In re Application County Collector

FIRST DIVISION
December 8, 1997

No. 1-96-3482

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF ) Appeal from the
THE COUNTY COLLECTOR OF COOK COUNTY, ) Circuit Court
ILLINOIS FOR THE TAX YEAR 1988. ) of Cook County.
------------------------------------ )
EDWARD J. ROSEWELL, Cook County )
Collector, )
)
Relator-Appellee, )
)
v. )
)
JOHN H. NALBACK ENGINEERING CO., et al.,)
)
Objectors-Appellants, )
v. )
)
NORTHFIELD PARK DISTRICT, and THE PARK ) Honorable
DISTRICT OF OAK PARK, ) FRANCIS BARTH,
) Judge Presiding.
Tax Districts-Appellees. )

PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the

court:

This is an appeal from the final judgment of the trial court
in a tax objection proceeding that overruled the objections and
entered judgment approving the 1988 taxes levied by the
Northfield Park District and the Park District of Oak Park (the
taxing districts). The following issues are raised by the
objectors on appeal: (1) whether the failure of the taxing
districts to file their 1988 budget and appropriation ordinances
with the county clerk prior to his extension of the 1988 tax
levies rendered the 1988 extensions illegal and subject to
objection by the taxpayers; and (2) whether the trial court's
ruling deprived the taxpayers of their property without due
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clauses of article
I, section 2 of the Illinois Constitution and the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV.
On June 7, 1988, the board of commissioners of the
Northfield Park District adopted the district's combined budget
and appropriation ordinance for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1989. On September 6, 1988, the board adopted the district's
1988 tax levy ordinance which was designed to defray a part of
the appropriation.
On March 15, 1988, the board of the Park District of Oak
Park adopted the district's combined budget and appropriation
ordinance for the fiscal year ending December 31, 1989. On
September 6, 1988, the board adopted the district's 1988 tax levy
ordinance which was to be applied toward the appropriation.
At the time that the county clerk extended the 1988 taxes in
1989 for both taxing districts, no copies of the 1988 budget and
appropriation ordinances had yet been filed with the county
clerk. The county clerk did not notify the taxing districts of
the fact that they had failed to file their 1988 budget and
appropriation ordinances.
A certified copy of the 1988 budget and appropriation
ordinance for the Northfield Park District was filed with the
county clerk on March 3, 1995. A certified copy of the 1988
budget and appropriation ordinance for the Park District of Oak
Park was filed with the county clerk on August 9, 1994.
The taxing districts claim that they inadvertently failed to
file their 1988 budget and appropriation ordinances with the
county clerk, and that the validity of the taxes is unaffected by
the omission. The objectors contend that the taxing districts'
tax levies are void in their entirety due to their failure to
timely file certified copies of their respective budget and
appropriation ordinances with the county clerk, as required by
section 162 of the Revenue Act, now part of the Property Tax
Code. 35 ILCS 200/18-50 (West 1996).
After paying the 1988 taxes under protest, the objectors
filed their objections to the extension of the tax levies for
both districts on February 5, 1990, alleging that the taxing
districts had failed to comply with the statutory requirements.
Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. On January
18, 1996, the trial court denied the objectors' motion for
summary judgment and granted the taxing districts' joint motion
for summary judgment. The court found that section 162 "requires
action by the clerk to be a condition precedent to any sanctions
to be imposed against these taxing districts."
According to the trial court, the sole remedy for the taxing
districts' failure to file their respective budget and
appropriation ordinances is the clerk's refusal to extend the
levy, but only after properly notifying the districts. The court
ruled that no "viable objection [was] created by the clerk's
failure to comply with the provisions of section 162 ***. [T]he
statute *** does not impose upon the taxing districts themselves
the burden of paying the price or incurring the penalty of the
clerk's failure to carry out the responsibilities imposed upon
that office by the General Assembly."
In the alternative, the trial court held that the taxing
districts' failure to file their budget and appropriation
