labor practice was
unfounded.
Here, the District's charges against the appellees remain
pending before the IELRB. An injunction was just one species of
relief the District sought. It still maintains claims for monetary
relief, declarations of IELRA violations, and an order to post
notices. Moreover, no order "terminat[ing] the proceedings before
the administrative agency" has been issued. 735 ILCS 5/3-101.
Having determined that neither the IELRA, the Administrative
Review Law nor Supreme Court Rule 335 confers jurisdiction over
this cause upon us, we turn to the District's alternative
contention that we have jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
307. Supreme Court Rule 307 is found in Article III, Part A of the
Supreme Court Rules which is entitled "APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT
COURT." 134 Ill. 2d R. 307. Specifically, Rule 307 is called
"Interlocutory Appeals as of Right," and it gives litigants
aggrieved by certain non-final circuit court orders including
orders "granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to
dissolve or modify an injunction" a right to appeal such orders.
134 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1).
The District cites no case in which a court applied Rule 307
where the IELRB decided not to seek an injunction from the circuit
court, and we found none. Instead, the District espouses the
language of Rule 335 as authority for its assertion that we have
jurisdiction here pursuant to Rule 307. Rule 335 relevantly reads:
"Insofar as appropriate, the provisions of Rules 301 through 373
*** are applicable to proceedings under this Rule." 134 Ill. 2d R.
335 (emphasis added).
As we have emphasized, the supreme court did not make Rules
301 through 373 applicable to all administrative review. On the
contrary, only those rules which are appropriate to administrative
review are made applicable. Not only is Supreme Court Rule 307
included in a section called "APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT," but
also, its first sentence reads, "(a) An appeal may be taken to the
Appellate Court from an interlocutory order of court: (1) ***
refusing an injunction." 134 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1) (emphasis
added). Based on that language, we do not find Rule 307 applicable
to this dispute.
Although the District claims the IELRB abused its discretion
in refusing to seek an injunction, it did not pursue the only
avenue for immediate review available to it. That route was via
section 13(b) of the Act, which reads:
"If, *** in the opinion of an employer a strike is
or has become a clear and present danger to the health or
safety of the public, it may initiate in the circuit
court of the county in which such danger exists an action
for relief which may include, but is not limited to,
injunction. The court may grant appropriate relief upon
the finding that such clear and present danger exists."
115 ILCS 5/13(b).
Under section 13(b), an employer may itself seek injunctive relief
in the circuit court even though the IELRB has not. This, in
effect, serves as a form of review of the IELRB's decision not to
pursue an injunction. However, if the activity an employer seeks
to enjoin is not a threat to the health or safety of the public,
the general rule, that non-final orders may not be immediately
appealed, applies, and an employer must wait until a final order
issues to pursue an appeal. Having forsaken the remedy provided in
section 13(d), the District must now wait for a final IELRB order
from which it may appeal.
For all of these reasons, we dismiss this appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Cousins, P.J., and Cahill, J. concur.