Jania v. Aguilera

SECOND DIVISION
December 16, 1997

No. 1-96-3453

DANIELLE JANIA, a Minor, By and Through ) Appeal from the
Her Mother, MICHELLE CANALES, and ANNETTE ) Circuit Court of
OSZCZEPINSKI, a Minor By and Through Her ) Cook County.
Mother, ALFREDA OSZCZEPINSKI, )
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. )
)
JOEL AGUILERA, Jr., CHICAGO BOARD OF ) Honorable
EDUCATION, and LOUIS SHANNON, ) Philip L. Bronstein,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs Danielle Jania and Annette Oszczepinski brought this
personal injury action against defendants, the Chicago Board of
Education (the Board), Joel Aguilera, Jr., and Louis Shannon to
recover damages for injuries plaintiffs sustained when they were hit
by a driver's education car driven by Aguilera. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Board, the owner of the car,
and Shannon, the driver's education teacher, on the basis that the
action against these defendants was barred by section 3-108(a) of the
Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort
Immunity Act). 745 ILCS 10/3-108(a)(West 1994). We reverse and
remand.
On March 24, 1994, Aguilera was driving the driver's education
car and Shannon was seated in the front passenger seat. Shannon was
employed by the Board and taught a driver's education course at
Prosser High School. The car was equipped with "dual control brakes,"
meaning that there is a brake pedal on the passenger side for the
instructor to use. Shannon checked the passenger side brake prior to
going out on the road with Aguilera and determined that the brake was
working properly.
As they traveled east on Belmont Avenue toward the intersection
of Belmont and Long Avenues, two pedestrians, the plaintiffs, stepped
off the curb on the southwest corner and began crossing the street.
While Shannon claims that plaintiffs crossed against the red light,
an independent witness testified that it was defendants who had the
red light. Shannon claims that he reminded Aguilera about "smooth
braking" and he saw Aguilera apply the brakes. Shannon also pressed
down on the instructor-side brake and grabbed the steering wheel. The
brakes did not respond and the car struck and injured plaintiffs.
After the accident, the car did not have any braking problems.
Plaintiffs brought suit against Aguilera, the Board and Shannon,
alleging that defendants negligently: (a) operated, maintained and
controlled the car at a speed greater than was reasonable; (b) failed
to stop in compliance with traffic control signals; (c) failed to keep
a proper lookout; and (d) owned, operated, maintained and controlled
the car without adequate brakes. Plaintiffs also alleged that Shannon
negligently failed to instruct and supervise Aguilera on the safe
operation of the car.
The Board and Shannon filed a motion for summary judgment alleging
that plaintiffs' claims against them were barred by section 3-108 of
the Tort Immunity Act, which provides that "neither a local public
entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a
failure to supervise an activity on or the use of any public
property." 745 ILCS 10/3-108(a)(West 1994). The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Board and Shannon, finding that since
Shannon was not driving the car at the time of the accident, any
negligence plaintiffs attribute to Shannon arises from his supervision
of Aguilera and is therefore immunized under section 3-108 of the Tort
Immunity Act. The claims against Aguilera remain pending and are not
at issue in this appeal.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the defendant owed no duty
to the plaintiff, (Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge, 148 Ill. 2d 417, 592 N.E.2d 1098 (1992)), or is immunized against liability by the
provisions of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/101 through 9-107 (West 1994)). Barnett v.
Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 665 N.E.2d 808 (1996).
Plaintiffs concede that summary judgment was properly granted
as to their allegation that Shannon negligently failed to instruct and
supervise the student on the safe operation of the car. Plaintiffs
also concede their claim that defendants negligently maintained the
brakes. However, plaintiffs assert that summary judgment was
improperly granted on their allegations that Shannon negligently
operated and controlled the vehicle at a speed greater than was
reasonable, failed to stop in compliance with traffic control signals,
and failed to keep a proper lookout. Plaintiffs contend that
defendants are not immunized from these claims since the claims are
based not on Shannon's negligent supervision of the student s driving,
but on Shannon's personal failure as co-driver of the car to prevent
it from crashing into plaintiffs.
We are not persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that Shannon's duty
to plaintiffs arose by virtue of Shannon being a co-driver of the car.
Nor are we persuaded by defendants' claim that because Shannon was not
the driver of the car, he owed no duty to plaintiffs. As defendants
point out in their brief, there are circumstances in which a passenger
in a vehicle owes a duty to a third person. A passenger in a car has
a duty to keep a proper lookout or control the driver if the passenger
knows or should know that such actions are essential to his or her
safety. Bauer v. Johnson, 79 Ill. 2d 324, 403 N.E.2d 237 (1980);
Seeger v. Canale, 241 Ill. App. 3d 177, 607 N.E.2d 687 (1993).
We find that Shannon, as a passenger of a vehicle equipped with
a dual control brake, owed a duty to plaintiffs that was independent
of Shannon s duty as a driving instructor. When Shannon saw that an
accident was imminent, Shannon had a duty to use reasonably available
means to prevent the vehicle from hitting plaintiffs. In this case,
the means available to Shannon involved the use of the passenger side
brake. A passenger side brake serves two purposes. One such purpose
is to instruct the student driver in operating the vehicle. Any
actions by Shannon in using the passenger side brake to instruct the
student driver are clearly immunized by section 3-108 of the Tort
Immunity Act. However, the more critical purpose served by the
passenger side brake is to allow the passenger to use the brake to
stop the vehicle in order to avoid an accident. Certainly when a
passenger is in a vehicle with an inexperienced driver, and the
vehicle is equipped with a passenger side brake, it is foreseeable
that the passenger may need to use his brake in order to avoid an
accident. To place such a duty upon a passenger in an car equipped
with a passenger side brake benefits the public significantly more
than it burdens the passenger.
In the instant case, when it became apparent to Shannon that
an accident was imminent unless the vehicle was stopped, Shannon had
a duty to use whatever means were reasonably available, such as using
the passenger side brake to avoid the accident. See Greenway v.
Craft, 258 Md. 1, 264 A.2d 818 (1970)(where driving instructor fails
to take proper precautions, he may be liable for injuries to a third
person). Shannon s actions in using the brake for this purpose are
not immunized by section 3-108, since these actions do not concern
instructing or supervising the student driver. We thus conclude that
the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in defendants'
favor since a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
Shannon breached his duty to use the means uniquely available to him,
the passenger side brake, to avoid the accident. We, therefore,
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with the
conclusions set forth herein.
Reversed and remanded.
RAKOWSKI and TULLY, JJ., concur.