ordinances must be construed as a procedural defect. Such
defects, "not affecting the substantial justice of the tax, shall
not vitiate or in any manner affect the tax" since they are
readily correctable. Finally, the trial court held that by
statute, there is no nexus between a taxing district's budget and
appropriation ordinance and the validity of its tax levy. As a
result, the appellees' failure to file their respective budget
and appropriation ordinances with the county clerk prior to the
extension of the tax levies did not nullify the otherwise valid
tax levies.
On March 21, 1996, the trial court denied the objectors'
motion for reconsideration. On August 30, 1996, the trial court
entered a final judgment order, overruling the objections and
sustaining the 1988 taxes as extended. Timely notice of appeal
was filed on September 27, 1996.
We will first examine whether the failure of the taxing
districts to file their budget and appropriation ordinances with
the county clerk prior to his extension of the 1988 taxes was
fatal to the tax levies. Section 162 of the Revenue Act requires
taxing districts to file certified copies of their budget and
appropriation ordinances with the county clerk within 30 days of
their adoption. 35 ILCS 200/18-50 (West 1996). The section also
provides that failure to file the required documents shall
authorize the county clerk to refuse to extend the tax levy until
such documents are filed, but only after giving timely notice of
the failure to the taxing district. 35 ILCS 200/18-50 (West
1996).
It is well-settled that "[w]here a statute creates a new
right unknown to the common law, and at the same time gives a
remedy for its enforcement, the remedy so prescribed is
exclusive." Hicks v. Williams, 104 Ill. App. 3d 172, 176, 432 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (1982). Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the only function of the courts is to
enforce the law as enacted by the legislature. Certain Taxpayers
v. Sheahen, 45 Ill. 2d 75, 84, 256 N.E.2d 758, 764 (1970).
Section 162 explicitly provides a remedy for the enforcement
of the duty of a taxing district to file a budget and
appropriation ordinance with the county clerk prior to the
extension of the district's tax levy. The statutory section
authorizes the county clerk to refuse to extend the tax levy
until the budget and appropriation ordinance is filed. However,
timely notice of the failure to file must be given to the taxing
district so that the defect may be cured. Section 162 does not
render a tax levy illegal due simply to a district's failure to
file its budget and appropriation ordinance with the county clerk
prior to the tax extension.
In this case, it is undisputed that the county clerk did not
notify the taxing districts of their failure to file their 1988
budget and appropriation ordinances. According to the plain
language of section 162, then, the county clerk, could not refuse
to extend the taxing districts' 1988 tax levies.
This case is comparable to People ex rel. Haas v. Amax Zinc
Co., Inc., 130 Ill. App. 3d 580, 474 N.E.2d 724 (1984). In Haas,
the St. Clair county board properly adopted a tax levy to defray
the county's juvenile detention home lease payments, but failed
to file a certified copy of the resolution with the county clerk
within the time contemplated by statute. The clerk nonetheless
extended the county's tax levy to include the lease payments.
The county did file a certified copy of the resolution with the
clerk during the following year. The Haas court ruled that
"[t]he resolution authorizing that levy was
timely made and it is not contended that such
levy was invalid except for the failure to
file a certified copy thereof. We conclude
that such defect is procedural and not
substantive and should not affect the
validity of [an otherwise proper] tax levy."
People ex rel. Haas v. Amax Zinc Co., Inc.,
130 Ill. App. 3d 580, 585, 474 N.E.2d 724,
728 (1984).
Likewise in the instant case, the failure of the taxing districts
to file their 1988 budget and appropriation ordinances with the
county clerk prior to the tax extensions does not invalidate the
otherwise valid tax levies.
Finding as we do that the taxing districts' 1988 tax levies
were proper, the objectors' next contention that the trial
court's ruling deprived them of their property without due
process of law must fail.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court of Cook County granting summary judgment in favor
of the taxing districts.
AFFIRMED.
CAMPBELL, P.J. and O'BRIEN, J., concur.